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Abstract 
 
Despite the increasing visibility of autism, this disorder has resisted a consistent and stable 
diagnostic definition, treatment approaches, and biomedical and genetic attempts to make 
sense of how it manifests within the body.  That this confusion remains despite the 
enormous biosocial productivity of the category indicates that there is likely a unique set of 
circumstances, an “epistemic murk” (Eyal et al 2014), in which autism exists, and perhaps 
thrives.  
  
Given there is limited understanding of how clinicians diagnose ASD in practice, especially 
within the diagnostic encounter of the clinical trial, this thesis focuses on the contention and 
“epistemic murk” that surrounds autism as the object of the clinical trial and the paradoxical 
attempts by medicine and the psy-sciences to codify, standardise and quantify this 
heterogeneous disorder. Using a video-reflexive ethnographic (VRE) approach, I observed 
and videoed 22 diagnostic sessions with parents and children over two years as part of a 
randomised double blind placebo-controlled drug trial in a children’s hospital in New South 
Wales, Australia. Edited clips from these videos were later played back to the clinician in 
reflexive one-on-one feedback sessions with the researcher, allowing the collaborative 
analysis of complex diagnostic data.  
  
This video data provides a rich, negotiated, embodied and socially nuanced picture of the 
autism diagnostic encounter in action within the clinical trial. In this context, autism is no 
longer perceived solely as a set of observable behaviours, but rather a disorder that is firmly 
located within the brain and its processes. ASD medication, the disorder itself, and the 
individual ASD brain cannot be properly conceptualised without each other, with each 
element feeding into a classificatory loop. This data also demonstrates how participants 
must constantly negotiate between the inherently qualitative nature of the diagnosis in 
practice and the standardised agenda of the clinical trial, which views disorder as a 
quantitative deviation from a statistical norm.  The thesis argues that during the diagnosis, 
the clinician must filter, categorise and quantify this complex, inter-subjective, experiential 
knowledge to fit with what counts as measurable evidence.  However, it is behind the 
scenes that the real labour of the clinical trial occurs.  This labour generates data through 
participants’ value-orientation, their experiences, stories, and corporeal translation of 
knowledge. This diagnostic work is above all complex, value-laden and qualitative. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Autism spectrum disorder as a “moving target” 
 
 
(Kenyon 2011) 
 
It is 3pm and I am halfway through my ABA [Applied Behavioural Analysis] session with Rowan 
[pseudonym], a four year old boy diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). I am sitting on 
the floor in a room with toys, a table and chairs, puzzle pieces and toys strewn about, and Rowan 
having a meltdown on the floor next to me. Rowan is considered “non-verbal” and has quite 
severe tantrums and inflexibilities. But in the year that I have worked with him I have come to 
know him by his joy when he is around his brothers and the family dog, his huge grin, his 
excitement when he watches or plays with Thomas the Tank Engine, and his love of rough and 
tumble play with his family.  
 
This is Rowan’s second ABA session for the day: six days a week he has two three-hour ABA 
sessions per day. Today’s session got off to a rocky start. Even before our session, during 
lunchtime, Rowan’s mum – Eve* – accidentally tripped over his perfectly lined up Thomas the 
Tank Engine and train-themed line of toys that stretched from one end of the house to the other 
(much like the image above). It took him a day to construct it. Each item in the line had been 
perfectly placed in a certain order and orientation that made complete sense to him, but no one 
else. By tripping on the toys, Eve had disrupted the carefully constructed line and sent many of 
the toys flying across the floor. The meltdown that ensued went for over half an hour: screaming, 
biting (his own hand), and tears.  
 
By the time I arrived at their house he had calmed somewhat, but I knew to adjust my 
expectations for the session ahead. Today we are working on his speech (although considered 
“non-verbal”, we are helping Rowan develop some sounds and functional words, like “more”, 
“open”, “up”), receptive language (like recognising and pointing to colours and objects from 
pictures in a children’s book) and some gross motor activities (such as jumping, balancing, 
throwing a ball). As a break between activities, Rowan selects some toys from my ABA toy bag – 
a Thomas the Tank Engine puzzle and some trains – and begins lining them up along the floor. I 
sit with him, intending to complete the puzzle with him and to practice working on turn taking. 
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This does not go down well: at my request to place the puzzle pieces into the puzzle frame, 
Rowan flings and kicks the puzzle pieces and toys in frustration, and spends the following 10 
minutes in meltdown. I wait patiently for him to calm, letting him know I am there ready to play 
when he is ready. I talk quietly about the puzzle and how I would love his help, as it is very tricky. 
Eventually, Rowan begins watching what I am doing and slowly makes his way over to my side, 
and then calmly begins slotting-in pieces of the puzzle.  
 
At the end of our session we go downstairs to chat with Rowan’s Mum. I often carry Rowan down 
the stairs at the end of our sessions and play a game where we jauntily go down a few stairs, 
then back up a couple of stairs backwards, then down again and up, pairing each movement with 
the appropriate word “up” or “down”. This often provokes a fit of giggles. On this occasion, we 
are standing nearly at the bottom of the stairs and Rowan is still in my arms. Our session finished 
on a good note and I am telling Eve how well he did and how well he recovered from his 
meltdown. As we are standing there, Rowan excitedly wriggles in my arms and exclaims suddenly 
and clearly, “Up, up”. We both stand looking at each other, mouths open in shock, and Rowan’s 
mother breaks out into an enormous grin as her eyes well with tears. This is Rowan’s first word.  
Introduction 
The passage above describes one of my most memorable moments working with a child 
with autism in my six years as an ABA therapist. Rowan was the first child I got to know on 
the spectrum, and I was lucky enough to get to know seven other children with autism and 
their wonderful families. It was through working with these eight very unique children that I 
began to appreciate and understand the famous saying in the autism community often 
attributed to Doctor Stephen Shore: “If you’ve met one person with autism, you’ve met one 
person with autism”.  
 
I have shared this recollection to draw attention to two important aspects of autism that 
will feature prominently in this thesis. The first is what clinicians would call Rowan’s 
“restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities” (American Psychiatric 
Association 2013), that is, lining up Thomas the Tank Engine trains and other train-related 
toys. For clinicians, the way Rowan lines up toys is “problematic” because he does this in a 
repetitive, restricted, excessively circumscribed and ritualistic way, and shows extreme 
distress when asked to change or move these toys. As I have stressed above, Rowan’s 
restricted and repetitive activities are unique to Rowan, and for other individuals diagnosed 
with autism, these activities may be similar, or they may be vastly different. It is these 
behaviours that this thesis will focus on, particularly in the context of the diagnostic gaze 
and the way they are standardised, quantified and coded. The second aspect of autism that 
this memory addresses is what I will refer to later in the thesis as “competence”. The 
significance of Rowan’s first word – “up” – is two-fold. Not only has he clearly 
communicated an intention beyond clinical expectations of him, but he has done so outside 
of the confines of the standardised and prescribed ABA therapy session. This is an important 
theme in this thesis: understanding the competence, strengths and abilities of children on 
the autism spectrum outside of the confines of prescribed medical and psychological norms 
of the standardised clinical encounter.  
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The ambiguity of autism spectrum disorder and its diagnosis 
In the eleven years that I have been working with children with autism and/or researching 
autism, I have witnessed increased visibility and major shifts in the way that autism is 
studied, funded, talked about, portrayed in the media, diagnosed and treated. The focus of 
this thesis is the way in which autism has been redefined, tweaked and tinkered with since 
being coined as a diagnostic concept in 1943 by Leo Kanner. This process is crucially 
influenced by medicine and the psy-sciences’ drive to standardise, quantify and categorise. 
This is in spite of the heterogeneous nature of autism spectrum disorder: autisms’ causes, 
age of onset, symptoms, comorbidity with other disorders (such as attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) or anxiety), and patients’ responses to treatment differ from 
individual to individual. For diagnostic practices, this translates to clinicians relying on 
interpretive work to reach a diagnostic decision. This involves observing the child’s 
behaviour directly, speaking with parents about their child, and/or using standardised 
diagnostic tools (such as the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) or the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS)). The information is then matched to the 
diagnostic criteria stipulated in the DSM 5. Thus, diagnosing and treating autism is carried 
out at an individual, case-by-case level and heavily relies on the clinician’s observation of 
the individual’s behaviour and speech (Silove, Blackmore, Warren, Gibbs, and Roberts 
2008). 
 
This sheer variability makes autism particularly difficult to test under the epidemiological 
paradigm, particularly using the gold standard of randomised controlled trials (RCTs). Yet, it 
seems that this ambiguous and elusive status of autism in fact fuels scientists’ and 
researchers’ efforts to represent it categorically and concretely in the biomedical sciences 
and diagnostic documents. In her book Constructing Autism, Majia Nadesan (2005) explains 
this medical drive for discovery of the “truth” about what autism is:  
 
Although present-day researchers represent autism as a continuum or as several continua of 
communicative and cognitive impairments, and pay lip service to the idea these impairments 
may stem from different etiologies, autism continues to be implicitly and explicitly theorized as a 
definitive entity whose origins can be found in faulty, neurological impairments (e.g., of the 
amygdale), or impaired biochemistry. The implicit but dominant model seems to be that there is 
a visual-spatial-topological autistic center that will ultimately be discovered. This view of autism 
implicitly invokes a model of medicine in which disease is ontological, a thing in itself, which can 
be distinguished from the afflicted patient whose ontological status is unrelated to the disabling 
disorder. (Nadesan 2005: 20) 
 
This thesis is concerned with teasing out and distinguishing between this medical model 
that views autism as ontological in nature, and the conception of autism as a nominal 
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category – subject to a vast array of social, political and cultural factors. As Nadesan (2005) 
explains: 
 
Perhaps it is the case that the etiology of autism lies in a multitude of mutually entwined 
biological and cultural/social factors, including the very standards of normality used in the 
determination of the disorder. Put another way, perhaps autism is not a thing but is a nominal 
category useful for grouping heterogeneous people all sharing communication practices 
deviating significantly from the expectations of normalcy. These communication practices are 
becoming, increasingly, standardized, codified, and widely distributed. (Nadesan 2005: 9) 
 
Of particular interest is the way that clinicians reconcile these two perspectives in the 
diagnostic encounter, and how they must juggle this epistemological struggle. This is 
significant too in the context of applying standardised assessment tools in the autism 
diagnostic encounter. As Nadesan (2005) suggests in the quote above, the key identifying 
autism “symptoms” are becoming increasingly quantified and standardised, with this 
approach growing in popularity amongst practicing clinicians. For example, in a recent 
survey of Australian clinicians (paediatricians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and speech 
therapists) involved in the diagnosis and treatment of autism, 82% of respondents reported 
that they either frequently or always administer standardised assessments in diagnostic 
evaluations for ASD (Taylor et al 2016).  A key aim of this thesis is to understand how these 
tools are operationalised in practice in the clinical encounter, especially given that in this 
same survey, 48% of respondents indicated that they have made provisional diagnoses 
(these are made when ASD is suspected but not confirmed) and 17% indicated they have 
diagnosed ASD when an individual does not meet criteria for the disorder (called diagnostic 
“upgrading”) (Taylor et al 2016). As John Ellard (1992) points out, applying standards and 
classifications within the psy-sciences comes with a set of assumptions about how these 
documents operate and the nature of the disorder being diagnosed, and how these 
standards do not match up with the reality of practice:   
 
The first error is to believe that the phenomena of every field of study can be laid out in a matrix, 
like the periodic table of elements. Many of the things which interest social and psychological 
scientists are not readily collapsible into neat entities, ready for categorisation. ... The act of 
observation is likely, or certain, to alter what is being observed, which means that different 
observers attending to the same phenomena may come away with different data, quite 
legitimately. If these and other more subtle problems are to be found in the hard world of 
physics, how can we assume that we have been presented with an orderable world? (Ellard 
1992: 547) 
 
A further error is to believe that a diagnostic classification, through intuition, successive reviews, 
logic or the invention of new machines will slowly advance towards and finally achieve an 
unquestionable truth...Look about you and ask which other branch of science has achieved this 
happy state, or is about to do so, and yet the pursuit continues. It is a fallacy which has been 
with us for thousands of years and yet its attractiveness has never diminished. (Ellard 1992: 548) 
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Given this ambiguity around the classification and diagnosis of autism, prevalence studies 
similarly and unsurprisingly reflect this uncertainty. For example, finding consensus on 
current prevalence of ASD in Australia is subject to debate: the Australian Medical 
Association (AMA) states on their website that currently, “there is no reliable data on the 
prevalence of ASD in Australia”.  Over the past decade, study after study has whittled 
prevalence rates down further and further. Internationally, estimates range from one in 100 
children affected by ASD in the UK (Brugha et al 2011), one in 68 children in the US 
according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Christensen et al 2016), and 
the astonishingly high rate of one in 38 children in a South Korean study (Kim et al 2011). 
The more conservative UK estimate is often cited in Australia, and based on data from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) this equates to approximately 230,000 children in 
Australia meeting diagnostic criteria for ASD. Currently, the most widely recognised and 
quoted estimate in Australia is around one individual with autism in every 100 people (1% of 
the population). This “increase” in diagnostic rates of autism has led many researchers and 
educators to refer to an “autism epidemic”. To unpack this notion of an autism epidemic in 
Australia, however, we need to take a closer look at autism in the clinical setting, and autism 
in a research or clinical trial context.  
 
Autism in the clinic 
My introduction to the world of autism was in a clinical setting, and thus, this thesis has 
been motivated by two important factors: my clinical work as an ABA therapist with children 
on the autism spectrum; and a pilot study for this thesis (see Lenne & Waldby 2011) 
exploring diagnostic and treatment practices of Australian developmental paediatricians in 
the clinic.  
 
My work as an ABA therapist threw me into the world of autism as an undergraduate 
psychology student wanting to learn more about the practice of child psychology. Through 
this clinical work, I became aware of the extreme highs and lows experienced by a child with 
autism and their family, as outlined in my interaction with Rowan and his mother Eve at the 
beginning of this chapter. I also learnt about the highly stressful and confusing nature of the 
autism diagnostic session, and how this process could be a relief to one family, devastating 
to another, and completely avoided by others. Parents often spoke of it as a baffling 
experience, and also gave me highly varied accounts of the approaches used by the 
paediatricians to reach the diagnostic label. This experience as an ABA therapist has placed 
me in a unique position as a social researcher who is interested in exploring the diagnostic 
clinical encounter and the people involved in this session: the clinician, the child and the 
parent.  
 
My clinical work provided me with six years’ experience working with families and their 
children with autism, and the clinicians involved in the diagnosis and treatment of this 
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disorder. I worked alongside clinicians to develop strategies and techniques to help the child 
and parent perform everyday activities and learn from their environment and peers. I then 
implemented these strategies and techniques in one-on-one and group settings (in the 
family home, preschools, schools and social settings) with the child on the autism spectrum 
for many hours each week. I worked closely with the parent to communicate the child’s 
progress and incorporated their ideas into the child’s program. This experience has given 
me invaluable insight into problems faced by each of these groups, pressing research 
questions that need to be explored, and perhaps most importantly, sensitivity and 
understanding when undertaking research with these groups.  
 
The pilot study, in which nine private practice paediatricians were interviewed about their 
experiences diagnosing and providing treatment plans for children with an autism spectrum 
disorder (Lenne & Waldby, 2011), raised many questions about how clinicians manage 
clinical uncertainty, and how they use diagnostic tools in practice when confronted with 
different cases. The pilot study examined the complexities and messiness facing clinicians 
who diagnose and provide treatment plans for children on the autism spectrum. The 
paediatricians interviewed for the study worked in private practices across Sydney, Australia 
and saw a wide cross-section of the community. These initial interviews provided me with 
important insights into the various clinical approaches to the diagnosis of autism and the 
role EBM and standardised diagnostic tools play in the clinical encounter. Three key findings 
emerged from these discussions:  
 
(1) The tacit and experiential nature of diagnosing and treating ASDs; 
(2) The skilful and creative interaction between the paediatrician and the diagnostic 
tools (tool “tinkering”); and 
(3) The paradoxical way in which the paediatricians use diagnostic tools: 
Paediatricians use these tools (which are based on statistical/probability data) 
when dealing with an outlier patient, that is, one that is difficult to categorise 
(such as children with a suspected co-morbid disorder, like anxiety or ADHD) 
(Lenne & Waldby, 2011).  
 
Autism in the clinical trial  
On the flip side, I would like to turn the focus of this thesis towards the field of clinical 
research, and more specifically the randomised controlled clinical trial (RCT). The 
uncertainty and ambiguity experienced in diagnosing and treating autism in clinical practice 
has its foundations in the way that research, evidence, standards and guidelines – that is, 
evidence-based medicine (EBM) – are created and disseminated in the fields of medicine 
and the psy-sciences. Dealing with an abstract concept such as autism, which has no known 
single, identifiable biological cause, marker or descriptor of its core symptoms, makes this 
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disorder incredibly difficult to fit into RCT and EBM paradigm. As Laura Schreibman (2005) 
points out:  
 
The field of autism is littered with the debris of dead ends, crushed hopes, ineffective 
treatments and false starts. This has been frustrating and discouraging for everyone, including 
parents and professionals…The field is susceptible to all sorts of false beliefs, snake-oil 
treatments, and potential “cures” because we are dealing with a devastating disorder for which 
we have few answers to date. Ignorance provides a vacuum that sucks in all kinds of ideas – 
some right, some irrelevant, some dead wrong, and some even harmful. (Schreibman 2005: 7)  
 
Understanding the challenges involved in the production of EBM in the field of autism 
research is thus a fascinating area of inquiry. Interestingly, the direction of my research and 
focus on the clinical trial for this thesis was shaped by the recruitment process: a 
paediatrician that was engaged in my original round of recruitment of private practice 
clinicians invited me to embed my study within a larger RCT he was overseeing at an 
Australian metropolitan children’s hospital which was testing the use of a drug to treat 
children diagnosed with ASD (the diagnostic sessions were conducted as part of the trial). So 
what initially began as a focused study of the private practice clinic and ASD diagnostic 
practices, developed into a study of the ASD diagnostic practices embedded in a clinical trial 
in a public hospital and the associated practices that take place within a clinical trial 
involving children with an ASD.1   
 
The clinical trial studied for this thesis is described in the protocol as a randomised double 
blind placebo-controlled trial, funded by the National Health and Medical Research Council 
(NHMRC) and run by a not-for-profit Australian children’s research institute. The trial aims 
to test the efficacy of the drug Fluoxetine (an antidepressant known as a selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitor (SSRI)) in treating targeted symptoms including repetitive behaviours, 
anxiety, irritability, aggression, and self-injury. In my description of my ABA session with 
Rowan at the beginning of this chapter, I outline many of the symptoms that the Fluoxetine 
would target: his repetitive lining up of trains, distress when the line is disrupted, 
inflexibility in the way that he plays with the trains, and engaging in self-harm through biting 
his hand.  
 
It is important to clarify here what an RCT is, as it is crucial to understanding the process of 
this trial, as well as to demonstrate why it is so difficult to force the square peg of autism 
into the round hole of the RCT or EBM. Lock and Nguyen (2010) explain that the RCT is:  
 
                                                           
1 Importantly, given the clinical trial studied for this thesis began its data collection in 2012, the trial protocol is 
tied to the DSM-IV-TR. However, the timeframe of this thesis (2010-2017) situates the production of 
knowledge about autism diagnosis at a significant crossroads where the medical and paraprofessions, and the 
research community, were gearing up for the shift from the DSM-IV-TR to the DSM-5. Thus, this thesis 
examines the influence and impact of both the DSM-IV-TR and the DSM-5. 
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[T]he pinnacle of biomedical research design because, by incorporating technologies of 
randomization, placebo-control, and blinding, it appeared to be impervious to bias, and the most 
objective of clinical research methods to date. In RCTs, the intervention to be studied is allocated 
to one group to which a control group is compared. To eliminate the placebo effect, the control 
group receives a proxy for the intervention: if it is a drug that is being evaluated, individuals who 
are controls receive a pill (the placebo) that appears identical to the drug under investigation but 
contains a biologically inert substance…this is why evidence from RCTs is considered to be the 
most valid, because the effects produced by therapeutic agents can be rigorously separated from 
the background “noise” of placebo effects, biased observers and subjects, and chance events. 
The RCT has become the gold standard for proving that a new drug or intervention is indeed 
effective. (Lock & Nguyen, 2010: 183) 
 
Bishop, Snyder, Aligna & Leite (2016) also identify that RCTs provide estimates of average 
causal effects, which implies that the intervention/drug etc. works better for some 
participants than others: “Establishing an average causal effect does not preclude the 
possibility that the intervention does not affect some participants and may have a negative 
effect on others” (502).  This is particularly difficult when it comes to autism research due to 
the problems associated with diagnosing this disorder and establishing what “average” is in 
this heterogeneous population. Further, the absence of biological markers or tests to aid in 
producing a diagnostic outcome makes it more challenging to carry out empirical 
investigations using RCTs. Arnold and colleagues (2000) explain this difficulty of applying 
RCTs to research involving patients with an ASD as follows:   
 
The broad spectrum of pathology encompassed and the wide individual variation in symptomatic 
expression (sample heterogeneity) and treatment response challenge the sensitivity, 
psychometric properties, and/or assumptions of most instruments and assessment  strategies 
commonly used in RCTs. (Arnold et al., 2000: 100) 
 
RCTs are difficult to apply to ASD research due to the heavy emphasis placed on direct 
observation in studies examining both diagnosis and treatment. Thus, attempts to 
standardise observational practices are essentially ineffective (see Arnold et al., 2000). 
 
This study 
Sociological investigations of the subtleties and complexities involved in the diagnostic 
clinical encounter when dealing with a heterogeneous disorder such as autism are scarce 
(Rafalovich, 2005).  Given the emphasis on observable behaviours as the key indicator of 
autism during the diagnostic encounter, I argue that for my research to properly capture 
these subtleties and complexities of diagnosis, a visual ethnographic approach is needed. 
Accordingly, I have employed a video-reflexive ethnographic (VRE) approach (Iedema, 
Mesman & Carroll 2013) to study the diagnostic practices of clinicians involved in the 
diagnosis of autism in the clinical trial setting. In Chapter Three I provide further details on 
the significance and background of this approach.   
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This thesis, through the methodology of VRE, allows me to fully embrace the “mess”, 
uncertainty and enigma surrounding autism and its classification and diagnosis. This thesis 
explores how creative collaborations with clinicians, parents and their children open up new 
ways of conceptualising and classifying autism, and reveals otherwise tacit practices that are 
brought forth through the visual and reflexive nature of this methodology. 
 
The aims of this study  
(1) To form a more complete, complex and nuanced picture of how evidence-based 
medicine and standardised tools are used in the ASD diagnostic/assessment process  
(2) To understand how clinicians reconcile the uncertainties and ambiguities of autism 
within the standardised, quantified and codified ambit of the clinical trial  
(3) To investigate the potential of video reflexive ethnography (VRE) and video technology 
to shape and change diagnostic practices  
 
The research questions for this study  
(1) To what extent does the drive for standardisation and statistical approaches to clinical 
medicine influence the ways clinicians diagnose and assess autism spectrum disorder?  
(2) How do the individual preferences and opinions of clinicians diagnosing/assessing ASD 
affect and interact with the process of labelling a child with ASD? 
(3) How do clinicians negotiate the problems of standardising the diagnosis of ASD in the 
clinical trial to ensure that the participants meet the RCT criteria?  
(4) Do video reflexive ethnography (VRE) and video technologies have the potential to 
significantly change what evidence “counts” towards ASD diagnosis and treatment?  
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CHAPTER ONE 
From “The Minus Children”2 to Epidemic: A History of 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) in Australia  
Introduction: the uncertainty and instability of the diagnostic label 
 
Mentally defective, mentally retarded, developmentally disabled, dementia 
praecocissima, childhood schizophrenia, atypical child, symbiotic psychosis, brain 
damage syndrome, negative elective mute, developmental aphasia, schizophrenic 
syndrome in childhood, infantile psychosis, semantic pragmatic disorder (SPD), Deficits 
in Attention and Motor Perception (DAMP), infantile autism, pervasive developmental 
disorder (PDD), Asperger’s Syndrome (AS), pervasive developmental disorder – not 
otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), childhood disintegrative disorder (CDD), autistic 
disorder, high functioning autism, low functioning autism, autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD)....? 
 
The list of diagnostic terms above illustrates the vast array of terms that have been used to 
describe a set of behaviours that have puzzled researchers and clinicians for nearly a 
century. Listing these various diagnoses is not an attempt to engage in retroactive diagnosis. 
However, it does convey that “for contemporaries it was plain that autistic children passed 
undetected through the custodial sieve and disappeared among residential populations” 
(Eyal, Hart, Onculer, Oren, and Rossi 2010: 77). What is particularly telling about these 
diagnostic labels is that they are a product of their time; they reflect the understandings and 
beliefs about “mental disorders” in that era, and they therefore change as these 
understandings and beliefs change. As Shirley Ferguson (2012), an Australian child and 
family psychologist, states: “The history of autism is written in its revisions and 
redefinitions. DSM 5 is where current thinking is at, DSM 6 will likewise be a totally different 
document.” The question mark at the end of the above list of labels conveys the historically 
contingent and fluid nature of the formulation of diagnostic criteria. Furthermore, it 
demonstrates, as Ferguson (2012) points out, the uncertainty surrounding the list of 
symptoms we identify as representing autism today, and what it will be labelled and what 
will constitute this label in future diagnostic documents. 
 
This chapter will present an historical analysis of the instability and uncertainty surrounding 
the labels “mental retardation,” “developmental disability” and “autism,” and their 
continuing volatility in the world of genetic science, biomedicine, psychiatry and psychology. 
While it is important to explore the evidence and key findings of scientists, researchers, and 
                                                           
2 “The Age reporter, John Larkin, stated, ‘We called them The Minus Children, not to downgrade them, not to 
imply they were lesser beings, but because they were behind, in everything from esteem to opportunity’” 
(Manning 2008).  
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clinicians that have advanced naturalist conceptions of this disorder, these perspectives will 
be explored alongside the social forces that have produced and perpetuated the changes 
and instability in the diagnosis, treatment, and the very conception and definition of this 
disorder. The associations that are formed between the various interested groups in the 
field of autism are key to understanding how parents and therapists have become 
formidable forces, and how the field of medicine, particularly psychiatry, has taken a back 
seat. This analysis will track how this label has transformed from Leo Kanner’s (1943) 
description of a rare subset of childhood schizophrenia to today’s apparent autism 
epidemic, and from Kanner’s very specific criteria to explain the behaviour of a small 
proportion of children to today’s diagnostic mess.  
 
Further, this chapter will explore the fluidity and historical contingency of this cultural 
category we label as autism today. It will show how and why this label is subject to change, 
controversy and resistance, thus leading to its constant revision and reconstitution.  As 
Rutter (1978) states: 
 
[T]he question is not “What is autism?” but rather “To what set of phenomena shall we apply the 
term autism?” There is no point in starting with the word autism and then defining it. It is merely 
a word and like any other word it means just what we want it to mean – no more and no less. In 
short, the word autism is merely a convenient substitute or shorthand term for Kanner’s long 
prose description, and no information is to be gained by analyzing it. (141) 
 
At present, there is no historical examination of how autism diagnosis and treatment 
evolved within the Australian context. As demonstrated above, this disorder has been 
labelled variously according to medical/psychiatric knowledge at the time, and perhaps 
even according to the whims of individual clinicians. This has made the researcher’s task a 
little more complicated, requiring the net to be cast a little further and wider to include 
research on individuals classed in the categories of “mentally retarded” (mental 
impairment), “feebleminded” and “developmentally disabled.” This chapter draws on a 
variety of resources to explore this subject, including some first-hand accounts of 
institutions in Australia during the 1960s and 1970s through interviews with two Australian 
psychiatrists (Doctor P and Doctor C), an Australian psychologist (Mr A) – all of whom have 
practised both before and after deinstitutionalisation – and the father of an individual 
diagnosed with autism in the early 1970s in Sydney, Australia (Mr D)3. 
                                                           
3 To conduct these historical interviews, ethics approval was sought from the University of Sydney HREC 
(Reference: MF/PE, Project No: 2012/2065) and Autism Spectrum Australia (ASPECT) (Reference: 1114). 
Participants were recruited via ASPECT through an email circular (outlining my study and interest in the history 
of autism in Australia) sent out by administrative staff. Three clinicians and one parent expressed interest in 
participating via email directly to me: Doctor P, Doctor C, Mr A and Mr D. All participants were sent participant 
information statements and consent forms, and interviews were organised to take place at a time and place of 
their convenience. Interviews lasted approximately 1 hour each and were audio-recorded. The purpose of the 
historical interviews was to capture the voices of clinicians and parents that had experienced “autism” in a 
very different historical context. Recruitment proved to be a challenge given the small number of clinicians 
that had practiced and specialised in “autism” during the 1960s to 1970s, and that most had retired from 
21 
 
It is posited by two US-based authors (see Eyal et al. 2010; Shattuck 2006), two of the most 
influential observers of autism (Kanner 1948; Rimland 1964) as well as an Australian 
psychiatrist and psychologist (interview data) that those individuals we now label today as 
“autistic” were likely institutionalised as “mentally retarded” up until a few decades ago. 
Indeed, it was not until deinstitutionalisation came about that there was even a need for 
these specific subsets of diagnoses – the umbrella term of “developmentally disabled” 
within the institutional setting sufficed. Thus, this chapter will be divided into two major 
sections which will each explore institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation in Australia. 
As Eyal et al (2010) demonstrate, these two historical periods provide crucial insight into 
how autism spectrum disorder came to be labelled as such and how this diagnostic label 
snowballed to become the “epidemic” that it is today.  
 
Section 1: Institutionalisation in Australia 
Introduction  
Historical explorations of education, psychiatry, welfare and childhood in Australia have all 
but disregarded an examination of developmental disabilities and intellectual disabilities as 
a part of this inquiry. When mentioned in these historical texts, the very concept of 
intellectual disability is discussed as natural and fixed, and certainly not an idea or label to 
be challenged or questioned (see Garton 1988). However, scholars such as Corinne Manning 
(2008) and David Earl (2011) are beginning to explore the ebbs and flows that this category 
has experienced within Australia, and also the changing fortunes of those that have been 
labelled under this umbrella category of intellectual disability. This section will examine, 
within the Australian context, the institution itself and classification systems within the 
institution for individuals falling broadly under the label “developmentally disabled” or 
“mentally defective”, as well as explore mentions and cases of autism. An influential 
framework embraced at this time, particularly within the institution, was the controversial 
science of eugenics. Many psychiatrists in Australia were enthusiasts of eugenics, and 
advocated the use of practices aimed at improving the genetic composition of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
practice. Similarly, recruiting parents of children that had received an “autism” diagnosis during this historical 
period was challenging for the same reasons. Importantly, these interviews are here to provide insights into 
the personal experiences of the clinicians and parent who were grappling with what was then considered a 
very rare condition. The experiences of these interviewees are not intended to be interpreted as the universal 
experience of these cohorts, but simply provide some personal narratives to interweave throughout the 
researched historical data presented in this chapter. I recognise, particularly in the case of Mr D’s testimony, 
that the reality of life within institutions for those with disability is a hugely contested space. I also recognise 
that this thesis has not provided historical testimony from those diagnosed with autism – particular in regards 
to disability activism and advocacy, and that this is a gap that warrants further investigation. Thus, it is 
important to acknowledge that while parents and carers may be supportive of new “community villages,” 
given the history of institutionalised care facilities and the relative dominance of parents and carers’ voices 
over those of people with disability themselves, a lot of care needs to be taken in reporting parents’ views as a 
comprehensive account. Thus, the historical interviews presented in this chapter need to be read with this in 
mind.  
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population (Carman-Brown and Fox 1996). Thus, they opted for the prevention of 
disabilities through programs of sterilisation or segregation (that is, institutionalisation).  
 
Early classification: “idiots,” “imbeciles” and “the feebleminded” 
Children and adults with a developmental or intellectual disability in Australia went largely 
unnoticed until the early twentieth century (Earl 2011). At this time, the British 
Government’s Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feebleminded (1904-1908) 
graded those considered “mentally defective” into three classes: idiots (lowest functioning), 
imbeciles, and the feebleminded (higher functioning) (Garton 1988). As is the case today, it 
was the higher-functioning classification that was the most difficult to assess. This 
presented problems from the point of view of eugenics, because the “feeble-minded” could 
slip between the diagnostic cracks and thus avoid the scrutiny and gaze of the state. The 
surveillance of children was therefore a priority, as it was believed that the application of IQ 
tests within schools would allow the success of eugenic reforms. As Harvey Sutton (1911), 
Director of the Victorian School Medical Service, declared: 
 
Normal physical defects and anthropometrics were inadequate for the proper testing of the 
capabilities of children. They needed more precise forms of intelligence testing ... the extension 
of surveillance into schools and the extensions of the concept of hereditary deficiency beyond 
that which is physically apparent. (904)  
 
These three grades of “mental deficiency,” and the psychiatric legitimacy associated with 
them, redefined the conception of the “dangerous classes”. As Garton (1988) outlines, this 
allowed psychiatrists and eugenicists to justify their arguments and ideas within the realm 
of science and rationality, rather than morality. Thus: 
 
The older philanthropic categories of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ often meant that those who 
were thought most dangerous to the social order were ignored or only came within the ambit of 
state control after they had committed a crime. The ‘science’ of IQ tests allowed for the 
determination of the ‘dangerous’ or ‘deficient’ classes before they had committed anti-social 
acts. The replacement of a discourse of ‘badness’ and ‘morality’ by one of ‘deficiency’ and 
‘illness’ favoured the intervention of the state to prevent social problems, rather than having to 
wait until offences had been committed. Doctors had new power to define which social groups 
required preventative social intervention. (Garton 1988: 59)  
 
Thus, diagnosis and categorisation acted as a way of seeking out the deviant members of 
the population and was often carried out in schools by general practitioners (Carman-Brown 
and Fox 1996). Those classed as “feebleminded” (that is, individuals with mild impairment) 
would have been taken care of in the home with their family, perhaps even taking up some 
form of unskilled employment in adulthood or assisting the family with the day to day tasks 
of maintaining the home. Individuals with more severe impairment, those classed as “idiots” 
and “imbeciles”, were certified by physicians and taken in at institutions (known as lunatic 
asylums at the time) such as Kew Idiot Asylum (later renamed Kew Cottages), which opened 
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in 1887 (Earl 2011; Manning 2008). However, these gradations or classifications of deviant 
members of the population were by no means stable categories with clear-cut boundaries. 
The particular point that Manning (2008) and Earl’s (2011) research makes on this issue, 
rather, is that rather than the myriad of developmental diagnoses at the clinician’s disposal 
today, psychiatrists at this time were able to categorise patients using a simpler 
classificatory system that was focused on institutionalisation.4 Accordingly, the 
development of classification systems for the intellectually disabled appeared to provide the 
justification for this institutionalising zeal.  Williams’ (1996) exploration of the definition and 
diagnosis of intellectual disability in New South Wales between the late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century delves into the social motivations behind this classificatory 
drive. She highlights that as early as the late nineteenth century the rise of classification 
systems, spurred on by the “scientific” endeavour in the field of medicine, demonstrated 
the allure of numbers and the conviction that meticulous measurement could ensure 
“irrefutable precision” (Williams 1996: 254). With regards to intellectual disability, a rise in 
state intervention and surveillance, evidenced by the work of constables, magistrates, legal 
guardians, superintendents and directors of state institutions, led to a greater regulation of 
childhood and those classed as “feebleminded” during the early twentieth century (Van 
Krieken 1991; Williams 1996). Thus, 
 
In the area of intellectual disability or “feeblemindedness”, the drive to quantify and classify was 
at first an intellectual endeavour to understand and therefore control “deviance” and later a 
response to contain what was seen as incurable. In essence, that which could not be cured could 
at least be contained. This notion of containment associated with surveillance is evidenced in 
court proceedings of persons admitted to institutions under The New South Wales Lunacy Act of 
1878, where under the omniscient legislative and medical gaze, patients were variously charged 
with offences such as “wandering at large”, “Not fit to be at large” and “not under proper care 
and control”. Furthermore, a belief in the incurability of those deemed to be “mentally 
enfeebled”, was to have a profound influence on approaches to management. (Williams 1996: 
255)  
 
Australia and the eugenics movement: assessment and surveillance   
Psychiatry played a dominant role at this time because it supplied “plausible explanations 
for a variety of social problems” (Garton 1988: 188). Through the expansion of its treatment 
facilities and the diversification of its patient populations, psychiatry’s gaze and jurisdiction 
widened. Significant also to this professional dominance in Australia was the wider interest 
in eugenics, evolution, heredity and social progress: 
 
A broad range of groups was concerned with the prospects for social progress in Australia, and a 
number feared the erosion of living standards by the proliferation of the ‘unfit’ in the 
                                                           
4 It is important to note that people currently diagnosed with autism today may have been categorised within 
this context as “mad,” or “idiots,” and some would not have registered as anything other than “normal.”  As I 
emphasise later in this chapter, and thesis, for the category of autism, this relationship of interconnected 
factors such as experience, classification, management and support is complicated and mutually constitutive. 
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community. Science was seen as the way out of many social policy dilemmas, and psychiatry, as 
the science of mental defect, was a favoured solution. (Garton 1988: 188) 
 
Harvey Sutton, a public figure and Australian professor in medicine during the early 
twentieth century, was also a strong supporter of the eugenic movement. For Sutton (1911), 
it was of the utmost importance for experts to decipher who was “hereditarily unfit” and 
segregate this group so as to “eliminate many undesirables from the community, and 
diminish the intensity of many social problems” (Sutton 1911: 905):  
 
One of the principles of eugenics is to eliminate in ideal fashion stocks definitely undesirable. It 
has been shown that the families of feeble-minded are large, and often mentally defective. Their 
numbers exceed the average number in the ordinary family, so that our problem increases with 
each generation. Again, the economical side presents itself, for if you do not help to check their 
increase you and your children will have to pay for their support. (Sutton 1911: 905) 
 
Similarly, psychiatrists were concerned with separating the curable from the incurable. 
Furthermore, Garton (1988) notes that the medical classification of “mental defectiveness” 
allowed social problems to be redefined and reconceptualised by psychiatrists as medical 
problems. For both eugenicists and psychiatrists at this time, mental capacity as measured 
by the intelligence quotient (IQ), was considered to be a “fixed potential” and therefore 
determined their educability. Thus, the psychiatric/eugenic division between the curable 
(educable) and the incurable (in-educable) defined whether a child would receive medical 
supervision in special institutions or education in the community (Lewis 1988: 144). The 
measurement and definition of “mental deficiency” therefore became a priority for 
researchers, both overseas and in Australia. To this end, in 1905 Binet and Simon developed 
the first IQ test which they claimed could accurately measure intelligence; classifying 
individuals that performed below certain scores into varying grades of impairment (Garton 
1988: 58).  
 
This overarching eugenic concern also began to manifest itself through increasing 
government intervention and surveillance of childhood. This was achieved through 
censuses, as well as testing in schools, baby clinics and child guidance clinics, which served 
in alerting professionals to the “existence of a group of children who developed at rates far 
below the expected statistical average” (Earl 2011: 87). These classificatory measures led to 
a greater interest in the care and placement of the feebleminded, and resulted in the 
passing of the Mental Deficiency Act in Britain in 1913 which “provided for the identification 
and compulsory detainment of feebleminded citizens” (Earl 2011: 88). This prompted 
Australian eugenic reformers over the next three decades to campaign for similar legislation 
to be passed in each of the states, arguing that the hereditarily feebleminded posed a threat 
to the nation (Garton 2010; McCalman 2009; Thomson 2010; Watts 1994). Despite this 
pressure from the eugenics movement in Australia, they were unsuccessful in their bid for 
the compulsory “care” of “mental defectives”, largely due to concerns surrounding 
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sterilisation clauses as well as cost issues. This absence of legislation meant that care of 
these individuals fell to their families, and this care was private and in some respects, silent. 
Because hereditary feeblemindedness was linked to social problems such as prostitution, 
alcoholism, and juvenile delinquency, mental deficiency became a problem to be dealt with 
“out of the public eye” (Earl 2011: 88). Such individuals were institutionalised when families 
were deemed to be unable to cope any longer.  
 
However, the scope of this early surveillance of the intellectually disabled was limited by the 
enormity of this task, the biggest issue being that consensus could not be reached amongst 
the experts. According to Williams (1996), this was due to: (1) the contentious nature of 
taxonomy; (2) the attempt to set up a homogenous classification of mental deficiency; and 
(3) the inconsistent, ambiguous and confused nature of the classificatory definition and 
terminology, particularly with regards to “feeblemindedness” (255-6). For example, while 
some doctors attributed the label of “feeblemindedness” to higher-functioning individuals 
(that is, a “high grade mental defective”), others applied it generically to all those with an 
intellectual disability (Williams 1996). Sutton (1911), in an address to the Australasian 
Medical Congress, also emphasised the perplexing nature of classifying individuals with 
mental impairment: “In introducing the subject of the classification of the feeble-minded, I 
do so with some trepidation, seeing that so little agreement exists even among the expert 
and experienced” (894). Additionally, he critiques the output of clinical measurement 
through standardised tests, claiming that “the clinical type gives us no real idea of their 
mental quality” (Sutton 1911: 894).  
 
Thus, the use of a “classificatory” schema (for example, a diagnostic checklist) when dealing 
with intellectually disabled populations during the early to mid-twentieth century was rare. 
Doctor P and Doctor C (interview data) both attest to this, stressing that in practice these 
standardised tools were not useful and in most cases, impractical. Instead, clinicians 
“depended almost entirely on observable and reported physical and behavioural 
phenomena and [were], to an extent, influenced by factors which fell outside the dominant 
medical paradigm, including an increasing drive to institutionalise deviance” (Williams 1996: 
253). For example,  
 
the most prevalent diagnostic indicator of feeblemindedness for admitting physicians was 
appearance. “Has a fatuous expression”, “a frightened idiotic expression”, and “expression 
shows signs of wanting of intelligence”, were common statements made in the records as factors 
observed indicating insanity. The second most prevalent diagnostic indicator was the inability to 
speak coherently, and the third, descriptions of physical impairment or deformities, for example; 
shape and size of the head; palate high, arched, of the gothic type; size of tongue; strabismus 
[eyes not properly aligned with each other]; and deformity and spasticity of limbs. (Williams 
1996: 263-4) 
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Similarly, clinicians in the US in the early 1900s working with individuals with intellectual 
disability relied on observed and reported phenomena as opposed to a clinical diagnosis 
(Scheerenberger 1987). Thus, subjective factors such as the child’s appearance, their age 
(for example, “the child is eight years old, yet acts like he is three”), their performance at 
school, and general coordination (Williams 1996: 258) were the focus of the diagnostic 
encounter. In fact, Alfred Frank Tredgold, the infamous American eugenicist, argued that 
the medical and psychological professions lacked relevance in matters of the committal of 
an individual deemed mentally defective (Tredgold 1947 [1908]). Instead, the decision 
whether or not to institutionalise an individual was a social and legal assessment which 
served to identify those who were socially incapable. Eyal et al (2010) confirm this view, 
explaining: 
 
In reality, medical or psychological expertise was called upon mostly to provide a seal of approval 
for a pre-existing social mechanism of exclusion. Any relative or even “any reputable citizen”  
could apply to the court to have somebody committed (...). The application would typically need 
to be verified by a three-person panel, only one of whom was a medical doctor or psychologist. 
Typically, the panel’s examination was brief and the whole procedure took only one day. (78) 
 
Williams (1996) argues that, despite the first mentions of the use of IQ tests as diagnostic 
aids amongst the intellectually impaired in 1909 in Newcastle Hospital, Australia, the real 
focus of diagnosis lay with the doctor’s decisions which led to an individual being 
institutionalised or permitted to live under the care of their family. Analysis of these same 
records showed that intellectual disability and mental illness (or “insanity”) were very 
closely linked and identified from an (institutional) administrative and diagnostic standpoint 
(Williams 1996). According to Australian psychiatrists Doctor P and Doctor C (interview 
data), once institutionalised, children and adults diagnosed with “mental retardation” were 
often grouped with those classed as “mentally ill” and received many of the same treatment 
approaches. Manning (2008) notes that in the Kew Asylum medical professionals tried to 
group the residents according to their intellectual and physical disabilities, and that this 
practice was motivated by the desire to put forth an image of Kew as an ordered institution 
that “catered for the specific needs of residents” (20-21).  
 
In reality, individuals assigned the label “mentally retarded” often faced a great deal of 
stigma with regards to their treatment within the institution. As Williams (1996) 
emphasises, there was “a sense of inevitability concerning the fate of those deemed to be 
afflicted, and institutionalisation, labelling, and treatment nihilism [were] a feature of 
management in the first two decades of the twentieth century” (268). Built into this label 
was the assumption that all individuals with some form of mental impairment fall within the 
same diagnostic category and should thus be treated in a streamlined fashion. This suited 
the diagnostic and treatment practises of the time: there was no need for delineated and 
specific diagnoses which would serve in grouping certain symptoms together in some 
semblance of order because the attitude towards these individuals at that time in Australia, 
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as in other parts of the world, was that they were a social problem that needed to be dealt 
with en masse in the institution.  
 
Large scale standardised testing in Australia 
Larger-scale efforts in Australia to measure the rates of “mental deficiency” amongst the 
population took place in the 1930s. McIntyre’s (1938) book The Standardization of 
Intelligence Tests in Australia explores the difficulties encountered in standardising IQ tests 
within Australian schools. His exploration of the Report on Mental Deficiency in the 
Commonwealth of Australia, an enquiry whose purpose was to determine the extent of 
“mental deficiency” in Australia (McIntyre 1938: 15), provides insight into the logistical 
problems encountered in the standardisation process. Investigation took place in “mental 
homes” and through a census of children attending state and private schools. Figure 1.1 
(below) records estimates of the number of “idiots, definite mental deficients and border-
line cases” for the age band 6 to 14 years in each state on the basis of returns from schools 
and institutions (see McIntyre 1938: 15).  
 
Interestingly, NSW’s figure is substantially less than the other states, and the Tasmanian 
figure is significantly higher. McIntyre (1938) notes these discrepancies arise from 
difficulties encountered in the standardisation process, such as imprecise instructions sent 
out to schools involved in the classificatory procedure. For example, he states:  
 
The preliminary notice provided the criterion of two or more grades retardation at age 10, and 
three or more grades at age 14, without defining the normal grade for 10- and 14-year-old 
children...Starting age and amount of retardation from grade to grade as well as from state to 
state, and the margin of uncertainty thereby introduced into the criterion, may well account for 
the interstate difference between the states other than New South Wales. (McIntyre 1938: 15) 
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Figure 1.1 (McIntyre 1938): Australian survey conducted in the 1930s – Estimates of the 
number of “idiots, definite mental deficient and border-line cases” for ages 6 to 14 years 
 
*According to McIntyre (1938) the NSW figure is abnormally low and should be discounted due to problems 
with the collection of data.  
 
McIntyre (1938) discusses the lack of clinicians in Australia that had been trained to 
accurately administer standardised tests, such as IQ tests: “The application of intelligence 
tests, either group or individual, as a regular practice, is confined to a very few specialists 
and enthusiasts in Australia, and any test demanding familiarity with a complex technique is 
certain to be faultily applied by a considerable percentage of teachers” (McIntyre 1938: 18). 
He also notes the inconsistencies that exist between the different tests administered by 
teachers (the criterion of “scholastic retardation”) and psychologists (mental tests, that is, 
IQ tests). McIntyre (1938) cites two studies, both conducted by H.T. Parker (unpublished) – a 
psychologist for the Tasmanian Education Department – which demonstrate vastly different 
categorisations made by teachers compared to psychologists. In one study, Parker found 
that after classifying the same population of Tasmanian school children, teachers classified 
207 children as “mentally deficient”, whereas the psychologists found only 102 cases with 
an IQ below 70 (the cut off for “mental deficiency”). In the second study, while the teachers 
found that the percentage of “defect” was greater for boys than girls, the psychologists 
found no significant difference between the sexes. McIntyre (1938) explains:  
 
The excess of boys in the whole group is due to the inclusion of a considerable number of dull 
boys, a percentage of their counterparts among the girls being regarded by the teachers as 
normal...it is likely the that greater conformability of girls than of boys to school organization is 
responsible for some of the disproportion in the Commonwealth Survey. (16)  
 
The suggestion is that different cultural expectations of girls and boys within Australian 
schools played a subjective role in the classificatory process. Another of the difficulties 
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associated with categorising individuals with an intellectual disability is that individual 
differences, requirements and social needs lose their importance and meaning through the 
intelligence test. In the early twentieth century, testing of individuals with mental 
impairment produced scores which allowed clinicians to group similarly scoring individuals, 
and then compare the higher and lower scoring groups (Lewis 1988: 144). This methodology 
failed to capture and explore the uniqueness of each individual and their strengths and 
difficulties.   
 
It appears that differentiation between individuals in the institution was not a focus of 
clinical concern. In fact, the category of mental retardation during the first half of the 
twentieth century was closely associated with the domain of “abnormal individuals” – with 
links to danger and criminality – which therefore placed it within the jurisdiction of 
psychiatry (Eyal et al. 2010). Importantly, Eyal et al (2010) explore, within the US context, 
the socioeconomic status of these individuals deemed “socially incapable” and find that 
they were disproportionately likely to come from what some considered at the time to be 
the “lower rungs of society”: immigrants, African Americans , or lower-class whites. This too, 
it seems, was the case in Australia, with Australian eugenicists (as discussed earlier) 
proclaiming that feeblemindedness was a problem of the “lower classes” and “lower races”. 
The concept of autism, of course, could not develop within such a homogenous setting – 
that is, the institution – but instead, it emerged on its margins as a “residual and rare 
category” (Eyal et al. 2010: 80). At the institution’s margins were upper- and middle-class 
families – families that contested the categorisation of their child as “feebleminded” and 
resisted their institutionalisation (Kanner 1943).  
 
The alliance between the paraprofessions and parents   
In 1943, Leo Kanner, a child psychiatrist, published his landmark article “Autistic 
Disturbances of Affective Contact” in which he described his diagnosis of the first eleven 
cases which he labelled with the term “autism.” Kanner argued that these eleven children 
(all from white and upper- or middle-class families) represented a subtype of childhood 
schizophrenia: they were distinct from children diagnosed with schizophrenia due to early 
onset, lack of hallucinations, and family histories. He also identified three key defining 
characteristics of autism: social isolation, language impairments, and insistence on 
sameness (Kanner 1943). Today, these remain defining characteristics of the disorder (see 
DSM5: American Psychiatric Association 2013). Kanner asserted that social isolation seemed 
to be the most salient of these characteristics, and consequently used the label “autism” to 
describe the disorder. Kanner (1943) wrote: “There is from the start an extreme autistic 
aloneness that, whenever possible, disregards, ignores, shuts out anything that comes to 
the child from the outside” (Kanner 1943: 242). He also noted that the condition existed 
amongst children diagnosed within the broader frameworks of “schizophrenia” and 
“feeblemindedness”: 
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These characteristics form a unique “syndrome,” not heretofore reported, which seems to be 
rare enough, yet is probably more frequent than is indicated by the paucity of observed cases. It 
is quite possible that some such children have been viewed as feebleminded or schizophrenic. In 
fact, several children of our group were introduced to us as idiots or imbeciles, one still resides in 
a state school for the feebleminded, and two had been previously considered as schizophrenic. 
(Kanner 1943: 242)  
 
Given Kanner was working with white upper/middle-class families, the very “discovery” of 
autism can be derived from a social need pushed by these parents in the mid-twentieth 
century. While the category of feeblemindedness continued as a widespread phenomenon 
among the lower classes, the label of autism served to initially differentiate the wealthier 
classes through clinical professionals (whose services were expensive) applying a “rare” 
label to middle- and upper-class children (Eyal et al 2010). Meanwhile, 
 
Within the institution, autism was completely below the radar, undifferentiated from an 
inchoate mass of institutional residents. Childhood schizophrenia was able to thrive during this 
period...precisely because it lost the delicate balance and swung all the way into the domain of 
mental illness, the domain of the psychiatric hospital and electroconvulsive treatment. (Eyal et 
al. 2010: 56) 
 
In practice, it appears that the professional and societal treatment of those classed as 
developmentally disabled or feebleminded in Australia continued to be dominated by the 
belief that little could be done for such individuals. Diagnostic and assessment practises 
continued to perpetuate the undifferentiated “inchoate mass” that existed within the 
institution. This situation in Australia during the 1950s to 1970s was discussed by two of the 
interview participants – Mr A (child psychologist) and Doctor P (psychiatrist):  
 
[Autistic children] would have fallen into the DD [Developmentally Disabled] category. Almost 
invariably. Some of the higher-functioning people...I dunno, they might have found themselves in 
other areas, but I think DD would have swallowed most of them...we had the DD services in the 
psych hospital, and initially, as I said, they were mixed up a bit. But then they got separate wards 
for them. But we also had DD services outside the psych hospital, and they varied a lot. (Doctor P 
(psychiatrist) – interview data) 
 
[T]he old style Royal Derwent [psychiatric] Hospital, where I did my prac placement in 1974; it 
had something like 2000 patients, but very few of them were identified with autism...basically, 
back then, the awful terms ‘mentally defective’ or ‘with psychotic illnesses’ [were used]. (Mr A 
(psychologist) – interview data)  
 
People were referred to as ‘retarded,’ it wasn’t even ‘intellectual disability’ back then. The 
categories were ‘Moron’ – a whole lot of inappropriate labels were used to describe people. I 
suppose it was a hangover from the 1960s, that institutions were where people who weren’t 
managing well in the mainstream went. For some it was tragic, as their main issues were not 
their intellectual disability, or even mental illness, but a combination of learning difficulties and 
hearing impairment, visual impairment: [disorders] that people in those days just understood as 
something that needed to be shut away. Terrible! (Mr A) 
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Throughout the first half of the twentieth century in Australia, medical practitioners often 
placed pressure on parents to place their developmentally disabled child in institutions like 
Kew Asylum. These societal attitudes towards children with developmental disabilities were 
fuelled by eugenics, the medicalisation of treatment approaches (centred within the 
institution), and the failure of governments and medical practitioners to recognise the 
differences between the care needed for the mentally ill and the intellectually disabled 
(Gillgren 1996). The intellectually disabled child was viewed as a “hopeless case,” incurable 
and therefore unworthy of Government funding: a population that, in the eyes of the 
authorities, was entirely expendable. In some cases, parents were told by doctors to 
“‘forget’ about their newborn, to go home and have another baby, or devote themselves to 
their other child or children” and most parents did as they were told (Manning 2008: 30). 
This often unquestioning acceptance of medical judgement reflects the popular attitude 
held amongst Australians at that time that medical specialists “knew best” (Manning 2008: 
31).  
 
However, during the 1950s in Australia, it was the paraprofessionals (that is, psychologists, 
dedicated educationists, occupational and speech therapists) united alongside parents and 
medical personnel that began to bring about changes in attitudes towards the feebleminded 
as well as altering the lives of individuals with mental impairment. The most powerful tool 
used by these united groups was research: through this medium they were able to show 
that learning for handicapped children seemed to follow a similar sequence as for 
“normally” functioning children; it simply occurred at a slower rate (Lewis 1988). This shift in 
attitude towards the “mentally retarded” also affected how it was socially and medically 
perceived. Whereas in the pre-war period, mental retardation was conceived of as a 
physiological condition and thus dealt with via segregation and prevention of reproduction, 
in the 1960s the notion that mental retardation was linked with lower socio-economic 
status (that is, those living in urban and rural slums) brought about a shift in social and 
cultural explanations. In Australia, this led to the formation of parents’ bodies such as the 
Australian Council for the Mentally Retarded – which did much to improve the facilities for 
those individuals during the 1950s and 1960s (Lewis 1988) – and the Slow Learning 
Children’s Group (SLCG) in Western Australia – which formed in 1951 and led to the 
establishment of residential facilities for children with intellectual disabilities, speech and 
occupational therapy clinics, and diagnostic and testing centres. This growth was driven by a 
string of highly successful publicity and fundraising campaigns – led by parents – which 
aimed to not only provide these groups with some much needed funding, but also to 
convince governments and the Australian public that children with intellectual disabilities 
deserved the community’s attention and the government’s support (Earl 2011). 
Furthermore, the emergence of the Australian Group for the Scientific Study of Mental 
Deficiency, established in the 1960s by professionals in the field, demonstrated the 
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optimism surrounding the capabilities of those with mental impairment in their education, 
training, socialisation and rehabilitation (Lewis 1988).  
 
When one examines the accounts of hospital staff and doctors describing the conditions of 
institutions housing children with intellectual disabilities, it is not surprising that such action 
was taken by parents. In an interview with Doctor Guy Hamilton (Gillgren 1996), the former 
senior medical officer at Claremont – an institution in Western Australia for children with 
intellectual disabilities – the reality of institutional life during the early 1960s is revealed: 
 
The care was appalling. In the male children’s ward, J Block, there were people who lay in bed 
with bed sores until they died; there were cot cases for whom little but basic nursing was 
provided; there was no policy of training and the care of 40 people in a ward by two or three 
rostered staff was inadequate. At meal times, they were seated at arm’s length from each other, 
so that they couldn’t grab each other’s food, which I suspect they did simply because they were 
hungry. Many who were incontinent were often hosed down outside, even in winter in the so-
called airing court. There was no individual care, there was no love, there was no care at all and 
all bad behaviour was coped with in the medical fashion, using what some used to call ‘chemical 
warfare’ against them. This was a medical response to abnormal behaviour; there was little 
psychological treatment or training. It was the only place in the world that I have found children 
as young as two years being referred to simply by their surnames...They were receiving worse 
treatment than animals and most certainly were not being treated as children. (Gillgren 1996: 78-
9) 
 
During the mid-1960s, parent groups began campaigning for real change via a new approach 
to the needs of the mentally impaired who were housed in psychiatric hospitals. Many 
hospitals set up training and re-education programs and the general process of moving the 
mentally impaired (residing in institutions) into special units where adequate attention 
could be provided took place (Earl 2011; Lewis 1988). The law was also updated to reflect 
the changing philosophy at the time. For example, the repeal of the Lunacy Act 1903 and 
enactment of the Mental Health Act 1962 in Western Australia represented the 
modernisation of law towards mental disorders (Rayner and Cockram 1996). Most 
importantly, the Mental Health Act Amendment Act 1965 (WA) introduced the word 
“intellectual” into the definition of mental disorder, thus separating mental illness (“a 
psychiatric or other illness that substantially impairs mental health”) from the “intellectually 
defective” (“suffering from arrested or incomplete development of mind”).  
 
Indeed, Carman-Brown and Fox (1996) argue that these changes were the first steps 
towards deinstitutionalisation within Western Australia, and this action challenged the 
fundamental conceptions about what intellectual disability was and how it should be 
treated. This opened up fertile new ground for the paraprofessions, particularly 
psychologists, to lay claim to. While psychiatrists remained tethered to institutional 
practices (psychotropic drugs, incarceration, and clinical interaction with and treatment of 
their patients, whom psychiatrists believed to be predominantly the mentally ill rather than 
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people with intellectual disabilities), psychologists had a new tool that, when wielded within 
the community setting, completely altered disability services (Carman-Brown and Fox 1996). 
Behaviourism represented a new path for Australian psychology due to its focus on 
observable behaviours rather than the unobservable and un-quantifiable inner-workings of 
the mind. Thus, it was measurable, efficient, useful, and had “scientific” status. The impact 
that behavioural psychology had on the developmentally disabled population, and 
particularly those labelled autistic, will be addressed in more detail in the next section.  
 
Funding for the intellectually handicapped increased substantially in the 1970s when the 
Whitlam Government introduced two Bills – the Sheltered Employment (Assistance) Bill and 
the Handicapped Children (Assistance) Bill – which provided funds for sheltered workshops, 
residential accommodation, training centres and training equipment (Lewis 1988). 
Allowances were also paid to parents of children who received care within the family and 
invalid pensions were paid to handicapped people sixteen years and older who were classed 
as 85 per cent incapacitated (Lewis 1988).  
 
It is evident that the rise in paraprofessions, and their alliance with parents, had a very 
important impact on the conception of autism in Australia in the mid to late 1960s. The 
formation of not-for-profit organisations by parents, such as the Autistic Children’s 
Association of South Australia (now known as Autism SA) – which provided services to 
individuals with autism and their families – began to emerge in Australia during the 1960s. 
This effort culminated in the organisation of the first conference on autism ever to be held 
in Australia in 1967 – Autism: Cure Tomorrow, Care Today. This conference saw the 
gathering of professionals and government officials from around the world to discuss topics 
of diagnosis, psychological assessment, therapeutic techniques and educational techniques 
for the autistic child. The presentations are peppered with hope – that science will provide 
the answers as to how to better diagnose and treat autism – but also tempered with the 
realisation that the condition itself is inherently enigmatic. Some examples of this optimism 
and realism are conveyed below by the Minister for Health at the time, the Honourable A.J. 
Shard (1967), a professor of child health at the University of Queensland, T.J. Rendle-Short 
(1967), and a professor of clinical psychology at Monash University,  E. Morey (1967): 
 
It has been said that generally autistic children are perfect physically and if we could only find the 
key to unlock them from their detached state we would uncover perfectly normal children. I 
realise that such a golden key will not be immediately produced at this conference. However, I 
am confident that this first Australian conference on autism will provide useful guidelines to the 
ultimate design of such a key. (Shard 1967: 11) 
 
When a new disease is recognized the pattern of events is usually as follows: At first all we have 
is a conglomeration of apparently unrelated symptoms. Later this group of symptoms is found to 
have a certain pattern and we give the new disease a name. The next stage is to find out the 
causation and if possible to the treatment of this new disease.  
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With Infantile Autism we are really only just past stage one: that is to say, we have some 
knowledge of the signs of and symptoms but we do not yet know which are most important. We 
do not know the cause and the treatment is largely symptomatic. We are not even agreed upon 
the name of the condition. (Rendle-Short 1967: 35) 
 
The psychological assessment of autistic children is no easy matter...As Edith Meyer-Taylor 
writes, ‘Not only may the whole of the psychological examination resemble a psychological 
experiment, but also each individual test situation. The child himself, rather than the test that is 
being administered, is the subject of experimentation...’ If our techniques are inappropriate and 
unsuited to assess a child, then he may well be ‘untestable’ and it is better to observe his 
behaviour rather than to attempt an assessment...[Autistic children] present us, both as 
psychologists and educators, with a tremendous challenge. (Morey 1967: 108-9) 
 
These quotes provide insight into professional attitudes towards the newly emerging 
condition of autism within Australia during the 1960s. While Shard, the politician, conveys 
the hope that many parents and professionals have invested in the world of science and 
medicine – that the right combination of early recognition, therapies and education will 
“unlock” the autism to reveal the “normal” child within – Rendle-Short and Morey, the 
doctor and psychologist, present the clinical reality of the practising professional. Rendle-
Short is concerned about what symptoms should make up autism, what causes it and how 
should we treat it, while Morey poses questions about whether autism can be diagnosed 
within the standardised paradigm of psychology. It is important to recognise that these 
questions, particularly those regarding the very act of defining and construing autism, were 
being raised at this time in Australia and that they were a point of contention for many 
clinicians, before the formal inclusion of autism in the DSM-III in 1980.  
 
The Australian parental experience of autism during the 1960s and 1970s: pioneers, 
advocates, experts  
The Autism: Cure Tomorrow, Care Today conference had a very clear, clinical focus – its aim 
was to provide professionals and families with information on the diagnosis, treatment and 
education of the autistic child. However, one perspective it failed to incorporate was that of 
the parents. It is appropriate therefore, at this point, to explore the diagnostic testimonies 
of some parents of children labelled with a developmental disability (including autism) 
during the 1960s and 1970s in Australia. What is clear from personal accounts provided by 
parents about their child’s diagnostic experience is that it was not a simple, straightforward 
process of going to the doctor and receiving a label. In Manning’s (2008) Bye-Bye Charlie, 
the reader is given a rare glimpse into the world of Kew Cottages, an institutional setting for 
individuals with an intellectual disability. Through the combination of oral testimony from a 
range of people including residents, families, staff, policy makers, and visitors, as well as 
documentary evidence, the book provides insight into institutional living. Manning (2008) 
references two cases of autism (probably diagnosed in the late 1960s to early 1970s, 
although she does not specify any dates) in Bye-Bye Charlie, quoting the mothers’ 
experiences of diagnosis and treatment in Australia:  
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As a little fellow, of say three, Stephen wasn’t talking, and we thought he must be deaf. I knew of 
the Princess Elizabeth Kindergarten for Deaf Children...so I took Stephen up there ... At the end 
of six months the Directress ... called me in and she said: ‘No Rosalie, Stephen isn’t deaf, I don’t 
know what his problem is.’ Then came the search. I got a lot of literature from America, there 
was this strange thing called ‘autism’. Autism just wasn’t a word in Australia. ('Rosalie' in 
Manning 2008) 
 
Who is to blame? What is to blame? These are questions that many parents of children with 
intellectual disability desperately seek to answer. Sometimes, however, there is no immediate 
explanation. This was the case for Rose and Martin Miller and their son, Sean. Rose explained: 
‘we really don’t know what happened... He was born perfectly normal ... [When he was] about a 
year old ... He just stopped developing like a baby does. He was tested for all sorts of things and 
nothing showed up.’ The local doctor referred Rose to a paediatrician who coldly told her that 
Sean would not develop any further. Unhappy with this doctor’s attitude and prognosis, she 
sought a second opinion and was sent to Elizabeth Turner at the Children’s Hospital. Sean 
underwent a battery of tests including those to determine if he had encephalitis, 
phenylketonuria or deafness. All tests were negative. Without a definitive diagnosis, and with the 
behaviours Sean was exhibiting, autism appeared a possibility. (Manning 2008: 48-9) 
 
From these accounts, it appears autism was a default diagnosis. When all other diagnostic 
options were exhausted through negative results, autism may have been the diagnostic 
fallback. Autism remained an unknown entity, a label attributed to enigmatic cases and a 
label that certainly did not provide any answers in terms of treatment approaches. These 
accounts are consistent with Lurline Morphett’s (1986) experience of receiving a diagnosis 
of autism for her son during the 1960s, outlined in her book Face to Face. She discusses 
taking her son to her general practitioner, a paediatrician, a psychiatric social worker, and 
finally to a psychiatrist. What is most striking about her account is how little information 
and explanation she is given by most of the clinicians she came into contact with: “There 
seems to be something wrong...but I don’t know what it is” (32); “From [the paediatrician’s 
description], I came to the conclusion that this was a severe mental illness” (34); “[The 
paediatrician] referred me to a child psychiatrist who, he said, was better equipped to deal 
with such problems and would confirm whether the diagnosis was correct” (34); “having 
been interviewed by the psychiatric social worker who asked a host of questions, and 
answered none” (36); “[The psychiatrist] did not realise we had never been exposed to the 
technical terms which were commonplace to him” (36). The general attitude toward 
children with a developmental disability at this time appears to have been medically 
oriented, focused on the incurability of intellectual disabilities: 
 
Certainly [the psychiatrist] was saying that the chances of Simon ever being normal were 
negligible, and that even if he made good progress he was likely to spend most of his life in a 
mental institution. (Morphett 1986: 37) 
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However, from Morphett’s discussion of the recommendations made by the Australian child 
psychiatrist, it is evident that parent advocacy and community service provision were 
certainly underway – the essential ingredients for the changes to later come with 
deinstitutionalisation: 
 
We were to write to England for a small booklet by Lorna Wing, a British authority on autism. In 
it were the answers to many of our queries. We were to contact the president of the state’s 
Autistic Children’s Association, of which the inaugural meeting had been held just a week before. 
By this means we could come into contact with other parents of autistic children, though, being a 
rare and recently recognised condition, there were not many children in our city as yet 
diagnosed. The final suggestion was aimed at providing our family with some relief from Simon’s 
persistent, irrational demands and in familiarising him with a different environment. We were to 
add his name to the waiting list of those seeking admission to a day school for seriously mentally 
handicapped children. We later carried out each of these suggestions, though the third one was 
not followed through to its conclusion. (Morphett 1986: 37) 
 
Similarly, Mr D’s son’s (“Joe”) diagnostic story follows a similar path to Morphett’s (1986) 
account:  
 
I don’t know how early we began to think we needed help because it takes quite a while to 
realise something more serious is happening and probably he was a bit under two [years old] 
when we felt he wasn’t developing normally. He hadn’t learnt things like feeding himself...So we 
saw our GP and said he doesn’t seem to be developing properly, and our GP said the Department 
of Health has a paediatric service in Parramatta and he referred us to them. We made an 
appointment. They brought in external specialists, one was a leading Sydney paediatrician to 
help assist families. I can’t give you an exact sequence of events; at first they just said, “he’s a 
slow developer, he’ll come good in time.” And so some time went by and he didn’t come good 
and we went back to them...at one stage they suggested psychoanalysing his mother – they 
suggested it, we declined. We had two daughters, we’d raised children before. We knew we  
were rational people – (laughs) I do have a University degree, I might come in the category of 
being suspected of being distant but his mother didn’t come into this category....They still 
persisted with the belief that he would come good...but sometime when he was about three to 
four [years old], the Readers Digest published a list of the attributes of autism...there were 
twenty different aspects of autism and he scored in our view, thirteen of them...autism is just 
like that, no one person will have all twenty, but some will have these and some will have those. 
So, we asked through this service was he autistic and they said, “No, he’s definitely not autistic.” 
Had we not been given that incorrect advice, we would have looked to the Autistic Children’s 
Association earlier. Whether that would have made a difference or not, I don’t know. They said 
he’s “negative-elective mute.” That is a way of saying [it] medically. (1) 
 
After four years of not receiving a diagnosis through the public system, other than the term 
“negative-elective mute,” numerous failed attempts to attain treatment services such as 
speech therapy, and placements in preschools and schools, Mr D took Joe to a paediatric 
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specialist, who then recommended they see a Professor of paediatric psychiatry – Julian 
Katz5: 
 
[Katz] took [Joe] aside into his office, leaving us for about ten minutes; and he came back and he 
said: “there’s autism there and he needs to get to an appropriate facility.” At that time the 
Autistic Children’s Association was based at Belrose in a cottage, which was full; but the new 
facility at Forestville was just completing and there was hope that we could get him in there 
when it was completed. That would probably be 1971 – Katz had a social worker who got Joe 
into [A facility]...The Principal of [the facility]... took him in and I went to see them one day – 
there was a group of children with the teacher and they had a picture of a dog; they were going 
round saying “d” for dog; what was [Joe] doing? – He was wandering round the room taking no 
notice. He just didn’t stay sitting with the group. This is characteristic of autism and the reason 
for the one to four ratio of teachers, because they do not concentrate in the normal way – you 
can’t get a group of them to work together. You have to work one to one at that early stage...he 
was there for a year and then the opportunity came to go to the Autistic Children’s School – this 
would have been [19]71-72 and he would have been six [years old].  
 
It is evident from Mr D’s account of this consult with Katz that diagnostic tools (such as an 
IQ test) were not used (due to Katz’s short interaction with Joe), and it is most likely that his 
diagnostic approach was consistent with earlier approaches (outlined above) that focused 
on subjective factors and observable phenomena.  
 
Furthermore, it is also apparent that Mr D played an active and informed part in obtaining 
the best diagnostic services and treatment for Joe. Yet many of his concerns and queries 
were dismissed throughout the diagnostic process. While it is widely accepted today 
amongst clinicians that parents coming to them with concerns about their child have an 
important and powerful role in the assessment and management of the child, it is important 
to realise that such an attitude was somewhat of an anomaly amongst clinicians before the 
1990s. An infant welfare nurse presenting at the First Twenty-Four Months in the Life of a 
Mentally Retarded Child and its Family Conference in Victoria in the 1970s, however, 
cautions clinicians against dismissing the parent’s gut instincts: 
 
However frequently we see a baby and however closely we have observed his progress we are 
not seeing him as his parents see him. When parents express concern there are almost always 
grounds for that concern, and there is always a need for careful investigation and consultation 
with the parents. (Morris 1977: 21) 
 
The difficulties experienced by families in researching, resourcing and locating treatments 
for those with mental impairment or developmental disabilities was a major discussion 
point at the First Twenty-Four Months in the Life of a Mentally Retarded Child and its Family 
Conference in Victoria in 1977. The Director of the Mental Deficiency Services, Doctor 
                                                           
5 Julian Katz was appointed as the first Professor of Child Psychiatry in Australia in 1963 at Sydney’s Royal 
Alexandria Hospital for Children and the University of Sydney.  
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Barlow, highlights the “tremendous fragmentation” that characterises service provision for 
children with mental impairment and developmental disabilities. He states: 
 
there is a complete lack of co-ordination. This stands out as probably one of the greatest 
handicaps to progress in the field of mental retardation in the State. The fragmentation and lack 
of coordination means, too...that even when services are available they are not necessarily 
known to be available. The mother who spoke used the term “stumbled into” – she stumbled 
into a number of services and sources of information, almost by accident. There is something 
terribly wrong when this has to happen. When services are so light on the ground anyway, we 
suffer in addition from the fact that nobody knows about half of them and what they’re doing. 
(Barlow 1977: 78) 
 
Mr D outlines the various schools his son Joe attended from preschool to primary school to 
special education providers during the late 1970s. The Autistic Children’s School was where 
he spent most of his primary school years (six to twelve years old). This school represented 
a leap forward in service provision for children with autism at the time given they were 
using ratios of 1 teacher to 4 children, with additional teacher’s aids. Significantly, Mr D 
explains, this was brought about by campaigning by both parents and Dr Katz 
(paediatrician).  
 
From a clinical perspective, Mr A (psychologist, interview data) discusses the very limited 
clinical knowledge with regards to treatment approaches for children diagnosed with a 
developmental disability or autism during the 1970s. He emphasises that schools would 
have been the main environment that children with a developmental disability or autism 
diagnosis received some form of therapeutic attention, however, he qualifies: 
 
[T]here weren’t so many special ed [education] teachers, there certainly weren’t speech 
pathologists or psychologists who specialised in intervention back in the 60s; that began to occur 
in the 70s certainly; so sadly, there weren’t a range of [clinical] disciplines involved; often parents 
were told this is how your child is, the outlook is pretty grim; the child won’t be able to do this or 
that; and it was a bit of a death, outcomes limiting sentence that they got from the 
diagnosticians. (Mr A – interview data) 
 
The various people (such as family and treatment providers) and situations the parent has 
to deal with and manage post-diagnosis creates a highly stressful and emotionally charged 
period in their life.  Coupled with lack of services, lack of treatment, lack of funding, and the 
inevitability of institutionalisation in childhood or adulthood, parents had very little hope 
and expectations for a child diagnosed with a developmental disability in Australia prior to 
the 1980s. However, it is clear from Earl’s (2011) research – exploring the development of 
parent advocacy groups for children with intellectual disabilities in Australia – that post-
World War II, parents and the community took on an increasingly active role in the care and 
assistance of children with an intellectual disability. This gradual growth in parent 
involvement from the late 1940s to the 1980s in Australia, along with the growth in the 
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paraprofessions, set the stage for a new network of expertise to develop in the wake of 
deinstitutionalisation. The removal of the institution as the “treatment facility” and the 
formation of an alliance between parents and therapists heralded new ways of treating this 
“undifferentiated inchoate mass” of institutionalised children within the home and the 
community (Eyal et al. 2010). The changes brought about in Australia (and worldwide) 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s by parent advocacy, the principle of normalisation, 
changes to the law and other classificatory devices, and an increase in government funding 
were all vital to the reshaping of the Australian public’s attitudes towards people with 
intellectual disabilities and how they should be treated and supported (Rayner and Cockram 
1996). The growing strength of these attitudes was a strong catalyst for change: replacing 
the medically-dominated custodial and institutional approaches to services with a 
community-based treatment program – deinstitutionalisation.  
 
Section 2: Deinstitutionalisation in Australia: from “undifferentiated 
mass” to “autism epidemic”  
Section 2 of this chapter will examine the process of deinstitutionalisation in Australia, the 
effect it had on diagnosis, treatment, and service provision for children and adults with a 
developmental disability, and how Eyal et al’s (2010) historical analysis of how the autism 
spectrum became the preferred way to represent and intervene in childhood disorders. 
While Eyal et al’s (2010) work is rooted in the US context, this section will demonstrate the 
ways in which it converges and diverges with the Australian context. Crucial to this 
discussion is the rise of the paraprofessions, particularly psychologists, in the classification, 
diagnosis and treatment of intellectual and developmental disabilities in Australia. This 
section will shed light on how autism came to be the paradigmatic childhood disorder – 
emerging in the void between mental illness (that is, childhood schizophrenia) and mental 
retardation – and how it has come to hold an “epidemic” status in Australia and many other 
parts of the world today. As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, an important 
source of information for this section has been obtained through interviews with two 
Australian psychiatrists (Doctor P and Doctor C), an Australian psychologist (Mr A) – all of 
whom have practised both before and after deinstitutionalisation – and the father of an 
individual diagnosed with autism in the early 1970s in Sydney, Australia (Mr D).  
 
It is important to point out that while much has been achieved in Australia through the 
process of deinstitutionalisation, the transition has been far from smooth, unproblematic, 
and preordained. In fact, deinstitutionalisation has taken somewhat of an uncertain and 
halting path: 
 
Deinstitutionalisation and normalisation proceeded almost by trial and error, structured by 
imperfect and contradictory understandings of their meanings; changes in their meaning through 
elaboration and experience; the influence of new professions ‘on the make’; decidedly 
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ambivalent public understandings of disability itself; and constant constraints on funding. (Stella 
1996: 93) 
 
Normalisation 
Before exploring what deinstitutionalisation means within the Australian context, it is 
necessary to briefly examine the philosophical underpinnings of this movement. The terms 
deinstitutionalisation and normalisation often appear together, and are even used 
synonymously sometimes to describe the policy and philosophy of moving formerly 
institutionalised individuals out into the community. The publication of Changing Patterns of 
Residential Services for the Mentally Retarded in 1969 saw the articulation of the principles 
of normalisation by key thinkers such as Bengt Nirje and Wolf Wolfensberger. For Nirje, 
normalisation involved establishing a quality of life for the intellectually disabled that was 
equal to the patterns and conditions of the everyday life of mainstream society (in 
President's Committee on Mental Retardation 1969). This definition was further elaborated 
upon by Wolfensberger: 
 
Use of culturally normative means (familiar, valued techniques, tools, methods), in order to 
enable persons life conditions (income, housing, health services, etc.) which are at least as good 
as that of average citizens, and to as much as possible enhance or support their behavior (skills, 
competencies, etc.), appearances (clothes, grooming, etc.), experiences (adjustment, feelings, 
etc.), and status and reputation (labels, attitudes of others, etc.). (Wolfensberger 1980: 80) 
 
Wolfensberger (1983) also proposed the term social role valorisation to describe the 
development of the normalisation principle. This term explains the phenomenon of social 
devaluation – whereby individuals who are seen as socially deviant both lose valued social 
roles and are given devalued roles – and the need to counteract this process by supporting 
processes which enable devalued individuals to attain and keep valued social roles (such as 
“employee” and “friend”) and avoid negative roles (such as “patient” and “deviant”) as they 
move out into the community. Thus, Wolfensberger (1983) argued that institutions breed 
attitudes of social devaluation through the practise of grouping devalued individuals 
together and isolating them from the community. Thus, social role valorisation is dependent 
upon discontinuing the practice of institutionalisation.  
 
Embracing the Principle of Normalisation: Deinstitutionalising Australian Facilities  
When defining the term “deinstitutionalisation,” it is important to differentiate between the 
individual and the institution itself, because the term has different meanings for these 
different entities. Thus, for Doctor P, institutionalisation of an individual within Australia 
means 
 
[Y]ou take away a person’s independence and you make them dependent on you as the treating 
or controlling person...in doing so...you take away their daily living skills, because they cease to 
have to do things for themselves: all their meals are supplied, in some cases clothing is supplied, 
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all medical care/dental care is automatic, they don’t do shopping, excursions (if there are any 
they’re organised by the treating team), and so on and so on. So you take away a person’s ability 
to be independent. In addition, you expose them to a regime, which is very controlling and 
determines exactly how they’re going to spend most of their day, and most of their life in fact. 
 
Thus, to deinstitutionalise an individual, one must address all of these factors that have 
contributed to their identification with an institutionalised individual. People must be re-
taught daily living skills, interacting in the community, carrying out tasks independently, 
making independent judgements about their lives and daily activities. All the abilities that 
have been stripped from the individual must be replaced. To deinstitutionalise the 
institution/hospital itself the structure and function of the hospital needs to be changed. 
Doctor P claims that before the 1961 Royal Commission in NSW, headed by Justice 
McClements, which set out some fundamental human rights for the mentally ill and 
mentally impaired, “some wards in psychiatric hospitals built for about 60 patients housed 
100 patients.” Thus, deinstitutionalising the structure of the psychiatric hospital involved 
housing patients in more appropriate conditions. Changing the function of the hospital 
involved altering treatment practices and staff practices/routines. Here, the aims of 
deinstitutionalising the individual were operationalised with the provision of patient 
autonomy through enabling patients to make decisions about their own treatment.  
 
The next step in the process of deinstitutionalisation is the movement or placement of 
individuals out into the community. This is distinguished from community care and is the 
subject of much debate when discussions around the effectiveness of deinstitutionalisation 
take place. According to Doctor P, community placement of individuals in institutions was 
taking place as early as the 1960s, long before the Richmond Report. He explains: 
 
One of the major reasons was that in...1955 we actually got tranquilisers...we didn’t have 
medications before that that were in use, apart from trying to control aggression basically – 
sedating people. We got the modern tranquilisers and the anti-psychotic drugs and we started 
using them in Australia in 1955. Within a matter of a year, the medical superintendant at 
Gladesville Hospital was writing his annual report to the Inspector General for the Insane (as it 
was in those days) that this had made a dramatic difference, patients who were uncontrollable 
were now controllable, patients who we thought would never move out into the community 
were now moving out into the community.  
 
Doctor P references a hand-drawn graph throughout the interview that charts the numbers 
of patients in residence at the Gladesville Hospital, Sydney, from 1958 to 1990 
(unfortunately I am unable to provide a copy of the graph as Dr P’s ethics approvals and 
data sources were unknown). This graph shows the dramatic drop in patients from 1958 to 
1980s. Thus, physically emptying out the institutions – one component of the 
deinstitutionalisation definition – took place in Australia between the late 1950s to the early 
1970s, according to Doctor P. Once physically outside of the institution, the former patients 
were: “more or less on [their] own. If you wanted ongoing treatment you came back to an 
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outpatient department, generally inside a hospital somewhere and you give them a script 
for drugs and send them away, that was it” (Doctor P). Prior to 1967, former 
institutionalised patients were released into the community without any financial aid or 
support. This, according to Doctor P, caused huge problems for these individuals and 
psychiatrists: patient numbers built up in outpatient departments, leaving many individuals 
stranded, helpless and homeless.  However, in 1967 the Commonwealth Government 
extended invalid pensions to developmentally disabled individuals, and later further 
extended this pension to mentally ill individuals. This pension was known as a “Sheltered 
Employment Allowance” (Department of Family and Community Services 2001; Department 
of Social Security 2009). Doctor P claims that the Sheltered Employment Allowance brought 
about “enormous changes” because it meant that “patients could save money, they had 
money for rent and bonds, they could go out into the community – so it meant that giving 
patients pensions made a huge difference.”  
 
While community placement was underway from the late 1950s onwards, community care 
was not implemented in earnest until the 1970s. Doctor P believes that community care was 
taking place, on a very small scale, in the 1960s through the staff of hospitals going out to 
visit discharged patients to check up on them. With the election of the Whitlam 
Government in 1972, there was a significant rise in funding for community care and 
community health. Doctor P states:  
 
A part of their funding was community health funding, and that funding enabled the 
development, for the first time, of comprehensive community care services (instead of just 
community placement, which is just bunging people out there)...[so] you now have community 
care, which means adequate follow-up, proper intervention, and other forms of care quite apart 
from just popping in and saying, “How’re you going? Here’s your tablets, blah!” and that’s it.  
 
However, this initial funding was steadily cut back: “initially it was Commonwealth funding, 
then it became Commonwealth-State funding, and of course the States jacked-up, and so it 
has taken a long while for it to develop where it is” (Doctor P).  
 
Dr P’s data source relates to the “mentally ill” population. However, the graph below (Figure 
1.3) shows the Kew Cottages – Australia’s largest institution for people with an intellectual 
disability – population peaked at 948 residents in 1968, with a rapid decrease in residents 
from 1977 up until its closure in 2007. Thus, comparison of the figures from Gladesville 
Hospital and Kew Asylum (Cottages) indicates that deinstitutionalisation of the intellectual 
disabled population began roughly twenty years later than the deinstitutionalisation of the 
mentally ill. This is probably due to impact of antipsychotics on the mentally ill population 
during the 1960s, whereas medication would have played less of a role for those with an 
intellectual disability.  
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Figure 1.3 (Manning 2008: 20): Kew Cottages Population Statistics by Decade from 1887-
2007 
 
 
In their report, Children with Disabilities in Australia, the Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare (AIHW) (2004) demonstrates that the impact of deinstitutionalisation on children 
with disabilities occurred primarily during the 1980s, with 9% of children with a severe 
disability living in cared accommodation in 1981, compared with 0.4% in 1998. The AIHW 
(2004) also points out that for children with intellectual disabilities the term non-
institutionalisation is perhaps more fitting than deinstitutionalisation, as this process of 
change has tended to be more about these younger individuals staying in the community in 
greater numbers, rather than moving out of institutions. For children with intellectual 
disabilities, the changes in attitudes, legislation and government involvement in Australia 
resulted in an improvement in access and availability of services, the introduction of income 
support for their carers, and more support from the mainstream education system. 
However, with the majority of these children now residing in households, provision of care 
rested mainly on the shoulders of family care givers. This has led to adverse health effects 
for the caregivers (that is, focusing on the health of the child has led to the caregiver 
ignoring their own health) as well as relationship strain and stress (30% of children with a 
disability live within a single parent family, compared to 18% of children without disabilities) 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) 2004).  
 
When consulting Australian policy documents formally outlining the process and aims of 
deinstitutionalisation, such as the Richmond Report (New South Wales Inquiry into Health 
Services for the Psychiatrically Ill and Developmentally Disabled 1983) and Policies for 
Developmental Disability Services (NSW Department of Health 1985), it is evident that the 
principles of normalisation have been formally acknowledged and upheld. For the NSW 
Department of Health (1985), normalisation: 
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advocates that the ways in which services assist persons with a developmental disability and the 
lifestyles which these services support should be valued by society in general and perceived as 
being as normal as possible within a local community and culture. (2) 
 
This philosophy is enacted by providing children and adults with a developmental disability 
with care, support, opportunities and agency in their everyday life. Thus, 
deinstitutionalisation or non-institutionalisation means not only being out in the 
community, but promoting dignity and independence, enhancing self-respect, encouraging 
and assisting the individual to lead a productive and satisfying life, ensuring the individual 
receives remuneration for productive work activities, encouraging and assisting individuals 
to make their own decisions, and having the opportunity to participate in community life 
(NSW Department of Health 1985: 2).  
 
The Richmond Report (New South Wales Inquiry into Health Services for the Psychiatrically 
Ill and Developmentally Disabled 1983) also made a very important distinction between the 
nature and needs of mental illness in comparison to the intellectually disabled. The 
separation of these two categories is an important feature of Eyal et al’s (2010) autism 
matrix theory, which will be discussed in the following section. In Australia, this separation 
meant the following:  
 
(a) The identification of two separate and distinct client groups 
(b) The establishment of two distinct management structures 
(c) The separation of budgets  
(d) The total physical separation of the two services 
(e) The employment of distinct client-specific categories of staff in each of the two service areas 
(NSW Department of Health 1985: 6) 
 
Hand in hand with the process of deinstitutionalisation was the considerable legislative 
development within Australia from the mid 1980s onwards which empowered the disabled 
through anti-discrimination and protective legislation. This legislation is vitally important in 
ensuring the rights of the intellectually disabled as well as determining what and how much 
help individuals may receive. Prior to this, the Australian Federal Government’s involvement 
in disability policy was limited to provision of pensions, some funding, benefits and direct 
services controlled by the Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service. By establishing and 
sponsoring some important initiatives in 1983, such as the Disability Advisory Council of 
Australia – consisting of people with disabilities and their advocates – and the Handicapped 
Programs Review, the Federal Labor Government at the time was able to make its mark and 
have a profound effect on disability service delivery throughout Australia (Rayner and 
Cockram 1996). These changes – that is, the emptying out of institutions, the changes in 
legislation, the changes in societal attitudes towards the intellectually disabled and mentally 
ill – are all the more impressive when one considers the group at the heart of this 
movement:  
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New services and legislation for people with intellectual disabilities did not arise because the 
medical professions decided they should. The response by the law in the late twentieth century 
to intellectual disability is a success story for families and ordinary citizens who formed interest 
groups, demanded government action, and who were prepared to go out and start the service 
themselves. They should not be left unresourced and excluded as ‘volunteers’ or clients. They 
should be a part of the rule-making, service development process. (Rayner and Cockram 1996: 
162) 
 
The Autism Matrix – differentiating the mass post-deinstitutionalisation  
The key question that must be asked now is: How did these shifts within the Australian 
context in terms of the professional/clinical domain (from medical model and dominance of 
psychiatrists and doctors to the developmental model with power ascribed to the 
paraprofessions, particularly psychologists), legal documents (changed legislation embracing 
the principles of normalisation), advocacy groups (the rise of parent activism) and social 
attitudes (for example, the Year of the Disabled in 1981 (Goddard, Davidson, Daly, and 
Mackey 2008)) affect the individuals who were formally institutionalised based on their 
status as mentally ill or developmentally disabled? This chapter has explored each of these 
elements separately, but this section will consider how their interaction created a unique 
space for the emergence of a disorder, autism, and how it was able to take on epidemic 
proportions.  
 
In the first section of this chapter, classification within the institutional setting was 
explained as a eugenic means of separating the “fit” from the “unfit”, the “educable” from 
the “ineducable”, and those to remain in society or be removed from it and housed within 
the institution. Within this context, classification was not required – differentiation between 
“abnormal individuals” would have been pointless when, in the majority cases, individuals 
received very similar treatment in institutions that only began to differentiate between the 
mentally ill and the intellectually disabled in the mid-to late-twentieth century. With the 
process of deinstitutionalisation beginning in earnest in the late 1970s in Australia, 
combined with the release of the DSM-III in 1980 (which essentially saw a paradigm shift in 
the way that psychology and medicine went about diagnosis and treatment), it is logical to 
assume that these changes would have brought about a shift in classificatory, diagnostic and 
treatment practises.  Thus, the deinstitutionalisation of the mentally disabled meant that 
 
[A] large number of children, who previously would have been institutionalized as mentally 
retarded, were now to be treated in the community at the earliest age possible, it also meant 
that the categories employed by the institutions to distinguish and diagnose children became 
meaningless and blended together into an ill-defined mass of “atypical children”. Here the 
ideology of “normalization” that guided much of the deinstitutionalization movement played an 
important role. It involved a thoroughgoing reorganization and democratization of the relations 
of expertise, by breaking the monopoly enjoyed by psychiatry over administrative power in the 
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field of retardation, and by empowering more peripheral professions as well as patients and 
parents. (Eyal et al. 2010: 56).  
 
As this chapter argues in the previous section, during the 1960s in Australia a shift began to 
take place within the institution, as well as professionally, with regards to the issues of 
assessment, treatment and care of individuals with an intellectual disability. This change 
was spearheaded by parent groups and psychologists, two groups that were highly 
motivated by the promises and outcomes suggested by the principle of normalisation. For 
parents, deinstitutionalisation promised better care and support for their child and a 
brighter future. For the paraprofessions and psychologists, community care brought power 
and professional dominance as they became the overseers of treatment programs and 
service provision. This hand-over of professional power to the paraprofessions also brought 
with it increased agency ascribed to parents in their ability to act like consumers and pick 
and choose the therapies and treatment approaches that best suited their child. For Eyal et 
al (2010), these factors were crucial in the shaping of autism spectrum disorder and the 
creation of the autism matrix.  
 
Eyal and colleagues’ (2010) book, The Autism Matrix, explores the history of autism, and its 
current status as an “epidemic,” through its connection with the deinstitutionalisation of 
mental retardation, which the authors claim began in the late 1960s in the United States. 
The desinstitutionalisation of individuals with an intellectual disability in Australia also 
appears to have begun in the late 1960s (see Figure 3), but did not begin in earnest until the 
1980s. Deinstitutionalisation acted as what Eyal et al (2010) term a “moral blender” (3). Old 
categories and labels that were mobilised within Australian and American institutions, such 
as “feebleminded,” “moron,” “mentally retarded,” “idiot,” “psychotic,” “schizophrenic 
child,” were apparently scrambled through the process of deinstitutionalisation. As a result, 
the boundary between mental illness and retardation was blurred. This, in turn, led to a 
“great undifferentiated mass of ‘atypical children’” which were then gradually sorted into 
new categories within a “new institutional matrix” (Eyal et al. 2010: 3). It is interesting to 
note that the Australian and US contexts appear to diverge at this point. As previously 
discussed in this chapter, the boundary between mental illness and intellectual disability 
appears to have always been blurred within the Australian institution. According to 
Australian and NSW Government documents and policies, it was not until the 1980s and 
deinstitutionalisation that any formal distinctions were made between these two categories 
(see NSW Department of Health 1985). However, as Figures 2 and 3 indicate, there was 
some separation between these categories at the institutional level.  
 
The new institutional matrix replaced the custodial institution with community treatment, 
special education, and early intervention programs. Furthermore, this mental health reform 
allowed new professional jurisdictions to open up and broaden their scope and significance 
(such as psychology and speech therapy). Whilst this process of deinstitutionalisation of 
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course demonstrates a major shift in the philosophical underpinnings of the treatment of 
individuals with an intellectual disability or a mental illness, Eyal et al (2010) point out that it 
should not be seen as a complete break from institutional ideas, but rather, a transference 
of duties to the family, whereby a new vision of systematising the comprehensive 
surveillance and placement of atypical children can take place.  These factors, Eyal et al 
(2010) claim, have led to a “spectrum of autistic-type disorders that [straddle] an 
indeterminate terrain between mental illness and retardation, thereby laying the 
groundwork for the epidemic” (9). Thus,  
 
The issue is not whether the rise in the number of diagnoses is due to vaccinations, pollution, 
or diagnostic substitution, whether it is “real” or fabricated. The issue is that our practices for 
representing and intervening in childhood disorders are no longer constrained by the 
opposition between retardation and illness, but proceed as if they can ignore it (Eyal et al. 
2010: 8-9) 
 
In terms of the treatment of ASDs today, psychiatrists have essentially taken a back seat. 
ASDs are notoriously difficult to diagnose because they resist medical classification. While 
psychiatrists and paediatricians commonly diagnose ASDs and prescribe medications (which 
do not treat the core of the disorder, but rather manage or control problematic behaviours), 
paraprofessionals have deployed behavioural, speech, occupational, and other therapies to 
address the core problems associated with this disorder. Eyal et al (2010) emphasise that 
these therapies date back to the mid-1960s, where they played a fairly marginal role and 
had little association with the discipline of psychiatry. As discussed earlier, behavioural 
psychology was being practised in Australia from the 1960s and was a key tool utilised by 
psychologists to demonstrate the practicality, measurability and scientific-nature of their 
profession. With deinstitutionalisation and the opening up of professional jurisdictions that 
came with it, a space opened up for these paraprofessionals to establish a legitimate place 
within the field. Thus, deinstitutionalisation allowed a “massive change in the social 
organization of expertise” (Eyal et al. 2010: 4).  
 
The parents of children diagnosed with autism played a key role in this change. Eyal et al 
(2010) claim that through the formation of parents’ groups such as the National Society for 
Autistic Children (NSAC) and National Association for Retarded Children (NARC), parents 
sought to undermine the dominance of the psychiatric profession, which had, in the past, 
frequently disregarded and belittled their perspective. In Australia, it was the formation of 
parent groups such as the Australian Council for the Mentally Retarded, the Slow Learning 
Children’s Group, and the Autistic Children’s Association of South Australia that fought hard 
to obtain services and rights for their children. Indeed, these groups united alongside the 
paraprofessions and even some medical professionals to raise awareness, change the law, 
and change professional opinions about the intellectually disabled. These Australian parent 
groups also used research and science to gain the respect of Government, and ultimately 
obtain funding (Earl 2011; Lewis 1988). A key research initiative was the formation of the 
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Australian Group for the Scientific Study of Mental Deficiency during the 1960s, which 
subsequently demonstrated that children with intellectual difficulties do in fact benefit from 
socialisation, education and training (Lewis 1988). It is findings like this, and the power and 
hope that they gave to parents, that demonstrates precisely why the label of autism 
became so popular and resonated so strongly with parents. Eyal et al (2010) explain that the 
appeal of the category of “autism” to parents is that it, above all, offers hope: while it 
removed the stigma attached to the category “mentally retarded” in the institution, it 
simultaneously opened up a large array of previously unavailable therapies and services that 
thrived on the idea that autism had a potentially transformative “critical window of 
opportunity” that may result in the child’s “cure.”  
 
Eyal and colleagues (2010) argue that the widening jurisdiction of paraprofessionals and the 
therapies they promote have had an important impact upon the diagnosis of autism, 
particularly upon the DSM. The creation of the identity “autism parents” together with 
deinstitutionalisation created the need for “a new type of expertise, capable of sorting and 
differentiating the ‘atypical children’” (Eyal et al. 2010: 23) Thus, at the core of this “new 
expertise,” according to Eyal et al, are the parents and therapists. They have been 
fundamental in the definitional and diagnostic shift that has occurred over the past twenty 
years. Eyal et al (2010) refer to all of the changes affecting autism’s diagnosis and definition 
as a “new institutional matrix” which can be thought of as a “looping dynamic”. The looping 
dynamic is made up of spirals in an “increasingly widening vortex” (23). The “autism 
epidemic” represents a final spiral in this vortex of looping processes (see Figure 1.4, 
below).  
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Figure 1.4: The new institutional matrix of autism based on information presented in Eyal et 
al (2010: 23-24)  
 
 
The looping dynamic is described as open and permeable, and therefore the entry of new 
therapies into this new institutional matrix is relatively easy. As new and old therapies 
interacted and combined, the experience of autism and its presentation in the clinic began 
to change. Eyal et al (2010) highlight the role of Applied Behavioural Analysis (ABA) and 
Sensory Integration Therapy in changing the focus of diagnostic practices and standardised 
documents. For example, self-mutilation and self-injurious behaviours used to be a central 
criterion in the diagnosis of childhood-onset Pervasive Developmental Disorder (PDD) in the 
DSM-III (1980). However, in the 1970s this behaviour began to be targeted through 
behaviour modification (such as Applied Behavioural Analysis) and was seen as treatable or 
controllable through these therapies. As a result, these behaviours came to be seen as 
marginal in clinical presentations and were discounted as outside the core symptoms of 
autism. In the DSM-III-R (1987), self-injury became an “associated feature” in the criteria for 
PDD. In the DSM-IV (1994) there is no mention of self-mutilation or head-banging. While 
behaviour modification eliminated criterion from diagnostic practices, Sensory Integration 
Therapy appears to have added to the criteria. Such approaches have “established both 
sensory hypo- and hyper-sensitivity firmly as a core feature of the autistic prototype, and 
arguably provided language and practices to give meaning and shape to autistic experience 
not as aloneness but as neurodiversity” (Eyal et al. 2010: 24) This continuing overhaul of the 
autistic prototype has been reinforced by the heterogeneity of the population captured 
through diagnosis. As it stands now, the DSM-IV-TR allows the diagnosis of a PDD to include 
both the intellectually disabled and “higher functioning” individuals. Thus, one can see how 
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these processes and their consequences led to the “autism epidemic,” which represents the 
final loop in the looping dynamic (see Figure 1.4). 
 
While Eyal et al’s (2010) work focuses on the US context, it is clear that many of the 
historical and philosophical underpinnings of the autism matrix are shared by the Australian 
context. The way that parent groups and the paraprofessions (mainly psychology in the 
Australian context) fought to secure community care and rights for the intellectually 
disabled, changed the way intellectual disability was perceived in Australia so that 
individuals were no longer deemed “hopeless” or “incurable,” and developed treatment 
approaches that created optimism amongst parents and professionals was crucial to the 
harnessing of this label and its epidemic status within Australia today.  
 
However, through the research conducted for this chapter, an absence in the literature was 
noted. There appears to be very few accounts of adults with autism living out in the 
community post-deinstitutionalisation. While it could be argued that autism was essentially 
unheard of only thirty years ago, it seemed to be an issue that required further 
investigation. This is what prompted an interview with Mr D, the father of Joe – a man in his 
late 40s who was diagnosed with autism in the early 1970s.  
 
Deinstitutionalising autism in Australia: Invisible adults? 
Central to the concept of this thesis is the idea that autism resists definition and 
classification. This is a consistent theme throughout this chapter also, and is evident too in 
the way that deinstitutionalisation has been applied to adults on the autism spectrum: 
autism never seems to fit neatly into the categorised or defined spaces set out for it. 
Deinstitutionalisation, of course, comes in many different forms. However, the reality in 
Australia, according to Mr D, is that adults with a diagnosis of “low functioning” or 
“moderate functioning” autism (as well as other more severely affected individuals with a 
developmental disorder) remain in a kind of limbo: residing in facilities that are somewhere 
in between an institution and a community cottage. For Mr D’s son – Joe –  as well as some 
of his other fellow residents with a diagnosis of autism, the prospect of 
“deinstitutionalisation” did not become a reality until 2010 (and there is even contention 
still as to whether the facility he resides in now constitutes an institution or not). The 
proposal was for him, and many others his age or older and with similar diagnoses, to be 
transferred from Macquarie Hospital, where he had spent the majority of his life, to 
community cottages. This proposal was originally made in the early 2000s. Macquarie 
Hospital continued to hold the status of “institution” and the movement of its residents to 
community cottages was a step towards meeting the commitment made to have all 
residents moved out of institutions and into the community. Mr D explains, however, his 
objections to this proposal based on the needs of individuals with an ASD:  
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I led a group to see the Minister to inform her that community cottages were not the right 
answer.... If someone is sick or behaving badly, the rest of the cottage is grounded, as they don’t 
have sufficient staff to deal with this; there is a level of disability which does not benefit from 
being stuck in an isolated cottage. So we saw the Minister (…) who said the money is available 
and it’s going to happen anyway and I can’t do anything about it. We went down the process of 
looking at service providers and defining what was needed. Now some of our folk are profoundly 
disabled, needing very special cottages; all need a big room and no two stories, as this presents 
problems....I wrote a submission saying, first of all, we’re quite happy to stay where we are, but if 
that’s not acceptable, because it’s in the middle of a psychiatric hospital, what we need is a 
community village – cottages together in a group; they are benefitted by being able to share, if 
someone is sick in a cottage, the adjoining cottage can work with them, and they can go out; if 
there is violence in a cottage there is staff on site who can come and help; a whole lot of reasons 
like that. I got word from the Minister’s office that he had opposition from all the advocacy 
groups, which is because they don’t know anything about [autism] – the groups are dominated 
by physical disability advocates... In the end, the Minister approved the idea of a community 
village, against all the opposition... So we won the battle and they all moved into the village in 
December (2010), which is located in the [Hospital] grounds, as the hospital had a lot of ground, 
but not up where the wards of the hospital are, but at the back of the hospital which fronts a 
domestic road. (8-9) 
 
Thus, deinstitutionalisation did not occur for these individuals with a diagnosis of ASD until 
2010. Furthermore, most other major facilities in NSW housing residents with some form of 
developmental disability/learning disability (such as Rydalmere, Marsden and Stockton) 
have yet to be “deinstitutionalised” according to Mr D. Yet crucially, many of the disability 
advocacy groups are critical of these newly set up community villages, arguing that they still 
resemble an “institution.” Mr D, who has had numerous dealings with these groups, 
elaborates on the debate that he and these groups are currently embroiled: 
 
I consider we have deinstitutionalised the Lachlan Centre [now known as the Norton Road 
Specialist Supported Living] with the village, but the advocacy groups don’t think so. People with 
Disabilities (Peak Advocacy Group) are taking the Department to court on that issue, saying it 
doesn’t comply with the Disability Services Act; and I think they will lose, because it is a valid 
defence to say we have residents with five residences; they will argue because they are side by 
side, it constitutes an institution. So, there is a big argument going on at the moment. It’s been in 
court for over a year on procedural arguments...We’ve got the village and I have not been 
daunted by the law, and I can tell you there will be more villages. 
 
Mr D explains that for many individuals with developmental disabilities, and particularly 
autism, the routine and security of the hospital or “institutional” environment has become a 
way of life for the residents, and to suddenly uproot them, especially those that have 
resided in such a setting for forty years or more, would be very distressing:  
 
They...have some residents who have been there a lot longer, [Rydalmere] is older [than other 
hospitals]; and so they have some residents who would probably be all right in the community; 
but, they’ve been there now for perhaps 40 years and they are into their late 60s - 70s, I believe 
one is 90; and the feeling is, that’s their community, and it would be very traumatic for them to 
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be transplanted into a community cottage and try and make contacts there. So there’s an 
argument that there is a group who ought to be kept together, because of their affinity to the 
others, as in a way that is their community; and then that raises the possibility of not just building 
accommodation but what we need is a geriatric facility. 
 
Mr D’s beliefs have also been expressed by other parents of individuals residing in an 
institutional setting. For example, Manning (2008) quotes the mother of an resident with 
autism, Rosalie, who supported the proposal to relocate the Kew Cottages residents to a 
cluster-style housing estate. While this idea was rejected by the Government and advocacy 
groups on the basis that such a development would perpetuate the segregation of Kew 
residents from mainstream society, Rosalie argued that a strong sense of “community” 
existed amongst the residents and staff at Kew and that this was worth preserving: “there’s 
a great deal of talk around these days...about developing communities, this was our 
community, and it’s all taken away from us now and it’s very sad” (Manning 2008: 232).  
 
These accounts demonstrate that while the discourse of “hope” and “cure” surrounds the 
classification and understanding of autism in childhood, and has made possible the 
formation of the autism matrix, the reality of conceptualising, treating and caring for 
individuals with autism and developmental disabilities in adulthood remains very much 
below the public radar.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter tells the Australian version of the story of how the category of mental 
retardation was transformed into a label – autism – that embodied a discourse of hope and 
created a new space in health care provision which brought with it a group of re-invented 
therapies and treatment approaches. It demonstrates that the development of a disorder or 
a label such as autism is historically contingent, subject to revision, redefinition and 
reconstitution, and above all, is a highly messy process. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The “seeable” and “sayable” body: The changing 
knowledge structure of the medical profession and the 
impact of the evidence-based medicine movement 
 
A classification is a way of seeing the world at a point in time...No classification is ever perfect. 
(World Health Organization 1993: vii) 
 
Introduction 
The statement above captures the imperfect, unstable and evolving nature of diagnostic 
categorisations. Since the first descriptions of “early infantile autism” in 1943 by Leo Kanner, 
the diagnostic category of autism has been reworked and redefined to reflect “this year’s 
shorthand for this year’s hypotheses about the nature of the things that interest us” (Ellard 
1992: 548). This literature review provides important background on medicine’s 
preoccupation with standardised diagnostic practices and the “gold standard” of evidence-
based medicine (EBM) and randomised controlled trials (RCTs), shedding light on how this 
reductionist biomedical practice came to be and outlining some of the key problems 
associated with it.  
 
From bedside medicine to the birth of the clinic: “What is the 
matter?” becomes “Where does it hurt?” 
For Foucault, the birth of modern medicine in the eighteenth century was not “an act of 
psychological or epistemological purification” whereby a linear progression in knowledge 
led to a “true” understanding of the nature of body and disease; rather, it involved a 
“syntactical reorganisation of disease” whereby a shift in the structure of medical 
knowledge led to an “epistemological rupture” (Foucault 1975 in Long 1992: 120). This can 
also be described as when hospital medicine (or a “medicine of tissues”) replaced the long-
practiced bedside medicine (or a “medicine of symptoms”) (Armstrong 1995; Long 1992; 
Peerson 1995; White 2002). Bedside medicine reigned during the period from the Middle 
Ages to the eighteenth century and was characterised by a dependent doctor seeking the 
patronage of the socially superior patient within the family home (Pickstone 1993). Doctors 
heavily relied on their reputation and were therefore motivated by their need to retain 
favour with the patient (White 2002). During this time, medicine was a:  
 
dialogue with ‘the sick man’ – a discussion of his or her ‘total symptom complex’ in a language 
shared by the patient. The aim was prognosis and therapy, reached by the exercise of 
‘judgement’. (Pickstone 1993: 436).  
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Armstrong (1995) refers to bedside medicine as a two-dimensional model of illness: the 
patient describes their symptoms, such as a headache or abdominal pain, which are then 
viewed as the illness to be treated. This model of medicine was favourable due to the 
minimal cost to the state and the reduced spread of disease (Peerson 1995). However, with 
the Industrial Revolution and urbanisation that came with it during the nineteenth century, 
the number of sick or destitute people without families to house them and take care of 
them rapidly increased. The focus therefore turned to the need to house these individuals in 
hospitals where they could receive more equitable health care. This marked the turn to 
hospital medicine or the “birth of the clinic” (Peerson 1995; White 2002). Armstrong (1995) 
refers to hospital medicine as a three-dimensional framework, whereby symptom, sign and 
pathology are involved in the diagnostic process. While the patient identifies their 
symptom(s), as they did within the bedside model of medicine, the doctor, through their 
clinical examination of the patient, adds to this information by providing an “intimation of 
disease,” that is, a sign (394). Armstrong (1995) explains further: 
 
For example, the patient’s symptom of abdominal pain might be linked to the sign of 
abdominal tenderness that the physician could discover; but neither symptom nor sign in 
itself constituted illness: both pointed to an underlying lesion that was the disease...the 
‘clinical picture’ as drawn by both symptom and sign enabled the pathology that existed 
beneath experience to be inferred. (394) 
 
Thus, this three-dimensional approach allowed the medical ideology of the time to change 
profoundly in this shift from the “medicine of symptoms” to the “medicine of tissues”. 
Under this model, colleagues and medical teachers were the key source of prestige for 
doctors; and the patient-doctor dynamic changed, whereby the patient became dependent 
upon the “professional doctor” (White 2002). Where previously the doctor had been 
concerned with the “sick person” as a whole, doctors were now interested in an “object-
centred medicine”(Pickstone 1993: 436): where disease was conceptualised as “a problem 
of the pathology of a specific organ, distinct from the whole existence of the individual” 
(White 2002: 121). This objectification of the patient replaced the former element of 
subjectivity present in bedside medicine (that is, the attention to the patient’s personality, 
culture, beliefs and their own perception of their illness) (Peerson 1995). Thus, patients, 
dependent upon the expertise and skills of the doctor, became the guinea pigs under the 
clinical gaze: “available in life for new kinds of clinical examination, and available in death 
for post-mortem examinations on an awesome scale” (Pickstone 1993: 436).  
 
Central to this objectification of the patient is the clinical “gaze”. For Foucault, the gaze 
relates to the idea that knowledge is constructed at the intersection of seeing, speaking, 
touching, hearing and knowing (Long 1992; Osborne 1992). Foucault (1973) stresses in the 
preface to The Birth of the Clinic that the ideological rupture in medicine that occurred in 
the early nineteenth century was above all tied to the “qualitative precision of description”, 
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rather than the “rationalization, scientization or even the...quantification of medical 
discourse” (Osborne 1994: 34). Foucault states: “the precise, but immeasurable gesture that 
opens up the plenitude of concrete things, combined with the delicate network of their 
properties to the gaze, has produced a more scientific objectivity for us than instrumental 
arbitrations of quantity” (Foucault 1973: xiv). The concept of gaze was also brought on by 
medicine’s interest in autopsy during the eighteenth century: seeking an “explanation for 
the nature of disease that occurred within the body, but which was not apparent on the 
surface” (Peerson 1995: 109). Thus they became concerned with making visible the 
invisible; changing the focus of medical thought from the living to the dead (Peerson 1995). 
In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault (1973) demonstrates that by the early nineteenth century 
medicine was focused on this “clinico-pathological correlation” and embraced a “three-
dimensional probing from symptomatic surface into diseased interior” (Armstrong 1995; 
Long 1992: 137). Importantly, this medical and scientific knowledge can be worked and 
manipulated so that the diseased body can be both “seeable” and “sayable”:  
 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, doctors described what for centuries had 
remained below the threshold of the visible and the expressible, but this did not mean that, 
after over-indulging in speculation, they had begun to perceive once again, or that they 
listened to reason rather than imagination; it meant that the relation between the visible and 
invisible—which is necessary to all concrete knowledge—changed its structure, revealing 
through gaze and language what had previously been below and beyond their domain. A new 
alliance was forged between words and things, enabling one to see and say. (Foucault 1973: 
xii) 
 
Thus, the “gaze” is made up of the tools and techniques of clinical examination: “inspection, 
percussion, palpation and auscultation” (Armstrong 1995: 394), that is, examining the body 
through observation, tapping or striking its surface, touching, and listening. This gaze has 
allowed the mapping of the human body, and through the post-mortem, has led to 
identifying “the exact nature of the hidden lesion” (Armstrong 1995: 394). 
 
While Foucault (1973) acknowledges that this rupture in medical ideology led to a more 
enlightened form of health care delivery, he also recognises that, through epidemics, 
doctors began to cast a “multiple gaze” upon populations which “brought power to the 
medical profession on a scale not previously experienced” (Peerson 1995: 112). This 
epidemiological gaze ensured medicine had a wider jurisdiction, enabling vast surveillance 
and control over society. Armstrong (1983) outlines how this epidemiological gaze persisted 
through to twentieth century medicine in Britain. First, health became a social concern, 
rather than a private one. Second, national registers were created in which information 
about births, deaths, marriages and notifiable diseases were documented (such as 
tuberculosis). Third, in-depth patient medical histories began to be documented for the 
purposes of monitoring mortality and morbidity rates. Fourth, surveys were deployed by 
medical researchers to collect information about the population – statistics, randomised 
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controlled trials and placebos all became commonplace techniques. Fifth, notions of 
“normal” and “healthy” versus “abnormal” or “pathological” were included in checklists, 
criteria, diagnostic tools to aid in classification of the patient. Foucault outlines the 
beginnings of this notion of medical normality in the nineteenth century: 
 
Medicine must no longer be confined to a body of techniques for curing ills and of the 
knowledge that they require; it will also embrace a knowledge of healthy man, that is, a 
study of non-sick man and a definition of the model man. In the ordering of human existence 
it assumes a normative posture, which authorizes it not only to distribute advice as to 
healthy life, but also to dictate the standards for physical and moral relations of the 
individual and of the society in which he lives. (Foucault 1973: 39-40) 
 
The diagnosis of autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) is very much reliant on concepts of 
normalcy and comparisons to “the norm”. The standardised tools used in the diagnosis of 
ASDs, such as the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R), involve the observation of 
behaviours which are then scored against a checklist of what is considered normal and 
abnormal behaviours. For example, in the DSM-III(R) (American Psychiatric Association 
(APA) 1987) the criteria for autistic disorder states: “Consider a criterion to be met only if 
the behavior is abnormal for the person’s development level”.  
 
Georges Canguilhem: The normal and the pathological  
Georges Canguilhem’s (1989) distinction between the normal and the pathological, on the 
one hand, and the norm and normativity, on the other, are central concepts used in this 
thesis to make sense of the autism diagnostic process. Canguilhem observes that medicine’s 
perspective on health is based on the notion that disease is a quantitative deviation from a 
fixed norm (a constant) and to return a patient back to health, medicine must focus on re-
establishing the norm from which the patient has strayed. However, Canguilhem (1989) 
argues that this distinction cannot account for the lived experience of health. A norm, within 
Canguilhem’s qualitative conception of health, instead represents a desired situation rather 
than a statistical average. Here, the norm is the condition of the organism at any one time, 
and it is dynamic: it actively maintains its balance and is continually adjusted (Zajicek 1995: 
333). This ability to adapt and change is described by Canguilhem (1989) as being 
“normative”. Thus, normativity is the historical and evolutionary rejection of abnormal 
states and depends upon the adjustment and maintenance of norms. For Canguilhem 
(1989), health is characterised by flexibility, mobility, variability, and normativity; disease is 
characterised by intolerance, stasis, conservativeness, and rigidity. Normal, therefore, is not 
the statistical average, but rather the creative ways that organisms adapt to their 
environments.  
 
Canguilhem (1989) stresses the importance of context and qualities of individual feeling 
when examining illness, rather than medicine’s preoccupation with quantitative expressions 
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of biological, biomechanical, chemical or genetic abnormalities. Context is central to his 
argument, given health and illness are defined by the organism’s ability to adapt to new 
environments, and thus establish new norms. Significantly, Canguilhem delineates between 
two types of norms: vital (biological) norms and social norms. For an organism, vital norms 
come inherently with it and the environment in which it lives. Social norms, in contrast, are 
actively set: 
 
In a social organization, the rules for adjusting the parts into a collective which is more or less 
clear as to its own final purpose – be the parts of individuals, groups or enterprises with a limited 
objective – are external to the adjusted multiple. Rules must be represented, learned, 
remembered, applied, while living in an organism the rules for adjusting the parts among 
themselves are immanent, presented without being represented, acting with neither 
deliberation nor calculation. (Canguilhem 1989: 250)  
 
Canguilhem emphasises, however, that despite this distinction, vital norms and social norms 
are inextricably intertwined. For example, Canguilhem (1989) uses the case of height – 
something one would assume to be firmly classed as a vital norm – to demonstrate how 
vital and social norms are in fact interlinked. In some populations, average height may 
reflect societal preferences for a certain height: for instance, extremities in height may be 
devalued leading to these people being isolated and finding it more difficult to reproduce. 
Food habits and lifestyle habits can also impact height: studies have demonstrated that in 
cultures where smoking is widely practiced, average heights are impacted. These factors 
then play a role in affecting the statistical average of what appears to be a biological fact.  
 
This distinction between, and simultaneous entanglement of, vital norms and social norms 
is important because it demonstrates that the creation of new norms is not just a biological 
process, but rather a complex interaction of social, biological, cultural, historical and 
political processes going on within an individual’s environment. Thus, when distinguishing 
between normal and pathological states, we must also take into account this complex 
environmental and contextual milieu in which the individual exists.  
 
Later in this thesis I will demonstrate the utility of Canguilhem’s (1989) qualitative 
reconceptualisation of the normal and the pathological in the way that it allows us to 
rethink the current medical approach to the diagnosis of autism in the clinical encounter. 
However, to achieve this, we must first understand the drive to standardise that dominates 
medical approaches, particularly when it comes to diagnosis and medical research. It is this 
movement away from the individual towards the social; the movement away from a 
medicine concerned with “a body of techniques for curing ills” towards a medicine of 
“normal” versus “abnormal” that the discussion now turns. It is through Foucault and 
Canguilhem’s work that one can understand the shift towards classification and 
standardisation within medicine, and see the foundations laid for the use of diagnostic tools 
and EBM.   
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Standardisation in medicine 
As outlined above, early nineteenth century medicine was characterised by a clinical gaze 
that penetrated beneath the surface of the visible (that is, the body of symptoms) to the 
inner workings of the invisible body. The knowledge created by this probing gaze prompted 
the conscious and unconscious creation of a system of order, a way of understanding, 
manipulating and applying this new information. Thus,  
 
...a ubiquitous set of tiny, invisible things were being negotiated and sewn into the social 
fabric. These were formal, commodified classifications and standards, both scientific and 
commercial. People classified, measured, and standardized just about everything – animals, 
human races, books, pharmaceutical products, taxes, jobs, and diseases. The categories so 
produced lived in industry, medicine, science, education, and government...Most of these 
[standardizing] activities became silently embodied in the built environment and in notions 
of good practice. (Bowker and Star 1999: 17) 
 
Classification, objectification and standardisation have made the practice of modern 
medicine possible, shaping it into the discipline it is today. According to Bowker and Star 
(1999), the term classification refers to a “spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal 
segmentation of the world,” while a classification system refers to a “set of boxes 
(metaphorical or literal) into which things can be put to then do some kind of work—
bureaucratic or knowledge production” (10). Standards endeavour to make actions 
comparable over time and space and are described as “mobile and stable” (Timmermans 
and Berg 1997: 273).  Bowker and Star’s (1999) definition of the term standards is more 
complex and involves six elements: they are a set of agreed upon rules; they transcend 
place and time; they operate within and between different contexts (for example, the 
creation of a link between the phone and the computer); they are often enforced by the 
law; standards in use do not necessarily represent the “best” standards; and they are often 
difficult and expensive to alter. 
 
More specifically, within a contemporary medical context, Timmermans and Berg (2003) 
distinguish four ideal typical categories of standards. The first category is labelled design 
standards, which are “structural specifications”, such as “the properties and features of X-
ray devices” (24). The second category is terminological standards, which “ensure stability 
of meaning over different sites and times” and include documents such as the International 
Classification of Diseases (25). The third category of standards is performance standards, 
which regulate professional work by “setting outcome specifications”. The fourth category is 
referred to as procedural standards, which take the form of clinical practice guidelines and 
“delineate a number of steps to be taken when specified conditions are met” (25).  These 
standards make up what is today known as evidence-based medicine (EBM). Within 
medicine, EBM is understood as “the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current 
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best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients” (Sackett, 
Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, and Richardson 1996: 71). It is disseminated through clinical 
practice guidelines and standardised tools which aim to “enforce good clinical reasoning” as 
well as provide a “vehicle through which order can be brought to all those practices where 
messiness reigns” (Berg 1998: 227).  
 
The key ideas forming the foundations of standardisation (that is, predictability, 
accountability, and objectivity produce universality) date back to the Enlightenment, and 
the notion that development and evolution of knowledge goes hand-in-hand with increased 
rationality and control (Timmermans and Berg 2003). But the beginnings of standardisation 
in medicine are said to have begun during the early twentieth century. At this time, the 
medical curriculum was changed and minimum standards were created, and these 
developments affected all hospitals across the United States (Timmermans and Berg 2003). 
Several factors are cited for these changes. Firstly, care of patients became more complex 
because treatment was managed not only by the patients’ primary physician but also 
medical specialists. Secondly, the standardisation movement was fuelled by fears that if 
efficiency standards were not created within the profession, public officials would do it for 
them. Thirdly, there was a desire to make hospitals more financially responsible institutions 
(Timmermans and Berg 2003).  
 
Following World War Two, standardisation in general established itself as a useful tool to 
“avoid direct political conflicts about barriers, inequities, and asymmetries in international 
trade and so a focus on standardization re-emerged as the ‘product of a global economy’” 
(Timmermans and Berg 2003: 12). Yet Timmermans and Berg (2003) note a divergence in 
the historical motivations behind standardisation within the medical profession. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, standardisation was aimed at the skills, tools, and 
facilities required by clinicians: “the content of the work itself was left unaddressed: to 
decide the proper course of action for a given solution was the unique prerogative of the 
individual professional” (Timmermans and Berg 2003: 13). However, during the 1980s, 
standardisation or EBM, focused on the content of the work itself – it aimed to regulate 
medical expertise and medical decision making (Timmermans and Berg 2003). The focus of 
standardisation in the medical profession today, in the form of EBM or clinical practice 
guidelines, is to “delineate what sequence of activities constitutes a professional response 
to a given situation” (13). Timmermans and Berg (2003) state:  
 
of all the kinds of standardization attempts that have affected medicine in the twentieth 
century, evidence-based guidelines represent the farthest-reaching and most direct attempt 
to prescribe and preset the actions of health care professionals. (14).  
 
In recent times, standards remain central to the production of knowledge, with significant 
resources allocated to creating and maintaining standards (Latour 1987). The concept and 
process of standardisation is most commonly associated with scientific practice, and is one 
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of the key criteria used to distinguish between scientific and non-scientific knowledge 
(Gottweis, Salter, and Waldby 2009). Within the field of medical science, it is believed that 
to reliably build upon this scientific knowledge, uniform conditions need to be implemented 
across laboratories, researchers and technologies to ensure the credibility and stability of 
discovery (Gottweis, Salter, and Waldby 2009). Timmermans and Berg (2003) similarly 
emphasise the centrality of standardisation to scientific practice. They highlight that without 
agreed-upon rules, systems and benchmarks shared by various work environments, 
adequate comparisons cannot be made, rendering such work useless in terms of building 
scientific knowledge through collaboration. As Gottweis and colleagues (2009) state: 
“Standards bind communities of practice across space” (170) and thus allow consistency 
across geographical location and cultural context.  
 
However, it is important to recognise that standards cannot just be analysed as “technical 
artefacts” (Gottweis, Salter, and Waldby 2009). Rather, according to Gottweis and 
colleagues (2009), they are the product of negotiation, debate and compromise between 
bureaucratic bodies, scientific communities, community groups, and the private sector. 
Therefore, they are always affected by the interests of these groups. Within the medical 
profession, there is a particularly strong administrative focus and reliance on standards. Yet, 
Bowker and Star (1999) emphasise that medicine as a science has not developed as a linear 
progression of ideas resulting from increasing consensus due to this reliance on standards. 
Instead, they state that it has developed as a “panoply of tangled and crisscrossing 
classification schemes held together by an increasingly harassed and sprawling international 
public health bureaucracy” (Bowker and Star 1999: 21).  
 
Young (1995) (in Bowker and Star 1999) emphasises the complex nature of categories within 
medicine and psychiatry. He highlights that while psychiatrists communicate with each 
other using the language and categories of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), 
many do not believe in the categories they are using. Bowker and Star (1999) demonstrate 
how the objectivity of classifications and standards are often compromised within the 
medical profession due to, for example, human limitations—that is, “people do not do the 
ideal job, but the doable job” (Bowker and Star 1999: 24). Therefore, standards appear to 
lead a double-life: their function in theory (that is, how they are discussed within the 
literature from a theoretical, versus empirical, perspective) and their function in practice. 
Indeed, in chapters four, five and six I elaborate on this disparity between the 
theoretical/discursive stance of the medical profession on the diagnosis of autism and the 
actual practice of diagnosing autism in the clinical encounter.  
 
Further adding to the complexity of standards and their use in medical practice, 
Timmermans and Berg (1997) introduce the idea of the “universality” of standards. They 
illustrate that it is the extension and transformation of networks already firmly in place that 
act as the essential ingredients to allow universality. The term “universality” within the 
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context of medicine refers to the ability to apply, for example, a diagnostic test, across 
different hospitals and even countries without practice variation. The term “network” 
within this context refers to a means through which medical knowledge and practices can 
be made universal. Latour (1983) explains his conception of networks using the railway as 
an analogy: “Scientific facts are like trains, they do not work off their rails. You can extend 
the rails and connect them but you cannot drive a locomotive through a field” (in 
Timmermans and Berg 1997: 274). Thus, the rails (networks) are the means through which 
trains (scientific facts) are made to work across different settings (universality). An example 
of a network is clinical practice guidelines.  
 
This process of extending and transforming networks will of course create tensions as past 
infrastructures, procedures and practices are challenged. Timmermans and Berg (1997) 
emphasise that while standards (such as clinical practice guidelines) are often portrayed as 
changing and replacing old practices, it is also important to see them as incorporating and 
extending already existing practices and routines. Furthermore, these authors stress that 
the universality of standards does not depend upon the presence of “centralized (scientific) 
control” (275), meaning that a standardised network does not require a “central actor” but 
rather “distributed activity” (275). This idea is illustrated through Timmermans and Berg’s 
(1997) analysis of an oncology protocol and the CPR protocol, in which they demonstrate 
that the origin of universal standards “is the result of historically situated, distributed work 
of a multitude of actors” (288). Thus, the concept of universality, as used by Timmermans 
and Berg (1997), emerges as quite precarious and uncertain, leading them to use the term 
“local universality” to address this ambiguity. They define local universality as follows: 
 
Local universality emphasizes that universality always rests on real-time work, and emerges 
from localized processes of negotiations and pre-existing institutional, infrastructural, and 
material relations. ‘Universality’, here, has become a non-transcendental term – no longer 
implying a rupture with the ‘local’, but transforming and emerging in and through it 
(Timmermans and Berg 1997: 275).  
 
Timmermans and Berg’s (1997) work marks a significant contribution to discussions 
surrounding the use of standards within the medical profession, as it provides a practical 
critique of the notion of total bureaucratic supervision and control, such as “protocols 
render physicians’ skills superfluous”, “protocols can become a form of ‘tyrannical 
domination’”, and that doctors are reduced to “mindless cooks” (287). Their work 
emphasises that “it is the protocol’s trajectory which is secondary and which is aligned to 
[the physicians’] goals and trajectories” (Timmermans and Berg 1997: 288) and that “many 
years of experience or a strong familiarity with the literature supersedes following the 
protocol to the letter” (289). The agency of the patient in the clinical encounter further adds 
to this complex view of clinical guidelines and tools. Timmermans and Berg (2003) claim that 
sometimes the patient’s hopes and goals will affect the clinician’s use of the guidelines and 
tools: “patients will often negotiate their eligibility for a protocol” or skip elements of it 
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“when they no longer see a meaningful link between their own future and the protocol’s 
trajectory” (71).  
 
Thus, to reconcile the patient’s wants and needs, the bureaucratic pressures to use EBM, 
and the physician’s own agenda, it is common for the physician to “tinker” with the protocol 
to make it workable in practice. Timmermans & Berg (1997) conclude that this is an 
acknowledged and accepted practice within the medical profession, stating: “Leaving the 
enrolled actors some leeway or discretion is often the preferred way to ensure their 
cooperation” (291). Considering the difficulty of applying EBM to the diagnosis and 
treatment of ASDs, it seems logical to assume that much “tinkering” with the diagnostic 
tools and guidelines occurs, and likewise that experience may supersede the use of EBM 
and its instruments.  
 
The evidence-based medicine movement: Epidemiology in medical 
practice 
Timmermans and Berg (2003), amongst a plethora of other researchers (see for example, 
Aveyard 1997; Eddy 2005; Marshall 1997; Timmermans and Mauck 2005), identify three key 
figures as forming the foundations of what is now widely known as EBM: Archie Cochrane, 
John Wennberg and David Sackett. Archie Cochrane (1972) argues against the overuse of 
medical techniques that were not supported by reliable and valid evidence, that is, the RCT. 
He advocates the use of systematic reviews of RCTs on a given topic by clinicians so that 
they could have quick access to evidence supporting or negating a certain intervention. This 
evidence is based upon a hierarchy, as outlined in Chapter One. Such a database now exists 
and is called the Cochrane Collaboration. The second key founder of the concept of EBM is 
John Wennberg (1984), who demonstrates that medical interventions often vary according 
to geographical location. Reasons given for this variation are: inadequate medical 
knowledge, physician practice styles, patient preferences, over-reliance on inadequately 
verified diagnostic tools, and basic inequities in the health care system (Timmermans and 
Berg 2003). Ultimately, Wennberg’s contribution to the EBM movement was the 
establishment of “optimal treatment levels”, which allowed government agencies and 
medical organisations to check treatment outcomes and allocate financial resources 
appropriately (Timmermans and Berg 2003: 15). The third figure discussed by Timmermans 
and Berg (2003) is David Sackett (1995), whose definition of EBM is most commonly quoted 
in the EBM literature. Sackett contributed to methodological approaches to analysing data, 
and evaluating the scientific validity and merit of medical interventions, as well as coining 
and promoting the term “evidence-based medicine” and articulating its principles 
(Timmermans and Berg 2003). However, what brought about this need within the medical 
profession, during the late 1980s, to change its epistemological framework from 
pathophysiology to epidemiology?  
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This is a critical question that Timmermans and Berg (2003) address. The key response they 
give relates to society’s scepticism, at this time, towards the professional expert and the 
privileged power and knowledge that they hold. Essentially, the position of the autonomous 
medical professional had come under pressure due to rapidly escalating health care costs, 
an increasing awareness of practice variations, vast amounts of data generated by evolving 
technologies, and a general dissatisfaction within society regarding the role played by 
experts and professionals (Timmermans and Berg 2003). Thus, the medical profession 
realised the need to act on these general feelings that were developing to maintain their 
status as professional experts and the “wielders of medical knowledge” (Timmermans and 
Berg 2003: 16) and ensure their professional survival.  
 
However, it has not just been the medical profession that has influenced the development 
of EBM. Four key groups are often identified as having an interest in the development of 
clinical guidelines: the medical profession, business or the private sector, the government, 
and insurance companies (Timmermans and Berg 2003). These four groups are also 
responsible for propelling the EBM movement forwards. The converging interests of these 
four parties have seen economic evaluations applied to the evidence, the results of which 
go on to affect the guidelines. For example, different interventions are not only judged 
based on their medical effectiveness but also on their financial cost. This can be seen in 
Australia through doctors prescribing medications listed under the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme (PBS). Medications listed under the PBS are subsidised by the Australian 
Government—for example, Risperidone is listed under the PBS and is often used in the 
treatment of behavioural symptoms of ASDs (such as aggression). However, the drugs listed 
under the PBS are arguably there due to “legal and political maneuvering” on the part of 
pharmaceutical companies (Rennie and Luft 2000: 2158), rather than their scientific merit. 
Rennie and Luft (2000) state: 
 
Pharmaceutical companies can be expected to continue to fund analyses of the cost-
effectiveness of their products, and, as legal and political maneuvering in the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia has shown, to continue to bring great political and legal 
pressure on the organizations responsible for deciding the relative merits of their products. 
(Schuchman 1999 and Wilkinson 1999 in Rennie and Luft 2000: 2158).  
 
Much of the literature addressing what is sometimes described as a “paradigm shift in 
health care” (Timmermans and Berg 2003: 18) has been divided into supporters (see 
Rosenberg and Donald 1995; Sackett et al. 1996) and critics (see Mykhalovskiy and Weir 
2004; Smith and Pell 2003; Timmermans and Kolker 2004) of EBM. The supporters of EBM 
claim that standardisation is essential for effective communication and collaboration within 
the medical profession as it assists transparency in practice and moves medicine in the 
direction of an “exact science” (Rosoff 2001 in Timmermans and Berg 2003: 19). The critics 
of EBM claim that it turns medical practice into “cookbook” medicine, reducing practice to 
simple rule-following and thus undermining the experience and clinical expertise of each 
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individual physician. A frequently discussed issue that has arisen from such debates relates 
to medical professionals’ compliance with clinical practice guidelines and thus the overall 
aims of EBM. Timmermans and Berg (2003) state:  
 
One of the great attractions and weaknesses of evidence-based medicine is that while experts 
might have decided what is best, it remains up to the professionals to acquaint themselves 
with the clinical guidelines and follow the consolidated advice. (21)  
 
These pro and anti EBM discussions are played out predominantly in the medical literature, 
whereas sociological examinations of EBM focus on explaining the processes that have 
caused this paradigm shift in medicine, and understanding how (and whether) this paradigm 
shift has changed the practice of medicine. The following section discusses five exemplary 
qualitative studies in varying contexts and within different sub-disciplines (for example, 
general medicine doctors, nurses, paediatric residents) examining the use of EBM in the 
clinical encounter.  
 
The reality of medical practice: A review of the empirical literature 
The recent empirical research within the sociology of the medical profession demonstrates 
that clinical practice is a complex and disorganised affair. This complexity is evidenced by 
many empirical (sociological) investigations of a variety of medical specialisations as well as 
general medical practice. This discussion concentrates on recent (post-2000) sociological 
contributions to understandings of EBM. Six exemplary studies are evaluated: two 
examining general perceptions and opinions of medical staff; one investigating perceptions 
and opinions of medical staff within an Australian context; and three illustrating the 
perceptions and opinions of psychiatrists and paediatricians. 
 
McDonald, Waring and Harrison (2006) provide an examination of the attitudes of hospital 
doctors and managers in the UK towards the implementation of rules in the context of 
patient safety. Their findings suggested a clash between the values of managerialism and 
medicine, highlighting that the doctors’ narratives were centrally concerned with the 
rejection of the discourse and rules of standardisation: “doctors’ accounts suggest that the 
rule is ‘there are no rules’” (McDonald, Waring, and Harrison 2006: 194). They point to 
social norms and values present both within and outside of the medical world as causes of 
these attitudes. Thus, within the context of medicine: 
 
The unwritten rules of medical practice suggest that doctors whose practice is closely 
governed by guidelines, or who comment critically on the work of other medical 
professionals, will no longer be regarded as doctors, since autonomy and a refusal to judge 
others are key elements of the medical identity. (Hunter 1991 in McDonald, Waring, and 
Harrison 2006: 198);  
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And within the broader social context: 
 
The fact that doctors command greater popular support and enjoy much higher levels of trust 
amongst the general public than do hospital ‘bureaucrats’ contributes to their ability to resist 
challenges to their autonomy. (McDonald, Waring, and Harrison 2006: 198) 
 
Furthermore, in another study conducted by McDonald and colleagues (2005), in which the 
perspectives of UK nurses and doctors regarding clinical guidelines were compared, it was 
found that doctors and nurses adopt and promote the collective values of the particular 
profession in which they have been socialised. Thus, while nurses emphasised the 
importance of following guidelines and standardised approaches to ensure patient safety, 
doctors stressed the need for flexibility in the face of unpredictability and emphasised the 
tacit nature of their knowledge through experience. In fact, doctors claimed that they did 
not “identify with” certain standards, nor regard them to be “legitimate,” and thus did not 
follow them. Here, again, one sees the distinctly social-side of medical practice emerging, as 
well as the process of “standards tinkering”.  
 
Hester-Moore (2005) interviewed fourteen Australian health practitioners (ten doctors, four 
nurses) about their management of decreased libido in her exploration of the tension 
between the use of standards/guidelines and the requirements of clinical practice. She 
demonstrates that both the guidelines and practitioners’ experience are involved in a 
“transformative process” while clinical decision-making is enacted (184). She highlights that 
the guidelines and the health practitioners’ translations of the guidelines into “‘doable’ 
everyday practice” are “mutually shaped and shaping, constructed by and constructing, 
social phenomena.” (184) This notion of negotiating or tinkering with EBM and its 
instruments appears to be a theme within sociological examinations of EBM. Additionally, 
Hester-Moore’s study, as well as the other studies discusses in this section, avoid a 
conceptual difficulty that Timmermans and Berg (2003) discuss with reference to theoretical 
examinations of EBM. This conceptual difficulty reinforces the distinction between 
experience (or clinical judgement) and the use of EBM and its instruments (Timmermans 
and Berg 2003). Perpetuating this binary avoids recognising the true complexities and 
intricacies of medical practice: the act of negotiating in and between guidelines, experience, 
and clients.  
 
Rafalovich (2005) interviewed twenty-six clinicians (including paediatricians) about their 
diagnosis and treatment of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in children. He 
claims that clinicians have reservations about the diagnostic validity of the DSM-IV, 
highlighting that the application of this guideline in the clinical setting requires negotiation 
on the part of the clinician in terms of using clinical judgement to aid in decision-making. 
Furthermore, the study stresses that the clinicians are not practicing in a vacuum, but are 
instead largely affected by the scepticism (and thus subjective interpretations) that 
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surrounds ADHD, both within the medical community and expressed in society at large (for 
example, in the media). Rafalovich (2005) states: 
 
Hence, the ambivalence elucidated in this study may demonstrate the reflexivity between 
clinical realms and the broader discursive contexts that affect, and are affected by, such 
realms. As the diagnostic category of ADHD and its most conventional methods of treatment 
remain mired in debate, the many points of contention that characterise the modern 
discussion of ADHD may become visible in the way clinicians realise their professional aims. 
(318) 
 
Again, this study accentuates the role of the social world in affecting the clinician in the 
clinical encounter. It is also particularly valuable as it examines the application of the DSM-
IV in the clinical encounter – the guideline used by paediatricians to diagnose ASDs.  
 
Similarly, Whooley (2010) draws on in-depth interviews with 21 US psychiatrists to explore 
how the DSM is used in practice, and demonstrate the contradictions and negotiations 
involved in the psychiatric diagnostic encounter. Whooley found that a tension exists for 
psychiatrists between “the desire for autonomy in practice and the professional goal of 
legitimacy within the system of mental health professions” (452). Thus, to establish 
autonomy within their profession, psychiatrists develop what Whooley terms 
“workarounds” to essentially undermine the DSM in the diagnostic encounter. 
Workarounds include using alternative diagnostic classifications, tinkering with diagnostic 
coding (numbers) on paperwork, and engaging in diagnostic negotiations with patients. 
Importantly, these findings raise questions about the supposed monolithic and powerful 
status of the DSM in medicine and psychiatry, and the notion of formal, standardised 
diagnoses that go hand-in-hand with this document. Whooley’s (2010) study provides 
important evidence that the application of the DSM, in everyday practice, is complicated, 
negotiated and contested.  
 
Another important finding of Whooley’s (2010) study is the way that psychiatrists invert the 
reductionist biomedical model of “first diagnose, then treat”. In reality, the psychiatrists 
apply their own classification system, essentially whittling down 300 diagnoses into two 
categories: mood disorders (axis 1) and personality disorders (axis 2). Significantly, the 
purpose of this binary distinction is not diagnostic classification, but rather “reflects 
different emphases determined by the psychiatrists’ interpretations as to what the proper 
focus of the therapeutic intervention should be” (Whooley 2010: 459): For mood disorders, 
medication; for personality disorders, psychotherapy. These psychiatrists discard the 
standardised diagnostic criteria in favour of “exercising professional discretion as to the 
type of treatment the patient may need” (Ibid: 459), and thus “treatment does not follow 
diagnosis; diagnosis follows treatment” (Ibid: 459). Here, psychiatrists are able to exercise 
their clinical autonomy and judgement, and prescribing medications plays an important role 
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in enabling this autonomy. This treatment-centric approach practiced by psychiatrists is also 
the focus of patients. Whooley (2010) explains:  
 
Because the DSM is a public document, patients also draw on it. Patients periodically come to 
the clinical interaction with a DSM diagnosis in mind. The increase in internet-based resources 
and direct-to-consumer drug advertising allows patients to be more proactive with their doctors. 
Because these resources tend to present mental disorders as diseases with specific cures, 
patients come to expect their psychiatrist’s orientation to conform to this view. (458) 
 
In Chapter Six I extend these ideas by exploring the role of the pharmaceutical industry in 
promoting the off-label – that is, “for medical indications that have not yet been tested” 
(Cooper & Waldby 2014: 215) – use of SSRIs for repetitive behaviours in autism. I examine 
how this use of off-label drugs is extremely lucrative for pharmaceutical companies – the 
way they are able to create and expand their markets via “making allusions…to 
nonapproved uses” (Rosewarne 2013: 136). By linking the off-label uses with the drug’s side 
effects, the pharmaceutical company is legally able to indirectly promote the drug for other 
uses. In doing so, they are able to include more and more indications under one 
standardised treatment, thus getting the most out of the evidence-base, and allowing the 
drug’s extension at the fringes (de-standardisation) through practice rather than 
“evidence”. In fact, one could argue that doctors’ reluctance to completely conform their 
practice to EBM is leveraged by the pharmaceutical industry. This analysis sheds light on the 
way that we view the clinical trial studied for this thesis, and the labour that is being carried 
out within it by both clinicians and parents.  
 
The final empirical study I would like to examine highlights the important interplay between 
using diagnostic tools and drawing on clinical experience. Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) 
study (also discussed in Timmermans and Berg 2003), in which paediatric residents are 
interviewed about their use of EBM in clinical decisions, aims to empirically investigate the 
extent to which EBM has altered medical training. Ultimately, it shows that “the political 
and ontological effects of EBM...subtly change the interrelationship between people and 
their tools of knowledge” (Timmermans and Berg 2003: 143). They state:  
 
An EBM medical practice will differ depending on what kind of research qualifies as evidence 
and the different clinical situations it pertains to. In order to qualify as EBM, should the 
resident reserve literature consultations for rare, difficult, and new cases, or especially for 
routine patient actions? What literature qualifies as solid evidence, and how should it be 
read? When can a resident who believes in EBM assume that he or she knows the evidence 
and skip consulting the literature? (Timmermans and Berg 2003: 145) 
 
Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) research, in which these questions are addressed, show 
that there are at least two very different ways of “doing EBM”, and these are embodied in 
the “librarian” and the “researcher” approaches (345). The majority of the participants in 
their study fulfilled the criteria of librarian, with the main difference between the 
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approaches relating to researchers evaluating the literature based on randomised controlled 
trials and librarians consulting any literature.  Thus, a key factor in doing EBM involves 
awareness of the evidence hierarchy. A further finding of Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) 
study is the power of clinical experience in the clinical encounter. Resident physicians (that 
is, people that have received their medical degree but are still involved in training) reported 
that in circumstances where they believe the attending’s (that is, a physician that acts as a 
supervisor to residents) clinical decision is at odds with the literature, and they approach 
the attending with the relevant evidence to discuss the case, the literature would likely lose 
out: “The attending would qualify the study’s findings with some reason why the 
recommendations did not apply in this particular case” (Timmermans and Berg 2003: 159). 
Timmermans and Berg (2003) go on to state:  
 
Not only did residents confirm that their superiors’ institutionalized power advantage and 
accumulated experience trumped any knowledge they might have gleaned from the 
literature, but they also admitted that they would act similarly when others challenged 
them...[they would] “likely stick with experience”. (160)  
 
However, the conceptual difficulty of evidence and experience being viewed as distinct, even 
opposite, entities, as discussed above, does not apply to Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) 
study. The authors qualify that the participants ultimately indicate that medical practice 
“inevitably contained a mixture of the two, albeit not necessarily in equal proportions” 
(Timmermans and Berg 2003: 163-4). Thus, they state: 
 
The quality that guides clinical decision making is not the tradition-bound experience put up 
as a straw person in the medical and sociological literature, but a mixture of skills and 
uncertainties grounded in medical knowledge. (Timmermans and Berg 2003: 163) 
 
These studies provide important context for this thesis, indicating that within medicine 
there exists an established research-to-practice disconnect. While EBM, guidelines and 
standardised diagnostic documents are presented within the medical context as the gold 
standard of clinical practice, their application in the everyday clinical encounter tells 
another story. In reality, these documents, while still used and referred to, are also tinkered 
with, worked-around, manipulated and negotiated with to fit with the “do-able” job. This is 
highly relevant to the diagnosis of autism given the heavy emphasis within medical, 
psychological and psychiatric research on the DSM and standardised diagnostic tools such as 
the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) and the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS).  
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Diagnosis as an apparatus: Labelling theory and the “looping effects 
of human kinds”  
Given the emphasis of this thesis on the use of standardised tools in the diagnostic process 
of labelling a child with autism, it is important to explore this notion of labelling and what it 
means within a sociological context. Labelling theory holds that if you attribute the label of 
“autism spectrum disorder” to a child and then institutionally confirm that label, then the 
labelled individual will adopt stereotypical patterns or key characteristics of “autistic 
behaviour”. This theory is applied to individuals. This work sits within the field of the 
sociology of diagnosis, with particular focus on the psy-sciences and psychiatric diagnoses 
and their interaction with changing norms and classifications (Jutel & Dew 2014; Nettleton 
2013; Pickersgill 2011). A key focus of the sociology of diagnosis is the way in which 
diagnostic categories are made up through professional, patient and political claims making 
and debate. Thus, notions of “normal” and “pathological” become distinguishable to 
individuals and society, and in turn play an important part in shaping the way that society 
relate to various treatments (such as medicating or therapeutic approaches) and negotiate 
situations such as institutionalisation, discharge and access to services (Hacking 1995; 
Pickersgill 2011). The DSM demonstrates an important example of a diagnostic text 
containing many contested categories and has come to shape, and be shaped by, a wide 
range of social actors and institutions. Especially relevant to this thesis, Annemarie Jutel and 
Kevin Dew (2014) point to the role of the pharmaceutical industry as an “engine of 
diagnosis” which helps to fuel changes to the American Psychological Association’s (APA) 
nosology and then becomes further entangled in the medicalisation processes that back 
“pharmaceuticalisation.” As a result, diagnostic focus shifts to a reframing of categories or 
pathologies in terms of the brain and pharmaceutical intervention – a theme I explore in 
more depth in Chapter 4.  
 
Hacking’s extension of labelling theory through his notion of “the looping effects of human 
kinds” provides an important foundation for understanding the key arguments within the 
field of the sociology of diagnosis. For Hacking (1995) “human kinds”6 are: 
 
[K]inds about which we would like to have systematic, general, and accurate knowledge; 
classifications that could be used to formulate general truths about people; generalizations 
sufficiently strong that they seem like laws about people, their actions, or their sentiments. 
We want laws precise enough to predict what individuals will do, or how they will respond to 
attempts to help them or to modify their behaviour. (352) 
 
Importantly, Hacking (1995) distinguishes between the classification of human kinds and the 
classification of natural kinds. Hacking explains that for natural kinds, if one were to call a 
                                                           
6 In his later works, Hacking (2007) distances himself from the term “human kinds” claiming it was confused 
and unhelpful. He clarifies that the “kinds of people” he discusses are those studied by the “human sciences,” 
that is, social sciences, psychology, psychiatry, and clinical medicine (Hacking 2007: 293).  
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red, round, edible and crunchy object an apple, and they were to class this as a fruit, it 
would make no difference to the object itself what it is labelled or how it is classified. It 
would, of course, make a difference to us in terms of how we treat the object: whether we 
eat it or not, what other food it compliments, how to eat it and so on. Alternatively, for 
human kinds, if one were to label a child “autistic,” a variety of reactions are likely. First, the 
label of “autism” may make the child’s family, other children, teachers, clinicians and so on 
treat and relate to the child differently. Second, the label of “autism” may also affect the 
child’s perception of him or herself due to the often morally loaded nature of human kinds. 
Both of these factors can contribute to changes in the definitions of the label or “kind” 
itself.  
 
For Hacking, once individuals have been classified or labelled, they are in turn changed by 
this label or “kind” due to its effect on and interaction with them. This can, in turn, change 
the very characteristics and essence of the label or classification itself. Thus, 
professionals/clinicians are then forced to adapt and evolve these classificatory categories. 
Interestingly, even the causal relationships between the individual and the label can be 
adapted, forming new “essential definitional connections” (Hacking 1995: 369). This process 
of changing categories/labels can also change how society thinks about those that are 
labelled. This is what Hacking calls the “looping effect”: labelled individuals rethink who they 
are and what their label means, the label/category changes as a result forming new “causal 
knowledge” and jettisoning “old causal knowledge” (Hacking 1995: 369). Hacking (2007) 
goes on to explain: 
 
We think of these kinds of people as given, as definite classes defined by definite properties. 
As we get to know more about these properties, we will be able to control, to help, to 
change, or to emulate them better. But it is not quite like that. They are moving targets 
because our investigations interact with the targets themselves, and change them. And since 
they are changed, they are not quite the same kind of people as before. The target has 
moved. That is the looping effect. Sometimes our sciences create kinds of people that in a 
certain sense did not exist before. That is making up people. (Hacking 2007: 293) 
 
Importantly, the label attributed to the individual forms only one part of the complex 
dynamic involved in the diagnostic process. The diagnosis of autism, for example, involves 
many actors (moving from the specific – the child and his/her family – to the more general – 
the bodies of knowledge about autism itself) that contribute to this looping effect (see 
Figure 2.1). The classification of a child within the autism spectrum disorder (ASD) category 
leads to the label of autism with a severity ranking between 1 (requiring support) to 3 
(requiring very substantial support) for social difficulties and repetitive behaviours (see 
circle 1, Figure 2.1), which in turn can affect the child classified (see circle 2), as well as their 
family and those that interact with the child (see circle 3). I have added the family of the 
child, as their role in the looping effect of the classification of ASDs is a crucial one, as will be 
discussed in chapters five and six (see for example Eyal et al. (2010)). The clinicians or  
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Figure 2.1: The Looping Effect of Classification - Formulated from information provided in 
Hacking (1995; 2007) 
 
 
experts (see circle 4) who classify, study, and treat those labelled with autism also affect this 
diagnostic dynamic through their own backgrounds, interpretations, and interests which 
shape their clinical gaze. These experts generate knowledge through discovery, judge its 
scientific rigour, and then apply it in practice. Thus, they routinely contribute to, and act on, 
circles 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 in Figure 2.1. Furthermore, the institutions (see circle 5) producing 
standardised tools and practice guidelines implement limitations and regulations which 
these clinicians and experts are expected to comply with. Hacking clarifies that by 
“institutions” he means formally organised, structured entities. Enveloping all of these 
actors is the “evolving body of knowledge” (Hacking 2007: 295) (emphasis added) (see circle 
6, Figure 2.1) about autism which comes from a vast variety of scientific groups, as well as 
popular science, and the media. This evolving body of knowledge can be seen through 
Latour’s black boxes and the many examples of these black boxes within the field of 
understanding autism spectrum disorders. Thus, “names of classes, and the people who fall 
under them, interact through larger interactions in the thriving world of institutions, 
experts, and their knowledge” (Hacking 2007: 297). The six elements illustrated in Figure 
2.1, below, are all interactive and play an active and crucial role “in looping effects and 
making up people” (Hacking 2007: 298).  
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Kanner (2007) uses the example of how the autism spectrum came to be through the 
classification of Asperger’s Syndrome (AS), which today no longer exists as a diagnostic 
category in the DSM 5. Despite the fact that Hans Asperger, a German Paediatrician, first 
described Asperger’s Syndrome in 1944 (in German), AS remained largely unknown until 
Lorna Wing introduced it to the English-speaking world in 1981. AS was then officially 
included as a diagnostic category in 1994 in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association 
1994), and then removed in 2013 from the DSM 5. Thus, Hacking (2007) explains: 
 
We have (a) a new classification, a new kind of person whom it is possible to be. (b) 
Individual people themselves change, as they are recognised to be of that type, or see 
themselves as high-functioning autists. (c) All of this requires institutions, including schools, 
social and health services, which disseminate and revise the current (d) knowledge. And 
there are (e) experts, including Lorna Wing. The institutions are vastly...ramified and the 
experts from...diverse fields... (304).  
 
Hacking (1995) goes on to explain:  
 
Responses of people to attempts to be understood or altered are different from the responses 
of things. This trite fact is at the core of one difference between the natural and human sciences, 
and it works at the level of kinds. There is a looping or feedback effect involving the introduction 
of classifications of people. New sorting and theorizing induces changes in self-conception and in 
behaviour of the people classified. Those changes demand revisions of the classification and 
theories, the causal connections, and the expectations. Kinds are modified, revised 
classifications are formed, and the classified change again, loop upon loop.” (Hacking 1995: 370) 
 
Hacking (2007) lists ten “engines of discovery” which he describes as imperative to the 
practice and progression of science today: (1) counting – for example, comparing rising rates 
of autism cases; (2) quantification – for example, while autism resists quantification it is 
believed by clinicians that the autism spectrum is comprised of a “quantitative range of 
disabilities” (Hacking 2007: 308); (3) creating norms – for example, standardised tools and 
guidelines which measure the child being diagnosed against “normal”  data; (4) correlation – 
for example, “We try to correlate autism with everything....The less we know, the more we 
search for correlations in the hope that they will direct us to something important.” 
(Hacking 2007: 309); (5) medicalisation – for example, autism was originally defined by a 
child psychiatrist and is therefore considered to fall within the domain of medicine; (6) 
biologisation – for example, autism is today understood by the scientific community as 
originating from biological and neurobiological problems which in turn provides families 
with a legitimate mental disorder that needs to be treated; (7) geneticisation – for example, 
the drive to link the biological with the genetic can be seen in the vast body of literature in 
search of the “autism gene.” Interestingly, this research in which deviance is linked to 
genetics has been explored over the past century, notably through the search for the gene 
that produces criminal behaviour; (8) normalisation – for example,  behavioural therapies 
for autism aim to shape autistic behaviours into more socially appropriate or “normal” 
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behaviours; (9) bureaucratisation – for example, screening for developmental delays occurs 
early on in a child’s life through visits to the doctor, at pre-school and school. Once 
identified as developmentally delayed, children are assigned to special services. Hacking 
(2007) states, “Autism is among other things a bureaucratic concept, used in the 
administration and management of awkward schoolchildren” (311); and (10) reclaiming 
one’s identity, that is, “resistance by the known to the knowers” (Hacking 2007: 305-6) – for 
example,  the formation of autism liberation groups, known as the neurodiversity 
movement, have reacted to this medicalisation, normalisation, and bureaucratisation of 
their difference and have accordingly tried to reposition themselves as experts and 
reformulate new institutions. All of these engines impact upon the looping effect described 
above. Indeed, it is because of these engines that the interactions between the elements of 
the looping effect framework have evolved so rapidly.7  
 
Latour and the “construction of scientific facts” 
Bruno Latour’s work provides an apt starting point to examine the relationship between 
science, technology and society, and the drive for standardisation within this milieu. 
Latour’s work can best be described as the ethnographic study of practices: he is not 
interested in searching for explicit knowledge already in the minds of the subject, rather, he 
is interested in locating knowledge “primarily in activities, events, buildings, instruments, 
procedures, and so on” (Mol 2002: 32). Latour’s work seeks to describe the diversity of 
practices and the complex relationships  involved in what he called “the construction of 
scientific facts” through direct observation of the scientific laboratory (Latour and Woolgar 
1986).  
 
Central to Latour’s work is the idea that the natural and the social are intertwined and are 
difficult to differentiate and separate. In Science in Action (1987) Latour breaks down 
traditional divides between science, society and technology, as well as the notion of 
something “inner” and “outer.” For example, Latour (1993) (in Mol 2002) examines several 
versions of the natural/social distinction, one of which is the subject/object divide. The 
subject, a social entity, “actively knows,” and the object, a natural entity, is “known”.  Latour 
places these concepts can be seen as two poles on a spectrum, “which have many quasi 
subjects and quasi objects, mixtures, in-between them” (Latour 1993 in Mol 2002: 31). 
Latour holds that instead of jumping between the poles on the subject/object spectrum 
(that is, “jumping between the ideas that reside in the minds of subjects and some objective 
                                                           
7 The recent work of Daniel Navon and Gil Eyal (see Navon 2011; Navon & Eyal 2014; Navon & Eyal 2016) 
provides an explanation of looping genomes and the diagnostic change and generic makeup of the autism 
population. Their work builds on Hacking’s framework of “dynamic nominalism” to demonstrate how 
knowledge about biological etiology can interact with the “kinds of people” set out by diagnostic categories in 
ways that “loop” or modify each element over time. Their historical analysis demonstrates how 
“geneticisation” played an important role in bringing together autism as a biosocial community and how 
evidence from genetics research later made an important contribution to the diagnostic expansion of autism. 
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reality out there”) one should recognise the interaction and interconnectedness of the 
natural and the social, the subject and the object, and of the persistent uncertainty when 
practising in this milieu (Mol 2002: 31). In Latour and Woolgar’s (1986) Laboratory Life, 
reality or nature does not have fixed traits. For them,  
 
Scientific activity is not ‘about nature,’ it is a fierce fight to construct nature. The laboratory is the 
workplace and the set of productive forces, which makes construction possible. Every time a 
statement stabilizes, it is reintroduced into the laboratory (in the guise of a machine, inscription 
device, skill, routine, prejudice, deduction, program, and so on), and it is used to increase the 
difference between statements. The cost of challenging the reified statement is impossibly high. 
Reality is secreted (243).  
 
Furthermore, Latour and Woolgar (1986) argue that the notion of “scientific discoveries” is 
in fact misleading, claiming that these discoveries have been constructed through social 
processes and that before these causal social processes these discoveries or facts did not 
exist.  
 
The importance of the social in the practice of science is discussed at length by Latour 
(1988) through the example of the pasteurization of France. This example illustrates how a 
scientific discipline changed a society, however, Latour simultaneously makes the point that 
no matter how influential a structure may be (in this case, vaccination), “science does not 
have the power to impose its order on society” (Mol 2002: 62). Thus, Pasteur’s work did not 
change society through its power or scientific rigour, but through a process of “association” 
(Latour 1988). For Latour, all the actors involved in this process of change were active 
entities. From the laboratory, Pasteur’s vaccination practices spread throughout French 
farms quite quickly due to his own movement between the lab and the farms. Pasteur, in 
doing so, had established a strong alliance between the lab and farmers, highlighting that 
they had much to gain through this alliance: through vaccination their cows would be 
protected from anthrax (Mol 2002). However, this new scientific discourse was unable to 
penetrate the clinic. Doctors in private practice did not stand to gain anything through this 
alliance with Pasteur’s lab because they stood to lose professional territory by handing over 
patients to other professionals to be vaccinated. As Mol (2002) points out, “Private doctors 
only started to “believe” in serums once the Pasteur laboratory put these on the market, 
and the doctors were free to use them in their own surgeries when they considered it 
appropriate” (64).  
 
This example clearly highlights Latour’s key argument: science does not possess the power 
to impose itself; change that comes about through a new scientific idea is driven by actors 
outside the laboratory who “associate” themselves with this idea. These actors form “chains 
of associations” which in turn comprise networks. The networks may be long or short, 
strong or weak, yet the strength of the network depends on what sustains the associations 
(Mol 2002). By Latour’s (1987) account,  when one follows scientists and engineers through 
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society, one can find a network of alliances that involve more than people and societies. 
These alliances can include machines and devices created by the scientists, or perhaps the 
disorder, disease or microbe they discover. These discoveries or creations, for Latour (1987), 
are also actants that play a vital role in these alliances or associations.  
 
This notion of associations, chains and networks fits in particularly well with Eyal and 
colleagues’ (2010) conception of the “looping dynamic” (see Figure 1.4, discussed in Chapter 
One). The spirals in this looping dynamic can be seen as associations made between actors 
outside of the clinical paradigm (essentially, those clinicians or researcher creating the 
standardised documents used to diagnose autism) and those within the clinical paradigm. 
These associations between actors have become quite strong over the past two decades: 
the alliance between parents, therapists, and now clinicians involved in the diagnosis of this 
disorder has had an enormous impact on the field of autism.  
 
Latour and the permanently opened “black box” of autism 
In Science in Action, Latour (1987) uses the metaphor of a “black box” to describe the inner 
workings of science and technology. A black box in this instance denotes an unquestioned 
fact. However, Latour is not interested in the black box product; rather, he is concerned with 
the process of how the fact became fixed knowledge, or a closed black box. He claims that it 
is through the resolution of controversy and the accumulation of support from colleagues 
that these scientific facts are made. Importantly, for Latour, nature (or the external world) 
itself is not of consequence in this process because throughout the controversy it is used to 
argue both the claims and counter-claims.  Thus, for Latour (1987), “all science is artificial in 
the sense that it is an object of investigation malleable within the bounds of its literature; it 
constitutes a universe of discourse, not a social institution mediating physical reality and 
biological processes” (Etzkowitz 1987: 696).  
 
Latour is centrally interested in “science in the making”: the open black boxes characterised 
by their uncertainties, controversies, and the various alliances that take place between 
actors (both things and people). All of these activities find expression through research in 
the laboratory, the production of scientific papers, and the development of networks. 
Busfield (2006) highlights that Latour (1987) provides a number of strategies and techniques 
used in the process of fact creation: “skilfully analysing the rhetorical devices used in 
academic papers, the use of citation, the creation of allies, as well as the “trials of strength” 
between the different protagonists that can lead to the closure of a black box.” (300). 
Furthermore, the black box’s status of open or closed is dependent upon the people that 
encounter it: “Do we take it up? Do we reject it? Do we reopen it? Do we let it drop through 
lack of interest? Do we make it more solid by grasping it without any further discussion? Do 
we transform it beyond recognition?” (29). Thus,  
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Buying a machine without question or believing a fact without question has the same 
consequence: it strengthens the case of whatever is bought or believed, it makes it more of a 
black box. To disbelieve or, so to speak, ‘dis-buy’ either a machine or a fact is to weaken its 
case, interrupt its spread, transform it into a dead end, reopen the black box, break it apart 
and reallocate its components elsewhere.” (Latour 1987: 29) 
 
Thus, the study of autism spectrum disorders can be seen as a field filled with open black 
boxes. It is a field that is constantly in a state of flux: whether it is diagnostic research, 
genetic research, pharmaceutical research, therapeutic research, research regarding the 
causes of ASDs and so on. Furthermore, it is not only clinicians that are keeping the black 
boxes of autism research open: parents play a vital and powerful role in this questioning 
process, as outlined by Eyal et al. (2010) in their book The Autism Matrix. The important 
point to make here, with regards to ASDs, is that “the scientific facts contained in the black 
box are not well established” (Busfield 2006: 303) and are therefore constantly being re-
worked, tinkered with, misused, or misunderstood.  
 
Diagnostic research: The changing categories from the DSM-II to DSM 5 
As discussed in Chapter One, the black box of psychiatric/psychological/medical 
classifications of ASDs through the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) has been, and 
still is, a highly contested, messy and uncertain space. Scientific controversy and the 
accumulation of research have gone hand-in-hand with the development of the DSM. From 
the DSM-II, when autism was included within the diagnostic category of childhood 
schizophrenia, to the DSM-5 (published in 2013), the term “autism” has been re-defined, re-
conceptualised and re-arranged within different classificatory categories. Even after all of 
this “tweaking,” the DSM’s diagnostic status is far from being a closed black box. As Volkmar 
and McPartland (2014) point out:  
 
Concerns about the impact of DSM changes should be considered in the context of sweeping 
changes occurring in psychiatric research. The director of the National Institute of Mental Health 
has expressed the organization’s intention to move away from research based on diagnostic 
categories toward emphasis on biological processes that can be applied transdiagnostically (Insel 
2013). It is possible that DSM-based groupings may become decreasingly relevant in federally 
sponsored research. (207-8)  
 
From a medical/positivist perspective, this is perhaps the most fundamental problem with 
ASD: lacking a consistent and stable definition means that any research involving its causes 
and treatment will be difficult to test under medicine’s hierarchy of evidentiary support. 
Without this fundamental stability in conceptualisations of its diagnosis, these uncertainties 
simply get passed on to subsequent research involving the category.  
 
Genetic research: The elusive goal of finding “autism genes” 
Despite the many technological and analytical advances in the study of genetics over the 
past decade (such as the HapMap project and the sequencing of the human genome), there 
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has yet to be “successful disease gene discovery in psychiatric diseases” (Gupta and State 
2007; Losh, Sullivan, Trembath, and Piven 2008: 1-2). This research is often described as 
“long and arduous,”(Gupta and State 2007) “sparse,” “lacking,” and “not well documented,” 
(Lichtenstein, Carlstrom, Rastam, Gillberg, and Anckarsater 2010), “fuzzy” and “unstable” 
(Rabeharisoa and Bourret 2009), while the subject matter is described as “elusive” (Gupta 
and State 2007; Losh, Sullivan, Trembath, and Piven 2008). Over 30 years ago the first study 
demonstrating “compelling evidence for a genetic etiology to autism” was published 
(Folstein & Rutter 1977). Subsequent studies have provided “strong but indirect evidence 
[supporting] the role of genetic factors in the etiology of autism” (Losh, Sullivan, Trembath, 
and Piven 2008: 2). Other methods such as genome screens, candidate gene association, 
examination of structural variants, and studying autism endophenotypes have all been 
“fraught with several methodological and analytic challenges,” which have led to a “scarcity 
of hard replicated findings to date” (Losh, Sullivan, Trembath, and Piven 2008: 8). Some of 
these challenges include: “limited power, varying designs, genotyping and analyses, and 
imprecise phenotypic definitions” (Losh, Sullivan, Trembath, and Piven 2008: 8).  
 
One of the biggest challenges facing these geneticists is that the definition of autism is so 
wide and varied. Thus, autism presents differently in every child, that is, each individual on 
the spectrum can potentially display a unique cluster of symptoms. Geneticists’ jobs are, 
therefore, very difficult because of the “phenotypic and etiologic complexity of [autism] 
itself, which may be compounded by varying phenotypic definitions used across studies” 
(Losh, Sullivan, Trembath, and Piven 2008: 3).  
 
However, some genetic studies remain optimistic that persistence will lead to “dramatic 
advances” in this area in the future (see, for example, Gupta and State 2007: 429; Losh, 
Sullivan, Trembath, and Piven 2008). But for now, according to Rabeharisoa and Bourret 
(2009) the work of psychiatric genetics, 
 
Remains (almost) entirely in the future, for current knowledge is far less developed and 
stabilized, and persistent uncertainties and controversies weigh on the role of mutations and 
the relevant models of disease. (707) 
 
Pharmacological research: The case of varied medication use among children with 
ASDs 
Medication use amongst children diagnosed with an ASD is substantial. For example, 
Oswald and Sonenklar (2007) found in their study of 2390 individuals diagnosed with an ASD 
that 83 per cent of the sample were prescribed drug(s). The seven most frequently 
prescribed classes of psychoactive drugs were antidepressants, stimulants, 
tranquilizers/antipsychotics, anticonvulsants, hypotensive agents, 
anxiolytic/sedative/hypnotics, and benzodiazepines. They found that individuals were 
prescribed, on average, drugs within 4 different classes (e.g. antidepressants, 
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anticonvulsants, stimulants and benzodiazepines) over the course of a year. Furthermore, 
over the course of a year, individuals submitted claims for up to six drugs in the same class. 
Thus, children with an ASD are “increasingly likely to be treated by a wide range of 
psychotropic and other medications” (Oswald and Sonenklar 2007: 353). One of the key 
reasons given for this variety is that “there are no clear guidelines regarding 
psychopharmacologic treatment of individuals with autism spectrum disorders” (Filipek et 
al. 2006 in Oswald and Sonenklar 2007: 348). I provide more detail about this 
pharmacological variety and use of medication amongst children diagnosed with ASD in 
Chapter Four.  
 
“What causes ASDs?” research: The case of the MMR vaccine 
Scientific and medical discussions about the cause(s) of autism always attract media 
attention: they are often controversial, represent a scientific breakthrough, and have 
important consequences for how autism is perceived by clinicians, therapists, parents and 
the lay public. One very controversial “scientific breakthrough” was that the measles, 
mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccination causes autism. This idea had prevailed within 
communities made of up families with children on the autism spectrum, such as Generation 
Rescue, before it entered the domain of science. A common story told amongst these 
parents went as follows: “My son was a bright, precocious, healthy two-and-a-half-year-old 
child in 1980 when I took him in for his fourth DPT shot....after that, he regressed physically, 
mentally and emotionally and became a totally different child” (in Palfreman 2010). These 
stories became widespread and easily accessible due to the “radically changed social media 
environment, where YouTube videos spread virally across the Internet” (Palfreman 2010). 
However, groups such as Generation Rescue did not effectively “get off the ground” until 
the infamous article, written by Andrew Wakefield – a British gastroenterologist, was 
published in 1998 in The Lancet. His study looked at 12 children with gastrointestinal 
problems and an autism spectrum disorder, 8 of which developed symptoms of autism 
following an MMR shot (Bedford and Elliman 2010): “Wakefield’s theory was that the 
measles vaccine inflamed the intestines, causing harmful proteins to leak into the 
bloodstream, eventually damaging the brain and causing autism” (Palfreman 2010). Within 
the scientific community, it was quickly pointed out that this paper had some fairly 
fundamental limitations when measured up to the “gold standard” of evidence: it was 
based on a small case series (only 12 participants), there were no controls, the paper linked 
three common conditions, and it relied on parental recall and belief (Godlee, Smith, and 
Marcovitch 2011: 64). Regardless, this article had a dramatic effect on vaccination rates 
across the world: in some places vaccination coverage fell to as low as 70 per cent (Ireland), 
and in parts of the U.S. it fell from 92% in 1995-6 to 80% in 2003-4 (Bedford and Elliman 
2010).  
 
The reasoning behind these parents’ concerns was simple enough: the child was fine, then 
they got the MMR vaccine, then they developed symptoms of autism. The two events 
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happen closely together, so it is reasonable to ask whether the two are causally related. 
However, it is also important to point out that this vaccination is given at an age (15 to 18 
months of age) when the first symptoms of autism also begin to appear: when the child is 
beginning to walk and develop language (Palfreman 2010).  
 
This controversy is particularly interesting because it involves a dialogue between the 
media, lay persons (active in movements such as Generation Rescue), and scientists. As Finn 
(2010) points out: 
 
The publication of [Wakefield’s] study, and the controversy and criticism that followed it, 
coincides with the rapid growth in the scope of Internet information resources and the 
number of Internet users (Madden 2006), and represents a unique opportunity to explore 
the intersection of expert and non-expert conversations about an issue of health, science, 
and public policy, mediated, in part, by a digital information environment.  
 
What is particularly interesting is that this dialogue between experts and non-experts has 
revolved around the scientific research that was carried out relating to the MMR link to 
autism. For some health professionals, non-experts have “tainted” the science and its 
understanding amongst lay persons: “Politicians, lawyers, and journalists have weighed in 
on the discussion and have confounded the science with emotion, belief systems, and the 
legal system” (Goldson 2009: 198). The impact of these non-expert views have bled into 
what scientists should study, and in Wakefield’s case, how they should study it. The black 
box of “do vaccinations cause autism?” was continually forced open by determined parent 
groups who suggested different hypotheses when the black box appeared to be closing. 
Thus, as Doctor Paul Offit, a paediatrician in Philadelphia, points out in the CBS 
documentary “The Vaccine Wars”:  
 
The hypotheses continue to shift. The first hypothesis, which, you know, people bought into 
long and hard, is that the combination measles, mumps, rubella or MMR vaccine cause 
autism. Twelve epidemiological studies showed that that wasn't true. Then the hypothesis 
shifted to thimerosal, an ethylmercury-containing preservative that was in vaccines, that's no 
longer in vaccines except for some multi-dose preparations of flu vaccine, that that caused 
autism. And that clearly has been shown not to be true....So now this is classic for pseudo-
science, is you just keep moving the goal posts. So now the goal post is, "No, we didn't mean 
actually MMR caused autism or thimerosal caused autism, we just meant vaccines in general 
cause autism." (Palfreman 2010) 
 
Over time, a large body of epidemiological and virological evidence failed to show a link 
between receiving the MMR vaccine and developing symptoms of autism. This led to The 
Lancet’s retraction of Wakefield’s 1998 article, claiming it was scientifically flawed. 
Furthermore, it transpired that some of the 12 children that had participated in his small 
study were referred to him through a lawyer involved in suing the pharmaceutical 
manufacturers on the children’s behalf (Palfreman 2010). This lawyer allegedly paid 
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Wakefield more than 435,000 pounds (Cohen and Falco 2011). Thus, we can see here how 
non-experts, such as lawyers, can affect the scientific process on a fundamental level. 
 
The role of parents in keeping the black box of ASD open 
As discussed above, parents played a key role in directing the research on the vaccination-
autism link and also keeping this black box open by generating further hypotheses through 
the movement Generation Rescue. While this is a fairly controversial example, where 
parents seem to be pitted against clinicians and scientists, another example, discussed at 
length by Eyal et al (2010), highlights how parents, through the National Society for Autistic 
Children (NSAC), also paved the way for the parent-activist-therapist-researcher as a new 
type of expert. This has been a slow and gradual process, evidenced by the shift in practice 
and ideology of the therapeutic and diagnostic professions, “towards a partnership model 
which values the clients’ perspectives and emphasizes respectful collaboration between 
professionals and their clients” (Avdi, Griffin, and Brough 2000: 327). 
 
A key achievement of the NSAC was that they “invented and disseminated a new style of 
being a parent – “autism parenting” as a vocation, as the “expert on your own child” and “a 
credible source of knowledge” (Eyal et al. 2010: 172), and were viewed as being key players 
in the implementation of interventions (Marcus & Schopler 1987).  Indeed, Silverman and 
Brosco (2007) detail how parents of children with an ASD have organised research funding, 
founded clinical research networks, and even suggested new avenues for research. For 
example, since the early 1970s, a subset of parents have described how their child 
developed normally up to a between 1-2 years of age, after which they began to regress, 
and were subsequently diagnosed with an ASD. Yet, only recently, researchers have begun 
to investigate these claims of regression, and a study conducted by Werner and Dawson 
(2005), confirmed these parental claims through the observation of birthday videotapes 
between these crucial years. Another example drawn upon is the Cure Autism Now (CAN) 
foundation. Two parents from CAN “understood that if autism were a complex and 
etiologically heterogeneous genetic disorder, a large sample of genetic material was 
necessary to understand the disorder” (Silverman and Brosco 2007: 394). Thus, 
 
Because researchers did not seem to be sharing genetic samples, these parents contacted 
families and enrolled them in a new gene bank organized through CAN, the Autism Genetic 
Resource Exchange. To prevent needless reproduction of results, CAN made the publication 
and sharing of data conditions of use. The Cure Autism Now Foundation was able to amass 
data and samples from more than 400 families at an initial cost of more than $6 million in 
private donations. (Silverman and Brosco 2007: 394) 
 
Why study autism? The direction of this project 
Recent work in the fields of sociology, anthropology and science and technology studies 
have begun to focus this interest in diagnosis, classification, diagnostic practices and 
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treatment to the understanding of autism, particularly its historical evolution and the role of 
various key social forces in bringing about its epidemic status today. Berend Verhoeff’s 
(2014) work on the stabilisation of autism as a category, for example, explores the drive of 
autism research to account for persistent uncertainties and conflicts in scientific 
understandings of autism, namely its heterogeneity and a failure to identify disease specific 
biomarkers. Verhoeff (2014) argues that the “reframing of autism as a neurodevelopmental 
spectrum disorder satisfies the scientific, institutional and socio-political needs for stability 
and homogenization” (65). Additionally, and of particular interest to this thesis, is the work 
of Jennifer Singh (2015) and Chloe Silverman (2011) who explore research programs and 
interests in autism, and highlight the crucial role parents play in the affective and personal 
choices they make, and the passion and hope they bring to the clinical encounter, that in 
turn shape the discourses of developmental psychology, psychiatry and even genetics and 
biology. These authors, among others (see for example Fitzgerald 2017 and Hollin 2017) 
explore the way that this affect and passion is also a key part of the way clinicians and 
scientists in the field of autism practice, diagnose, treat and research.  
 
Thus, the fundamental aim of this project is, as Latour (1987) states, “to be there before the 
box closes and becomes black” (21):  “Apart from those who make science, who study it, 
who defend it or who submit to it, there exist, fortunately, a few people, either trained as 
scientists or not, who open the black boxes so that outsiders may have a glimpse at it” 
(Latour 1987: 15). As an early intervention therapist that works with children on the autism 
spectrum, as well as a sociologist, I have a unique opportunity to enter this clinical world 
simultaneously as an insider and an outsider. I enter as an insider due to my own clinical 
background, as an applied behavioural analysis (ABA) therapist, a treatment approach 
frequently approved and recommended by clinicians. I enter as an outsider with the ability 
to approach the clinic with an analytical and critical sociological eye and thus open the black 
box of ASD assessment practises.  
 
As outlined in this chapter, three key factors contribute to the complexity of medical 
practice today. First, the notion that standards lead a double-life, in that there is a disparity 
between the motivations of administrative and bureaucratic bodies developing 
standards/guidelines and the motivations of those that must apply them in practice. Second, 
the idea that health-care workers do not do the ideal job, they do the “doable” job. This 
often involves “tinkering” with standards to make it workable in practice. Thus, the 
trajectory of a standard is second to the clinician’s goals. Third, the idea that standards and 
guidelines are affected by the interests of many groups external to the medical profession, 
such as government and industry. These factors suggest that the medical epidemiological 
“gaze” is not as rigorous, standardised, nor scientific as it often purports to be. In fact, the 
medical “gaze” appears to be affected by many political and social forces at work within the 
medical profession and outside of it. 
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Investigating this complex conception of the medical “gaze” within the context of a disorder 
such as autism, surrounded by scientific uncertainty and medical complexities, therefore 
makes for an interesting study. Autism spectrum disorder is shrouded in scientific 
controversy and uncertainty due to its medical status as a heterogeneous disorder. Thus, 
ASDs’ causes, age of onset, symptoms, comorbidity with other disorders (such as ADHD), 
and patients’ responses to treatment all differ according to each individual. This sheer 
variability makes ASDs particularly difficult to test under the epidemiological paradigm, 
particularly using the gold standard of randomised controlled trials (RCTs). Diagnosing and 
treating ASDs is carried out at an individual, case-by-case level and heavily relies on the 
clinician’s observation of the patient’s behaviour and speech (Silove, Blackmore, Warren, 
Gibbs, and Roberts 2008). While standardised tools and guidelines that aid in the diagnosis 
of ASDs exist, it appears clinicians are critical of their functionality in practice and that 
sometimes they are used incorrectly (Symons 2008). Clinicians are constantly trying to force 
a square peg into a round hole:  
 
According to the federal [US] legislation, children are developmentally disabled if they have 
diagnoses that are known to result in disability or because they have documented 
developmental delays. Yet, as Zola (1993) noted, the dichotomisation of disability is 
problematic. It imposes an artificial structure of categories that are not consistent with 
individuals’ experiences of their bodies and assumes that disability is static, while children’s 
development is dynamic...In EI [early intervention], the developmental guidelines serve as a 
template for normalcy. That template fits some children well but does not fit others. (Leiter 
2007: 1636) 
 
However, sociological investigations of the subtleties and complexities involved in the 
clinical encounter when dealing with a heterogeneous disorder such as autism are scarce 
(Rafalovich 2005).  Thus, an investigation of a variety of clinicians’ “gazes” and how they are 
applied in the clinical encounter to autism spectrum disorder will shed light on the inter-
subjectivities, subtleties and complexities involved in clinical assessment. Such an 
investigation will provide greater understanding of what the “doable” job entails in the 
assessment of ASDs, the role standards play in the clinical encounter, and what internal 
and/or external political and social forces affect the “gaze” of the clinician. In doing so, this 
study will hope to show that: 
 
The difficulty for medicine as a discipline is maybe not that this subjectivity is happening, but 
that the medical research tradition lacks strategies for the study of interpretive action, its 
dynamics and its consequences. (Malterud 2001: 397). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Video-reflexive ethnography and the study of the 
diagnosis of autism in action 
 
―We study science in action and not ready made science or 
technology; to do so, we either arrive before the facts and machines 
are blackboxed or we follow the controversies and reopen them.‖  
(Latour 1987: 258, italics in original)  
 
Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I examined the history of developmental disabilities and 
autism spectrum disorder in Australia – including the ways they have been defined and 
treated over the past 100 years, and the increasingly prominent role standardisation and 
evidence-based medicine (EBM) have come to play in this process.  I explored the difficulty 
of applying EBM to developmental disorders such as autism, as well as medicine’s relentless 
pursuit of the “gold-standard” of evidence: that is, how it seeks to bring order and structure 
to what is inherently messy and disordered.   
 
Autism spectrum disorder is a heterogeneous disorder – there is a lack of scientific certainty 
around its causes, age of onset, symptoms, comorbidity with other disorders (such as ADHD 
and anxiety disorder), and patients’ responses to treatment.  This variability makes ASD 
particularly difficult to test under the standardised epidemiological paradigm, particularly 
using the gold standard of randomised controlled trials (RCTs).  Accordingly, ASDs are 
diagnosed and treated at an individual, case-by-case level, drawing upon the clinician’s 
observation of the patient’s behaviour and speech (Silove, Blackmore, Warren, Gibbs, & 
Roberts, 2008).  
 
While standardised tools and guidelines that aid in the diagnosis of ASD are promoted by 
the Australian medical community (Silove et al., 2008), clinicians are reportedly critical of 
their functionality in practice (Lenne & Waldby, 2011; Symons, 2008). This was the key focus 
of the pilot study8 to this thesis, which found that to reconcile this tension, clinicians use 
clinical creativity through the process of tool tinkering to do the “doable job”. This also 
means that sometimes these tools are used in circumstances in which they are not intended 
to be used (for example, with individuals that are outlier cases due to possible co-morbid 
disorders) (Lenne & Waldby, 2011). Following on from this pilot study, this thesis seeks to 
explore the nuances and complexities around how these standardised tools are being used, 
                                                           
8 Interviews were conducted with nine Australian private practice developmental paediatricians in 2009 
(Honours thesis).  
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negotiated, interpreted, tweaked and analysed in practices that constitute the ASD 
diagnostic encounter.  
 
Thus, this chapter extends upon this theoretical discussion by presenting the guiding 
methodological approach used for this thesis – video-reflexive ethnography (VRE) – which 
enables me to engage with and capture the messiness, complexity, indeterminacy and flux 
of the autism diagnostic encounter within a clinical trial. In explaining and justifying this 
approach, I will consider the methodological literature around video ethnography and VRE, 
and the ways that other medical and health issues have been previously dealt with “in the 
field.” I examine key studies and examples in the fields of sociology and medicine that have 
used video data and VRE within the clinical/healthcare setting and within the context of 
working with children with autism.  Finally, I outline the setting, design and analytical 
approach of this study and the relative unchartered territory that was embarked upon when 
developing the project.  
 
Guiding principles and background  
In formulating my methodological approach for conducting research, developing methods 
and gathering data, I found the work of Charmaz (2011), Glaser and Strauss (1967), Latour 
(1987) and Law (2004) particularly helpful. This approach aligns with the key concepts laid 
out in Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Charmaz 2011) whereby “data collection 
and analysis reciprocally inform and shape each other through an emergent iterative 
process” (Charmaz 2011: 360).  
 
As I have discussed in Chapter Two, Bruno Latour’s ethnographic work on the study of 
scientific practices presents an insightful theoretical framework that directs my 
methodological approach. Just as Latour focuses on procedures, relationships, activities, 
machines and events in the “construction of scientific facts” (Latour and Woolgar 1986),  
this thesis also investigates the interactions, procedures, inscriptions and notes, 
standardised tools and body language central to the process of reaching an autism diagnosis 
in the clinical encounter. Latour’s (1987) work highlights the active nature of investigating 
“science in the making” through the notion of “black boxes.” Open black boxes represent 
fields of inquiry that are characterised by uncertainties, controversies, and various alliances 
that take place between both things and people. A researcher that wants to explore open 
black boxes must take on a malleable and dynamic approach that is able to cope with this 
constant state of flux. I will argue that the approach I have used in this thesis to explore the 
construction of autism diagnosis, or autism diagnosis in the making, within a clinical trial 
echoes Latour’s own theoretical approach regarding the construction of scientific facts and 
the study of “science in action.”  
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For this study, I began with some research questions that originated from a 2009 pilot study 
in which I conducted semi-structured interviews with nine developmental paediatricians. 
These research questions focused on understanding the tacit and experiential nature of the 
ASD diagnostic process in more detail, and how and why standardised tools were used in 
the clinical encounter. Coupled with a review of studies examining the diagnosis of ASD, I 
established that there was a need for the use of a set of methods that would enable access 
to this knowledge (beyond the approach of interviews). Additionally, I also revised and re-
worked my research questions and themes as the research progressed. The pilot study also 
established the need for a set of flexible methods that, in the field, can adapt 
to/complement the notion of “science in action” (Latour 1987: 258) and the background 
messiness, flux and indeterminacy (Law 2004) of the clinical encounter:  
 
events and processes are not simply complex in the sense that they are technically difficult to 
grasp (though this is certainly often the case). Rather, they are also complex because they 
necessarily exceed our capacity to know them. No doubt local structures can be identified, 
but…the world in general defies any attempt at overall orderly accounting. (Law 2004: 6) 
 
Thus, the point of the methodological approach taken in this thesis is not to “uncover,” 
“objectify,” “know,” or “unlock” the diagnosis of ASD and the various practices associated 
with the diagnostic clinical encounter, but rather to study diagnostic practices as they occur 
in action – embracing their messiness, unpredictability and uncertainty – and reflexively 
make sense of these alongside the clinician with the aim of encouraging dialogue about tacit 
and experiential knowledge and practices. Methods that remain removed or stay at a 
distance from the complexity of the clinic in action (such as interviews and focus groups) do 
not seek to understand the nuances of medical practice, and in the case of this study, tell us 
nothing new about the diagnosis of ASD.  
 
The approach of conducting ethnographic fieldwork was therefore very appealing, as I was 
drawn to the way that it would enable me to fully immerse myself in the clinic and its day-
to-day practices. The following passage from Bosk’s (1985) account of his ethnographic 
fieldwork with genetic counsellors highlights the richness and complexity of the data 
available when conducting this type of research: 
 
[F]ieldwork puts us directly in touch with the human dimensions of social life in a way that no 
other method of inquiry does…Full understanding involves an intimate contact and this is what 
fieldwork provides. It allows us to describe a set of fundamental life experiences as they occur – 
it provides us with the words to inscribe the arc of human experience…it allows us to see the 
human conflicts that lie beneath the surface of an advancing and dazzling medical 
technology…Fieldwork supplies precisely what other methods of research drop out – the 
experiencing individual as a member of community and the set of shared meanings that sustains 
that individual’s action in an uncertain world. Fieldwork allows us to see social life as we live it…it 
allows us to examine the fit between principles and practice. (Bosk 1985: 14)  
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In the following sections I will detail the effectiveness of video-reflexive ethnography (VRE) 
as a collaborative qualitative methodology used to improve the quality of care in healthcare 
settings and as a tool to enact change. I will also draw on both medical and sociological 
studies and examples to highlight the power of video when engaging in research with 
children with autism and their families.  
 
Video ethnography and video-reflexive ethnography: collaborative 
research in the health-care setting  
 
Far from being a research style of representativity, measurement, or proof, Video Ethnography is 
a soft procedure characterised by gaze-seeking and experimentation, by plausible suggestions 
and possible views, one whose strength and effectiveness seems to lie precisely in the fact that 
even well focused pictures can provide material for discussion and provoke a need for 
communicative validation. It is not the fixation of a fact, but the onward goal of movement of 
thought which becomes the goal of ethnographic research by means of motion pictures. (Mohn, 
2009: 179-180) 
 
The quote above emphasises three key strengths of the video-reflexive ethnography (VRE) 
approach that are central to the data collection process used for this thesis. The first is the 
ability of an image to “provide material for discussion” and “provoke a need for 
communicative validation.” The second is the way that VRE enables us to examine practices 
in action (Latour 1987) by focusing on “the onward goal of movement of thought.” The third 
is the way that VRE produces important discussions between clinicians, and between 
clinicians and researchers, thus allowing the key findings of this study to be brought forth. 
This section will explore the significance and importance of using the dynamic, visual, 
adaptable, flexible and active techniques of VRE to explore the diagnosis of autism within a 
clinical trial.  
 
At its very foundations, the purpose of video ethnography is to focus on and capture the 
audiovisual aspects of people in action (Knoblauch, Schnettler, & Raab, 2009), allowing the 
researcher to document the intricacies, intimacies and complexities of day-to-day life.  
There is a strong emphasis on the naturalness of the data gathered in this way: individuals 
or groups that are being studied are expected to go about their daily routines and work as if 
they were not being observed or filmed (Knoblauch et al., 2009). The ethnographic 
approach used alongside the video-recording is crucial to this notion of capturing “natural” 
data – that is, it is necessary for the researcher to spend time with and build rapport with 
the participants to achieve this naturalness, and for the researcher’s presence to be 
accepted (Knoblauch et al., 2009).  However, this is not to say that ethnographic 
observations and video data are “neutral” documents – they are produced with a focused, 
and somewhat predetermined, scope and therefore should be seen as having an author 
(Mohn, 2009). For Mohn (2009), the camera is used in the field as a “Caméra Stylo” (a 
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picture-pen) whereby “[d]esigning the moving image articulates the focus of observation” 
(175) as opposed to recording and/or transcribing and analysing any and every situation.  
 
Lomax and Casey (1998) extend this perspective, arguing that the process of filming and 
observing as a researcher helps to “socially construct and produce the data that is collected” 
(1.4). Thus, rather than treating video data as a duplication of the unrecorded event, or 
claiming that the video camera distorts the research process, Lomax and Casey (1998) 
contend that: 
 
The activity of data collection is constitutive of the very interaction which is then subsequently 
available for investigation. A reflexive analysis of this relationship is therefore essential. Video 
generated data is an ideal resource in as far as it can provide a faithful record of the process as an 
aspect of the naturally occurring interaction which comprises the research topic. (1) 
 
The video-reflexive ethnographic approach combines two innovative methodologies: “video-
ethnography” and “video-reflexivity.” The process of video-reflexivity involves ethnographic 
video footage of clinical practices being played back to the clinician(s), patient(s), and/or 
patient’s family involved for review, discussion and analysis. Studies have demonstrated 
that through this reflexive process, clinicians learn, develop and even change their practices 
after developing this new awareness (for example, Carroll 2009; Carroll et al 2008; Iedema 
& Carroll 2010; Iedema et al 2006). The reflexive component of the research relies on video-
recording the diagnostic sessions and playing-back these clips to the clinician involved for 
their analysis, alongside the researcher. Video-reflexive ethnography allows the researcher 
and clinician to engage with messiness, complexity, indeterminacy, flux and the clinic in 
action. 
 
These methodologies have been used within hospital settings to facilitate clinician-learning 
and clinician-led practice redesign (see Carroll 2009; Carroll, Iedema, & Kerridge 2008; 
Collier, Sorensen & Iedema 2015; Collier & Wyer 2016; Iedema, Long, & Forsyth 2006; Wyer, 
Iedema, Jorm, Armstrong et al. 2015; Wyer, Jackson, Iedema, Hor et al. 2015). Iedema and 
colleagues (2006) highlight the usefulness of this methodology in the health-care setting, 
claiming that the challenges facing contemporary health-care work involve “constantly 
confronting new evidence, different viewpoints, diverging interests and unpredictable 
emotions. This produces processes which are not linear and mechanical, and which 
therefore demand reflexive conduct” (164).  
 
Video-reflexivity is above all an interventionist approach, providing a “powerful form of 
feedback, enabling people to confront and intervene in everyday complexity” (Iedema et al. 
2009: 133). In contrast to studies using observational, ethnographic and interview 
approaches, video-reflexivity enables a more dynamic approach: real-life clinical situations 
are videotaped by the researcher who later plays back segments of this video to the 
clinicians involved for their analysis and discussion (Iedema et al. 2009), while the 
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researcher simultaneously makes sense of the video alongside the clinician. This 
collaborative and reflexive approach between researcher and clinicians enables a mutual 
and dialogic relationship (Iedema & Carroll, 2010) to form: “Video-based research can 
facilitate a crossing of the divide between data and analysis, and instead produce a ‘data-in-
analysis’, where participants account for, and explain, their practices as they are performing 
them for the camera” (Forsyth, Carroll, & Reitano, 2009: 215-16). It is a way to negotiate 
and cross the boundaries “between researchers and researched and between knowing and 
doing” (Juhasz, Heath, & Iedema, 2009: 323). An important effect of the practitioner/patient 
being involved in the research process and participating in this self-reflection and 
collaboration is the direct impact on practice and the way practitioners and/or patients “are 
enabled to articulate changes to better suit their contexts and purposes” (Iedema 2014: 
196).  
 
The video-reflexive approach is best suited to unpacking the complexities of medical 
practice and unspoken rules, behaviours and individual idiosyncrasies of the clinicians being 
studied. It provides an opportunity for insights to be shared across disciplines, and for new 
meaning and practices to be created by the clinician alongside the researcher. It is above all 
a collaborative approach: allowing researcher/clinician/patient to collectively negotiate and 
determine what issues are important, what data to collect, how to collect this data, and 
how to use the data (Iedema 2014). Thus, it has a direct impact on those involved in the 
research, “because they have been given a stake in it and its outcomes.” (Iedema 2014: 197) 
Iedema and colleagues (2009) contend that two important and contrasting realisations are 
reached by clinicians when watching-back video-clips of their practice:  
 
First, they realise the extent to which their practices embody their own peculiar logic – a logic 
they have often learned no longer to see. This logic harbours a regularity that has become second 
nature, thereby slipping from conscious view. Second, the footage reveals for them the 
complexity and indeterminacy of what they do. It reveals their practical wisdom, or phronesis, 
which they had equally come to take for granted (Dreyfus 1979). They observe themselves 
making on-the-spot decisions, acting on hints and intuitions, sharing tasks with colleagues in 
ways they could not have described beforehand nor afterwards, displaying knowledge they 
gained in unexplained ways, and so forth. (293)  
 
Iedema, Mesman and Carroll (2013) elaborate further on another complex dimension of 
what clinicians “see” when watching their video footage – rather than just focusing on what 
appears before them on the screen, participants draw on knowledge and experiences within 
their organisation, take into account things that have happened in the past, and look 
forward to possible future occurrences – thus they are “linking what was shown to what 
was known” (Iedema 2014: 198). Here, video images can be seen as multi-layered, allowing 
participants in the reflexive session to variously interpret the data in what Iedema and 
colleagues (2013) refer to as the “hologrammatic” effect of VRE.  
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I would like to turn the discussion now to two key studies, conducted over the past two 
years, which have used VRE with patients and families to explore issues around patient 
safety within the context of the Australian hospital.  These two studies represent important 
contributions to the VRE literature as their findings have important implications for practice 
redesign within the healthcare setting. By outlining the methodology and findings of these 
studies, I want to demonstrate the potential of VRE to enact real change in medical and 
organisational practice. Further, these studies demonstrate the insight and knowledge that 
patients and families have to offer within the clinical domain, and how this knowledge can 
be used to enact changes to the social-emotional practices within the clinic as well as clinical 
and standardised practices.  
 
In Collier et al. (2016) VRE is used to explore patients’ and families’ perspectives on patient 
safety within end of life care. The researchers point out that current organisational 
definitions of harm and safety fail to take into account the socio-cultural aspects of 
healthcare delivery and are determined exclusively by researchers, policy-makers and 
clinicians. Using VRE over a period of 18 months in an Australian tertiary acute hospital, 
Collier et al. (2016) worked with patients with an advanced life-limiting illness and their 
family members. Through this research they demonstrate that patients at the end of life 
have unique perspectives and experiences of safety and harm, and that these patient and 
family-defined concepts are not always acknowledged, defined or addressed by clinicians or 
hospitals. Some of the interpersonal concepts of harm and safety that they raised included 
compassion, effective interdisciplinary communication and continuity of care, focus on the 
person not disease, dignity and the act of listening and then acting. Addressing these patient 
and family definitions by incorporating them into current guidelines and practices will have 
important implications for the way that patients experience safety and harm within the 
context of dying in the future.  
 
In Wyer et al. (2015), VRE is used to examine patients’ understandings of hospital infection 
control in a metropolitan teaching hospital in Sydney, Australia. They note that research to 
date has focused on top-down approaches that address frontline clinician practices, namely 
the expertise and insights of people providing and receiving care with regards to patient 
safety. Wyer and colleagues (2015) offer an alternative approach by using VRE with patients 
during their experiences of care to explore patients’ understandings and enactments of 
infection prevention and control. Using VRE was vital to this study’s success as it enabled 
the researchers to engage with patients at the frontline of care and reveal, through reflexive 
viewings of their video data, patient-identified infection prevention control practices and 
roles that patients can play to contribute to their own safety. This demonstrates the 
valuable contribution that patients can make in achieving patient safety in the clinical 
setting, and emphasises that clinicians should be supporting, consulting and engaging with 
patients to achieve safer care.  
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Thus, the video-reflexive component of this approach is advantageous for numerous 
reasons within the context of healthcare: it allows the researcher to capture fast-paced, 
complex and multifaceted clinical processes as they unfold, thus providing a rich record of 
the clinical encounter (Iedema et al. 2013); it frames the clinical encounter in a “‘visual 
language’ that is more easily accessible” (Iedema 2014: 196) to clinician/patient/researcher; 
and perhaps most importantly, it dismantles the notion of the research subject through the 
act of playing-back video footage to those who appear in it and making sense of it together 
as a “deliberate democratic strategy and ethical act” (Iedema 2014: 196). These features are 
highly relevant to researching the autism diagnostic encounter embedded within a clinical 
trial given that this endeavour involves: complex and multi-faceted diagnostic processes 
that are framed within standardised tools (WISC-IV/WAIS-IV and ADI-R) and must answer to 
the broader framework of the clinical trial protocol; collaboration with, and the important 
role of, parent and child in the ADI-R and WISC-IV/WAIS-IV respectively; focusing on the 
predominantly visual aspects of diagnosing autism given that assessment of this disorder is 
reliant on observable behaviours; and working alongside the diagnosing clinician in a 
collaborative way to understand the complexity and uncertainty involved in this practice, 
and how standardised tools are enacted, interpreted and tinkered with in this clinical trial 
space.  
 
Using video with children and children with autism: research in 
medicine, psychology and social sciences 
One of the key factors that motivated my use of video as a tool to collect data for this thesis 
was my frequent exposure to the video camera during my ABA therapy sessions with 
children with autism. Video is often used during these therapy sessions to monitor, analyse 
and improve the performance of the therapist. In many early intervention approaches, like 
ABA and Floor Time, videoing the child during their session is also a common way for 
supervising clinicians to keep abreast of the child’s progress or any problems parents and 
other therapists are struggling with. I also found in my own practice as a therapist that many 
of the children enjoy watching themselves in these videos made during their therapy 
session, and will in fact learn from this process in a kind of self-reflexive practice. For 
example, video is a common tool used in the various treatment approaches to ASD. The use 
of a technique called “video modelling” involves the child observing a video of 
peers/siblings/themselves demonstrating specific skills and then imitating the observed 
behaviour. This well-established technique aims to improve skills such as toileting, 
socialisation/play skills, communication and so on (Cardon & Wilcox 2011; Keen, Brannigan, 
& Cuskelly, 2007; Mechling & Moser, 2010; Nikopoulos & Keenan, 2004; Sherer et al., 2001). 
 
In recent years, research in experimental and clinical settings in fields such as psychology, 
education and medicine often portray video as a tool used to “unlock” or “solve” the 
mysteries and complexities of clinical practice to produce new ways of quantifying or 
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categorising individuals or conditions. James et al (2012) suggest that this use of video 
footage in clinical assessments and diagnosis is increasingly common due to its ability to 
predict a range of developmental outcomes. For example, in two studies exploring using 
retrospective video analysis, home videos of infants with autism are analysed and coded 
into categories to determine the usefulness of sensory-motor measures and social behaviors 
as early predictors of autism during infancy (Baranek, 1999; Baranek et al., 2005). These 
studies advocate the use of computer-based coding technology in the retrospective analysis 
of video (Baranek et al., 2005), and claim that this analysis provides “a window into the 
earliest manifestations of autistic symptomology within a naturalistic paradigm” (Baranek, 
1999: 223). Other studies focus on filming the child in their everyday environment to 
provide more “accurate” information to the health care provider about the child’s 
symptoms and their responses to therapy (Jones & Schwartz, 2009; Oberleitner et al., 2006).  
 
Furthermore, an “App” – ASDetect – launched in 2015 and developed by La Trobe 
University, Melbourne, uses a series of videos and questions to guide parents through the 
identification of potential “red flag” signs of ASD (Barbaro & Dissanayake 2010; 2013). It 
gives parents access to video footage from clinical assessments with children with and 
without ASD, and clearly identifies the context and expected key behaviours of children at 
each age.  This demonstrates the use of video in the screening process on a large scale, and 
the way in which video is being harnessed in the clinic to capture more ASD diagnoses. 
 
These examples of the use of video in the clinical setting are an important illustration and 
acknowledgement of the very established role that video plays within the autism clinical 
setting and the way that video can be used as a means of reaching diagnostic decisions. 
Given the reliance on observable behaviours to diagnose this disorder, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that video has come to play such a significant role in the clinical and 
therapeutic setting. However, research that directs the lens of the video camera towards 
the diagnostic encounter with children, and the autism diagnostic encounter specifically, is 
limited.  
 
In recent years, two researchers at the University of Wisconsin, Jason Turowetz and Douglas 
Maynard, have begun using audio and video data to explore how clinicians diagnose 
children with autism. Using this data – which spans two eras (1980s and 2010s) and is 
derived from a larger project examining the testing and diagnosis of autism at an 
interdisciplinary developmental clinic – these researchers explore a variety of issues such as 
category attribution as a diagnostic device (Turowetz & Maynard 2016) and the use of 
narrative and storytelling in clinical settings (Maynard & Turowetz 2017). Their findings offer 
an important contribution to the sociology of diagnosis literature, and clinical 
understandings of how autism is diagnosed in practice. For example, Turowetz and Maynard 
(2016) demonstrate that reaching a diagnostic label involves piecing together information 
about the patient, then fitting that information into a diagnostic category, and then 
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providing adequate justification to the parent as to why the child fits/does not fit the 
category of autism. Maynard and Turowetz (2017) argue in a later paper that for clinicians 
to arrive at a diagnosis of autism they must build a narrative case, that is, they use stories 
and test performances as evidence to support or negate a diagnosis of autism. These 
researchers use conversation analysis procedures to analyse the audio and video data, and 
thus the focus of this research is predominantly on these conversational interactions, rather 
than the visual and embodied nature of the interactions. For example, the transcribed 
quotations included in their papers (see Maynard & Turowetz 2017; Turowetz & Maynard 
2016; Turowetz 2015) are focused on patterns of speech – such as intonation, pauses, 
emphasis – and what is said. This is a significant point of divergence from my own research 
and data collection approach for this thesis.  
 
Grant and Luxford’s (2009) exploration of the intercultural communication between child 
health nurses and parents in Australia presents a unique example of the use of VRE in child 
and family health settings. Their research focuses on understanding the intercultural 
communication issues that vulnerable migrant families experience in the clinical setting. 
During their three stages of data collection, Grant and Luxford (2009) focus on developing 
trust with the child health professionals (child and family health nurses, social workers, 
doctors, physiotherapists and administrative staff) through participant observation, making 
visual recordings of practice during consultations between child health professionals and 
parents, and reflecting on practice through the use of in-depth interviews with the child 
health professionals after viewing their video recordings. Grant and Luxford’s (2009) study is 
particularly pertinent as a resource for this project as it outlines some important benefits of 
the VRE methodology when working in a clinical setting with families (who are discussing 
their children) and clinicians. Using VRE allowed the researcher to identify “differences 
between what participants said in the field and what they did in practice...Without video, 
this depth of critique would not be possible. Major areas of incongruence included 
professional knowledge, identity and relations of power.” (228) One of the examples Grant 
and Luxford (2009) provide regarding this incongruence in professional knowledge relates to 
one of the clinicians claiming that her decisions and recommendations are based on NHMRC 
guidelines, yet later clarifying (after watching a video clip of herself) that most of her 
practice is based on life experiences. This process allows for reciprocity, self-determination 
and self-understanding (Grant & Luxford, 2009) for the clinician, because the clinician and 
researcher work side by side in a mutually beneficial relationship. Iedema and colleagues 
(2006) point out that this approach is “participative, dynamic (as in ongoing and iterative), 
and protective of individuals” (164). This is described as an endogenous approach – that is, 
relying on “cooperation and negotiation among practitioner-clinicians and hospital 
researchers as the bases upon which meaning and significance are constructed” (164).  
 
This study seeks to reimagine the way that video can be used in the autism clinical 
encounter, establishing it as a useful research tool to help “sort out” – by making visible and 
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overt – the tacit practices and diagnostic messiness that constitute the autism diagnostic 
encounter. Video, in the context of this study, is used not as a tool to structure, codify, 
“more accurately diagnose” or treat autism, but rather as an illuminating device to closely 
understand, analyse and make sense of autism diagnostic practices. The video-reflexive 
ethnographic approach offers a further layer to this analysis: it allows me, as the researcher, 
to build up a rich observational account and experience of the autism diagnostic process, 
and the opportunity to reflexively engage the diagnosing clinician in discussions about her 
own unique insights about her practice.  
 
By playing back video clips of significant moments/incidents to clinicians, they are given the 
chance to identify and explain the often tacit, difficult to articulate, or complex details of the 
diagnostic encounter alongside the researcher.  As Schubert (2009) explains: 
 
Video recording and analysis in videographic research should be considered focusing devices 
which are embedded within a larger context of multiple methods, ranging from participant 
observation to interviews and producing very detailed accounts of selected phenomena in the 
field. Using video equipment as a sociological instrument, one has to keep in mind that it does 
not produce or reproduce ‘reality’ but that it consists of an array of artefacts which aid in the 
sociological reconstruction of practices by distorting our perceptual habits and exempting us 
from some restrictions of space and time. (124) 
 
This use of video-reflexivity to transform the previously tacit and implicit into 
something that is visible, explicit and able to be challenged and analysed, 
demonstrates the innovative and unique nature of this methodological approach. The 
philosophical principles underlying the methodology align with the key arguments of 
this thesis: video reflexive ethnography is not fixated on “producing or reproducing 
‘reality’” nor is it fixated on facts, the purpose is rather “the onward goal of movement 
of thought…by means of motion pictures” (Mohn, 2009: 179-180).  
 
Setting: The autism diagnostic encounter nested within a clinical trial  
This study was nested within an NHMRC-funded randomised double blind placebo-
controlled trial, conducted within an Australian metropolitan children’s hospital9. The trial 
investigates the use of a Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) in the treatment of 
anxiety in children with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD). As I have argued in the 
preceding chapters, applying a randomised controlled trial (RCT) design to investigate the 
effectiveness of a drug in children with a diagnosis of autism presents numerous challenges, 
particularly the problems associated with diagnosing this disorder and establishing what is 
deemed “average” within this heterogeneous population. The absence of biological markers 
                                                           
9 Ethics approval was sought from the University of Sydney HREC (Reference: MF/PE, Project No: 2012/2065), 
Autism Spectrum Australia (ASPECT) (Reference: 1114), and the Australian Metropolitan Children’s Hospital 
where my research was conducted (HREC approval number 11/SCHN/156 and SSA/12/SCHN/158) 
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or tests to aid in producing a diagnostic outcome makes it more challenging to carry out 
empirical investigations using RCTs:   
 
The broad spectrum of pathology encompassed and the wide individual variation in symptomatic 
expression (sample heterogeneity) and treatment response [for ASD] challenge the sensitivity, 
psychometric properties, and/or assumptions of most instruments and assessment strategies 
commonly used in RCTs. (Arnold et al., 2000: 100) 
 
This study, nested within the clinical trial, therefore presents a unique opportunity to 
observe and record EBM in practice, and the various social, political, medical, and 
interpersonal factors that play a role in this process. Understanding how clinicians address 
the problem of working within the paradigm of an RCT with a population of children on the 
autism spectrum will also provide valuable insights into how clinicians work within and 
between the confines of the standardised world of the clinical trial. Nesting this study within 
this drug trial provides a valuable opportunity to investigate not only the ASD-specific aims 
and research questions outlined above, but also to turn the sociological gaze on the 
practices and rules that make up a clinical trial. 
 
Ethical and practical implications of working with children with autism  
When embarking on this thesis, I knew that I wanted to explore the complexities of the 
autism diagnostic clinical encounter using video, and this required navigating three layers of 
methodological and ethical challenges: working with children; working with children with 
autism; and working with children with autism using video. Each layer (see Figure 3.1) raised 
its own methodological, ethical and practical implications that required consideration. 
Importantly, these issues were not simply addressed in the ethics application and then 
ignored, but rather dealt with and re-visited throughout the entire methodological 
development, ethics, data collection, data analysis, and writing up process. From the outset, 
I knew that finding participants would be challenging given that I wanted to work with not 
only children, but children with a potential autism diagnosis. Further, I planned to video the 
intimate and emotionally charged setting of the diagnostic clinical encounter for this 
ostensibly sensitive and vulnerable population.  
 
Alderson’s (2000) work was helpful in navigating the ethical, methodological and practical 
issues outlined above. The importance of recognising children as participants in the 
research, rather than objects, was key to my approach in working in this field. I recognised 
that children with a possible ASD diagnosis could “speak ‘in their own right’ and report valid 
views and experiences” (Alderson 2000: 243). For children with autism, “speaking” may also 
involve sign language, body language, facial expressions or sounds. It was therefore 
important to respect and attempt to record and document the varied forms in which these 
children communicated their thoughts and ideas within the diagnostic encounter. While the 
children were not included in the reflexive interviews, their “voices” (including body 
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language, facial expressions and sounds) within the video data are an important part of this 
thesis, especially the proceeding chapters. 
 
Figure 3.1: Methodological, ethical and practical implications of the research  
 
 
Alderson (2000) also stresses the importance of informed and voluntary consent for 
children in research and points out the danger in researchers assuming that the consent of 
the parent/guardian will suffice and that children are incapable of expressing their consent 
or refusal to take part in a research project. A concerted effort was made prior to each 
diagnostic session with the child to not only ask for the parent/guardian’s consent, but also 
to seek the child’s approval on the consent form (name, signature and date). Additionally, 
before each diagnostic session began, the clinician would explain to the child (while with 
their parent(s)) that a researcher would be videoing the session, and sought confirmation 
that this was something the child was comfortable with. When the child came into the room 
for the diagnostic session, I would show the child the camera and let them examine it and 
show them where it would be set up in the room. Two of the ten children that participated 
in the diagnostic session (the WISC-IV) opted to not be videoed (despite their parents’ 
consent), but consented to my presence throughout the session, and this decision was of 
course honoured.  
 
One further point made by Anderson (2000) that will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 is 
the issue of “infantilising” children that participate in research: 
 
[P]erceiving and treating [children] as immature and, in doing so, producing evidence to 
reinforce notions of their incompetence. This can include ‘talking down’ to children by using 
over-simple words and concepts, restricting them into making only superficial 
RESEARCH WITH 
CHILDREN
RESEARCH WITH 
CHILDREN WITH 
AUTISM
RESEARCH WITH 
CHILDREN WITH 
AUTISM USING VIDEO
•Key issues 
•consent
•respecting children's rights
•object/subject/participant?
•Key issues
•consent
•vulnerability of population
•sensitive to needs of child with 
autism
•Key issues
•confidentiality (visual record of 
child)
•video may impact on/interfere 
with diagnostic session
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responses…researchers’ over-complicated or poorly explained terms, topics and methods can 
also misleadingly make children (and some adults) appear to be ignorant or incapable. (243-4) 
 
In Chapter Five I will discuss how, within the context of the WISC-IV/WAIS, the children’s 
competencies/strengths/skills/quirks were often overlooked or ignored within the confines 
of the standardised questions presented in this “diagnostic test.” The WISC-IV/WAIS was 
part of a battery of standardised tools that were administered as part of the clinical trial and 
thus the clinicians were bound by the trial protocol with little room to maneuver. While the 
clinicians did not have control over the questions asked of the child, they were able to find 
moments and ways to creatively engage with the children during the standardised 
diagnostic encounter.  
 
Study design 
Figure 3.2 outlines the five stages of data collection that make up the study design. This 
design was developed through close consultation with the video-reflexivity and video-
ethnography literature. Collier and Wyer (2016) offer a similar summary of their approaches 
to VRE through Collier’s end of life study, and Wyer’s inflection control study (see Collier & 
Wyer 2016: 983). The video camera was used in the formal assessment stages involving the 
WISC-IV/WAIS-IV and ADI-R (stage 3) as well as the reflexive interviews with the clinician 
(stage 5). Observational field notes were taken when video was deemed inappropriate to 
use.  
 
Stage one outlines the pilot study, which involved discussions and interviews with nine 
private practice paediatricians specialising in the diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder 
(details discussed above). As outlined in Iedema et al. (2009), these initial discussions with 
clinicians orient the researcher and provide engagement with and insight into the problems 
and complexities of clinical practice. This is the beginning of the “alongsider” approach 
taken in video-reflexivity. By allowing researcher and clinician to develop this knowledge 
alongside each other, and thus including the research participants in the methodological 
process, a mutual respect is obtained. While Iedema and colleagues (2009) use the same 
participants throughout their study, the initial phase of my study draws on a different group 
of clinicians (private practice paediatricians) compared to stages two to five (clinical trial 
psychologists), outlined above in Figure 3.2. 
 
Stage two builds upon the knowledge obtained in stage one through time spent with the 
clinicians involved in the assessment process of the clinical trial. During this time, I 
familiarised myself with the clinicians through observation, asking questions, engaging the 
clinicians in discussions about various aspects of the trial, and general rapport building. This 
occurred for three months prior to stage 3, but continued throughout stages 3 to 5. 
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Figure 3.2: The five stages of the video-reflexive ethnography process nested within the clinical trial 
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Stage three involves observing and videoing the diagnostic sessions between clinician-child 
and clinician-parent. Both of these sessions were structured by standardised tools: an 
intelligence test (WISC-IV/WAIS-IV) with the child, and the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (ADI-R) with the parent(s)/caregiver(s). The WISC-IV/WAIS-IV takes roughly one to 
two hours to administer, and the ADI-R takes two to three hours. Later in the chapter I will 
detail the procedure I used to transcribe and analyse this video data. I observed and/or 
videoed a total of 10 WISC-IV/WAIS-IV sessions and a total of 12 ADI-R sessions (see Table 
3.1 for more detail).  
 
Stage four includes observing the psychologist during the WISC-IV/WAIS-IV and ADI-R 
sessions making notes and scoring the responses onto the respective standardised tool 
answer booklets. After the conclusion of some of the sessions, I was able to go through the 
inscribed and partially scored answer booklets and film/make notes on key sections of 
particular interest. I was able to observe and make notes on 9 ADI-R scored booklets and 6 
WISC-IV/WAIS-IV scored booklets (see Table 1 for more detail).  
 
Stage five comprises the reflexive part of the methodology. Here, one-on-one interviews 
(both around 90mins in length) between myself and the clinician take place in which video 
clips of the diagnostic sessions with both the child (WISC-IV/WAIS-IV) and parent (ADI-R) are 
played-back. The reflexive sessions are structured loosely around interview questions that I 
developed during the analysis of the ADI-R and WISC-IV data. These questions are linked to 
the video clips that are played back to the clinician. The detailed process of analysing, 
coding and selecting these short video clips is discussed later in the chapter (see Table 3). 
The video clips are played back to the clinician for her insights, analysis and general 
comments. While I selected the video clips and formulated questions about these clips from 
my own analysis of the data and using my “researcher’s gaze,” the focus of this stage of the 
methodology is to make sense of the video-clips and the data gathered in “stage three” 
alongside the clinician. The clip was played to the clinician during the one-on-one interview 
(and sometimes played again for follow-up) and then the psychologist was given the 
opportunity to provide thoughts, feedback, and analysis about the clip before I asked any 
further questions. 
 
Recruitment  
Given that my study was nested within the clinical trial, participant recruitment for the 
clinical trial itself was carried out independently by the clinical trial clinicians. Therefore, my 
study recruitment took place within the group of participants that had already agreed to 
take part in the clinical trial through this initial recruitment process. In the sections below I 
detail these two recruitment processes. 
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Recruitment for clinical trial participation  
Participants for the clinical trial were mostly recruited by paediatricians connected with the 
hospital, as well as by some private practice paediatricians.  Information was given to 
participants about the trial, and they were given time to consider the trial and their child’s 
participation. The trial recruited participants with the following characteristics:  
 
1. Aged between 7 and 17 years; 
2. Has a known diagnosis of an autism spectrum disorder; and 
3. Has troublesome restricted, repetitive and stereotyped behaviours 
 
Both the child and their parent(s) were required to participate in the trial. After contact was 
established and consent obtained, two diagnostic sessions were used to confirm the ASD 
diagnosis for the trial. First, the psychologist administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Children (4th Edition) (WISC-IV) for children aged between 7-16 years, or the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (4th Edition) (WAIS-IV) for those aged 17 years, in a one to two hour 
diagnostic session with the child. The WISC-IV is an individually administered intelligence 
test for children between the ages of 6 to 16. It can be completed without requiring the 
child to read or write, and requires the clinician to record and code the child’s responses, 
which then allows the clinician to calculate a score which represents the child’s cognitive 
ability. The WISC-IV is sometimes used to diagnose attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) and learning difficulties. The WAIS-IV is very similar but has been adapted for an 
adult population. Second, parents underwent a two-hour diagnostic interview – the Autism 
Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) (a standardised diagnostic tool) – with the 
psychologist.  The interview is described as employing highly standardised procedures and 
requires the interviewer to record and code the informant’s responses, whereby a score is 
generated and allows the interviewer to indicate whether or not the child is on the autism 
spectrum.  
 
Recruitment for my study 
Two female clinical psychologists were involved in conducting the assessments as part of 
the clinical trial and both were employed by the hospital. Psychologist 1 (shortened to 
“psych” in the transcriptions of the video data) – the main trial clinician – conducted all of 
the sessions except for the WISC-IV with Nikolas (see Table 3.1), which was carried out by 
Psychologist 2 (shortened to “psych#2” in transcriptions of the data). Both clinicians were 
sent an information statement and consent form requesting their participation in the filming 
of the assessment consultation with parent and child, and an interview with the researcher. 
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Table 3.1: List of participants (pseudonyms) and participation checklist 
Participant 
Child 
(pseudonym) 
 
Sex 
(M/F) 
Age 
(yrs) 
Participant(s) 
Parent(s) 
(pseudonym) 
ADI-R WISC-IV/WAIS 
Observed Video length 
Hrs, mins (‘), 
secs (‘’) 
Analysed 
scored tool 
Observed Video length 
Hrs, mins (‘), 
secs (‘’) 
Analysed 
scored tool 
Ian M 12 Kate ✓ 2hrs 21’53” ✓    
Gil M 9 Sarah ✓ 2hrs 54’49” ✓    
Leo M 13 Alice ✓ 2hrs 54’35” ✓ ✓ 1hr 18’18”  
Paul M 7 Teleri ✓ 1hr 58’26” ✓ ✓ 1hr 21’24” ✓ 
Rupert M 11 Sophie & Stewart ✓ 1hr 31’48” ✓    
Nikolas M 8 Siobhan    ✓ ✓ 1hr 19’00” ✓ 
Michael M 13 Teneale ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Patrick M 8 Laura & Tom ✓ 3hrs 23’55” ✓    
Des M 17 Brienna    ✓ (WAIS)  ✓ 
Lorna F 13 Alison    ✓  ✓ 
Brendan M 15 Tim & Lena ✓ 1hr 48’34”  ✓ 1hr 33’44” ✓ 
Daniel M 9 Hayley ✓ 2hrs 19’32”  ✓ 1hr 23’42”  
Manahil M 13 Hana   ✓ ✓   
David M 7 Abigail ✓ 2hrs 13’49”  ✓ 0hr 26’00”  
Stephen M 7 Jenny & Matthew ✓ 3hrs 02’03”     
Harvey M 12 Bronte ✓ 1hr 57’48”     
Simon M 16 Jacob ✓ 1hr 50’45”     
  
 
 
101 
Psychologist 1 then helped with recruitment of the parents and children by sending out the 
information statement and consent form to all the parents of the children participating in 
the clinical trial, requesting their permission to allow the researcher to video their child 
during the ASD assessment process as well as video the parent-clinician assessment process. 
A section requesting the consent of the child, where appropriate (in terms of the child’s 
comprehension and writing abilities), was also included. A total 13 ADI-R sessions were 
observed and 12 of these were videoed. A total of 17 parents consented to be videoed 
and/or observed during the ADI-R session: 9 of the ADI-R sessions took place with one 
parent present, and 4 took place with two parents present. A total of 10 children were 
observed during the WISC-IV/WAIS-IV diagnostic sessions, and of these, 6 sessions were 
given permission to be videoed (see Table 3.1). 
 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, I was very aware of the importance of being respectful 
of, and sensitive to, the context of the diagnostic encounter. Therefore, the following steps 
were taken to ensure that my presence, the use and purpose of the video, and the purpose 
of my study were made clear to participants: 
• In the weeks prior to the scheduled date of assessment (ADI-R or WISC-IV) the 
clinician emailed the parent/caregiver the Recruitment Package for my study, as well 
as telephoned the parent/caregiver to speak about any questions or concerns they 
may have about my study; 
• The clinician would speak privately to the parent(s)/caregiver(s)/child in person 
immediately prior to the assessment session to confirm they were comfortable with 
the use of the camera and my presence. During this time I would wait separately in 
the room where the session would take place;  
• The clinician introduced me to the parent(s) and child and they were given the 
opportunity to ask any further questions they had about my study, after which the 
signed consent forms would be handed over;  
• I stressed that the video could be switched off at any time if they wished; and 
• I then confirmed with the parent(s)/caregiver(s)/child whether it was okay to begin 
filming. The duration of the session was then filmed until the participant(s) left the 
room at the conclusion of the clinical encounter (usually around 1-2 hours for the 
WISC-IV/WAIS-IV and 2-3 hours for the ADI-R).  
 
Context – the clinic room 
Unlike Lomax and Casey’s (1998) description of their dilemma in setting up the camera, and 
negotiating the social complexities and nuances of determining the appropriate time to 
switch the camera on and off, my study was situated within “the clinic” rather than “the 
home” and so the camera was set up prior to the consult starting (and participant entering 
the room), and then switched off once the consult had ended and the participants had 
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departed the room – thus there were clear boundaries around the start and end of the 
filming period.  
 
The camera took the form of a small, unobtrusive device, about the size of an iPhone, and 
was set up on a small tripod in the corner of room (see Figure 3.3, below). Figure 3.3 roughly 
illustrates the field of vision captured by the camera in the shaded area of the diagram, and 
the two images next to the diagram demonstrate the actual video image captured: the face 
and upper half of the body of the child or parent and psychologist, but I do not appear in the 
frame. This was a logistical decision – the rooms that the diagnostic sessions were 
conducted in were quite small and the researcher’s priority was to capture the participant, 
the psychologist and the materials used in the assessment, which often meant that the 
researcher was cut out of the shot. The participants’ attention was sometimes drawn to the 
camera, but given that the camera was left to run for 2-3 hours at a time, and effectively 
ignored by the psychologist and researcher, it did not feature as an object of much interest 
throughout the sessions. This is evidenced by how few times it is mentioned in conversation 
throughout the clinical encounters, and the infrequency of eye-gaze directed toward the 
camera. This lack of interest in the camera may in part be explained by the cognitively 
demanding nature of the diagnostic sessions for the parents and children, with the 
participants becoming quite absorbed in the questions/tasks. However, as discussed earlier 
in this chapter, it is important to stress that I do not consider this video data as a “neutral 
document” (Mohn 2009). I consider myself the author of this video data, given I have 
chosen and directed the angle of the camera, and thus the focus of observation, so that the 
viewer attends to certain components of the room and interaction being studied and 
analysed.  
 
An important issue to consider in discussions about camera placement and angles is the way 
that these video recording practices impact and influence the way that myself, and the 
clinician, then go on to understand and analyse this video data. Being aware of the power of 
the camera and where it is placed, how it is focused, and why it is directed at such an angle 
are all important considerations when orienting an analytical gaze to the video data 
produced and then later reflexively engaged with. Mengis, Nicolini and Gorli (2016) argue 
that the practice of conducting video research is not simply an objective experience in which 
we record activities, conversations and interactions, but rather is has a “performative effect 
on the object of inquiry” (1). In this way, they explore how both camera angle and 
movement make up different forms of spatial understanding, orient the analysis, and 
foreground different dimensions of spatiality (Mengis et al. 2016: 2). Importantly, these 
researchers point out that the researched space, such as the clinic room illustrated above 
that the autism diagnostic sessions take place in, must be seen as a social space which 
comes with its own inherent values, power relations and aesthetics. 
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Figure 3.3: Typical room set-up for the ADI-R and WISC-IV and camera views 
 
 
Based on the definition and explanation provided by Mengis et al. (2016), the configuration 
of camera angle and movement used for my own video research for this thesis is classed as 
the “American-Objective View,” which sees space as “experienced and interpreted” (13). 
Here, the camera is fixed at a medium shot distance at eye level: it shows the clinician and 
parent from above the knees (as opposed to an all-encompassing shot of the room) from a 
fixed vantage point (as opposed me moving, directing, or zooming-in the camera lens to 
focus on people or objects). Mengis et al. (2016) argue that this type of video apparatus 
allows for the analysis of meaningful interactions: the audience is able to observe/hear 
dialogue, body language, gestures, facial expressions, and the way that the bodies occupy 
the physical elements of space (affectively and relationally given the small space that the 
camera angle focuses on). Thus, “the American-Objective View makes us focus on the 
experienced and the interpreted space…the relational space created between clinicians and 
patient” (14). The camera shot is fixed and continuous, which in turn means that what is 
recorded and then played back represents a continuity of place and time, suggestive of: “a 
sense of a coherent scene to which we have access from the beginning to the end and from 
which we can thus draw a meaningful conclusion (and a morale).” (14) Mengis et al. (2016) 
caution that: 
 
The apparatus of the American-Objective View positions us as onlookers, witnesses of something 
that unfolds in front of our eyes and thus still performs a space that is objective in character. It 
generates objects and subjects as distinct entities, a strategy that reflects not only the traditional 
composition of naturalistic iconography but also puts us into the position of traditional 
ethnographic observers. (14)  
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While the gaze of the camera in my study appears to de-emphasise the contextual space of 
the clinic room, Mengis et al. (2016) point out that the apparatus of the American-Objective 
View privileges interactional accounts and an understanding of space as experienced and 
interpreted. This approach is appropriate for my study given the key focus of the videos is 
on the verbal and non-verbal interactions between the psychologist and parent(s) or 
psychologist and child, and the way that the diagnostic tool (and its associated materials for 
the WISC-IV/WAIS) is read from, interpreted, manipulated and inscribed upon. The spatial 
relationships that exist within these interactions are focused and directed within a defined, 
small space. An important element of Mengis et al’s (2016) critique of the American-
Objective View is the way that it perpetuates the notion of the objectified participants. 
However, an important strategy of the VRE approach is to dismantle the concept of the 
research subject by playing-back video footage to those who appear in it and making sense 
of it together in what Iedema (2014) describes as a “deliberate democratic strategy and 
ethical act” (196). By playing back edited video clips to the diagnosing psychologist in my 
study, I hope to subvert these traditional ways of objectifying participants and contribute a 
new approach to research within the field of the sociology of diagnosis.  
 
The researcher’s presence during the clinical encounter 
Lomax and Casey (1998) make the point that when conducting video ethnography, the 
researcher appears to be “doing nothing” in comparison to, for example, a field-note 
observer who is busily taking notes and therefore “observably and accountably engaged” 
(19). This can present an interesting situation for the researcher, as it leaves more scope for 
them to engage with the interaction they are studying and become an active participant, as 
compared with the field-note observer.  Carroll (2009) suggests that in conducting VRE, this 
notion of the participating researcher manifests through the considered application of 
researcher reflexivity. This researcher reflexivity involves managing and negotiating the 
ethical challenges that arise when both the participant and researcher view the video data, 
such as ensuring the participant feels comfortable in embracing the vulnerability and 
openness that comes with viewing and critiquing one’s own practices. Carroll (2009) also 
discusses the tendency in VRE research publications to write-out the researcher, minimising 
or completely erasing the valuable contribution that they make in producing and reflexively 
engaging with the video data.  
 
Extending upon Carroll’s (2009) work, I discuss my involvement, below, in the diagnostic 
encounters with the parents, children and clinicians. While I was generally not physically 
present in the recorded video data, conversations sometimes take place between myself 
and the psychologist, myself and the parent(s)/child, as well as all people present in the 
room. Additionally, it is clear from the videos that I participate non-verbally in the sessions 
as evidenced by the occasional glances/changing facial expressions made by the 
psychologist and participants in my direction. I found that visual (non-verbal) 
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acknowledgement was sometimes expected of me with, for example, what I interpreted as 
a querying look (eyes wide, raised eyebrows) from the parent. In hindsight, I regret that I did 
not manipulate the room/camera placement prior to the beginning of the session to ensure 
that I was also captured in the camera shot. As a participant, at times, throughout the 
clinical encounter, I believe I have missed out on some valuable data by not including myself 
– the researcher – as a participant in this complex, socially-nuanced clinical encounter. For 
example, in my field notes – jotted down as reflections after each session – I talk about my 
reactions to:  
• a mother crying during a diagnostic session and how difficult it was for me to not be 
able to comfort her; 
• a parent telling a funny story about her child, and the beautiful shared experience 
between myself, the psychologist and the parent laughing alongside each other; 
• not being able to understand what a child is saying, and the psychologist looking 
towards me for clarification to see if I could decipher what was being said;  
• a child making a clever joke that the psychologist did not understand, and my 
reaction as the researcher – trying to stifle my laughter so as not to disrupt the flow 
of the session, but giving the child a small grin to let her know that I had “got the 
joke.”  
 
These moments offer valuable insights into how all parties intersubjectively negotiate the 
complex terrain of the ASD clinical encounter.  
 
A further layer to this researcher involvement is of course the reflexive session. Given the 
sheer amount of time spent at the field site over the course of many months, it was 
inevitable that I formed a friendship with the main psychologist conducting the diagnostic 
sessions as part of the clinical trial. Not only were we a similar age, but we had a similar 
clinical background in that we were both originally trained as Applied Behavioural Analysis 
(ABA) therapists. Thus our interactions in the reflexive interviews took on a multilayered 
form: at times we would embrace a colleague-to-colleague dialogue in our discussions 
around clinical and therapeutic aspects of autism; at other times we would joke and speak 
as friends, sharing stories about our everyday lives; when asking a predetermined question 
within the interview, we would defer to the researcher-participant dialogue; and finally, 
when explaining a particularly complex aspect of the diagnosis or clinical trial to me, the 
psychologist would adopt the “expert” role. Like Collier and Wyer (2016), I consider my role 
in this research to be participatory and active – whether it is through intersubjectively 
negotiating these emotionally-charged moments in diagnostic sessions or engaging in very 
frank and open reflexive sessions in which both the psychologist and I must manage the 
shifting relations of researcher-participant, colleague-colleague, friend-friend, or expert-
student.  
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Transcription and analysis of data 
One of the biggest problems facing researchers who work with video data is how to 
transcribe the data, or at least make it accessible for analysis. Transcription, in this context, 
therefore forms a central part of data analysis because what is transcribed “generates 
observations that are fundamental to analytical inferences” (Knoblauch et al., 2009: 15). 
While visual forms of representing data are becoming possible – Knoblauch et al (2009) 
discuss “visual mentality” as a mode of analysis that focuses on visualising and imagining as 
opposed to the written word – current technology only allows the researcher to create 
frame grabs and themed clips, which are then translated into some form of textual 
representation (photo stills are also used in some representations). The dilemmas that are 
faced by the researcher in this transcription process are explored in the following two 
accounts: 
 
Even before we start to search for the ‘right semantics’ for the actions, gestures, bodily and facial 
expressions, articles of clothing, etc. we observe, we are faced with the dilemma that total and 
simultaneous perceptions must be brought into a succession of written thoughts. (Soeffner, 
2009: 208) 
 
[T]he relative neglect of video in the social sciences is sometimes attributed to its complexity and 
abundance. A few minutes of recording produce a large quantity of visual, kinaesthetic, and 
acoustic data that must be transcribed and prepared for analysis. Video data is certainly among 
the most complex data in social scientific empirical research. It is multi-sensual and sequentially 
ordered, enclosing both diachronic and synchronic elements, e.g. speech and visual conduct, 
gesture, mimic expressions, representation of artefacts and the structure of the environment, as 
well as signs and symbols…Hence, video recording generates an extraordinary abundance of 
data, confronting the researcher with the problems of data management, retrieval and selection. 
This may not only cause the problem of data overload, but also raises the question of how to 
select sequences appropriate for further scrutiny…[T]he methodological problem of what 
constitutes the unit of analysis and how to assure a balance between time-consuming 
microanalysis and an overview over the whole data corpus remain open questions for future 
methodological debates. (Knoblauch et al., 2009: 14).  
 
Given the sheer number of hours of data collected for this study (approximately 45hrs), as 
well as the richness and complexity of this data (as described above and in the table below), 
the analysis process required a systematic and organised approach that would enable the 
researcher to make the most of this data. The complexity of the data gathered in the 
diagnostic sessions with both the parents and children that participated in the clinical trial is 
conveyed in Table 3.2, below, where three important features of the data are examined: 
 
Table 3.2: Textual, audio and visual features of data 
Feature of data  Examples 
Textual content Content of what is said and the meaning behind these words.  
Audio Overlapping speech, emphasis on certain words, pausing, 
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raising/lowering of pitch or intonation, speaking or muttering 
quietly, raising voice, and imitation.  
Visual Nonverbal gesture or action (hands), body language (for example, 
turning towards/away from someone), facial expressions, gaze, 
posture, touch, and spatial behaviours. The visual features are 
transcribed using square brackets and italics, for example [shakes 
head].  
 
Accordingly, to make this data accessible for analysis, I used an approach loosely based on 
McNaughton’s (2009) analysis of video recordings of classroom interactions during a series 
of educational drama lessons. Her paper outlines five key steps in this analysis process – 
which I have adapted to suit my data – and are described in Table 3.3, below (McNaughton, 
2009): 
 
Table 3.3: Video-reflexive ethnography analysis process (adapted from McNaughton (2009))  
 Steps of analysis Description  
Step 1 Familiarisation and 
Initial impressions: 
descriptive notes of 
the video data 
This step initially involved watching each video clip one to 
two times and taking general, descriptive notes about the 
diagnostic sessions as well as the general structure of the 
sessions. The purpose was to familiarise myself with the 
data so that I could begin to make connections between the 
different diagnostic sessions and participants. 
Step 2 Developing 
analysis tables 
(See Tables 3.4 and 
3.5, below) 
From the notes taken in step 1 about the structure of the 
diagnostic sessions, I developed analysis tables for both the 
ADI-R sessions with the parents and the WISC-IV sessions 
with the children (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5). These tables 
acted as a template for any subsequent analysis that took 
place. The ADI-R analysis table comprised three columns 
(see Table 3.4):  
(a) Video number and time interval (for example, video 
1, 09’28”-11’56” – this would mean that the clip 
came from video 1 (often there were three videos 
per diagnostic session), and the significant clip runs 
from 9 minutes (‘) and 28 seconds (“) to 11 minutes 
and 56 seconds); 
(b) Theme (classificatory categories that were used to 
group, link and make associations between the 
data); and  
(c) Examples/quotes (under this column significant clips 
would be described or transcribed to add further 
explanatory detail).  
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The WISC-IV analysis table took on a similar structure, but 
included an extra column that delineated the ten tasks that 
make up the WISC-IV (for example: perceptual reasoning, 
verbal comprehension, working memory and so on) (see 
Table 3.5).  
Step 3 Initial identification 
of significant clips 
and initial coding 
of themes 
Videos of each diagnostic session were re-watched, with 
detailed notes taken on video number and time interval, 
theme, and notes taken in the examples/quotes column 
about the clip. Refining of themes occurred in this stage of 
the analysis process, as well as initial identification of key 
clips that would need to be transcribed for further analysis. 
Additionally, clips that may require further reflexive 
feedback from the psychologist are highlighted in yellow in 
the analysis tables. 
Step 4 Transcription/video 
stills of clips for 
close analysis 
Each analysis table is consulted and significant clips that 
have been documented in step 3 are then re-watched, 
transcribed – taking into account the textual, audio and 
visual features of the data, as outlined in Table 3.2, above – 
and/or edited at key moments as video stills. All 
transcriptions and video stills are edited to ensure 
anonymity of participants through the use of pseudonyms 
(for text) and blurring of faces (for images). 
Step 5 Selection of clips to 
play back in 
reflexive session 
with psychologist 
Analysis tables are consulted to determine which of the 
clips initially marked in step 3 as requiring reflexive 
feedback should be shown to the psychologist. For example, 
sometimes up to twenty clips under the same code/theme 
are marked to be shown to the psychologist for reflexive 
feedback. One to three clips are selected based on the sub-
themes present, or to provide a contrast between videos. 
These videos are transferred to the Apple iMovie program 
which provides facilities for stopping, reviewing, and 
isolating (cutting) clips into “episodes”. Subtitles can be 
added to difficult-to-hear episodes. 
Step 6 Reflexive interview 
with psychologist 
video – repeat 
steps 1-4  
(See table 3.6, 
Two reflexive interviews with the psychologist were 
conducted using some predetermined questions to 
structure the interviews. These questions were developed 
based on the analysis tables from the ADI-R and WISC-IV 
(see Tables 3.4 and 3.5). The video data from the reflexive 
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below) interviews were treated similarly to the ADI-R and WISC-IV 
video data. Each video clip is viewed one to two times and 
general notes and observations are made. An analysis table 
is developed with the same structure as the table used for 
the ADI-R (see Table 3.6). Significant clips are then identified 
and aligned with existing themes, and any new themes are 
identified in this reflexive analysis. Step 4 (transcription) is 
repeated as described above. 
 
The development of the analysis tables (see step 2, Table 3.3) was also based on 
McNaughton’s (2009) study. She describes her approach as an Analysis Matrix in which she 
records the clip time, description and interpretation of verbal and non-verbal language, and 
theme codes in a table structure.  Each ADI-R, WISC-IV and WAIS-IV that I observed had a 
separate table with observational and analytic notes, transcriptions of key interactions, and 
thematic coding (see tables 3.4, 3.5 & 3.6, below). I found this a very useful way to structure 
and easily access my analysis. The three tables below illustrate snapshot examples of the 
analysis tables for the WISC-IV, ADI-R and the reflexive interview with the psychologist: 
 
Table 3.4: Adapted Example Analysis Table WISC-IV/WAIS-IV (McNaughton, 2009) 
Section of 
WISC-IV 
Video # and 
time interval 
Theme 
(derived from 
my analysis) 
Significant quotes and researcher notes 
Perceptual 
Reasoning Index 
(PRI): Picture 
Concepts - 
children are 
provided with a 
series of pictures 
presented in rows 
(either two or 
three rows) and 
asked to 
determine which 
pictures go 
together, one from 
each row. 
Video 1 
34’05” – 
34’46”  
 
Abstract 
competency 
vs. concrete 
competency 
Example here of ability of child to construct story 
around his real-life experiences and relate to the 
pictures. Explains why these images are salient to 
him.  
Paul points to the picture of the leaf and the 
skateboard (correct answer is glove and shoe)  
 
Paul: because when you ride a skateboard there’s 
all these leaves on the ground [smiles] 
Psych: [laughing] is that what happens to you, is 
it? 
Paul: [Nodding and smiling] and sometimes 
there’s lots of leaves and they get…and my 
skateboard gets stuck in them. 
Psych: Oh no! 
Paul: And sometimes I ride my […?] and it gets 
stuck on…my ground is like [shows psych by 
drawing with finger on table], and it gets stuck in 
those and I go flying off! [smiles] 
Psych: [laughs] Oh no! You have to be careful!  
 
This interchange, which displays “concrete 
110 
competency” is ignored and not recorded on the 
test, other than an incorrect answer.  
 
Table 3.5: Adapted Example Analysis Table ADI-R (McNaughton, 2009) 
Time 
interval 
Theme  
(derived from my 
analysis) 
Significant quotes and researcher notes 
Video 2 
21’35” – 
22’30” 
Parents as 
experts: Insight of 
parents into their 
child’s behaviour 
Tim: He’s very immersed in media. He loves songs, he loves rap… 
Psych: [Laughing] He told us! 
Tim: …all that sort of stuff. Heaps of that, he loves all that. Lots of 
videos and things like that, and he will listen and re-listen to stuff, I 
think, until he gets it… 
Psych: OK. 
Tim: Ahh, actually. He just keeps going until…then one day he’ll say 
something that he could’ve said twenty times ago, but he says it then 
and indicates his understanding. That’s due to the immersion he’s 
given himself. 
 
Table 3.6: Adapted Example Analysis Table for Psychologist Reflexive Interview (McNaughton, 
2009) 
Time 
interval 
Video 
analysed 
Theme  
(derived from my 
analysis) 
Significant quotes and researcher notes 
58’00” Brendan 
(PAR11) 
Video 2: 
10’26” – 
11’59” 
Rigidity of test/ 
standardisation 
 
 
Researcher: So, there’s 1-2 minutes there where he’s 
just like [pretends to be distracted by looking around 
room]… 
Psych: You know what, they’re not listening to your 
verbal instruction because it’s too much language for 
them. And, I mean, that’s the tool! There’s too much 
language, but if you just give them an example, they 
draw on what they’re supposed to do based on the 
example – like the pattern, they’re looking for a 
pattern. So the minute I said the example, he came up 
[demonstrates regaining of attention with clear eye-
contact]. 
Researcher: Yeh, interesting…just to clarify, so with 
the tool, you have to [provide] that explanation, so 
you kind of, I guess, are sitting there kind of going 
“blah blah blah” (I have to say this) and then you’re 
like, ‘OK, let’s get to the examples [laughs] so I can get 
[their attention] back!’  
Psych: Yes! [Very emphatic in response] Exactly! 
You’ve got it one-hundred percent! I feel like that all 
the time!  
 
Schubert’s (2009) approach to the process of analysing video in the form of “content logs” 
(120) also provided a helpful guide for theme/code development within the context of my 
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study. Schubert stresses that the content logs are not complete transcripts of video, but 
rather may contain rough descriptions, transcripts of segments of the video, and may 
contain references to analytic concepts/themes. Importantly, and in accordance with 
Grounded Theory methodology of conducting research,  
 
The content logs change as the research progresses: they become more detailed when sequences 
are analysed…The role of theoretical saturation in the process of identifying ethnographic chunks 
and creating content logs is that an analysis is always conducted with respect to the progress of 
the research…i.e. the researcher starts coding with theoretical sensitivity, continues to refine the 
categories by theoretical sampling and the process comes to an (sometimes tentative) end, when 
theoretical saturation is reached. In the practice of video analysis, this process resolves into the 
multiple steps and iterations of analysing videographic data, which are oriented towards the 
relevance of the material for the research questions: a) selecting key sequences…, b) repeated 
viewing…, c) systematically comparing different cases… (Schubert, 2009: 120-1) 
 
The process undergone for the analysis in this study is outlined in detail in Table 3.3 (above) 
and highlights the refining, coding and reaching theoretical saturation methods. Another 
layer of the development of themes in the analysis process is the large pool of data that the 
themes were developed from. Figure 3.4, below, illustrates the sheer variety of data drawn 
upon during the analysis process, while Figure 3.5 demonstrates an example of how I 
directly applied this approach to a theme I draw on in Chapter Six.  
 
Figure 3.4: Illustration of theme development (adapted from Balmer, Master, Richards, 
Serwint, & Giardino, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Example text from video 
transcription of ADI-R/WISC-
IV/WAIS-IV] 
Data from observation/video 
[Example images from video 
of ADI-R/WISC-IV/WAIS-IV] 
[Example text from reflexive 
interviews with 
Psychologist] 
[Example images from 
reflexive interviews with 
Psychologist] 
Data from interviews 
[Example text and images of 
analysis of 
documents/instruments/tools 
used in ASD assessment] 
Data from documents/tools 
THEME X 
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Figure 3.5: Example from my analysis of how I used the various forms of data for theme development  
 113  
 
Figure 3.5 (above) provides an example of how this approach adapted from Balmer 
and colleagues (2010) was applied in practice to my various modes of data. Using the 
example theme of “Rendering” and ASD diagnosis, which I discuss at length in 
Chapter Six, I show how I use transcribed text and corresponding video stills from 
the videoed ADI-R between the psychologist and the parents (Sophie and Stewart), 
as well as the corresponding transcribed text from the reflexive interview in which I 
ask the psychologist about this specific interaction, combined with the scored and 
inscribed page from the ADI-R answer booklet in which the psychologist’s notes 
about this interaction are recorded. The cumulative power of this data, combined 
with my knowledge and analysis of the literature (see Chapter Two), enables me to 
develop themes in this complex analytic process.  
 
Conclusion 
The focus of this thesis is the use of video-reflexivity to analyse clinical encounters 
within a randomised control clinical trial.  The subjects of that clinical trial were 
children who had a known diagnosis of an autism spectrum disorder, and their 
parent(s) or caregiver(s).   
 
Autism spectrum disorders are experienced differently by each individual – ie. each 
person has different symptoms, responds differently to treatment, and often has 
varied co-morbidity with other disorders.  Accordingly, the interaction between this 
infinitely varied disorder and a randomised control trial which sought to categorise 
how those individuals [insert] provided a fascinating backdrop for the video-reflexive 
methodology of this study. 
 
I used a video-reflexive approach in which as researcher I both filmed clinical 
encounters and sat in on those encounters, with the intention of being an 
“alongsider” in the study, and the natural consequence that at times I was also in 
limited ways a participant.  Approximately 45 hours of data (observed and the 
majority video-recorded) was collected for this study, which provided rich and 
complex data for analysis.  I then transcribed the data and categorised it by theme, 
before engaging in a “reflexive” session with the clinician to consider the clinical 
encounter.  In this reflexive session, the clinician initially provided unprompted 
analysis of the data, before more directed discussions took place, in particular 
reflexive analysis of the observations I had made.  
 
In the following three chapters, I explore the key findings of this incredibly rich and 
unique data. Chapter Four will explore how the “autism” of the diagnostic encounter 
in the clinical trial differs in some fundamental ways from the “autism” diagnosed in 
the paediatrician’s or psychologist’s clinic. I will consider: how the context of the 
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clinical trial directs the diagnostic gaze of the psychologist in the clinical encounter; 
how this diagnostic gaze is directed towards the paediatric body and mind; and what 
factors motivate this diagnostic difference.   
 
Chapter Five will examine the physical diagnostic tools themselves as artefacts of the 
diagnostic process: the wording of the questions; the way that they are read out; the 
inscriptions of the psychologist on the tool itself; and how the handwritten 
diagnostic notes – taken throughout the clinical encounter – are filtered by the 
psychologist into a single number placed in a box on each page underneath each 
question. I will argue that this can clearly be seen in the administration WISC-
IV/WAIS-IV whereby responses from the child are scored based on their competence 
in various tasks, while the test simultaneously ignores or minimises other 
competencies. The labour involved in achieving an ASD diagnosis will be explored 
through the rigid way the trial requires diagnosis to fit within the narrow parameters 
of what counts as “evidence”. The diagnostic session must be conducted in a certain 
way to fit the ambit of the clinical trial and the drug to best tested. 
Chapter Six will contrast the diagnostic practices of the psychologist during the child 
WISC-IV/WAIS-IV session versus the parent ADI-R session. I focus on the way that 
corporeal labour is used in the ADI-R diagnostic encounter, that is, the way that 
clinicians use bodily gestures to encourage the compliance of their patients during 
assessments and examinations. Crucially tied in with this discussion is the emphasis 
the methodological approach of this thesis has on the visual – that through the use 
of video I have been able to capture and analyse the significance of this corporeal 
labour in the clinical encounter and demonstrate how it is often used by both 
psychologist and parent to convey and in fact translate significant clinical 
information that may have been invisible or misunderstood otherwise.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Autism in the clinic, autism in the clinical trial: 
Refocusing the diagnostic and treatment gaze in 
the clinical trial 
 
There is a yawning gap between, on the one side, the prominence of autism as 
a clinical, epidemiological and social force, and, on the other, what can be said 
with certainty about autism as a neurological, genetic or diagnostic object. 
(Fitzgerald 2014: 244) 
 
Introduction: ASD, medication and the clinical trial 
This thesis has argued that the category of autism is uncertain, controversial, 
ambiguous and heterogeneous. In this chapter I will focus on the contention and 
“epistemic murk” (Eyal et al 2014: 236) that surrounds autism as the object of the 
clinical trial. Autism has resisted a consistent and stable diagnostic definition, 
treatment approaches, and biomedical and genetic attempts to make sense of how 
autism manifests within the body.  That this confusion remains despite the 
enormous “biosocial productivity” of the category indicates that there is likely a 
unique set of circumstances, an epistemic murk, in which autism exists, and perhaps 
thrives. 
 
The clinical trial is an example of this biosocial productivity, motivated by the drive 
to make sense of this disorder.  In particular, recent years have witnessed a rapid 
increase in the publication of randomised, double-blind, placebo controlled clinical 
trials assessing psychoactive medications for the treatment of autism to guide 
clinical practice (Hollander et al 2004; Hollander et al 2012; Myers & Johnson 2007).  
 
However, issues of contention, heterogeneity and “epistemic murk” remain relevant 
within this ASD clinical trial setting too. These trials are steeped in uncertainty, and 
the results are frequently subject to debate and critique. As Elizabeth Wilson (2008) 
explains with respect to the placebo-drug relationship in antidepressant clinical 
trials:  
 
The conclusions drawn from the data, the suggestions for further research, the criticisms 
about methodology and design, and the data themselves are extraordinarily 
heterogeneous. The variables that ought to characterise the placebo response in 
depressed subjects seem unruly or profligate; over time they have not settled into 
reliable patterns from which judicious treatments or reliable clinical designs could 
emerge. For example, the location of treatment (in or out of hospital), the age of the 
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trial participants, the length of the trial, and the mode of psychological assessment, all 
generate patterns of placebo response; and all of these variables can change with 
different antidepressant medications. (33)  
 
I will use Wilson’s exploration of the placebo response and the drug-placebo 
relationship to reimagine the way that we understand the clinical trial and the 
placebo-drug relationship.  For Wilson (2008), it is about understanding how 
“ingestion, physiological activity and therapeutic alliance might be aligned” (38). This 
argument has much relevance to the fluoxetine clinical trial studied for this thesis, 
particularly the notion that a participant’s response to the active drug is intimately 
tied up with, and inextricably linked to, being in the clinical trial itself. 
 
But before delving straight into an exploration of the inner workings of a clinical trial 
assessing the effectiveness of the drug fluoxetine on repetitive behaviours in 
children with ASD, it is important to reflect on the context surrounding the 
medication of children on the autism spectrum.  This includes a brief consideration 
of the important period of deinstitutionalisation in Australia. Current treatment 
practices of medicating children with an ASD will also be considered, with an 
exploration of why the use of drugs such as antidepressants, stimulants and 
antipsychotics have become established and common-place in the treatment of ASD 
given the lack of evidence supporting this approach.  
 
Then, by exploring Dick Willems’ (1998) ideas around the potential for medications 
to “reorganise the body by creating new identities for it” (118), I will consider the 
ways in which the mechanisms of these “autism drugs” may be understood as 
feeding back into and altering conceptualisations of autism, its categorisation, and 
its diagnosis.  
 
This chapter will go on to consider the context of the clinical trial and examine how 
the diagnosis of autism is marked by some key differences in this specific clinical 
encounter. A key distinction made in this chapter is the differences between “autism 
in the clinic” and “autism in the clinical trial.” In analysing this difference I examine: 
how the context of the clinical trial directs the diagnostic gaze of the psychologist in 
the clinical encounter; how the diagnostic gaze is directed towards the paediatric 
body and mind; and what factors motivate this diagnostic difference. By using some 
key examples from my filming of ASD clinical trial diagnostic sessions, I will argue 
that the autism of the diagnostic encounter in the fluoxetine clinical trial differs in 
some fundamental ways from the autism diagnosed in the paediatrician’s or 
psychologist’s clinic.  
 
By drawing on Nikolas Rose’s work on psycho-pharmacological societies and the 
neurochemical self, I hope to shed light on this re-focusing of the diagnostic gaze. 
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This analysis raises broader questions about the way in which the medical profession 
has come to code children’s quirkiness, “reduced emotions”, “abnormal eye 
contact”, difficulty in “making friends”, “fixated interests” and “lining up toys” 
(American Psychiatric Association 2013) as autism spectrum disorder, treatable by 
drugs such as fluoxetine. 
 
Historical considerations: drugs as an enabler for non-
institutionalisation 
In Chapter One, I explored the historical underpinnings of autism spectrum disorder 
and presented an historical analysis of the instability and uncertainty surrounding 
the labels “mental retardation”, “developmental disability”, and “autism”, and their 
continuing volatility in the world of genetic science, biomedicine, psychiatry and 
psychology. In particular, in Chapter One I argued that the individuals we now label 
today as “autistic” were likely institutionalised as “mentally retarded” up until a few 
decades ago. Indeed, it was not until deinstitutionalisation came about that there 
was even a need for these specific subsets of diagnoses – until then, the umbrella 
term of “developmentally disabled” within the institutional setting sufficed. 
 
As discussed in chapters one and two, the dominant treatments available for 
children on the autism spectrum are behavioural and psychological in nature. With 
the rise of the paraprofessions between the 1970s and 1990s in Australia and 
worldwide, as well as the availability of certain drugs such as tranquilisers, anti-
psychotics and antidepressants, the scene was set for deinstitutionalisation. In an 
interview with an Australian psychiatrist, who practised during the 
deinstitutionalisation period in Australia, Dr P speaks of this deinstitutionalisation-
enabling environment created by the introduction of these drugs:  
 
One of the major reasons was that in...1955 we actually got tranquilisers...we didn’t 
have medications before that that were in use, apart from trying to control aggression 
basically – sedating people. We got the modern tranquilisers and the anti-psychotic 
drugs and we started using them in Australia in 1955. Within a matter of a year, the 
medical superintendant at Gladesville Hospital was writing his annual report to the 
Inspector General for the Insane (as it was in those days) that this had made a dramatic 
difference, patients who were uncontrollable were now controllable, patients who we 
thought would never move out into the community were now moving out into the 
community.  
 
Interestingly, some of the earliest studies involving children with autism and 
medication involved the hallucinogen lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). These studies 
were conducted by a United States psychiatrist named Lauretta Bender during the 
1960s. In her most frequently cited 1963 study titled, “LSD and UML treatment of 
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hospitalized disturbed children” (Bender, Faretra & Cobrinik 1963), Bender and 
colleagues state that: 
 
The heightened perceptual awareness, increase in rapport, and breaking through of repressive 
ego defenses suggested a possible use of the drug as an adjunct psychotherapy, especially of 
neurotics, and has led to considerable experimentation in this area. In all of these studies LSD 
was usually given in single doses of 30 to 400 μg at weekly intervals, for varying periods of 
time, generally in conjunction with individual or group therapy. (Bender, Faretra & Cobrinik 
1963: 84)  
 
Bender et al (1963) identify many of the core symptoms we identify with autism 
today. Social impairment is discussed in terms of isolation and solitary behaviour: 
“Rarely did one child play with an adult, and even then the play was momentary, 
returning a ball thrown to them once and then losing interest” (86) and “Many were 
completely unresponsive to their environment, sitting or standing alone” (86). 
Examples of speech and communication deficits were identified as: 
 
Many of these children had not spoken any intelligible words; some made guttural sounds, 
screamed, or uttered other noises. Some had one or two words which were used rarely for 
communication; some seemed to understand directions and to be on the verge of speech; a 
few hummed or sang commercials, or bits of nursery rhymes. (86-7) 
  
And notably, she singles out anxiety and repetitive behaviours as the final key 
symptoms: 
 
The autistic children showed all degrees of severity of symptoms and anxiety. Many 
were…rocking, whirling, and staring at their fingers. Others made contact only by excessive 
clinging, pulling, and biting or scratching. […] A boy, one of twins, avoided contact with other 
persons by covering his eyes or ears with his hands, or turning his back when approached, 
occasionally darting anxious fleeting glances at the person addressing him. Another boy beat 
his cheeks and forehead violently with his fists, or banged his head against the wall, so that his 
face was continually bruised and a football helmet had to be worn for protection. (86-7) 
 
Bender et al (1963) are hesitant in their recommendations regarding the 
effectiveness of the drug, stating that, “[i]n general, we have not yet distinguished 
important characteristic differences in the clinical response to either LSD or UML, 
although there seems to be moderately greater excitability with LSD, especially early 
in treatment.” (87) However, they go on to claim that when half of the children were 
taken off the medication for a period of four weeks, a short time afterwards many of 
the children regressed and lost previous gains that had been demonstrated whilst on 
the drug.  
 
Understanding the role of medication in the deinstitutionalised landscape is key to 
understanding the success of the paraprofessions at this time, and how their 
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therapies and educational and psychological treatment approaches were able to 
flourish. In their report Children with Disabilities in Australia (2004), the Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) demonstrates that the impact of 
deinstitutionalisation on children with disabilities occurred primarily during the 
1980s and 1990s, with 9% of children with a severe disability living in cared 
accommodation in 1981, compared with 0.4% in 1998.  
 
The AIHW (2004) also points out that for children with intellectual disabilities the 
term non-institutionalisation is perhaps more fitting than deinstitutionalisation, as 
this process of change has tended to be more about these younger individuals 
staying in the community in greater numbers, rather than moving out of institutions. 
For children with intellectual disabilities the changes in attitudes, legislation and 
government involvement in Australia resulted in an improvement in access and 
availability of services, the introduction of income support for their carers, and more 
support from the mainstream education system. However, with the majority of 
these children now residing in households, provision of care for them rests mainly on 
the shoulders of family care givers. This has led to adverse health effects for the 
caregivers (that is, focusing on the health of the child has led to the caregiver 
ignoring their own health) as well as relationship strain and stress (30% of children 
with a disability live within a single parent family, compared to 18% of children 
without disabilities) (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) 2004). 
 
Consistent with this idea of deinstitutionalisation (or non-institutionalisation) and 
the push for psychological and educational treatment approaches in the community, 
drug research during the late 1970s and 1980s focused on medications that could 
work hand-in-hand with therapy. A good example of this is Haloperidol, an 
antipsychotic medication, which was believed to make children more amenable to 
behavioural therapy (Feinstein 2010). In a placebo-controlled and double-blind 
study, Campbell and colleagues (1978) critically assessed the interaction of the two 
treatments – Haloperidol and behaviour therapy – with regards to their effects on 
symptoms and language acquisition in 40 autistic children aged 2.6 to 7.2 years. They 
concluded that: “Haloperidol was found to be significantly superior to placebo in 
decreasing certain symptoms, depending on the age group” (640). Thus, from the 
late 1970s, research into the collaboration between drug and therapy in the 
treatment of autism was well under way.  
 
The rate of prescribing these types of medication in children in general continues to 
rise. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a dramatic increase in the use 
of psychotropic medications by children and adolescents in the United States. The 
increase cut across age, racial/ethnic, geographic, gender, and insurance groups and 
included stimulants, antidepressants, and other psychotropic medications (Olfson et 
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al 2002: 518). Olfson and colleagues’ (2002) US-based study demonstrates, for 
example, that children were 3.56 times more likely to use an antidepressant in 1996 
than in 1987. Indeed, fluoxetine was actually approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in late 1987, and was marketed in the US in 1988. This is 
unsurprising given that during the 1980s, childhood and adolescent depression 
became a topic of considerable clinical and research interest (Angold 1988), with 
studies demonstrating an apparent increase in the number of depressed children 
and adolescents (Weissman et al. 1984; Ryan et al. 1992).  
 
Recent studies also show that, despite this ambiguity and uncertainty, medication 
use amongst children diagnosed with an ASD is substantial (Oswald & Sonenklar 
2007). Spencer et al (2013) report in Pediatrics that among 33,565 children in the US 
with ASD, 64% had a filled prescription for at least one psychotropic medication 
(Spencer et al. 2013: 833).  
 
In a study of 2390 individuals diagnosed with an ASD, Oswald and Sonenklar (2007) 
found that 83 per cent of the sample were prescribed drug(s). The seven most 
frequently prescribed classes of psychoactive drugs were antidepressants, 
stimulants, tranquilizers/antipsychotics, anticonvulsants, hypotensive agents, 
anxiolytic/sedative/hypnotics, and benzodiazepines. This study found that 
individuals were prescribed, on average, drugs within four different classes (that is, 
antidepressants, anticonvulsants, stimulants and benzodiazepines) over the course 
of a year. Furthermore, over the course of a year, individuals submitted claims for up 
to six drugs in the same class. Thus, children with an ASD are “increasingly likely to 
be treated by a wide range of psychotropic and other medications” (Oswald and 
Sonenklar 2007: 353). One of the key reasons given for this variety is that “there are 
no clear guidelines regarding psychopharmacologic treatment of individuals with 
autism spectrum disorders” (Filipek et al. 2006 in Oswald and Sonenklar 2007: 348). 
It is also worth mentioning that several studies have demonstrated a correlation 
between psychotropic medication and geographic characteristics, such as increased 
medication use in lower socioeconomic and rural areas in the US (Farmer et al 2009; 
Rosenberg et al 2010).  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, given this propensity for medicating without scientific 
evidence, that today children’s behavioural problems constitute a growing market 
for psychotropic drugs. Regardless of the benefits or risks, this has become big 
business for the pharmaceutical industry. According to a recent survey conducted by 
Medco Health Solutions (a pharmacy benefits management company) which looked 
at prescription purchases in the US, spending on behaviour drugs for children and 
adolescents rose 77 percent from 2000 through 2003. These classes of drugs – SSRIs, 
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antipsychotics, and stimulants – are now the fastest growing type of medication 
taken by children, eclipsing antibiotics and asthma treatments (Freudenheim 2004).  
 
However, the medical literature remains cautionary about the benefits of 
psychoactive drugs in the treatment of ASD. For example, a study in Pediatrics in 
2011 performed a systematic review of medical treatments available to those on the 
Spectrum, and found that, “although many children with ASDs are currently treated 
with medical interventions, strikingly little evidence exists to support benefit for 
most medications” (McPheeters et al 2011: 1318).  
 
Furthermore, medical literature offering clinical recommendations to practitioners 
regarding the treatment of autism spectrum disorder often contains cautions and 
caveats in its assessment of the use of psychoactive drugs. Behavioural and 
educational therapies are usually discussed first, and are portrayed as preferable 
(see for example Scahill 2008; Myers & Johnson 2007). In Myers and Johnson’s 
(2007) review of ASD treatment options, for example, not only do they begin the 
discussion of treatment options with a comprehensive look at the various 
behavioural and educational approaches available, but when they do eventually 
begin their discussion of psychopharmacological options they preface the discussion 
with warnings that: “treatable medical causes and modifiable environmental factors” 
must be first ruled out; the clinician may actually be dealing with a co-morbid 
disorder which is separate to the symptoms of ASD; and that “there is currently 
insufficient literature to establish consensus regarding an evidence-based approach 
to pharmacologic management” (1170-1). It is therefore clear that the medical 
literature is upfront in addressing the uncertainty and murk that surrounds autism 
treatment approaches.  
 
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs): fluoxetine, 
autism, and the anxious/obsessive brain 
Of specific interest to this chapter is the class of psychoactive drugs known as 
antidepressants (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors – SSRIs), and more 
specifically, a type of SSRI called fluoxetine. Aman and colleagues (2005) have shown 
that between 1993 and 2001, antidepressants showed the largest increase 
compared to other classes of psychoactive drugs amongst children with autism, with 
reported use rates tripling in this time. Fluoxetine is often cited as the third most 
commonly prescribed antidepressant, sitting behind paroxetine and sertraline 
(Oswald and Sonenklar 2007).  
 
Fluoxetine – which is also known by the trade names Prozac, Sarafem, Ladose and 
Fontex, among others – was approved by the US Food and Drug Administration 
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(FDA) for use in the treatment of major depressive disorder in December 1987. The 
US fluoxetine patent expired in August 2001, with generic formulations available in 
the US and elsewhere. Fluoxetine is commonly associated with treatment of major 
depressive disorder (including paediatric depression), obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(in both adults and children), bulimia nervosa, panic disorder and autism. However, 
no drug authority has specifically approved the use of SSRIs for the treatment of 
autism. Thus, the prescribing of SSRIs and fluoxetine for autism is either “off label” 
or related to an “associated indicated disorder such as obsessive compulsive 
disorder (OCD) or depression” (Williams et al 2013: 3). “Off label” indicates that a 
medication is being used in a manner that is not specified by the FDA’s approved 
packaging label, for example: it is being used in an unapproved age group, at an 
unapproved dosage level, or an unapproved form of administration. In Australia, to 
date, only fluvoxamine (an SSRI) has been given a specific indication of OCD in 
children eight years and over, “while prescribers are urged to exercise caution in 
prescribing other SSRIs for children under the age of 18 years” (Williams et al 2013: 
3).  
 
In clinical trials in which SSRIs are tested within a population of people diagnosed 
with an ASD, Nikolas Rose’s (2003) notion of the “neurochemical self” helps to 
explain this reconceptualisation of autism as a “brain problem”. According to Rose 
(2003), neurochemical selves operate within psycho-pharmacological societies as we 
“have come to understand our minds and selves in terms of our brains and bodies”. 
Rose (2007) suggests that everyday emotions and conduct are being 
reconceptualised in terms of neurological theories and neurochemical deficiencies, 
which require treatment through pharmaceutical products and psy-expertise. There 
is also a “wider shift in which such drugs are becoming central to the ways in which 
our conduct is governed, by others, and by ourselves” (Rose, 2007: 223).  For 
example, in Hollander and colleagues’ (2012) double-blind placebo-controlled trial of 
fluoxetine in adults with ASDs we can see the use of this neuro- and bio-medicalised 
language in the description of the disorder, firmly locating autism within the brain: 
 
The interest in SSRIs for the treatment of ASDs stems from a hypothesized role for 
serotonin (5-HT) in the pathophysiology of ASDs and the similarities between repetitive 
behaviors in ASDs and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), a condition for which SSRIs 
are a first-line treatment. It has been hypothesized that dysfunction of 5-HT regulation in 
ASDs occurs during early developmental periods, results in cortical morphogenetic 
abnormalities and altered 5-HT neurotransmission, and influences symptom domains 
such as anxiety and rigidity. (Hollander et al 2012: 292) 
 
I will explore the way that Rose’s concept of neurochemical selves is enacted in the 
clinical trial studied for this thesis in detail later in the chapter.  
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Reorganising the autistic body through treatment 
In Willems’ (1998) exploration of the narratives of asthma patients and the way that 
clinical practice is shaped by the different medications available to asthma patients, 
we are shown that these differences in drugs are what generates a division of the 
disorder, in classificatory terms, into “subclasses fitting these treatment possibilities” 
(109). In other words, the different medications become the negotiator and 
mediator in debates about how to classify patient X or Y. Figure 4.1, below, 
illustrates Willems’ (1998: 105-118) argument in his chapter “Inhaling drugs and 
making worlds”. 
 
Figure 4.1: Diagram representing Willems’ (1998) ideas on different drugs-different 
asthmas-different lungs 
 
Willems (1998) observes that in the clinical encounter, asthma medication A – 
salbutamol – is administered in situations when the clinician is trying to distinguish 
between two subclasses of asthma: “reversible” and “irreversible”. When the 
asthmatic patient has their lung function tested, the clinician takes a measurement 
before inhaling the bronchodilator, and after. The asthma is classified as “reversible” 
if lung function significantly improves after inhalation. Thus,  
 
as therapeutic agents, [bronchodilators] also diagnose…without the existence of 
bronchodilators it would be impossible to reverse the airway obstruction, and thus it would be 
impossible to sensibly differentiate between reversible and irreversible asthma. Drugs 
construct the division in a very down-to-earth sense: they enter the lungs and physically 
produce a reversal of the obstruction of the airways – in “reversible” cases, that is, not in 
“irreversible” ones. (110) 
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Similarly, medication B – chromones – demonstrates a second distinction within the 
classification of asthma: “mainly allergic asthma” and “mainly aspecific 
hyperreactivity”. Chromones are often the first step in diagnosis and treatment of 
the patient. If the use of the drug chromoglycate reduces complaints and the need 
for bronchodilators (medication A), then the patient is classified as having an allergic 
form of asthma. Alternatively, the patient will receive treatment of inhaled steroids, 
and they are diagnosed with a nonallergic form of hyperreactivity. Thus, we can see 
from these different medications – A and B – different forms of asthma are 
constructed and diagnosed with these treatment possibilities. Willems (1998) also 
highlights that the drug itself is not the only actor in this creation of difference and 
reordering of bodies. Other actors include the measurement devices, obedient 
subjects, epidemiological researchers, laboratory researchers, the clinicians who 
prescribe the drug, and so on.  
 
Taking these ideas one step further, Willems (1998) points out that this reordering of 
asthma classification through different medications also creates a reordering of the 
body, or more specifically, the lungs. Thus, as Figure 4.1 demonstrates, with 
medication A, asthma is conceptualised as a problem of constricted tubes, with the 
bronchodilators opening up these tubes to clear the airways. Medication B, on the 
other hand, is concerned with protecting the lungs against allergens. The lungs are 
treated as a defence line against inhaled intruders. As Willems (1998) explains: 
 
In all asthma practices, airways are treated – but they are treated as different airways. 
Some drugs strengthen entrance barriers, others open up constricting tubes, and yet 
others treat inflammatory membranes. If these were all “aspects” there would have to be 
one underlying or overarching unity: “the lungs.” But if different practices each treat 
different lungs, and each of them defines its own ontology of the airways, then the answer 
to the question what kind of object “the lungs” are starts to look quite different. (113) 
 
Different Treatments, different autisms, different brains 
Having explained the key ideas behind Willems’ (1998) argument, I will now seek to 
apply these concepts to the practice of prescribing medicine to children on the 
autism spectrum. Firstly, however, it is important to recognise that the above 
examples analysing the treatment of asthma are based on known and established 
physiological mechanisms that take place in asthma sufferers. The underlying causes 
of these different types of asthma have been established, with drugs treating these 
specific conditions. On the other hand, the diagnosis and causes of ASD are shrouded 
in far more controversy, uncertainty and complexity.  
 
In Figure 4.2 I apply Willems’ (1998) ideas to the highly complex and uncertain 
practice of prescribing medications to children on the Spectrum. I have used the 
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example of three commonly prescribed medications for ASD, and illustrated the way 
that these different approaches reorder or reframe conceptualisations of the 
classification of autism. Thus, for ASD medication A – fluoxetine (SSRIs) – autism 
symptoms are seen through the lens of anxiety as indicated by the child’s symptoms 
of repetitive behaviours. If the child’s manifestations of anxiety – repetitive 
behaviours – decrease with the use of fluoxetine, the link between autism and 
anxiety is strengthened. From a clinical trial point of view, the effectiveness of this 
drug in the sample of children tested provides evidence for the targeted nature of 
this drug in treating repetitive behaviours in children with ASD. Importantly, it also 
provides evidence for FDA (or Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) in Australia) 
approval for the drug to be used in ASD-symptom treatment. Furthermore, this sort 
of drug research is also seen as a way of getting closer to understanding the autistic 
brain. As Figure 4.2 demonstrates, the effectiveness of “ASD medication A” also 
feeds into the classificatory loop by providing information about how an “autistic 
brain” reacts to fluoxetine (SSRIs).  
 
The same is true for medication B – Ritalin (stimulants) – and medication C – 
Risperidone (antipsychotics). To prescribe Ritalin is to see autism through the lens of 
hyperactivity and attention deficits, and thus to reorder autism in the child as 
defined and treatable by drugs and therapies that target these hyperactive 
behaviours. Likewise, if this drug is deemed effective, it informs clinicians about the 
mechanisms of the autistic brain through the addition of stimulants.  
 
The important point here is that the ASD medication, the disorder itself, and the 
individual ASD brain cannot be properly conceptualised without each other. The 
brain and the medication do not precede medical practice, but instead, they follow 
from them (Willems 1998). As ASD medical practice, research and knowledge shifts 
and evolves, the essence of the ASD brain will alter with them.  
 
Thus, the action and agency of these medications, and the various actors crucial to 
their administration, are a vital part of understanding how conceptualisations of ASD 
are established, critiqued, and developed: 
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Figure 4.2: Different treatments – different autisms – different brains (adaptation of Willems’ (1998) work) 
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Drugs, then, are therapeutic agents, but as a part of their therapeutic action, they 
produce differences and similarities, divergences and connections. They do not merely 
help the body, or body parts, to resume old functions that are hampered by disease. 
They also define diseases and reorganise the body by creating new identities for it. 
(Willems 1998: 118)  
 
Fluoxetine and autism in the clinical trial: refocusing the 
diagnostic gaze 
The clinical trial examined for this dissertation was particularly interested in one of 
the three core areas of impairment in children with autism: stereotyped behaviours, 
interests and activities10. These behaviours are the focus of the fluoxetine trial, 
because research suggests that they are linked to anxiety (that is, children with high 
anxiety tend to have more repetitive behaviours than those without anxiety) 
(Rodgers et al 2012) and are therefore a visual way of identifying and “measuring” 
anxiety in children with ASD.  
 
Children were often sent to participate in this trial by their paediatrician, and in 
many cases had previously received a diagnosis of autism, or were believed to have 
autism by their paediatrician. Thus, the diagnostic session in the trial was often just a 
formality to “confirm” the paediatrician’s diagnosis or instincts. The trial was able to 
offer families, in turn, a free diagnostic report via the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (ADI-R), an intelligence test for the child via the Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Children (WISC-IV), as well as the possibility of free medication and thorough 
monitoring by clinicians for the sixteen-week clinical trial period.  
 
To begin the diagnostic encounter (which was often the first point of contact 
between parents and trial staff) in this fluoxetine trial with children with ASD, the 
psychologist would explain the purpose of the study to the parent(s) and what the 
study was hoping to achieve. Unlike a private practice diagnostic session, the 
fluoxetine-focused nature of this trial (and diagnosis) directs the clinician and parent 
gaze towards the child’s anxiety, and the behavioural manifestations of this anxiety 
(“repetitive and/or stereotyped behaviours”). Thus, in the following exchange with 
the mother (Laura) and father (Tom) of Patrick (see Table 1 – at end of document – 
for more information about participants), an eight-year-old boy with a suspected 
autism diagnosis, we can see how attention is shifted towards these key components 
of the clinical trial:  
 
                                                           
10 These may include: (1) Encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns of interest that is 
abnormal either in intensity or focus; (2) Apparently compulsive adherence to specific non‐functional routines or rituals; (3) 
Stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger flapping or twisting, or rocking back and forth); (4) 
Persistent preoccupation with parts of objects. (American Psychiatric Association 2000)  
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Psych:  So, basically, with the study, before we start, it is for kids with autism. So, 
they’re looking at all those behaviours that Patrick shows, so doing this 
[demonstrates Patrick’s behaviour of rubbing/picking at hands], breaking the 
pencil… the goal of this study is to look at the medication to see if it reduces 
that behaviour. So the medication that we use – it’s been around for a long 
time – but they’ve never actually looked at it with kids on the Spectrum, and 
all those repetitive behaviours. So, it’s an anxiety-based medication. But 
we’re looking at controlled doses, because what we’ve been finding is that a 
lot of paediatricians, they either give you too much, or too little; and that 
dosage effects kids on the Spectrum in terms of: does it make them do those 
behaviours more; is it effective at all? And what we’re finding is that it’s not, 
that’s why this trial is looking at a specific dosage. And at the moment, what I 
find in a lot of the kids that we’ve looked at is that it has had an effect on the 
kids that do have the medication.  
 
The psychologist makes direct reference to the specific repetitive behaviours 
exhibited by Patrick – picking and rubbing at hands and breaking pencils – and 
immediately establishes a link between repetitive behaviours, anxiety, and 
fluoxetine. Not only is the parents’ gaze directed toward links between behaviour-
brain-drug, but also the apparent agency of this drug through its action and effect: 
the fluoxetine targets the anxiety, and we see a reduction in the behaviour. The 
agency of the drug, however, is tempered somewhat by this clarification from the 
psychologist a few minutes later: 
 
Psych:  The goal of the medication is not to cure something like that [aggressive 
behaviour], but it should help him to cope a little bit better. So, if it was a 
situation like that, you’d hope the medication would just make him cope a 
little bit more than what he normally does.  
 
In the case of Brendan, a fifteen year-old boy who is described by his mother (Lena) 
and father (Tim) as having “compulsive tendencies”, the psychologist references 
behaviours Brendan exhibited during his WISC-IV consultation with her, and uses 
these to illustrate this link between brain-behaviour-drug and the specificity and 
agency of the fluoxetine in targeting the anxious behaviours: 
 
Lena:  I think that the other, probably obsessive, tendency that he has is he could 
become a bit of a hand-washer. You know, he spends a lot of time going in 
and out of the bathroom and washing his hands.  
Psych:  So they’re the types of behaviours that we’re going to look for when we are 
starting the medication – so, how compulsive is he when he’s washing his 
hands [whilst on the medication]. And, you know, he does that pop pop pop 
[psych raises her index finger and gestures to her cheek] with his mouth. 
These are the types of behaviours to look for – so less of these [while on the 
medication]. Even for when he rocks [back and forth] more, or when he gets 
quite worked up and you can see he is getting quite anxious. Any of those 
mannerisms that he does. I noticed [in the WISC-IV] when he was getting 
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frustrated on one of the tasks he was getting quite worked up he’d rock a 
little bit more.  
Lena & Tim: Yes [both nodding].  
 
Similarly in the case of Stephen, a seven year-old boy who has received a myriad of 
labels from various clinicians over the years (for example, he was diagnosed with 
Agenesis Corpus Callosum (ACC)11 at birth, and later received diagnoses of Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and ASD), we can see through his mother’s 
explanation of his current situation that his anxiety is mixed in with the “murk” of his 
condition(s). For example, Jenny, Stephen’s mother, explains the complexity of 
Stephen’s diagnostic and treatment situation to the psychologist in the process of 
telling her son’s story:  
 
Jenny:  So he went to Dr X, and he mentioned that he might have ADD, and I think 
that was over the three year period he was [being treated by] him. So, then 
we came here and saw Dr Y, and Dr Y said: ‘Look, to me he’s got some autism 
spectrum disorder items there,’ which the psychologist who we saw – I think 
one of the things she said was that he displays bizarre behaviours, which yeh, 
he did…So I said, ‘yes, look, bits of his behaviour that I look at, and I look at 
what autism is, [the behaviours] do display on the autism spectrum. Certainly 
with areas of play that he does – it’s very ordered, very specific – and his 
routine stuff…So, Dr Y said, ‘His anxiousness could be, with the behaviour he 
showed here, Asperger’s Syndrome.’ He said, ‘I can sit here and just reel all of 
it off [different diagnoses] and it’s kind of there in one big ball.’ 
 
Jenny:  Stephen’s got a myriad of things: ACC, ADHD, ASD – there’s a million other 
ones [labels] the doctor said we could give him. So, he’s been on Risperdal for 
a long time, and I think when we moved over here, there were questions as to 
why he had been on it for such a long time. So we’ve taken him off that and 
we just wanted to try to look at alternative solutions. He’s tried Tegretol, 
Ritalin – Ritalin sent him the other way: he’s quite anxious, which is part of his 
Asperger’s, so it actually made him focus on his anxiety…so that didn’t last for 
long at all. So I think it was to look at fluoxetine as another method to try to, 
sort of, contain his anxiety and his anxiousness and all of that.  
 
The psychologist then goes on to explain how the medication will work by targeting 
his specific anxious, repetitive behaviours, while also cautioning that the actual role 
of the medication is not to cure, but to help with the “regulation” of behaviours: 
 
                                                           
11 Agenesis Corpus Callosum (ACC) “is a rare congenital abnormality in which there is a partial or complete absence of the 
corpus callosum. This is the area of the brain which connects the two cerebral hemispheres…The first symptoms of ACC are 
usually seizures, which may be followed by feeding problems and delays in holding the head erect, sitting, standing, and 
walking. The seizures may be caused by a very common disorder called infantile spasms, which is associated with ACC. There 
may be impairments in mental and physical development, hand-eye coordination, and visual and auditory memory. 
Hydrocephalus may also occur. In mild cases, symptoms such as seizures, repetitive speech, or headaches may not appear for 
years…There is no standard course of treatment for ACC. Treatment usually involves management of symptoms such as 
hydrocephalus and seizures if they occur.”(Brain Foundation 2014) 
 130  
 
Psych:  So, the only thing with the study is that it’s blinded, so I don’t know if he’s 
going to have fluoxetine or not. There’s a possibility he’ll be on placebo. But it 
will be good as well, because then we can see what’s working and what’s not, 
and then, based on that, we should know. So the study finishes at the end of 
the year, so we’ll know most likely next year what he was on. And then, based 
on that, you can work out if it’s something you want to use long-term. So it’s 
an SSRI, it’s quite a good medication – just watching the kids that I’ve seen in 
the study (it’s gone on for three years now). So, you know, we’re looking at 
repetitive behaviours, so all his anxious behaviours 
 
Psych:  The fluoxetine, the goal of that, I mean, it’s not going to cure his routines, but 
it should help him to regulate himself just a little bit better. So they’re the 
changes that you’re looking for: is he crying longer, is he getting so worked up 
so quickly… 
 
Stephen’s case is particularly interesting given his diagnosis of ACC and the comorbid 
conditions that are associated with his primary diagnosis of ACC. His case illustrates 
Willems’ (1998) ideas shown in Figure 4.2 (as discussed earlier in this chapter) in 
terms of the way that medications feed back into how clinicians understand, make 
sense of, categorise and treat disorders. Stephen has been given a cocktail of drugs 
over the years in what appears to be a trial and error process in coming to decisions 
about how to categorise and define his condition. In the following discussion 
between the psychologist and Stephen’s mother, Jenny, below, we can see how this 
has clearly been a problem for Stephen throughout his life, and the psychologist’s 
recognition that this is quite common for children with ASD in general:  
 
Psych:  With these kids it’s hard as well. I can see why he’s had so many diagnoses. 
The kids on the Spectrum, because they’re so inflexible and show a lot of 
symptoms that the kids with ACC, ADHD and so on show, they all show similar 
stuff. All the kids that come in, they’ve got this label, this label, this label, this 
label [laughs as she counts on her fingers].  
Jenny:  He was born, obviously, with Agenesis Corpus Callosum, so everything else is 
just associated with that. I think he’s had autism [diagnosed] at one point 
with one psychologist that we went to see, and I was like, ‘No, he isn’t 
autistic, he’s just born with ACC, which will then potentially show you: autistic 
spectrum, anxiety, all those things, and they’re all associated with ACC.’  
Psych:  Yeh, I mean, that’s probably why you’ve had a hard time trying to find 
something conclusive [laughs]. Yeh, and the meds!  
 
In the reflexive interview with the psychologist, we discussed the difficulty of 
including children in the trial with comorbid disorders. Interestingly though, while 
Stephen’s ACC was acknowledged as an added complexity, the psychologist kept 
returning to the idea that as long as the diagnosis established that ASD was “the core 
thing” then the child was included in the trial. Thus, as long as the medication was 
able to address those “core” ASD symptoms, the psychologist was satisfied that it 
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was the ASD that was being “treated.” Here we can see Willems’ (1998) ideas played 
out in the way the psychologist justifies Stephen’s inclusion in the trial:  
 
Psych:  With the ACC, it’s still clear that even though he’s got this other neurological 
condition, he’s still presenting with features of ASD [slaps hand on table to 
emphasise]. [Jenny and Matthew] even said it themselves, “All kids with ACC 
are different and they have a bit of this and a bit of that, whereas Stephen has 
all the of [the ASD symptoms]”, so all the autism stuff.  
 
Psych:  With the trial, we have to rule out specific diagnoses – only the mental health 
ones though, because I think they show similar symptoms. In terms of other 
things, we haven’t screened. As long as they have ASD. And I can only think of 
three kids [with comorbidities]: Manahil, who had deafness; Stephen who had 
[ACC]; and [new participant, not participating in my study] who had a family 
history of sensitivity to the medication. I haven’t seen it as an issue. I mean, 
you always want to screen for comorbidities. In our trial we made sure that 
ASD was the core thing. With stuff like that it’s hard, because ASD is 
neurodevelopmental, and ACC is neurological as well, so, it could be both. It’s 
hard to say.  
Me:  So, participants like that are still included in the trial, even if there is some 
question mark [over the diagnosis]…? 
Psych: Yeh, because we’re still looking at the autism symptoms, right! So with the 
autism symptoms, we still want to make sure that the medication’s helping 
those symptoms.  
 
This cocktail of drugs and diagnoses, as the psychologist recognises, is quite common 
amongst the population of children with ASD. For Lena and Tim, Brendan’s parents, 
Brendan’s experiences with the stimulant-classed drug Ritalin demonstrated that 
this was not the right approach for him, and led to their participation in the 
fluoxetine trial as they try to come to terms with how to manage his behaviour: 
 
Lena:  When he was on Ritalin, and one of the reasons for us deciding to stop was, 
he became quite a compulsive picker, and picked at himself, bit his fingers 
and nails back to the quick, and was picking at his skin, that kind of thing. 
 
Lena:  This was another reason why we stopped Ritalin, because I felt that he was 
becoming too melancholy and he became very delicate, emotionally, and 
would just snap. He would hit his head on the wall, or pull his hair, or 
threaten self-harm, that kind of thing.  
 
Again, here we see Willems’ (1998) notion of the role of medications in the 
reorganisation of the body, and how they create new identities through the action of 
the medication. Brendan’s paediatrician had a certain idea about his condition, or his 
autism, and prescribed a drug he thought might alleviate some of his “problem 
behaviours”.  However, the drug produced certain side-effects that made its use 
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untenable, and so Brendan’s autism was reordered as a disorder that may be altered 
using the SSRI fluoxetine.  
 
Likewise, for Daniel, a nine-year-old boy with high-functioning autism, anxiety is still 
a significant problem for him despite the cocktail of medications he is on. His 
mother, Hayley, discusses his current dosages of Ritalin and Risperdal and how he 
has stopped taking these medications for the purposes of the study. She expresses 
concerns about the potential for Daniel to receive the placebo (in-active drug), and 
what this will mean. However, the psychologist explains the benefits of taking part in 
the trial: 
 
Psych:  So hopefully, at least we know then that the extra medication that we are 
adding is definitely working. 
Halyley: Well, if it’s worked for the other kids [in the trial], I don’t see a reason why it 
shouldn’t work for him. Especially if he’s in their category [autism with 
anxiety]. 
Psych: Ohhh, he fits, he is the biggest match. So, it’s really good – the SSRI will be 
perfect for him. At least we’ll know that that is the medication he’s been 
needing.  
 
Psych:  Like I said, it’s good [taking the fluoxetine and going off the other 
medications]: because then we’ll know the Ritalin is definitely working; the 
Risperdal is definitely making a difference in his behaviour; and if he needs an 
SSRI – so it’s good to see.  
 
Thus, using Willems’ (1998) theory, we can see that the psychologist is positioning 
the fluoxetine as a potential third element in this drug cocktail to help the child’s 
behaviours. By not taking the other two drugs – Ritalin and Risperdal – they are also 
able to confirm if these medications are “definitely making a difference to his 
behaviour”. Thus, taking these medications/not taking these medications feeds back 
into decisions about what sort of behaviours make up Daniel’s brand of autism.  
 
Another key difference between autism diagnosed in the clinic and autism diagnosed 
in the clinical trial is the way that the child is diagnosed. This difference is perhaps 
most obvious through the complete reliance on the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (ADI-R) – the diagnostic tool that structures, directs and essentially 
standardises the whole of the psychologist-parent interview – throughout the clinical 
trial. In contrast, the diagnosis in the clinic is often more dynamic, experiential and 
nuanced, as evidenced by interviews I conducted with Australian private practice 
paediatricians in 2009. Eight of the nine paediatricians interviewed indicated that 
they ranked clinical experience and observational knowledge as the highest 
diagnostic competencies. Using phrases such as: “one can just pick these things,” 
“you just mentally classify,” and “expertise is being able to recognise patterns” 
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illustrates this preference for the “gut feeling” approach to diagnosing autism 
spectrum disorder (Lenne & Waldby 2011: 75).  
 
Diagnosis in the clinical trial, on the other hand, needs to be specific, documented, 
transparent, and scientific. The focus is on distinguishing between “the patient 
meets the trial criteria” and “the patient does not meet the trial criteria.” As 
Fitzgerald (2012) explains, this transparency and “rigour” is vital for the clinical trial:  
 
But perhaps more interesting, in this case, is what marks the difference: for inclusion in 
the clinical trial, participants will have to pass a given cut-off on at least one, and 
preferably both, of the ‘gold standard’ quantitative scales. This is a requirement of 
publishing in a good journal – and is obviously governed by concerns about the 
homogeneity of participant populations across different studies. But for the clinic, 
where this kind of specificity is less of a concern, there is a different solution, and this 
is to cede some epistemological space to whether autism is actually ‘felt’ by the 
clinician in the course of the encounter. (Fitzgerald 2012: 80)  
 
Thus, the motivation behind diagnosis in the clinical trial is also fundamentally 
different when compared to the clinic, or private practice, as explored in the 
following exchange between the parents of Patrick and the psychologist: 
 
Psych: So, what this assessment is, so the one I am doing now… I mean, if you go to 
any private clinic we use the same type of assessment. So it’s to confirm if he 
is or isn’t on the Spectrum. And it sounds like he is quite, I mean, he is on the 
Spectrum. 
Laura: Yeah, I have no doubt. 
Psych: If you did want a thorough, thorough, thorough assessment, there is another 
assessment that we also use, but, I mean, if you know he’s on the Spectrum, 
you’re looking at, you know… do you see the diagnosis in terms of [a means 
to getting] extra funding, extra help; or do you want a more thorough 
diagnosis which… 
Tom: Is for treatment mostly… 
Psych: Yeah, exactly! 
Laura: And he needs that funding for school and stuff.  
Psych: And that’s what I say to a lot of families: there’s no point in spending all the 
extra money on… 
Laura: To tell us what we already know. 
Psych: Exactly! So this [gestures at ADI-R booklet] is good because it will just tell us if 
he is or isn’t. I’ll be able to give you a report, you can use that report for what 
you need, and hopefully it will help him a little bit more. And also, maybe I 
can give you some suggestions of what else to do, and we can go from there.  
 
We can see from this dialogue that while the focus of diagnosis in the clinic/private 
practice is to identify whether the child has autism, it is predominantly motivated by 
the steps that come after this diagnosis. Thus, diagnosis in the clinic is about 
establishing areas that the child needs help with, their strengths and weaknesses, 
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and how to get funding so that the child can participate in therapies, go to school, 
and so on. In the clinic, diagnostic and treatment recommendations are often 
mediated, not by “science” or “facts”, but by socio-political factors, such as patterns 
of government subsidy (Lenne & Waldby 2011), whereas, in the context of the 
clinical trial, the diagnostic focus is more immediate: the ADI-R “will tell us if he is or 
isn’t [on the Spectrum]”. Furthermore, the diagnosis in the clinical trial is presented 
by the psychologist as concrete and stable – he is or he isn’t – with the psychologist 
stating at the beginning of this extract that, “it sounds like he is quite, I mean, he is 
on the Spectrum”. This certainty is echoed by the mother too: “Yeah, I have no 
doubt”. Yet, this child is eight-years old and has resisted any sort of diagnostic 
category since his behaviour was deemed “problematic” by his parents at the age of 
three or four. This certainty around diagnosis presents a stark contrast to the picture 
of autism painted in the literature review of this thesis, as well as by the 
paediatricians in the clinic (for example, one paediatrician in my pilot study refers to 
the field of developmental paediatrics as “airy-fairy”).  
 
Dealing with “epistemic murk” in the clinical trial: the “psyche-
neuron-pharmaceutical” alliance 
Nikolas Rose’s work on psycho-pharmacological societies and the neurochemical self 
is particularly helpful in understanding how this shift in diagnostic gaze occurs within 
the clinical trial. As explained earlier, Rose (2007) suggests that everyday emotions 
and conduct are being reconceptualised in terms of neurological theories and 
neurochemical deficiencies, which require treatment through pharmaceutical 
products and psy-expertise.  
 
Thus, individuals diagnosed with ASDs, their parents, and the various therapists 
involved in their diagnosis and treatment are all reconceptualising the symptoms of 
ASD in terms of the functioning of their brain chemicals. In the case of this fluoxetine 
trial, autism is no longer perceived as just a set of observable behaviours, but rather 
a disorder that is firmly located within the brain, and its processes. The drug, 
fluoxetine, is not only presented as a substance relieving the symptoms of anxiety 
(the repetitive behaviours), but is also a way of “modulating and managing these 
neurochemical anomalies” (Rose 2007: 223). The key goal of the medication is not to 
cure, or even to “normalise,” but is rather to “adjust the individual and restore and 
maintain his or her capacity to enter the circuits of everyday life” (Rose 2007: 210). 
This is highlighted in a statement made by the psychologist as she discusses the 
medication with the parents of Patrick: 
 
Psych:  The goal of the medication is not to cure something like that [aggressive 
behaviour], but it should help him to cope a little bit better. So, if it was a 
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situation like that, you’d hope the medication would just make him cope a 
little bit more than what he normally does.  
 
This adjustment and restoration of the self, according to Rose, occurs alongside, and 
as part of an alliance with, “the doctor and the molecule” (2007: 211). This notion of 
an alliance with the doctor, and the “patient’s” (and/or parents’) use of, and 
engagement with, the language around the “molecule”, “neurochemistry”, and “psy-
jargon” is particularly evident in these clinical trial diagnostic encounters, and 
demonstrates an extension of this concept of the “self” in the diagnostic encounter.  
 
This doctor-pharma alliance is also heavily dependent on the cooperation of the 
participant in the trial (or in the majority of cases, the cooperation of the parent). 
We can see in many cases that the parents are often critical of, and hesitant about, 
the medication and its potential benefits or effects. In the following interaction 
between Patrick’s parents and the psychologist, we can see Laura and Tom 
advocating for the individuality and uniqueness of their son, and their concern that 
they would rather he not take the medication if these qualities will be affected:  
 
Tom: I wouldn’t want him to be a zombie, but! 
Laura:  Yeah! 
Psych: No! 
Laura: This is the one thing I am worried about, as difficult as Patrick can be in 
situations, I would rather change his situations, than change him. If he’s going 
to be on the ADD or ADHD medication… 
Psych: It’s different… 
Laura: If he’s going to be mute… 
Psych: It’s different… 
Laura:  I want that spunky little boy… 
 
Likewise, for Bronte, the mother of Harvey – a twelve-year-old boy who will be 
attending secondary school the following year – there is a process of negotiation 
that goes on between parent and psychologist. In many instances throughout the 
diagnostic interview, the mother stresses the improvements her son has made 
through psychological intervention, and through the use of techniques she has 
developed herself at home. In the interchange below, the mother is filling out a 
rating scale to obtain a baseline measurement of her son’s repetitive behaviours that 
will be addressed by the medication. We see her challenge the psychologist’s 
assumptions (that her son has ASD) behind giving her this rating scale to fill out: 
 
Bronte:  With the compulsions, he’s fixed it up himself!  
Psych:  Well…is there anything that you want to see with the medication? Like, does 
he bite his nails, or pace up and down…? 
Bronte:  Constant things in his hands… 
Psych:  Even touching himself at home, maybe a little bit less, or…? 
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Bronte:  You see, it’s amazing how even that has improved! 
Psych:  OK, because he’s got the awareness now. 
Bronte:  Maybe just the constant things in his fingers. 
Psych:  Because I think that’s something we’d be able to see from the medication.  
 
At the end of the diagnostic session with Bronte, Harvey’s mother, we see the 
psychologist provide both a psy- and neuro- explanation to justify why Harvey is on 
the Spectrum and why medication will be helpful for him: 
 
Bronte:  So, does it look as though he is on the Spectrum? 
Psych: It sounds like he is, yeah. It sounds like he’s on the Spectrum. His repetitive…I 
have to look a little bit more at the scoring…it still sounds like it’s very 
borderline, because a lot of it’s anxiety as well. So, with kids that are anxious, 
they show some symptoms as kids on the Spectrum. But all the other things: 
the hand flapping is such a big thing; the fact that he’s very socially behind, 
you know, it’s been quite consistent since he was a child; these are the signs 
that we’re looking for. 
Bronte:  I mean, I just don’t want to put him on a medication…although, I guess he 
needs it for his anxiety anyway. 
Psych: Yeah, yeah. So, SSRIs are used for kids that are quite anxious these days. But 
what they’re finding with kids on the Spectrum is that it’s helping with these 
repetitive mannerisms a little bit more. And, because their serotonin is not 
balanced, it’s supposed to just help balance it a little bit more. It’s just; there’s 
never been a consistent dosage before, so paediatricians have been giving 
whatever they think. So it hasn’t been standardised yet. So, this trial, 
hopefully, will [provide] that.  
 
The limitations in the solely neurological explanation for autism can be seen here. 
The psychologist draws on behavioural language to explain the diagnosis to the 
mother, and then switches to the neurological language to rationalise the need for 
the medication. Yet, even in this brain-based description, we can see the “epistemic 
murk”: on the one hand, the psychologist reassures the mother of the widespread 
nature of the use of fluoxetine among children with anxiety and autism; yet 
paradoxically highlights that there is a lot of uncertainty around what dosage to give 
to children, and that ultimately this is based on the discretion of the treating 
paediatrician.  
 
The ability of these families to think critically about, and debate the effectiveness of, 
this neurochemical re-shaping of their child demonstrates that clinical trial 
participation, and the diagnostic encounter within this context, is a negotiated 
space. It also highlights that the clinician-pharma alliance in the clinical trial is in fact 
actually a clinician-parent-pharma alliance. This is particularly evident in the 
following exchange between Patrick’s mother, Laura, and the psychologist, in which 
Laura demonstrates her knowledge about how clinical trials work with relation to 
testing the effectiveness of the medication when there are confounding 
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environmental variables present. Within the trial protocol, there are very strict 
guidelines around controlling the use of other medications the child may be taking 
(that is, they are not allowed to participate in the trial if they are taking any other 
psychoactive medications). However, there are no guidelines around whether the 
child is participating, or about to begin participation in, behavioural, speech, or 
occupational therapies, or if the child will be undergoing any environmental changes 
that might significantly affect their anxiety levels (such as a change in school). Both 
mother and psychologist recognise this limitation, yet the psychologist stresses, at 
the end of the interchange, that the medication will lead to noticeable, positive 
changes in the child’s behaviour:    
 
Laura: Will environmental changes affect the results? Because, I have always 
strongly believed that Patrick is a product of his environment, and we are 
looking at putting him in [a new public school] which has only got 120 
students, so having a different environment…I mean, he’s still going to be an 
autistic kid in a main-stream system – which is a challenge in itself – but I 
think it will help reduce those high level sort of [behaviours]… 
Psych: It will, and all the environmental factors… I mean, the problem with all these 
studies is you can’t just pin-point that it is the medication. I mean, it could 
help a little bit, but the fact that he changed schools; even […] if you change 
something at home; you know, the fact that he’s going to OT; if he’s had his 
therapy; or whatever he’s doing – that’s all going to play a role. 
Laura:  But all those things are changing, because all those things are targeting the 
autistic spectrum. 
Psych: Yeah, because now you know. 
Laura: Yeah, so his OT – we’re going back to OT now – but it’s to target what we now 
know his condition is. 
Psych:  And you’ll see changes, you really will. Give it about eight weeks and you’ll 
see changes in terms of his anxiety, inflexibility, his behaviour…  
 
This conversation provides valuable insight into the very nature of this “epistemic 
murk” of ASD. We already know that there is no causal, linear pathway that can be 
traced between pill and mind. As explained by Elizabeth Wilson: 
 
The pill does not act directly on the brain – it has to be ingested, absorbed, 
transmogrified and transported via the bloodstream to the liver; in the liver it is 
metabolized and then dispersed through the entire body (fat, muscles, skin, blood 
brain barrier); once in the brain the SSRI arrives at the cerebral synapse and modulates 
the uptake of one neurotransmitter out of the scores of peptides, amino acids and 
monoamines that regulate chemical traffic in the human central nervous system (CNS). 
(Wilson 2011: 286). 
 
The complexity of the biological mechanisms involved in the workings of an SSRI 
demonstrates the whole-of-body approach that is taking place. Taking this one step 
further, we can recognise that this body exists in an environment that acts on it in 
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profound and significant ways, and that we therefore need to look at the drug as a 
“modulator within a complex system” (Wilson 2011: 286), as well as modulated by 
the environment the body exists within.  
 
Thus, the neurochemical re-framing of autism is always kept in check by the 
“epistemic murk” (Eyal et al 2014) that engulfs autism, and the entanglement 
between the key actors or paradigms in this context: the drug (fluoxetine); the 
neurosciences (explanations about how fluoxetine works); the psy-sciences 
(treatment therapies such as Applied Behavioural Analysis (ABA) and occupational 
therapy (OT)); the parent (as the key provider of information in the diagnostic 
encounter, they direct the gaze of the clinician); and the child. This “epistemic murk” 
manifests itself in these ASD diagnostic encounters by the inability of neurological 
theories or the drug itself to dominate the diagnostic discussions due to the many 
uncertainties around them. This is demonstrated by obvious gaps and limitations in 
the “evidence” or “explanations” offered to the parents during discussions about the 
drug or the trial itself, as well as the way that the parents try to make sense of their 
child’s behaviour. For example, there are numerous instances of parents querying, “I 
don’t know what’s going on up there” (gesturing to the head/brain) or “he/she is in 
his/her own world” when they are explaining behaviours their child exhibits (for 
example, losing their temper/throwing a tantrum or engaging in repetitive behaviour 
such as rocking or picking at hands).  
 
This “epistemic murk” is also evident in the heavy emphasis on the “psy-sciences” 
and “psy-therapies” throughout the clinical encounter. Much of the language that 
both the parents and psychologist use is heavily reliant on a behavioural (and mainly 
“visible”) understanding of autism: (e.g. mentions of the child’s “sensory processing 
difficulties”, “inflexibilities”, “repetitive behaviours”). Additionally, the psychologist 
constantly refers the parents to psychological techniques (using “social stories” to 
alleviate anxiety) or therapies (the “Cool Kids Program” – run by the Department of 
Psychology at Macquarie University) throughout the diagnostic session, to provide 
the families with strategies to manage the child’s autism and anxiety.  
 
Wilson (2011) talks about a “coalition between psyche and neuron and 
pharmaceutical” in her analysis of neurological and clinical trial data on the use of 
SSRIs in depressed paediatric populations. She claims that these “depressive states 
are neither caused nor cured by singular events (a gene; a pharmaceutical); rather 
they are complex, non-deterministic sedimentations of phamaco-affective, ideo-
chemical and neuro-social affiliations” (277). I argue that this trial seems to 
demonstrate the beginnings of this kind of psyche-neuron-pharmaceutical alliance, 
where drug and therapy are presented as working hand-in-hand. This is particularly 
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evident in the following conversation between Laura, Patrick’s mother, and the 
psychologist: 
 
Psych: This medication makes you more aware. So, you know how these kids, they 
can’t express themselves – so kids on the Spectrum, they can’t express 
themselves – so what I’ve found with a lot of the kids that I’ve had, is that 
they actually express themselves more. So, you’ll see more emotion because 
they don’t know how to express themselves. So, with the medication, it’s 
making everything more clear. So, once he’s expressing himself more, it’s 
about intervention, and strategies that [child’s psychologist] is using. Because, 
he should be able to, not digest, but just understand a little bit more, and by 
understanding a little bit more – it sounds like he understands…he doesn’t 
understand, but he’s aware of what he’s doing. So we want that awareness.  
Laura: Yeah [nodding], he’s very aware, he doesn’t want to be like that, he’s knows 
it’s not right.  
Psych: So what we want is, we want him - because he’s more aware - to start using 
the tools that he’s been given. So, you know, if it is the ‘traffic light system’, if 
it is ‘breathing’, if it is – whatever they gave him…and that’s what the goal of 
the medication is: to help him stop for a sec, so that he can use those tools, 
and so he does regulate himself a little bit more. So you have to give it at least 
six weeks – it won’t take effect immediately.  
 
Here we can see that the fluoxetine is presented as an enabler: by taking the 
medication, the child’s mind will be altered to make him more “aware” and in doing 
so, will make his uptake of therapy or intervention more effective. According to the 
psychologist, the fluoxetine will allow him to “regulate himself a little bit more” 
which, in turn, will allow him to effectively use the “tools” he has been given in the 
psychological interventions. Both components work hand-in-hand, in an alliance; the 
child’s anxiety cannot be addressed without both elements.  
 
Relationship between placebo and drug 
Given that this trial is a “double-blind placebo controlled trial”, the participants, their 
parents, nor the clinicians, know who has received the active (fluoxetine) or placebo 
medication. Thus, the primary aim of most clinical drug trials is to separate the drug-
response from placebo-response. Wilson (2008) claims that it is the “political 
imperative” of the clinical drug trial to “render drug and placebo distinct events” 
(35), and that clinical literature actively dismisses the idea that a drug-placebo 
relationship has co-evolved to “exist in a mutually beneficial alliance” (35). She 
draws on two key meta-analysis studies published in the journal Prevention and 
Treatment to demonstrate the difficulty in separating the placebo from the 
antidepressant medication. In the first study, which collated data from 47 clinical 
trials, “80 per cent of the improvement in patients taking the drugs was also seen in 
patients in placebo control groups; and the mean difference in improvement 
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between patients taking the drug and those in the placebo group was only a few 
points on the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale” (31). In the second study, a meta-
analysis of 19 clinical trials demonstrated that “placebo response accounted for 
about 75 per cent of the response to active antidepressant medication” (31) (this 
included SSRIs).  
 
Wilson (2008) argues that instead of focusing on whether the drug or placebo are 
the sole author of antidepressant effects, or whether we reject the drug or the 
placebo as a clinical hoax, we should be turning our attention to modelling “a system 
of efficacy in which drug and placebo are properly, happily entangled” (33). Thus, 
Wilson argues that there is actually “a fundamental affinity between these events” 
(34): 
 
Every new antidepressant finds its identity in relation to placebo, and it is now an 
industry requirement that in order to measure medication effects accurately we must 
also measure placebo…these circumstances are not simply convention and sound 
methodological design but are also an unformulated recognition that the response to 
medication and the response to placebo are parasitic on each other. (34) 
 
Wilson (2008) points to a now obsolete definition of placebo to further reinforce this 
notion of the parasitic relationship between drug and placebo – in the fifteenth, 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the term placebo was used descriptively to 
infer that someone was a flatterer, a sycophant or a parasite. Wilson (2008) 
describes several clinical trial studies in her paper that point to this parasitic 
relationship. She explains that given the difficulty in differentiating between drug-
responders and placebo-responders in clinical trials of antidepressants, researchers 
struggle to justify the addition of the new drug to the market. The focus therefore 
turns to finding a “reliable biological marker” that allows the researchers to 
differentiate between placebo-response and drug-response, thus isolating what is 
referred to in the clinical literature as a “true drug response” (Wilson 2008: 36). 
Wilson (2008) stresses that these trials push for the drug response to be “freed from 
its contaminating relation to placebo” (36), yet paradoxically, she points out, the 
“antidepressant drug is most clearly itself – indeed can only fully be itself – when it is 
under the influence of placebo” (36).  
 
Wilson (2008) examines two studies (Leuchter et al 2002 and Hunter et al 2006) 
conducted by a UCLA research group that are interested in showing a particular 
biological marker (cerebral perfusion – blood flow in the brain) can differentiate 
between placebo-response and drug-response (antidepressant). The studies, both 
using the same data-set, involved two phases (see Figure 4.3): phase one involved a 
1-week placebo lead-in where participants were told they were receiving the active 
medication (an antidepressant), but were in fact given a placebo and then had EEG  
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Figure 4.3:  Diagrammatic representation of the Leuchter et al (2002) and Hunter et al (2006) antidepressant clinical trial  
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measures taken at the start and end of the week; and phase two involved the 8-week 
treatment condition, whereby only participants that did not respond to the placebo in the 
first phase (group B) were then randomly spilt into two groups that either received the 
placebo (group X) or received the active medication (group Y) and EEGs measures were 
taken at regular intervals. While both studies used the same dataset, they focused on the 
EEG results taken from different groups of participants and at different times (see Figure 3), 
and accordingly had very different findings. 
 
Leuchter et al’s (2002) study focused on the EEG results from the 8-week treatment 
condition of the responders to placebo (group (i) in Figure 4.3) and the responders to 
medication (group (iii) in Figure 4.3). They found that there was a biological difference 
between the two groups, with group (iii) demonstrating a decrease in prefrontal perfusion 
(an indication of good medication response). Hunter et al’s (2006) study focuses on the EEG 
results from the 1-week placebo lead-in phase for the participants that received the active 
treatment (group Y in Figure 4.3). They found that the decrease in prefrontal perfusion 
(indication of good medication response) emerged in Group Y (those receiving the active 
treatment condition) in the placebo lead-in phase – before the active drug is administered. 
Importantly, they also discovered that the brains of Group (iii) – the responders to 
medication – pre-empts this “reliable biological marker” that will develop once they have 
been given the active medication. The brains of Group (iv) – the non-responders to 
medication – show no changes during the lead-in phase. Wilson (2008) points out the 
significance of these findings: 
 
On the basis of these data, it seems that being a good medication responder means being a good 
placebo responder: having a good drug response seems to go hand in hand with having a good 
placebo response, and, likewise, the less well you respond to placebo the less well you respond to 
the drug. (37)  
 
Wilson’s (2008) analysis of these two studies provides a compelling argument for 
reimagining the way that we understand the clinical trial and the placebo-drug relationship.  
For Wilson (2008), it is about understanding how “ingestion, physiological activity and 
therapeutic alliance might be aligned” (38). Wilson (2008) posits that for Group (iii) – the 
drug responders (see Figure 4.3) – “the active medication harnesses a capacity for 
improvement (an antidepressant potential) that is catalysed first by being in the trial itself” 
(38). Thus, one could argue that in the placebo lead-in phase, Group (iii) have already taken 
the “antidepressant” and “ingested the treatment” via the hope and exposure to “the clinic” 
that is attached to being in the trial itself:  
 
It seems that, for the drug responders, the active medication harnesses a capacity for 
improvement (an antidepressant potential) that is catalysed first by being in the trial itself. In the 
placebo lead-in phase, the drug responders have already taken the antidepressant: before they 
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have taken the active medication they have ingested the treatment. The drug they are given in 
the weeks following the lead-in phase is a condensed, pharmaceutical dose of a treatment that 
has begun with the exposure to placebo pills, clinical staff, and hope [emphasis added]. (Wilson 
2008: 38)  
 
This argument has much relevance to the fluoxetine clinical trial studied for this thesis, 
particularly the notion that a participant’s response to the active drug is intimately tied up 
with, and inextricably linked to, being in the clinical trial itself.  
 
Before examining Wilson’s (2008) arguments around how the anticipation of clinical care 
and the hope that comes with it affects the participant’s “drug response”, I would like to 
draw attention to the fact that the clinical trial studied for this thesis was very preoccupied 
with the separation of placebo and drug. When introducing the parent(s) to what 
participating in the clinical trial will entail, the psychologist does so by presenting the 
placebo and the drug as very distinct entities. Furthermore, she presents the drug as having 
a quantifiable and determinable effect that will allow both the clinicians and the parents to 
know whether the child is on the active medication.  Similarly, when the placebo is 
mentioned, the psychologist always speaks with certainty about both herself and the 
parents knowing that the child is on the inactive medication. In the following exchange 
between Patrick’s parents, Laura and Tom, and the psychologist during the diagnostic 
encounter, we can see this immediate distance set up by the psychologist between the 
active drug (fluoxetine) and the placebo:  
 
Laura: That’s why I’m keen to do this trial, because hopefully, when he gets to that point… 
Psych:  Yeah, I think the medication will help him if he’s at that point… 
Tom: But we don’t know if he’s going to get the medication. 
Psych:  That’s the other thing as well, yeah.  
Laura: I think we’ll know. If there’s no change, if he’s still reaching that red line… 
Psych: Yeah, yeah.  
Tom: But it depends on each person too, it depends on the effects. 
Psych:  I think you’ll be able to tell, I really do. 
Laura: I think we will.  
Psych:  Because, I’ve been on this trial for two years now – you can tell! So I think you’ll be 
able to tell.  
 
Tom:  What have been the results so far with this trial?  
Psych:  I mean, we can see that there has been an effect with kids that have been on the 
medication. I mean, I can see, just comparing all the kids, the ones who are on the 
medication and the ones who aren’t, but I still haven’t had any confirmation yet and 
we won’t know until the end of the trial. 
 
The psychologist’s assurances to both parents that they will know whether the child is on 
the medication are based on her two years’ of experience on the trial (“you can tell”) – 
despite the fact that the trial is double-blinded and the results are not released until the trial 
has reached completion.  
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In some cases, the psychologist establishes which participants present as being “perfect” for 
the clinical trial during the ADI-R interviews. These participants have “obvious” or easily 
identifiable anxious behaviours (specifically described as repetitive or stereotyped 
behaviours in the context of ASD) which makes them “easy to quantify” and thus clear 
whether the medication is having an effect.  The following extracts from the ADI-R 
interviews with Leo’s Mum (Alice), Daniel’s Mum (Hayley), and Patrick’s Mum (Laura), 
demonstrate this apparent certainty around the ability to determine the effectiveness of the 
active drug:  
 
Psych:  I actually think…he’s perfect for this trial. Just meeting him, without doing the 
assessments.  
Alice:  [laughs] Why…? Why’s that?  
Psych:  Just because his behaviours are quite…they’re there, so at least it’s quite easy to 
quantify, you know, if the Fluoxetine is working or not. 
 
Hayley:  Well, if it’s worked for the other kids, I don’t see how it shouldn’t work for him. 
Especially if he’s in their category. [laughs] 
Psych:  [smiling] He fits! He’s the biggest match! So it’s good, the SSRI will be perfect for him. 
So then we’ll know that’s the medication he’s been needing. 
 
Psych:  Yeh, and you’ll see changes, you really will! Give it about 8 weeks and you’ll see 
changes in terms of his anxiety, his inflexibility, his behaviour… 
 
We can see from these examples that this clinical trial is still firmly attempting to project the 
scientific endeavour to separate drug response from placebo response. While they do not 
go as far as Leuchter et al (2002) to use a biological marker to distinguish between drug and 
placebo responders, there are numerous references throughout my data where the 
psychologist talks about the ease of measuring the effectiveness of the fluoxetine by 
quantifying children’s anxious behaviours. This is a key focus of the ADI-R assessment, and 
much time is spent detailing each child’s repetitive and stereotyped behaviours for the 
purposes of measuring the effectiveness of the drug.  
 
As illustrated earlier in this chapter, the focus of the ADI-R and the WISC-IV during the 
clinical encounter is to direct the clinical gaze towards the repetitive and stereotyped 
behaviours that the medication will target. Another important consideration here is the 
responsiveness of both the child and the parent(s) to the medication/placebo. While the 
child ingests the drug, and experiences the “physiological effects”, the parents observe (as 
well as experience) the external, behavioural effects of the medication, and are asked to 
report on these “positive or negative side effects” weekly in a “trial diary”. Thus, part of the 
aim of these “diagnostic” sessions is to educate the parents about what they need to focus 
on and look for in their child’s behaviour to accurately measure and quantify whether the 
medication is having an effect. The examples below demonstrate this directed focus:  
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Psych:  OK, so basically with the study, before we start, it is for kids with autism. So we’re 
looking at…so all those behaviours that Patrick shows: so, doing this [gestures rubbing 
hand up and down arm], breaking the pencil [mimes both hands in fists as if holding 
pencil and snapping hands apart and upwards]. The goal of this study is to look at the 
medication to see if it reduces that behaviour. So, the medication that we use – it’s 
been around for a long time – but they’ve never actually looked at it with kids on the 
Spectrum, and all those repetitive behaviours. So it’s an anxiety-based medication. 
Ummm, but we’re looking at controlled doses, because that’s what we’ve been 
finding: that a lot of paediatricians, they either give you too much, or too little; and 
that dosage affects kids on the Spectrum in terms of: you know, does it make them do 
those behaviours more; is it effective at all…and what we’re finding is that it’s not. And 
that’s why this trial’s looking at a specific dosage, and at the moment what I’ve found 
with the kids we’ve looked at is that it has had an effect on the kids that do have the 
medication. So, Melbourne Hospital are using it, WA are using it, and it’s the first study 
in Australia to do this kind of stuff.  
 
Psych:  So, you know, we’re looking at the repetitive behaviours – so all of his anxious 
behaviours. So, what does he normally do? Is he constantly checking [things], walking 
around…? 
Jenny:  Routine is a big thing. So, we weren’t at work this morning, so [that generated] a bit of 
anxiety: “I’m not in my normal going to school time” – so anything outside of his 
normal routine or the way we do things. So anything that’s outside the norm, it just 
chucks him.  
Matt: He hates anything…just doing something off the cuff. Everything has to be planned. He 
likes to know in advance what we’re doing. If we’re going to stop him doing 
something, we have to say, “In five/ten minutes time, we’re going to be doing this.” 
You’ve always got to break everything to him gently.  
Psych:  The fluoxetine, the goal of that, I mean, it’s not going to cure his routine changes, but 
it should help him to regulate himself just a little bit better. So, they’re the changes 
you’re look for: is he crying longer, is he getting so worked up so quickly…  
 
Psych:  Well, it’s just basically if he did any of those things [points at scale] and he does some 
of these [points at items on scale], I noticed, you know, he shakes his legs and he 
clenches his hands, so these are all the things… 
Alice:  Oh! [smiles and looks surprised] 
Psych:  Oh, [laughs] just from watching him! 
Alice:  I know he flicks his fingers [demonstrates each finger joining with thumb and flicking] 
Psych:  Yeh, he does that as well. These are all the things we want to look out for when he’s on 
the Fluoxetine – to see if it’s decreased, OK? 
 
Psych:  And then also, with his blinking, so with a lot of the repetitive behaviours, it is the 
autism, and it could be exacerbated by anxiety. And a lot of kids on the Spectrum are 
quite anxious. And then the other thing, as well, it could be a tic. I mean, I don’t know, 
because I am not assessing him for that, but all it is, it’s just stress-related, so if he’s 
anxious, it makes sense. Umm, so all you’ve got to do is the Fluoxetine – if it is not 
placebo – you should see a change. And the other thing is, if you end up seeing a 
psychologist, to focus on those types of stress management. 
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Returning now to Wilson’s (2008) scepticism of the possibility of there being a “true drug 
response,” I would like to draw attention to what Wilson calls the pill-clinician-assessment-
hope matrix:  
 
The 2006 study [conducted by Hunter at al] casts doubt on the idea that there can be any such 
thing as a true drug response, elicited independently of anticipation or clinical care [emphasis 
added]]. In this sense, Hunter et al.’s data show that what is ingested in a clinical trial is not an 
isolated pill but also a wide set of expectations delivered through intensive clinical attention. I 
swallow the pill, I ingest the clinicians, I incorporate confidence in measurement and cure. It may 
be this capacity to ingest more than just a pill that marks the difference between a drug 
responder and a drug non-responder. Perhaps the drug non-responder takes in too little or 
(paradoxically) is too drug focused, remaining sequestered from the broader therapeutic milieu. 
Perhaps the drug responder takes in just enough of the pill-clinician-assessment-hope matrix 
[emphasis added] to catalyse a sustainable antidepressant reaction. (Wilson 2008: 38)  
 
In the clinical trial studied for this thesis, there is evidence in every ADI-R that I observed 
and/or filmed of a genuine concern for each participant’s care and wellbeing.  This is a 
prominent theme throughout the ADI-R sessions and is worth noting given Wilson’s (2008) 
argument that a drug response is likely tied up with the participant not only ingesting a pill, 
but also the hope and care that comes from interacting regularly with clinical staff and 
benefitting from their advice and expertise, as well as the hope associated with taking the 
active medication. While my study was not privy to the results of the fluoxetine clinical trial 
(still running) and thus I am unable to follow-up or draw any conclusions about the 
fluoxetine reactions of participants, there are certainly many examples throughout my data 
to suggest that the pill-clinician-assessment-hope matrix was at work in this clinical trial.  
 
I will explore these ideas later in the thesis (Chapter Six) in the form of the care work 
performed by the psychologist during the ADI-R diagnostic encounters. The following 
example from the ADI-R session with Patrick’s parents, Laura and Tom, highlights this care 
work embedded within the psychologist’s “coaching” of the parents as to how they can 
identify whether the medication is effective for their son Patrick:  
 
Psych:  This medication makes you more aware. So, you know how these kids, they can’t 
express themselves – so kids on the Spectrum, they can’t express themselves – so 
what I’ve found with a lot of the kids that I’ve had, is that they actually express 
themselves more. So, you’ll see more emotion because they don’t know how to 
express themselves. So, with the medication, it’s making everything more clear. So, 
once he’s expressing himself more, it’s about intervention, and strategies that [child’s 
psychologist] is using. Because, he should be able to, not digest, but just understand a 
little bit more, and by understanding a little bit more – it sounds like he 
understands…he doesn’t understand, but he’s aware of what he’s doing. So we want 
that awareness.  
Laura: Yeah (nodding), he’s very aware, he doesn’t want to be like that, he’s knows it’s not 
right.  
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Psych: So what we want is, we want him - because he’s more aware - to start using the tools 
that he’s been given. So, you know, if it is the ‘traffic light system’, if it is ‘breathing’, if 
it is – whatever they gave him…and that’s what the goal of the medication is: to help 
him stop for a sec, so that he can use those tools, and so he does regulate himself a 
little bit more. So you have to give it at least six weeks – it won’t take affect 
immediately.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter orients this broader thesis, and my video-reflexive ethnographic fieldwork 
examining the diagnosis of autism, within the space of the clinical trial. I explore the way 
that the clinical trial studied for this thesis deals with medical uncertainty around 
medicating children with autism by using various techniques such as Rose’s concept of the 
“neurochemical self”, establishing a clinician-parent-pharma alliance, and the way that the 
clinical trial itself feeds into the autism classificatory loop by providing “data” and 
“evidence” as to how an “autistic brain” reacts to fluoxetine. I also explore how the 
clinicians and parents involved in this clinical trial must refocus their diagnostic gaze and 
conceptualisation of autism to fit with the ambit of the clinical trial: that is, autism 
symptoms are seen through the lens of anxiety as indicated by the child’s symptoms of 
repetitive behaviours. This anxiety/repetitive behaviours-focused gaze is key to 
understanding the diagnostic process that is discussed in the following two chapters, in 
which I explore the use of the two standardised diagnostic tools (as stipulated in the clinical 
trial protocol): the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-IV) and the Autism 
Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R).  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Observing, constructing and achieving autism through 
diagnostic tools 
 
Introduction 
In this, and the following chapter, I will explore the different ways that quantitative and 
qualitative notions of the normal and the pathological are utililised in the clinical trial during 
the ASD diagnostic sessions with both the children (WISC-IV) (this chapter) and the parents 
(ADI-R) (Chapter Six). In particular, I will examine how these approaches are in constant 
tension: while the quantitative approach to diagnosis is presented as a governing and 
overarching presence – a rule to be followed to fit the paradigm of the scientific clinical trial, 
the qualitative approach is often viewed as the practical, ethical and necessary way to 
conduct the diagnostic sessions. These diagnostic tools, particularly the WISC-IV, tend to 
generate a very scientific and quantitative understanding of ASD, shaping diagnostic 
conversation, stories and behavioural observations into “data” and “evidence” to support 
criteria of what is normal and pathological to fit the ambit of the clinical trial.  
 
I will consider how prescribed values of normality and pathology embedded in the 
diagnostic tool give rise to a dichotomy between what Maynard (2005) describes as 
“abstract competence” and “concrete competence.” Most tests used in the assessment of 
ASD measure abstract competence, that is, “the ability to answer questions in general, 
theoretical terms independent of any particular context,” whereas concrete competence is 
“experience-based, tied to specific contexts, and exhibited in the performance of everyday 
actions, such as issuing and following directives, turn-taking, making and responding to 
requests, engaging in play, and so forth” (Turowetz 2015: 58). We can see these concepts 
played out in the WISC-IV, where responses from the child are scored based on whether 
their competence in various tasks aligns with standardised criteria, while any competencies 
not stipulated in the criteria are ignored or minimised.  
 
The chapter will draw on Georges Canguilhem’s (1989) distinction between the normal and 
the pathological, on the one hand, and the norm and normativity, on the other, to help 
illuminate the distinction between these two ways of diagnosing. Canguilhem observes that 
the development of science as a positivist, objective enterprise required the ability to make 
a quantitative distinction between the normal and the pathological. Thus, medical views 
about health are based on the notion that disease or malfunction are a quantitative 
deviation from a fixed norm – taken to be constant – and that to return a patient back to 
health, medical practice must focus on re-establishing the norm from which the patient has 
strayed. Yet this distinction cannot account for the lived experience of health since there is a 
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value attached to this medical concept of the normal (representing a fixed entity): that is, 
the normal is linked to an “ideal” state. This attachment of value takes place through a shift 
from the normal to the norm, whereby the concept of normality bridges the gap between 
description and value. The term normality is thus simultaneously used for objective 
descriptions and to make value judgments or establish rules/principles. Thus, the 
pathological state is qualitatively different from the healthy state because it holds a 
fundamentally different value for the organism. This dimension of value, established by the 
nature of the organism, cannot be reduced to a numerical quantity. Here Canguilhem 
mobilises the concepts of norm and normativity to designate the ability of living subjects 
and organisms to adapt to change. For Canguilhem (1989), a norm represents a desired 
situation rather than a statistical average. The norm is the condition of the organism at any 
one time, and it is dynamic: it is continually adjusted in order to actively maintain its balance 
(Zajicek 1995: 333). Normativity, on the other hand, is the historical and evolutionary 
rejection of abnormal states and depends upon the adjustment and maintenance of norms. 
For Canguilhem (1989), it is this distinction between the normal and the normative that is 
fundamental to his concept of what defines health – “health is a margin of tolerance for the 
inconstancies of the environment” (Canguilhem 1989: 197). Health is characterised by 
flexibility, mobility, variability, and normativity, that is, the ability to create and maintain 
new norms through adaptation to a given environment; disease is characterised by 
intolerance, stasis, a tendency towards conservation, and rigidity. Consequently, what 
counts as normal is not the statistical average, but rather the creative ways that organisms 
adapt to their environments.  
 
Using diagnostic tools in the diagnosis of ASD: The WISC-IV and ADI-R 
and their historical roots 
This chapter, and Chapter Six, focuses on the use of standardised diagnostic tools, the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – 4th Edition (WISC-IV) and the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview-Revised (ADI-R), to categorise individuals as “on the autism spectrum.” To 
understand why these diagnostic tools are used in the assessment of ASD, I consider their 
historical roots as well as how they are administered in the clinical setting.  
 
The stark difference between these two tools and the way they are administered (setting 
aside the obvious difference that the WISC-IV is administered to the child and the ADI-R to 
the parent) can largely be traced back to the two different epistemologies influencing the 
origins and evolution of these tools. These two histories stem from: (1) on the one hand, the 
normative positivist emphasis that drove much of psychological thought from the mid-
twentieth century and onwards, whereby standardised and metrically-oriented processes 
were preferred and concepts of children and their development were embedded in a 
cognitive notion of the subject; and (2) on the other, a developmental paediatric approach 
that was striving for standardisation, but also sought to accommodate the complexities and 
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uncertainties surrounding the current knowledge of the disorder of autism by allowing the 
development of a tool with flexibilities.  
 
The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children  
Despite the rapid development in science and technology in medicine over the past century, 
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) and intelligence tests, more generally, 
have been subjected to only minor changes over this time. The test continues to be 
administered in the same way and includes tasks dating from the 1800s and early 1900s. For 
example: the “block design” task, developed by Samuel Kohs in 1923, was based on a 
commercially-available game of the time called “Color Cubes”; the substitution test (coding) 
was introduced in 1911 by Robert Woodworth and Frederic Lyman Wells was designed to 
measure the ability to learn new associations (see Figure 5.1, below); and the digit span test, 
which was developed by Joseph Jacobs in 1887 and is designed to test working memory 
(Boake 2002). As Boake (2002) points out, the Wechsler scales contain mental tests from a 
period before the concept of psychometric intelligence was even developed.  
 
Figure 5.1: Substitution Test (Woodworth & Wells 1911 in Boake 2002: 385) 
 
 
The Wechsler scales were developed between the 1880s and the First World War. The 
popularity of intelligence tests was cemented as a result of an intelligence-testing program 
carried out by the US Army during the First World War. The 1920s-1930s saw the 
development of a new group of intelligence tests, which led to a dramatic rise and 
expansion in the use of these tests, especially within the context of schools. The Wechsler-
Bellevue scale was published in 1939 and quickly gained prominence due to its use of 
familiar tests that psychologists viewed as “valid”, its ease of administration and statistical 
interpretation, and the large standardisation sample (Boake 2002). In 1949, a revision of 
Wechsler-Bellevue Form II was published as a children's scale, the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children:  
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The WISC introduced the basic standardization procedure to be followed by later Wechsler 
intelligence scales. The sample consisted of 100 male and 100 female subjects at each age from 
5 to 15 years. The subjects, who were all white, were selected to represent the proportions of 
the U.S. population residing in four geographical regions, as well as the proportion of parents 
working in various occupations. (Boake 2002: 400)  
 
In Donna Varga’s (2011) critical examination of “scientific child study” within the field of 
psychology, it is evident that the study of children changed quite dramatically during the 
twentieth century. Scientific procedures were privileged, whereby environments were 
controlled, conditions were replicated for comparisons, stimuli and variables were managed 
and manipulated, processes were standardised, and results recorded, scored and compared. 
For Varga (2011), this final process of recording and scoring characteristics of the child to 
“obtain a summary of the person’s self” was also about transforming something dynamic, 
individual and complex into a static form – a statistic – which “produces an individual that 
can be measured, compared and acted upon” (148). Thus, for Varga (2011):  
 
this era [beginning of the 20th century] invented and disseminated processes of child study for the 
rational organization of child development. What a child is and can be, and the meaning of 
childhood, was disembodied through scientific observation processes that abstracted time and 
space from behavior, and categorized children’s development into progressive stages to 
symbolize a universal ideal. (Varga 2011: 140) 
 
In her historical examination of the transformation of autism in Britain, Evans (2013) notes 
that, during the 1960s, British psychologists challenged the dominant notion of the 1950s 
that “autism” referred to excessive hallucinations and fantasy in infants. Most of the 
psychologists – pre 1960s – derived these theories from their study of individual cases that 
they had observed and/or treated themselves. Evans (2013) emphasises that: 
 
Their understanding of autism was framed by a broader disciplinary-wide agreement that 
developmental psychology was a science that tracked the emergence of subjectivity. If they did 
employ basic statistical methodologies, these were used as an adjunct to these theories. (13)  
 
From the late 1950s, however, psychologists began to turn to epidemiological studies to 
radically challenge this old model of child development, and the concept of autism that was 
built upon it. Epidemiology was seen as a method of validating psychology as a science, and 
thus:  
 
‘Autism’ was then completely reformulated as a new descriptive category to serve the needs of 
this new model of child development. From the mid-1960s onwards, child psychologists used the 
word ‘autism’ to describe the exact opposite of what it had meant up until that time. Whereas 
‘autism’ in the 1950s referred to excessive hallucinations and fantasy in infants, ‘autism’ in the 
1970s referred to a complete lack of an unconscious symbolic life. (Evans 2013: 4)  
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Evans (2013) argues that a big part of this radical reformulation of the label “autism” was 
intricately intertwined with the more “general shift in Anglo-American psychiatric reasoning 
which sought to understand psychological problems through epidemiological studies rather 
than individual cases” (4).  
 
Furthermore, this emphasis on epidemiological methods had strong roots in the practical 
endeavours of advocacy groups to campaign for the provision of schooling and education to 
children with autism.  For example, the Society for Autistic Children, which began to set up 
schools exclusively for children with autism in Britain in the 1960s, was keenly aware of the 
need to provide education and other services to families after deinstitutionalisation 
occurred (Evans 2013). Thus: “The need to integrate all children within the same 
educational framework also encouraged their integration in a unified theoretical framework 
concerning the development of their thought” (17). Indeed, Mr L. S. Piddington, a 
psychologist for the department of education in South Australia, speaking at the Autism: 
Cure Tomorrow, Care Today conference in Adelaide, Australia in 1967, shares his beliefs 
regarding the necessity of providing early assessment and treatment services through child 
guidance clinics and kindergartens:  
 
One of the great difficulties concerning this whole problem of autism has been that a number 
of children that we have had to deal with have been fairly old when first discovered and early 
treatment had not been possible…These are the children that have been posing a colossal 
problem to us all and do continue to do so in any education system. We can only suppose and 
hope that such children…would have been entirely different had they had early treatment and 
diagnosis as suggested by Professor Rendle-Short or if they had the treatment that I suggested 
in the Kindergarten or Lady Gowrie [child guidance clinic]…May I comment in passing about a 
point raised by Professor Morey in her discussion concerning Intelligence Tests and 
assessments. I cannot help feeling that if it is possible to obtain a reasonable accurate 
assessment from the child in a test situation, that he is well on the way to being accessible to 
the sort of treatment that I am indicating here. (115) 
 
From the 1960s onwards, researchers such as Mildred Creak, Beate Hermelin and Neil 
O’Connor began developing diagnostic features common to childhood schizophrenia to 
enable statistical, population-based studies. Hermelin and O’Connor were particularly 
interested in the use of statistical analyses centred on behavioural measures (Evans 2013). 
Michael Rutter, likewise, saw the importance of the application of epidemiological methods 
to all childhood psychiatric disorders. Rutter (1965) was convinced the need to classify these 
disorders, and argued that they needed to be identified and characterised before 
meaningful studies could be conducted about such disorders.  
 
Similarly, in the Australian context, while there appeared to be some hesitation amongst 
psychologists regarding the applicability of IQ tests when working with autistic children, 
there is a strong push within the field of psychology to use a variety of standardised 
assessments and tools in the diagnostic process. Professor E. Morey, a Victorian clinical 
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psychologist, discusses the various assessment tools used within her practice at the Autism: 
Cure Tomorrow, Care Today conference in Adelaide, Australia in 1967: 
 
Autistic children do not all present the same problems as to the techniques [of assessment] to 
be used. Some older children, and indeed some of the younger ones who are not severely 
handicapped, may well be able to undertake a formal psychological examination such as Merrill 
Palmer, a Revised Stanford Binet or a Wechsler Test for Children. This is useful because some of 
these children may be helped in a normal school setting and it is useful to have an assessment 
which can compare them with their classmates. (106) 
 
…any plan for the education of an autistic child must also consider his social and emotional 
development. These aspects usually must be assessed by report (usually from the parents) and 
observations of the child at play. Report techniques such as the Vineland Social Maturity Scale 
and the Bristol Adjustment Guides have been used with autistic children with success. Play 
observation and interpretation is also used, but full understanding of the autistic child’s 
fantasies and play activities is very difficult. (108) 
 
The foregoing discussion has made it clear that the psychological assessment of autistic 
children is no easy matter. The psychologist must have a great variety of skills and techniques 
available, and must be able to use these with flexibility without entirely invalidating his 
findings…Wherever possible, each item is presented in standard form first. This is a prerequisite 
wherever scoring with available norms is aimed at. Then the examiner introduces 
modifications, partial solutions, questions…The skilled examiner avoids arbitrary modifications 
but manipulates with psychological insight. (108-9) 
 
It is clear from these quotes that Morey (1967) is aware of the challenges of standardising 
the assessment of autism, yet these quotes also represent the ever-looming push for the 
quantification of the field of psychology. By using scales, standardised reporting measures, 
and cognitive tests, the child undergoing assessment can be plotted on a graph, compared, 
and measured against the “norm”. By shifting the focus of diagnosis from the mind to more 
observable qualities like behaviour and communication, measurement and standardisation 
of assessment became possible.  
 
Evans (2013) observes that in the late 1960s there was a key shift in conceptualisations of 
autism from a disorder defined by hallucinations, to one that focused on deficits in 
communication. Thus, she summarises: “These language abnormalities or differences then 
came to be a defining feature of the new concept of “autism” in its new psychological 
metamorphosis, which followed its radical strip-down to behavioural measures in the 
1960s” (19). These changes eventually translated to categorical changes in the form of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Third Edition (DSM-III) (1980), where 
the category of childhood schizophrenia (and reference to hallucinations) was completely 
written out and replaced instead by the category of “pervasive developmental disorders,” 
under which “infantile autism” was included as a sub-category.  
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Given the strong focus of IQ tests on observable behaviours and the quantification of 
cognitive abilities, it is unsurprising, therefore, that the WISC was used in diagnostic tests 
with children with possible autism. Indeed, the continued popularity of today’s use of the 
WISC in the assessment of neuropsychological disorders is often cited in the literature 
(Camara, Nathan & Puente 2000). Yet it is interesting to note that Wechsler himself did not 
specifically develop the scale to measure cognitive deficit (Boake 2002). As Boake (2002) 
demonstrates through the following insightful quote from British psychiatrist Andrew 
Patterson12 in 1944, the key problem for the WISC and other intelligence tests aligns very 
closely with Canguilhem’s (1989) arguments regarding the loss of the complex, rich, 
functional, contextual and qualitative:  
 
On the outbreak of war there was a clamour for tests for intellectual impairment. The academic 
psychologists through no fault of their own were encouraged to produce tests for conditions of 
which they had little knowledge and no clinical experience. This is the very opposite of the clinical 
approach where close observation should lead to the formulation of a test. In no other sphere of 
clinical science are tests devised before the phenomena have been studied. Such tests devised a 
priori tie nature down to a certain pattern of breakdown and such an assumption has always 
hindered progress. It also leaves out of account the variety of ways in which interference with 
cerebral function may express itself in the field of performance. There is more than a danger that 
the stereotyping of modes of investigation will force us to think along those lines only, and to 
close our eyes to and cease investigation of the breakdown which the hard facts of clinical 
observation present. (Paterson 1944, in Boake 2002: 402) 
 
Over the years, subsequent WISC revisions have been based on standardisation samples 
that are considered larger and more racially and ethnically representative. The WISC-IV 
(2003) is the current version that was administered as part of the clinical assessment in the 
SSRI clinical trial studied as part of this thesis. It takes approximately 1½ hours to administer 
and consists of ten tasks that test a child’s perceptual reasoning, verbal comprehension, 
working memory, and processing speed.  
 
A psychologist conducts the test one-on-one with the child. Before beginning the 
assessment, the psychologist must configure the room and materials as prescribed by the 
WISC-IV manual and are therefore (ideally) standardised across all assessments. Figure 5.2, 
below, provides an indication of what this configuration looks like.  
 
The role of the psychologist is to ensure that the child attempts each of the tasks prescribed 
by the WISC-IV within this standardised space she has created. This is achieved through 
verbal standardised instructions prescribed by the WISC-IV manual. The exact delivery of 
these instructions is considered important to ensure comparability between each case. The 
importance placed on this sameness or standardisation is particularly evident in the digit 
span task where the reading of the digits is expected to be carried out in a monotonous 
                                                           
12 I was unable to access these primary documents as they were obtained by Boake (2002) in his historical 
research within the Archives of the History of American Psychology.  
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tone, avoiding any accent or rhythm which will assist the child in the degree of ability that 
they will be able to repeat what has been said. The emphasis and focus on standardisation, 
and the effect this has on the administering clinician are the key points of difference 
between the WISC-IV and the ADI-R.  
 
Figure 5.2: WISC-IV room and material configuration (during a perceptual reasoning task) 
 
 
The Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) 
It is interesting that this epidemiological-influenced redirection of the clinical gaze towards 
the autism diagnostic encounter not only shaped the practice of psychology, but has also 
filtered into medical practice. Over the past fifty years, a large variety of standardised scales, 
checklists and questionnaires have been developed to assess the symptoms and behaviours 
of autism – as aligned with the diagnostic criteria set out in the various versions of the DSM. 
These tests were developed to serve a variety of purposes, such as: diagnostic screening, 
describing behaviours and their severity, and charting behaviour change as a result of 
therapies (Matson 2008: 12). Matson (2008) points out that due to the uncertainty 
surrounding autism’s etiology, there was little consensus on which assessments should be 
used: 
 
Early theoretical perspectives regarding causal mechanisms in autism differed markedly with no 
consensus regarding whether autism was a biological or a psychogenic disorder; and thus, no 
consensus about assessment tools. The tendency of differing perspectives to focus on particular 
features of autism to the exclusion of others meant that comprehensive assessment related to 
all areas of the children’s functioning was often not achieved. These factors then influenced 
assessment processes – whether it was essentially qualitative or quantitative and whether or 
not it was derived primarily from naturalistic observation, interview, observation within a 
clinical setting, using standardized measures, or some combination of these. (10)  
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One of the earliest autism diagnostic questionnaires that can be found in the literature is 
Bernard Rimland’s E-2 Checklist which was developed to measure Kanner’s description of 
autism, known as “classic autism” (Rimland 1964). Turning to the Australian context, T.J. 
Rendle-Short, a University of Queensland professor of child health and medical doctor, 
speaks about his development of a standardised checklist through his work with autistic 
children at the Autism: Cure Tomorrow, Care Today conference held in Adelaide in 1967. 
Rendle-Short’s (1967) paper, entitled “The diagnosis of infantile autism,” begins by 
establishing the profound uncertainty surrounding the diagnosis and definition of autism. 
He also, crucially, identifies the tacit quality of a medical diagnosis and the role of 
experience in the clinical encounter and how this plays out when dealing with a case of 
autism: 
 
What a doctor really does when he makes a diagnosis is to compare the child before him with his 
memory of previous children he has seen and also of check-lists recorded in the literature. If a 
previous child was called a case of autism and the present case has the same signs and 
symptoms, the he too is likely to be a case of autism. But the real trouble is that no two children 
are identical, and really all we can say therefore is that this child is more or less like a child we 
saw before whom we call autistic, who in turn was like another child, and so on. (35)  
 
For Rendle-Short, this presents a key problem for the clinical identification of autism, and 
has led him to conduct his own research in an attempt to produce a standardised checklist 
to be used in the diagnosis of autism. Using the method of “Numerical Taxonomy,” a 
method he states that is “used for many types of scientific classification, for instance trees 
and insects,” the researchers compared 25 autistic children with “50 normal children, 50 
children with Rubella deafness and 30 Cerebral Palsied children.” As a result, they came up 
with 13 items, which they have called “the major manifestations of Infantile Autism” 
(Rendle-Short 1967: 36).  
 
It was through the development of the Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI) in 1989 by Le 
Couteur and colleagues that a “gold standard” approach to autism diagnosis began to 
emerge. The ADI-R, a structured parent or caregiver interview, was developed to probe the 
child’s developmental history and current behaviour centering on autism diagnostic criteria 
(Matson 2008). The ADI was written and developed by two medical professionals (as 
opposed to psychologists) Michael Rutter (a child psychiatrist) and Ann Le Couteur (a 
developmental paediatrician). The questions it poses focus on how the child would act in 
typical situations, particularly in terms of social reciprocity, communication, and repetitive 
behaviours, as well as what the child was like during preschool years (Feinstein 2010). The 
ADI-R requires extensive training for the clinician and the actual administration lasts two to 
three hours. It is appropriate for use regarding individual ages 1½ years to adulthood. 
 
This first version of the ADI was mainly used for research purposes. In Le Couteur and 
colleagues’ (1989) paper, in which they report on the reliability and diagnostic validity of the 
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ADI, we are provided with an outline of the two key factors that led to the development of 
this diagnostic tool. First, they identify the acknowledged need within the disciplines of 
psychology and psychiatry for the development of standardised diagnostic instruments that 
allow clinicians to compare diagnostic information from patient to patient and clinic to 
clinic, thus making the diagnostic process explicit and operational. Second, while Le Couteur 
and colleagues (1989) recognise the importance of observational diagnostic tools (such as 
the ADOS) in the assessment of ASD, they point out that they can only access behaviours at 
a static point in time and do not take into account the course of development.  
 
The Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI) was designed to be administered to the child’s 
principal caregiver (see Figure 5.3, below, as an illustration of the interview set up) and 
“aims to provide a lifetime assessment of the range of behaviors relevant to the differential 
diagnosis of pervasive developmental disorders” (Le Couteur et al 1989: 365). Thus, the ADI 
was designed to distinguish between autism and other developmental comorbid disorders 
that present with similar symptoms such as ADHD, anxiety disorder, OCD, Tourette’s 
syndrome and so on. The ADI is a standardised interview and is classed as such for two main 
reasons: first, it specifies the range of behaviours to be covered; and second, there is a 
predetermined coding system for each behavioral item:  
 
Each coding is intended to specify some particular type of abnormality. A coding of 2 or 3 is made 
when that specified abnormality is present (the 2/3 distinction, when that is provided, being 
made on the basis of its severity). A 1 coding is used when it is clear that the subject has 
exhibited behavior of the type specified in the coding, but when it is not severe, frequent, or 
marked enough to warrant a 2 coding. It is not used to reflect vague, dubious, or uncertain 
abnormalities (these are coded 0). The 0 coding mean that the behavior specified in the coding 
was not present. This does not necessarily mean that the behavior was fully normal, but it does 
mean that any departures from normality were not of the kind specified in that particular coding. 
(Le Couteur et al 1989: 369) 
 
The interview consists of 93 questions and takes the following structure: 
 
(1) Opening questions: general orienteering questions, when and how the parents first 
became aware that something might be wrong with the child, and key 
developmental milestones;  
(2) Communication questions; 
(3) Social development and play questions; 
(4) Repetitive and restricted behavior questions; and 
(5) Questions about general behavior problems.  
 
The questions ask for information about when the child was four or five years old, as well as 
current behaviour over the twelve months before the interview. The tool developers specify 
that:  
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Figure 5.3: The typical room set up for the ADI-R interview with the caregiver 
 
 
For each behavioral item, there is an initial compulsory probe and also a coding with instructions 
on the detail required in order for the investigator to decide whether or not the specified 
behavior is present. The interviewer is expected to be fully familiar with the conceptual 
distinctions and differentiations required for each coding, and with the specific aspects of 
behavioral information that are necessary in order to decide on each rating. Guidance is provided 
in the interview schedule in the form of suggested supplementary probes but the onus is on the 
interviewer to ask whatever questions are required in order to clarify precisely which behaviors 
were manifest. The basic interviewing task is to obtain detailed descriptions of actual behavior 
with particular reference to the differentiations required for each coding. The standardization of 
the interview, therefore, lies in the specification of the behavioral criteria used for each rating. 
Interviewers are guided in their questioning not just by the probes provided but, more 
particularly, by knowledge on just what information is required for each rating. (Le Couteur et al 
1989: 367)  
 
There are some key techniques used by the ADI that have been included for the purposes of 
improving retrospective recall. This is clearly a difficulty for any interview requiring someone 
to recall information and examples that occurred up to ten years ago. Le Couteur et al 
(1989) point out that this is because we do not encode memories in terms of dates, or ages, 
but rather, associate them with significant personal events. The first of these techniques is 
called a “trigger” event: the parent is asked about a significant event that occurred between 
the ages of four and five, such as a birthday, moving house, Christmas, or holiday, to help 
them remember this time in the child’s life. Thus, “the objective is to trigger memories of 
what the child was doing at some personally memorable period or occasion, which can be, 
dated according to external temporal landmarks” (Le Couteur 1989: 368-369).  
 
An example of how the clinical trial psychologist achieves the narrative behind this trigger 
event is demonstrated in the following extract from an ADI-R in which she questions Bronte, 
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the mother of Harvey (a 12 year-old boy who has had problems with anxiety and was 
referred to the trial when his paediatrician recently mentioned that he may have ASD): 
 
Psych:  So, what we’re going to do…with this assessment it goes back normally to about the 
fourth and fifth birthday. So, is there anything significant that happened around that 
time to help you remember Harvey back then?  
Bronte:  [laughing] remembering Harvey when he was four…[crosses arms and looks 
thoughtful]  
Psych:  Anything major happen…? 
Bronte:  Nothing major happened…I mean, he didn’t talk ‘til he was…I can go back even 
further [gestures by moving finger in an arc] [laughs] – he didn’t talk until two and 
two months. We remember this very well because we were like, ‘He’s not talking! 
He’s not saying anything!’ and then at two and two months he’s just talk, talk, talk 
[gestures with hand to mimic mouth opening and closing]. And then he got 
absolutely fascinated with numbers – numbers in Coles’ aisles (which made shopping 
interesting). Numbers on clocks – highly fascinated with numbers. And then at 
around four it was electronic games, so he became really fascinated with electronic 
games… 
Psych:  Was there any games that you remember that he was absolutely obsessed with? 
Bronte:  No, but he’s obsessed with Animal Crossing now! [laughs] 
Psych:  [laughing] Oh dear! So then maybe if I say the electronic period, that’s when you can 
remember the behaviours specifically around four and five?  
Bronte:  Yeh! I was pregnant with [sibling] and I remember waiting in the obstetrician’s office 
and he was playing his games [gestures with both hands to indicate playing with 
game console]  
Psych:  All right, so you were pregnant [writing in ADI-R booklet] OK!  
 
By allowing Bronte to talk through her memories of Harvey from the age of two, Bronte is 
able to picture certain key events, or obsessions in this case, that interested Harvey. Bronte 
recalls Harvey’s interests in electronic games, which then prompts her memory of being 
pregnant and being in the obstetrician’s office watching him entertain himself by playing an 
electronic game. The psychologist now has a specific memory that she can use throughout 
the diagnostic interview that conjures up an image in the mind of the mother of this time in 
Harvey’s life.  
 
Interestingly, in one ADI-R with Laura and Tom, parents of trial participant Patrick (an eight 
year-old boy who struggles with social interaction and aggression), Laura acknowledges the 
usefulness of this technique in the way that it helps her to remember back to Patrick at the 
age of four: 
 
Psych:  All right, what about when he was four or five? 
Laura:  [nodding]  
Tom:  [mutters] Can’t remember. 
Laura:  [Turns to Tom] Don’t you just go back to the home? I always go back to – when we’re 
talking about him now – I envisage myself in this house, and when we talk about four 
years ago, I picture myself in the house at [suburb].  
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Psych:  Yeh, that’s why we have to pinpoint that area… 
Laura:  It’s good! It’s a good technique! [laughs] 
Psych:  Yeh [laughing], otherwise you’d be thinking, hmmm, OK…?  
Laura:  There’s too many things that have happened in the last, you know, eight years – so I 
just think about that home and how our life was. 
Psych:  Exactly, because it’s so specific as well, it helps! It’s good! 
 
The second technique is the use of specific occasion questioning style: the interviewer is 
expected to elicit a sequential account of the child’s behaviour – what they actually do – by 
focusing on a specific occasion, and ideally prompting the parent to “recreate a picture in 
their minds of a sequence of behavior that they have observed, rather than report a general 
impression” (368). The following example from one of the clinical trial ADI-R videoed 
sessions with the parents (Jenny and Matthew) of Stephen, a seven year old boy who has 
also been diagnosed with Agenesis Corpus Callosum (ACC), shows how the psychologist 
must use prompts to determine whether Stephen displays joint attention (that is, the ability 
of one individual to alert another to an object by means of eye-gazing, pointing or other 
verbal or non-verbal indications): 
 
Psych:  But it’s quite consistent? He points quite a bit?  
Matthew:  Yeh [shrugs] 
Jenny:  Does he? I’m going to have to have a look now when I go back. I don’t know if he 
does! Think of him pointing specifically to stuff?  
Matthew:  [Hand on chin, thinking] 
Psych:  So, if he sees something in the shop, “Mum, I want the Oreos” [demonstrates with 
arm outstretched and index finger clearly pointing] or whatever. “Hey, let’s go over 
there” [demonstrates with vaguer gesture – arm and hand are floppy, hand is curled 
over], or… 
Jenny:  I don’t think he does 
Matthew:  He’d just walk over. He’d just go there.  
Psych:  [writing in ADI-R booklet] so he does some… 
Jenny:  I’m trying to think now, but… 
Matthew:  I’m sort of second-guessing myself… 
Jenny:  Yeh, it’s a bit like that. 
Matthew:  It’s probably because he doesn’t point that you don’t always get it. So, you end up 
looking around thinking, “well where are you looking?” 
Psych:  But he’ll still do that [demonstrates with index finger extended, with arm close to 
body], he’ll do the [vague gesture with hand], whatever it is?  
Matthew:  He might just say, “Look at the car” and you’ll be like [looks over both shoulders as if 
confused and searching], “Where?” So yeh, he probably doesn’t when I think about it 
because that’s probably part of the problem, where I can’t see it half the time. 
Psych:  Ah, OK. And I’m assuming it was the same when he was younger? 
Jenny & 
Matthew:  Yeh. 
Psych:  [Changes answer in ADI-R booklet by crossing out and writing new response] OK, let’s 
go with that. 
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In the following chapter, I will draw on Gardner and Williams’ (2015) work to explore how 
the psychologist uses another technique, one that is not explicitly discussed or specified in 
the ADI-R, regarding the use of corporeal labour to generate responses and conjure images 
in the parent’s mind.  
 
From these examples we can see that the ADI-R relies on experienced and skilled 
interviewers who have been highly trained both in how to question parents to elicit the 
responses required by the tool and in the practice of making conceptual distinctions 
involved in coding. It is important to note that during one of my reflexive interviews with 
the psychologist, she mentioned that when conducting her first two ADI-Rs, she was 
required to video them for “research reliability.” This involves another psychologist 
watching the videos back and conducting their own coding and scoring of the ADI-R 
separately. The two scored documents are then matched up to ensure “inter-rater 
reliability,” that is, ensuring consistency between the ways that assessors/administrators 
score the tool.  
 
The ADI (1989) was modified and renamed the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) 
in 1994. The revised interview has been reorganised, shortened, and modified to be 
appropriate for children with mental ages from about 18 months into adulthood and linked 
to ICD-I0 and DSM-IV criteria (Lord et al 1994). Video data of the ADI-R sessions with parents 
gathered during this clinical trial will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.  
 
Using diagnostic tools in the clinical trial: Why use the ADI-R and 
WISC-IV?  
This was one of the first questions as a researcher that I pondered as I began filming the 
diagnostic sessions with the trial participants. In a review of other clinical trials involving 
testing medications for children on the autism spectrum, I was interested in whether there 
was a set precedent or an established protocol with regards to what tools to use to 
determine an ASD diagnosis. Eleven studies were reviewed in which children with autism 
participated in a randomised controlled clinical trial testing either a Serotonin Reuptake 
Inhibitor (SRI) (DeLong et al 2002; Hollander et al 2005; King et al 2009; Owley et al 2010; 
Henry et al 2006), such as fluoxetine, or a stimulant (Jahromi et al 2009; Nickels et al 2008; 
Posey et al 2004; Posey et al 2007; Research Units on Pediatric Psychopharmacology Autism 
Network 2005; Stigler et al 2004), such as methylphenidate. While all studies required the 
diagnosis to be consistent with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (4th Edition) (DSM-IV-
TR), the way that these diagnoses were reached was incredibly varied. Some studies 
required the presence of an existing diagnosis of ASD (meaning that some form of 
assessment had been carried out externally to the trial) (For example, Owley 2010, Henry 
2006 and Research Units on Pediatric Psychopharmacology Autism Network 2005); some 
studies required one diagnostic tool or a combination of diagnostic tools (For example, 
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DeLong 2002; Hollander 2005; Jahromi 2009; King 2009; Owley 2010; Posey 2007); others 
provided only a vague account of diagnostic requirements, such as “diagnoses were made 
using the DSM-IV” (Posey 2004; Stigler 2004); while another study required participants 
with “research-identified autism” which was based on the child’s medical records, 
developmental, neurological, psychological and psychiatric assessments, as well as reports 
on school visits (Nickels 2008). The different tools used across these studies varied from the 
ADI-R (n = 4), Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) (n = 3), Childhood Autism 
Rating Scale (CARS) (n = 1), and the Aberrant Behavior Checklist (ABC) (n = 1). Six out of the 
eleven studies reviewed used one or more diagnostic tools. No studies reported using the 
WISC-IV.  
 
What was most surprising about this review of RCTs for ASD drug trials was the complete 
lack of justification in these articles as to why a certain diagnostic approach had been taken, 
thus providing no insight or logic behind this quite fundamental selection criteria. Similarly, 
the clinical trial psychologist (psych) that took part in my study was also blind to the 
justifications behind why certain diagnostic tools had been written into the trial protocol. As 
a clinician with a background in private practice diagnosis and treatment of ASDs, her 
thoughts regarding this issue were particularly illuminating:  
 
Psych:  So, I guess the point of [the WISC-IV] is just for reconfirmation of the diagnosis [from 
the ADI-R] in the trial. But in private practice, for example, we would not rely on this 
at all. At least we use the ADOS and the ADI-R, and observation. 
Me:  And why are you using the intelligence test? Why is that used and not an ADOS or 
something? 
Psych: To be honest, I ask myself the same question, because regardless of the IQ…I mean, 
we use cognitive testing as well for a diagnosis but that’s just to see where they’re at 
in terms of cognitive functioning and where to diagnose them [on the spectrum] – 
because, you know, your Asperger’s have a higher IQ.  
 
And later in the interview, the psychologist goes on to elaborate how diagnosis works in the 
private practice setting:  
 
Psych:  That’s why the best practitioners of a lot of studies are using more than one 
diagnostic tool. I know ASPECT [Autism Spectrum Australia] do. I mean, a school 
observation will tell you so much in two hours, of where that kid is at in terms of 
functioning.  
Me:  Sure, sure. That’s really interesting.  
Psych: It is interesting! I honestly wish they had the ADOS in this trial… 
Me:  Do you know why it isn’t? Was it just a time thing? 
Psych: I think it was a time thing; and I think [the ADI-R] is just easier to score, especially 
because it’s hard to find people who are trained in [the ADOS]. But I would prefer 
ADOS for this [trial] assessment [of ASD], and I asked myself the same question when 
I first started [working on the trial]: “Where’s the ADOS and why do we need the 
cognitive testing?”   
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This ambiguity and messiness of diagnostic practice pervades all elements of autism work: 
whether it is diagnosis in the clinic, recommending treatment practices, prescribing 
medications, or conducting clinical trials, the elusive nature of ASD is inherent to all aspects 
of its study and practice. ASD clinical trials are not immune, despite the seemingly protected 
and legitimised scientific space of the randomised controlled trial (RCT).  
 
The diagnostic tool as a “list”: shaping the gaze through a point of 
reference 
Just like studies using the RCT and clinical trial approach, using standardised assessments 
and checklists in the diagnosis of ASD gives the impression, to the uncritical eye, of validity, 
stability, visibility, and certainty.  The standardised diagnostic tool is an important artifact of 
the clinical trial procedure for this very reason: in theory, it allows other clinicians and 
researchers to trace the line from diagnostic label back to the start of the assessment 
process. This section will consider the work involved in abiding by the rules and directions 
set out by the tools: the wording of the questions; the inscriptions made by the psychologist 
on the tool itself; and the scoring process whereby the psychologist must filter the “mess” 
of their notes into scores placed in boxes. These inscriptions and scores are of course 
informed by prescribed ideas (as dictated by the DSM) of what counts as normal and 
autistic, and are dictated and enforced by the instructions in the tool, as well as the training 
that the psychologists must complete to conduct the assessments. The quantitative notions 
of what the average child is capable of are the underlying basis of cut-off scores in the WISC-
IV and the ADI-R. Likewise, for the ADI-R, scores not only indicate whether the child is 
“normal” or on the autism spectrum, but also delineate an average for autism itself – 
indicating where on the Spectrum the child can be placed based on this number. Thus, it is 
important to consider how these criteria work or act upon the clinician, and how in turn, the 
clinician works or acts upon the criteria (that is, tinkering with the tool). This latter point will 
be explored later in the chapter.  
 
Law and Lynch (1990) point out that criteria or “lists” impact profoundly upon one’s 
perception and how they perceive and observe what is in front of them. They describe this 
as a reflexive relationship: 
 
“Perception” is list-driven in the sense that the current state of the list provides motives for: 
searching the environment; regarding, disregarding and selecting among potential experiences; 
remarking upon or saying nothing about an observed event; and treating an announced sighting 
as a notable, doubtful or unremarkable claim. There is thus a reflexive relation between the 
literary phenomenon of the list and the embodied and interactional performance of observation 
and representation. (Law & Lynch 1990: 270) 
 
This reflexive relationship is further articulated by Latour (1999) and can be extended to the 
process of diagnosing ASD. The diagnosis, via the diagnostic tool, is a construction, a 
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discovery, an invention and a convention. As Latour (1999) would have it, the diagnosis is: 
constructed by the work of the psychologist and by applying the construct of the diagnostic 
tool; invented, because without the work of the trial psychologist, and other psychologists in 
developing the diagnostic tool, as well as the psychiatrists that originally created the label 
“autism”, there would be no diagnosis, no autism; discovered, because the diagnosis has 
been “hidden” or previously “missed” – “it discovers a form that until now has been hidden 
but that we retrospectively feel was already there beneath the visible features” (67); and 
conventional, because without the psychological conventions of coding, standardising and 
labelling behaviour, these children would be considered “quirky” or “mentally impaired” 
and so on (66-7). Thus, the point of this process is to:  
 
establish a reversible route that makes it possible to retrace one’s footsteps as needed. Across 
the variations of matters/forms, scientists forge a pathway. Reduction, compression, marking, 
continuity, reversibility, standardization, compatibility with text and numbers – all these count 
infinitely more than adequatio [the correspondence of the mind and reality] alone. (Latour 
1999: 61) 
 
The way that the psychologist records much of what is said by the parent(s) in the ADI-R in 
written form on the tool itself, and then uses these notes to justify the codes/scores she 
eventually records for each question is an example of how this diagnostic tool attempts to 
align itself with the scientific notions of replication – the ability for another psychologist to 
retrace these steps and to reach the same diagnostic conclusions (Latour’s (1999) 
“reversible route”). This process, using the videoed interviews with the psychologist 
conducting the ADI-R as part of the clinical trial, can best be represented in Figure 5.4, 
below. Through this process, the psychologist first observes and listens, often 
simultaneously transcribing and forming initial opinions based on experience. Then, later, 
while “scoring” the ADI-R, the psychologist shapes and constructs the reported symptoms, 
anecdotes, stories into a numerical value, until a final numerical value is reached or 
“achieved.” This score is compared to population data, whereby the psychologist is able to 
compare these scores with norms based on the “average” or “neurotypical” child and 
determine whether this child falls above or below certain cut-off criteria that deem them to 
be on the Spectrum or not on the Spectrum. Based on these scores, the clinician can then 
develop a report in which this numerical value translates back into a compatible and 
comparable diagnosis with a body of evidence behind it, thus fulfilling the needs of the 
clinical trial. The diagnosis is then translated or articulated into a report for the parent. Thus, 
the process, as outlined in Figure 5.4, is as follows:  
 
• Step A shows the multi-faceted and complex context of the child’s everyday life: 
interacting with family, going to school, playing, watching TV, interacting with peers, 
struggling with challenges within their environment.  
• Step B indicates the diagnostic interview – the ADI-R – with the parent/caregiver 
where the psychologist asks the parent a series of questions about the child’s life, 
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how the child would act in typical situations (for example, in terms of social 
reciprocity, communication, and repetitive behaviours). This step also incorporates 
the psychologist’s inscription of this information in hand-written note form onto the 
tool (see Figure 5.4, below) 
• Step C illustrates the point of reference that is used to make sense of, and ultimately 
“score,” each response given by the parent using the criteria that assigns a numerical 
value of 0, 1 or 2 based on conceptions of what is normal and abnormal behavior. 
The psychologist’s written records of the parent’s answers are converted into 
numbers (see Figures 5.6 and 5.7). As Figure 5.6 shows, however, these scores are 
interpretive and can create confusion, as illustrated by the scribbled out score in one 
of the boxes.  
• Step D details how these numbers are then manipulated to produce a “score” which 
has been fed through a statistical equation. Through this number or “score”, the 
child is placed on a spectrum or bell curve – directly comparing them to thousands of 
other children of their age (see Figures 5.6 and 5.7). 
• Step E indicates the final step in this decontextualisation whereby the “score” and 
bell curve are translated into a report that is provided to the parent/caregiver (see 
Figure 5.8).  
 
Figure 5.5, below, outlines the basic steps involved in the translation of observed behavior, 
to written text, to numerical value, to the use of norm values in the WISC-IV.  While steps C 
to E remain essentially the same between the two tools, it is the first two steps that differ 
most markedly, and produce a very different diagnostic encounter for the subject of the test 
(that is, the child in the WISC-IV and the parent in the ADI-R). Steps A and B in the ADI-R 
involve drawing on information from the parent about the child’s everyday life – what they 
were like as a young child, how they interact with their family and friends, what they know 
about their child’s school-life, their child’s likes and dislikes, how they deal with change, and 
numerous other contextual aspects of the child’s life. Steps A and B in the WISC-IV, 
however, is completely removed from the contextual factors of the child’s everyday life – 
the child is asked highly rigid questions, some of which are directed to be read in a 
“monotonous tone”, to determine their cognitive capacity within a test-like environment.   
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Figure 5.4: The process of decontextualisation in the diagnosis of ASD using the ADI-R 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Administering the WISC in the clinical trial 
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Figure 5.6: Hand-written notes made by the psychologist during the ADI-R (see Step B, above) 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Score sheet with final cumulative scores on the ADI-R (see Step D, above)  
 
 
The “mess” of this contextual information that is provided by the parents in the ADI-R, and 
through observation of the child’s behaviour in the WISC-IV (See Figures 5.6 and 5.8) 
presents particularly strong visual imagery of the disordered way in which this information is 
often conveyed to the psychologist. During the ADI-R, for example, the parent is asked to 
remember back to a period when their child was four to five years old (for some of the 
parents, this meant trying to conjure up memories from up to 12 years ago). As a result, the 
parent often jumps from one memory to another, requiring the psychologist to transcribe 
examples of behaviours and events that can often be disjointed, occurring at different ages, 
and sometimes relating to questions that are asked further on in the manual.  
 
While this mess and scrawl, as a product of fragmented memory recall, is inherent to the 
ADI-R approach, the free observations of the psychologist during the WISC-IV are very much 
on the periphery. These observational notes are certainly not the focus of the test, and are 
usually scribbled hurriedly by the psychologist during the few moments within the 
structured test that she is able to take a moment to watch the child. These moments are 
  168 
 
infrequent given the rigid structure, time-sensitive nature, and normative focus of the test. 
The interactions that take place between child and psychologist are generally drained of 
inter-subjectivity and creativity.  
 
Figure 5.8: Handwritten notes made by the psychologist during the WISC-IV 
 
 
Crucially, in the clinic, this apparent “scribble” and mess is in fact a highly ordered and 
important recording of salient occurrences throughout the diagnostic encounter. While 
these scribbled notes may appear haphazard and disordered, they are in fact a record of the 
visible and important facts they have observed throughout the session, and form a crucial 
part of the knowledge and diagnostic process. These notes are used in reports written to 
schools or other clinicians, and to aid in justifications of treatment approaches 
recommended to families. Whereas, in the clinical trial setting, this complexity and detail is 
invariably lost and rendered superfluous given that the focus of the diagnosis is to produce 
the comparable “score” – deeming the child to be on the Spectrum or not on the Spectrum, 
with the overall focus being eligibility of the child to participate in the clinical trial. Thus, this 
textual knowledge – while important – is ultimately trumped by the norm values or score in 
the hierarchy of knowledge production of the clinical trial.  
 
Emphasising deficits and eliding strengths: The case of abstract 
competence versus concrete competence  
Canguilhem’s (1989) definition of the scientific understanding of the normal and the 
pathological pervades this clinical trial. Not only are the very notes that the psychologist jots 
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down turned into a “score”, but also conversations, body language and behaviors are 
scrutinized through this quantified gaze. Manyard (2005) and Turowetz’s (2015) work is 
helpful here in exploring how the diagnostic tools focuses the quantified gaze to ignore the 
“concrete competence” of the child in favour of “abstract competence”. They demonstrate 
how questions in standardised tools are often targeted towards testing abstract 
competence, and in doing so, misinterpret, misunderstand, or sometimes altogether ignore 
concrete competencies possessed by the child. I will explore the ways in which the WISC-IV 
(administered to the child by the psychologist) fails to recognise many strengths of the child 
being assessed due to the rigid way that the tool is administered and the rules around 
scoring responses.  
 
Manyard’s (2005) work uses conversation analysis to examine the performance of children 
diagnosed with an ASD in a videoed Brigance Diagnostic Inventory of Early Development 
standardised test (this test uses questions like: “what do you do when you’re hungry?”). His 
analysis distinguishes between “commonsense” and “autistic” intelligence, highlighting that 
children with an ASD answer in a way that reverses a “structural preference for gestalt or 
global interpretation of utterances” (abstract competency) and instead favours a “stimulus-
bound, local understanding” (concrete competency) (Manyard 2005: 499).  
 
Similarly, Turowetz’s (2015) work uses a conversational analysis approach to a videoed case-
study assessment of a child with a possible ASD, combining this with group diagnostic 
meetings about the child’s diagnosis with other clinicians and the mother. In this 
examination, the various perspectives are considered whereby different interpretations 
arise about what certain behaviours the child exhibits mean. In a specific task, in which the 
child is being asked to reference a picture of two cups, one empty and one full, the 
psychologist asks: “this is empty, this one is….” The child, in response, tries to “pick up” the 
cup (although of course he cannot, because it is a picture) and pretends to drink from it, and 
then pretends to hand it to the psychologist. The psychologist interprets this behaviour as 
the child confusing image with reality, which has serious implications for determinations 
around how high or low-functioning an autistic child he was considered to be. However, in 
the diagnostic meeting in which the parent was present, the mother reinterprets this 
behaviour based on her knowledge of her child. For her, this is her child demonstrating a 
problem-solving strategy in which he attempts to distinguish between empty and full by 
physically picking up the cup to see which is heavier. The researcher then adds his own 
interpretation of the incident through his viewing and analysis of the video (interestingly, 
this is not discussed in the meeting, and the video of the incident is not replayed at the 
diagnostic meeting): for him, the incident with the cup demonstrates the child attempting to 
initiate play with the psychologist.  
 
This example highlights the highly interpretative nature of diagnosis, and how three 
different perspectives all produced conflicting explanations for a behaviour. The 
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interpretation of this behaviour was key in determining important aspects of the child’s 
diagnosis. These ideas are summarised, below: 
 
A clinician’s emphasis on abstract competence may lead her to assess a child’s performance in 
terms of whether or not he measures up to the standards of the tests he is given. This may cause 
her to miss or ignore the various kinds of concrete competence the child could be displaying, as 
Tony did when he engaged in play with Laura—play that, as we saw, he may have been trying to 
initiate even before the clinician “redirected” him. While this is problematic for any child being 
assessed, it is especially so for autistic children. As Maynard and Turowetz (2014) have shown, 
such children tend to be so oriented to concrete activities, like giving directions or repeating 
phrases, that these may interfere with the child’s ability to demonstrate the abstract competence 
a given instrument is designed to measure. This is not to say that measures of abstract 
competence are (or should be considered) inappropriate or irrelevant to diagnosing autism, but 
that features of their design and implementation can diminish or obscure certain competencies a 
child displays in interaction. Accordingly, it is important to identify and recover forms of concrete 
intelligence a child may exhibit in order to offset and balance assessments of his abstract 
intelligence, as well as to discern whether and how the former may have affected the latter. This, 
in turn, could provide a more nuanced picture of the child’s strengths and limitations. (Turowetz 
2015: 74) 
 
For the children participating in the clinical trial studied for this thesis, demonstrations of 
this preference for abstract versus concrete competence are evident in the videoed WISC-IV 
assessment between the psychologist and child. In the case of Brendan, a fifteen year-old 
boy who loves action movies, video games and rap music, there were several instances of 
this concrete competence. For example, as discussed in Manyard’s (2005) explanation of 
autistic intelligence, concrete competence favours a “stimulus-bound, local understanding,” 
and this localised stimulus-specific knowledge is conveyed in the following exchange:  
 
Psych:  What does absorb mean? 
Brendan:  Absorb? 
Psych:  Yeh, absorb. 
Brendan: Absorb means to take something from someone, a lot like a monster’s case they would 
need…ummm…for example, when human beings need energy to survive that would be 
absorbed, or to take something and to take it, eat it, drink it, etc.  
 
Brendan is scored “0” for this response (that is, according to the WISC-IV manual, he did not 
provide an answer that was correct or partially correct). He has clearly used examples that 
are salient to him in his response, drawing on his interests in television shows, movies and 
video games. The way that the WISC-IV has devalued this response, and ignored potential 
strengths in his answer (the way that he has drawn on examples to process and articulate 
his response) means that his overall performance on this task is significantly undervalued.  
 
Interestingly, the psychologist’s notes on the WISC-IV score sheet also demonstrate the way 
in which her emphasis on abstract competence creates a kind of “tunnel vision” in the way 
that she goes about assessing the child in the diagnostic process. Thus, not only does the 
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test, with its limited questions and rigid scoring criteria, use narrow categorisation 
techniques, but so too does the psychologist through the way that she views the child’s 
behaviours. In her notes on the score sheet she has written that Brendan engages in 
“atypical verbalisations” through the “repetition of words”. However, my notes as a 
researcher observing the session (in person, and via video analysis later) provide further 
context to these “atypical verbalisations”. I note that Brendan’s repetition of words occurs 
during the verbal comprehension task, and to me, seem like an effective technique to help 
Brendan process the word, giving him time to think about its meaning and sound. Brendan’s 
dad, Tim, confirms this in the ADI-R interview, explaining that repetition and immersion is 
Brendan’s way of making sense of things: 
 
Tim:  He’s very immersed in media. He loves songs, he loves rap… 
Psych:  [Laughing] He told us! 
Tim:  All that sort of stuff. Heaps of that, he loves all that. Lots of videos and things like that, 
and he will listen and re-listen to stuff, I think, until he gets it… 
Psych:  OK. 
Tim:  Ahh, actually. He just keeps going until…then one day he’ll say something that he 
could’ve said twenty times ago, but he says it then and indicates his understanding. 
That’s due to the immersion he’s given himself. 
 
Similarly, the observed WISC-IV session with Lorna, a 13 year-old girl who was very talkative 
and made many jokes throughout the diagnostic encounter, is another example of the 
psychologist using this “abstract competence tunnel vision”. In the psychologist’s notes on 
the WISC-IV score sheet, she has written that Lorna displayed “odd facial expressions” and 
“exaggerated expressions” and that there was “lots of talking – no context”. In contrast, the 
notes that I made as the researcher throughout the session focus on the way that Lorna 
builds rapport with the psychologist and researcher. Her “exaggerated gestures” seem to 
reflect her sense of humour: she is very expressive (making comic angry faces as she tells a 
story); at the completion of each block task she makes comic celebrating gestures (hands up 
in the air with clenched fists – as if standing on a podium accepting applause); when a task 
becomes too hard she throws her hands up to her face dramatically and says “I give up!” 
(while smiling). These behaviours all generate laughter from both psychologist and 
researcher. Yet they are interpreted and inscribed by the psychologist as abnormal.  
 
Creativity in responses to some of the WISC-IV questions are also quite insightful in terms of 
understanding the ways that concrete competence emerges in the diagnostic encounter. 
The following exchange between Lorna and the psychologist during the verbal 
comprehension vocabulary task further highlights Lorna’s quick wit, yet also the inability of 
the psychologist to comprehend the significance of her response and the creative way in 
which she has answered the question: 
 
Psych:  What does mimic mean? 
Lorna:  What does mimic mean [looks directly at psych, smiling] 
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Psych:  [Distracted, checking manual] Yes, what does mimic mean? 
Lorna:  [Looking disappointed] To copy someone.  
 
Likewise for Michael, a 13-year-old boy who was alert and eager to do well throughout the 
task, asked the psychologist, in response to a question about what should you do if you find 
a wallet in a supermarket: “Can there be a right or a wrong answer? Because there’s a 
difference between what you should do and what you might want to do?” While the 
psychologist has given Michael the maximum 2 points for this question, for his answer she 
has only written down his response after this clarification, “give it to the shopkeeper or 
manager”. The WISC-IV manual does not contain criteria for scoring an answer that 
demonstrates capabilities outside of the rigid objective of the question. Each question’s 
purpose is clearly demarcated and scores must correspond to the parameters set out in the 
manual.  
 
David, a 7 year-old boy who was previously diagnosed with ASD, dyspraxia and language 
delays, similarly demonstrates some creative interpretations to questions. The examples 
discussed below, both within the context of the ADI-R interview with David’s mother, 
Abigail, highlight the complexities of the English language at times for children on the 
Spectrum, and the humorous ways that language can be interpreted. The first excerpt from 
the ADI-R interview involves the psychologist questioning Abigail about how David responds 
to “simple” instructions or requests; the second excerpt involves David’s comprehension of 
instructions and his literal interpretations:  
 
Psych:  So, is there an example? For example, what about if you said, “David, go get my purse 
from my bedroom”? 
Abigail:  Oh no, do you want to laugh! [Claps hands in exclamation] OK! I go, “David, can you get 
me the straw broom [laughing, bent over] I need to sweep the floor”. OK, he went and 
got me a straw [plastic drinking straw], cos he only heard straw [gestures with both 
palms straight and flat, facing each other – as if indicating a segment] [laughing] 
Psych:  [laughing, head back] 
Abigail:  …and [pauses while laughing] he came to blow [demonstrates as if blowing through 
straw] [laughing] with the straw [rocking back and forth with laughter] 
Psych: [laughing loudly] 
Abigail:  Yeh, so that was like…I thought, “Oh, I should have said…” instead of using “straw 
broom” – because I’ve never used those two words together – I always say, “Go get the 
broom”. But I don’t know what made me, because I try to…like, I use simple sentences, 
but I just said, “Go get the straw broom” [laughing]. 
Psych:  That is so funny! It was like that when we did the assessment and I said, “Oh, we’re 
going to say [the numbers] backwards now,” so he turned around [draws circle with 
finger in air] and sat backwards [laughing] 
Abigail:  [laughing] But, like, he takes literal [gestures with both palms straight and flat, facing 
each other – as if indicating a segment]…so I was in stitches. I can’t laugh at him, but it 
was so hilarious. I’m like, “Oh no!” [laughing] 
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Psych:  OK, so we’re going to go back and look a little bit more at his language. So, how much 
language do you think David understands, now, if you don’t gesture at all? 
Abigail:  If I talk to him, and even if he’s not looking at me, he understands everything – if he 
wants to listen… 
Psych:  Yeh, that’s fine… 
Abigail:  …if he’s engaged, umm [pause] Like yesterday I said, “David, there’s money in your front 
pocket of your school bag”. And he wasn’t showing me that he [was listening] and I 
looked at him and I go, “Look at me! Where’s your money?” and he goes, “In the front 
pocket of my school bag”. So he knew exactly, but he looked like he was completely 
zoned out. So yeh, I think he understands everything, umm, he does take things literal. 
Like, when I say, “Hold your horses mate”, he goes, “I got no horses!” [mimics a 
perplexed look] [laughs] 
Psych:  [laughing, a lot] 
Abigail:  So, his comprehension is another thing: he understands everything, but he doesn’t 
understand slang, he doesn’t understand sarcasm… 
Psych:  Yeh. 
Abigail:  Umm, he understands what you’re saying, and he’s also got to be in the right frame of 
mind to. 
 
I would argue that these four creative examples of Brendan, Lorna, Michael and David’s 
responses reflect concrete competencies. If reconfigured in this way during the diagnostic 
encounter, one could also argue that these responses align with Canguilhem’s (1989) 
qualitative notions of norm and normativity and the ability of living subjects to adapt to 
change. By exercising flexibility and applying a dynamic approach in these situations, more 
strengths and skills would be acknowledged and recognised in these children within the 
WISC-IV tool. The responses in the examples above demonstrate a remarkable aptitude in 
these children to use creative ways to adapt to their environments. In Brendan’s case, using 
his specialised interests in television, movies and video games to provide a definition for a 
word; in Lorna’s case, using humour to engage with the psychologist within the context of a 
(fairly boring) assessment; in Michael’s case, understanding the nuances of human 
behaviour when it comes to desires versus social expectations; and in David’s case, 
interpreting instructions in a literal, but novel way by: (1) getting the straw to blow the dust 
on the floor into a pile to be collected up, instead of sweeping; (2) turning his chair around 
backwards instead of listing the numbers backwards; and (3) being puzzled by his mother’s 
request to “hold your horses” and responding indignantly, “I got no horses!”  
 
Sometimes basic competencies and skills are altogether overlooked. During the verbal 
comprehension vocabulary task, 9 year-old Daniel and the psychologist engage in some 
confused exchanges, which ultimately lead to Daniel completing this section of the test 
before he should have. This is based on a rule in the test that stipulates that if the child 
provides five incorrect answers in a row (indicated by scoring the child 0 on the score sheet) 
then the task will end at that point (see Figure 5.9, below). This means that his score for that 
component of the test is recorded as significantly less than his actual capabilities.   
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Figure 5.9: WISC-IV score sheet for the Verbal Comprehension Vocabulary task 
 
 
It is important to mention that for this WISC-IV session with Daniel, the psychologist was 
recovering from a cold and visibly and audibly displays symptoms of congestion (blowing 
nose, coughing and affected speech). In the following two examples, we can see that Daniel 
is initially confused by the word he is asked to define (probably due to the psychologist’s 
problems with articulation given her congestion), and once he has understood what was 
asked of him and is trying to process an answer, he is cut off and unable to pursue a certain 
line of thinking that may have produced a “correct” answer. In the second example, we can 
see a very clear example of how sometimes a complete breakdown in communication can 
occur, with neither party aware that it has happened:  
 
Psych:  What does “ancient” [sounds like “agent” due to psych’s blocked nose] mean? [turns 
head away to cough]. An-cient [pronounced “agent”]. [looks at Daniel] 
Daniel:  Agent…? [trails off looking puzzled, furrows brow]. Agent. [Looks at psych, as if to 
clarify] 
Psych:  What is it? 
Daniel:  Did you mean a-gent, or an-cient?  
Psych:  An-cient 
Daniel:  Oh! Like the Ancient Pyramids! [smiles in recognition]. A pyramid is like a square-based 
pyramid… 
Psych:  [Cutting Daniel off, writing in book, not looking up] So, what does the word ancient 
mean?  
Daniel:  Spooky? 
Psych:  Spooky. Anything else? [Writing in book, not looking up] 
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Daniel:  [Puts head down] That’s it.  
 
Psych:  What about obey? [pronounced “a-bay” due to the psych’s blocked nose] What does 
obey [pronounced “a-bay”] mean?  
Daniel:  Like, a bay is a place where, umm…island… [looks up, thinking] 
Psych:  Yeh, anything else?  
Daniel:  [shakes head] 
 
Daniel is cut off by the psychologist when he begins to explain what a pyramid is, and re-
directed to the word ancient. His next response is to link the word “ancient” with “spooky”. 
Daniel is never given an opportunity to fully explain his knowledge about pyramids, nor 
justify why he thought pyramids were “spooky”. The WISC-IV does not allow the 
psychologist to delve deeper, to prompt, to follow-up, to clarify. This example highlights the 
complete disregard the WISC-IV has for the process of thought, creativity and 
intersubjectivity. In the second example, the complete lack of follow-up, or even clear 
repetition or clarification of the question means that Daniel is scored “0” on the score sheet. 
As I watched this situation unfold during the session with Daniel, I could clearly see the 
miscommunication that had occurred, and yet I was not able to intervene and disrupt the 
session to explain to the psychologist what had happened.  These situations were common 
throughout the WISC-IV and I found them ethically challenging: while I wanted to observe 
the way that these tools are administered in the clinic in a natural, everyday basis, I felt 
conflicted by the knowledge that I could have helped the child perform better on the test.  
 
The focus of the WISC-IV is to get through the questions before the child becomes too 
fatigued; therefore, the psychologist often shuts down any perceived divergences from the 
question and attempts to constantly refocus the child on the task at hand. However, when 
we consider that the psychologist is not only working with children, but also those with an 
ASD, the normative and rigid focus of the WISC-IV is amplified further. In the reflexive 
interviews with the psychologist, we discussed the problems associated with applying the 
WISC-IV to this group of children in the clinical trial. One of the key problems the 
psychologist identified was the wordiness and length of the instructions she must read out 
to the children: 
 
Psych:  Well, the instructions are really long, and look…remember we’re…remember the tool 
is comparing typically developing kids of all ages – so a six year old, or what you’d 
expect a six year old to do. So, it’d expect [the clinician] to say, “Ah, you know, pick 
one from here that goes with one from here” – and you’re just pointing – so they 
should be able to pick that up straight away. With the kids with autism, you need 
limited language, you need to get their attention, you need to prompt them visually in 
terms of what to do and you might need to give the example again because they’re not 
understanding. So, I think that would be the difference in terms of the two. 
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The psychologist identifies four key ways that the tool fails to accommodate for children 
with an ASD, and techniques that she would use to help the child understand when reading 
out the WISC-IC instructions: (1) the language in the instructions needs to she shortened 
and limited; (2) gaining the child’s attention (for example, using rewards such as, “let’s do X 
first, then we can play with Y [showing a toy/game that the child enjoys]; (3) using visual 
prompts to make the question clearer; and (4) repetition of the question or the example 
question at the start of each task to ensure the child understands what is expected of them.  
 
The clearest examples of the way that concrete competency is altogether ignored in the 
WISC-IV is through the Perceptual Reasoning task involving “picture concepts”. In this task, 
the child is shown rows of pictures where they must pick which pictures are associated with 
one another. The children are required to point to the pictures that they think “go together” 
but they are explicitly told that they are not required to explain why they go together (and 
of course, the scoring for this test is either right or wrong – if the child selects the 
predetermined associated pictures as set out in the manual, they achieve points). Thus, in 
the following examples, we can see how Paul (a seven year-old boy who told stories about 
his family throughout the diagnostic interview and talked about his favourite books by Roald 
Dahl) and Nikolas (a nine-year-old boy who was highly focused throughout his test and very 
compliant) use creativity, story-telling and contextual, stimulus-specific examples to explain 
their selected pictures (even though they are told by the psychologists that they do not 
need to): 
 
Paul:  [points to the picture of the leaf and the skateboard [see Figure 5.10, below] 
(“correct” answer is glove (1) and shoe (5))] 
Paul:  because when you ride a skateboard there’s all these leaves on the ground [smiles] 
Psych:  [laughing] is that what happens to you, is it? 
Paul:  [Nodding and smiling] and sometimes there’s lots of leaves and they get…and my 
skateboard gets stuck in them. 
Psych:  Oh no! 
Paul:  And sometimes I ride my […?] and it gets stuck on…my ground is like [shows psych by 
drawing with finger on table], and it gets stuck in those and I go flying off! [smiles] 
Psych:  [laughs] Oh no! You have to be careful!  
 
Figure 5.10: Image from Perceptual Reasoning (Picture Concepts) Task (Paul) 
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Nikolas:  [Nikolas selects the windmill, the key and ladder (see Figure 5.11). “Correct” answer 
is windmill (3), merry-go-round (5) and world globe (12)] 
Nikolas:  The windmill, the ladder and the key go together because you use them all for 
something I don’t know [laughs], but you would definitely use the key to get into the 
windmill and I think you’d use the ladder to get up to higher places in the windmill.  
 
Figure 5.11: Image from Perceptual Reasoning (Picture Concepts) Task (Nikolas) 
 
 
Through these examples we can see the importance of context-specific information and 
creativity in forming responses. For Paul, the skateboard and the leaf trigger happy and 
exciting memories of him playing on his skateboard. He uses the pictures to tell the 
psychologist a story about something he enjoys doing, demonstrating other skills (such as 
language, sense of humour, affect and so on) that are not recognised by the WISC-IV. In 
Nikolas’ response we can recognise his ability to construct a kind of narratival logic within 
the pictures that is salient to him. Yet, this response is simply marked incorrect and the 
concrete competence displayed here – creativity, narrative construction, logic – is omitted.  
 
When I discussed the Perceptual Reasoning (picture concepts) task with the psychologist in 
the reflexive interview, I played her some of the videos discussed above. It was interesting 
to understand how she grappled with and reconciled the competing notions of 
acknowledging the value of each child’s concrete competency (their creativity and ability to 
piece together information in a novel and unique way), yet also her deference to the 
standardised, clinical privileging of abstract competencies.  The quotes below highlight the 
way that the psychologist contends with these conflicting views, and the way that she 
“thinks out loud” as she processes these new ideas, and ultimately why she defaults to the 
normative and clinical approach: 
 
Psych:  Yeh, no, it’s interesting you say that, because I had a kid the other day, umm – literally 
the other day – who every single one he was giving me his logic as to why [the 
pictures] went [together]. And yeh, you can see the pattern that they’re thinking in 
their head in terms of why it associates with that [picture] – I mean, that’s their 
thinking – but again, remember we are comparing…[autistic] kids to all levels, so 
they’re just trying to find out the average with that. Which is a shame! But, like I said, 
this isn’t a diagnostic tool, so you wouldn’t use that, but for observations, you’d put 
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that as part of [the report] – I mean, it depends on the purpose of the report. For this 
[clinical trial], we only needed IQ, but if we’re doing an autism assessment, but we’re 
also unsure of the cognitive stuff, you’d write all this information down.  
 
Psych:  But remember, as well, because it’s a testing tool, they always go by numbers…in 
terms of scoring and because then if we use the descriptors…it’s like when you’re 
coding your own stuff, right? You have to come up with a code and you don’t know 
how subjective or standardised it is. But yeh, you’re right – I agree….And remember 
the question though is, at the end of the day, [Paul] has to find the most common 
[association between the pictures]…even though that’s his experience, he’s not 
generalising to what it should actually be13 …you know what I mean? 
 
While the psychologist acknowledges the value in the experience-based knowledge and 
thought processes the child goes through to produce a creative and unique response, her 
training in the rigorous, standardised and normative world of psychological testing, RCTs 
and EBM trumps all else. In the clinical trial they must “always go by numbers”, “try to find 
out the average”, and “compare” with the average. The clinical trial necessitates culling any 
information that cannot be reduced down to a number – “we only needed IQ” – and 
reduces information down to a binary of “right” and “wrong” – “he’s not generalising to 
what it should actually be”. This final statement (the last bolded sentence in the quote 
above) highlights the language that is commonly used by the psychologist when discussing 
the tools and their function. There is an assumption being made here that what is “average” 
is correct and fixed, that these tools provide the parameters of what counts as “the way that 
we should think.” Here, the psychologist clearly defers to Canguilhem’s definition of the 
scientific understanding of the normal and the pathological.  
 
In the next example, I would like to demonstrate what can be achieved if the codified, rigid, 
statistical-norm based approach of the WISC-IV is relaxed and a more qualitative, 
experiential-based style is embraced with the child. This in turn allows for these concrete 
competencies to be demonstrated by the child. This approach would align with 
Canguilhem’s use of the concepts of norm and normativity to designate the ability of living 
subjects to adapt to change.  
 
Daniel, a 9-year-old boy whom the psychologist has previously worked with, was very quiet 
for the first forty minutes of his WISC-IV assessment. He spoke minimally, and only when 
required to – not wholly unsurprising given he has already been diagnosed with an ASD, but 
noteworthy given his already built-up rapport with the psychologist. In my notes I have 
recorded that he was “very shy” and “quiet”. However, when the psychologist begins asking 
Daniel questions as part of the “Verbal Comprehension Index – Vocabulary” task, in which 
the child must provide a definition of a word, Daniel begins to open up as the psychologist 
engages him in conversation about his little brother Charles (whom the psychologist also 
                                                           
13 When the psychologist says “he’s not generalising to what it should actually be,” she is referring to Paul’s 
interpretation of how the pictures in the Perceptual Reasoning (picture concepts) task are associated. 
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knows). This conversation is generated through one of the questions – “What is a pest?” – 
during which Daniel relates a story to the psychologist, which helps him to ultimately 
answer the question. The quote below, extracted from this conversation, demonstrates the 
naturalised, contextual and experiential way in which the child generates this answer, 
outside of the confines and rigid structure of the parameters and rules set out by this tool:  
 
Psych:  All righty, you ready for the next one? What is a pest?  
Daniel:  Oh, what do you mean, “a pest”?  
Psych:  Yeh, what’s a pest? [Looking down at the WISC booklet and writing in the score 
sheet] 
Daniel:  What’s a pest anyway? [Smiling, confused] 
Psych:  [Trying to hide a smile] You tell me! 
Daniel:  I think it’s my brother! My brother’s a pest! [Smiles] 
Psych:  [Laughing]  
Daniel:  He just annoys me – I get cranky! He just teases me and he gets up on the couch and 
then goes around trying to smack me, and then he laughs [Smiling] 
Psych:  [Smiling and writing in WISC-IV score sheet] Oh no! 
Daniel:  Once, I was trying…running upstairs to watch a movie and I had chocolate in my 
hand [demonstrates as if holding chocolate in outstretched hand]… 
Psych:  Yeh… 
Daniel:  …and I was running up, falled on the stairs…I had this thing [pulls up sleeve on shirt 
to his elbow], on here [shows Psych spot on arm just near elbow – looks at her as he 
is telling her] – I had a cut… 
Psych:  Oh noooo! [Sympathy in tone] 
Daniel:  …and then when Charles’ iPad – he just dropped that, like about two times, there’s 
the sharp bit [show’s psych his fingers, which are fanned out, pointing at a spot 
between his fingers] and he put his finger…I saw it was bleeding there [rubs spot on 
finger while looking at psych] 
Psych:  So, the iPad broke as well and [Charles’] finger was bleeding? 
Daniel:  [Gestures by rubbing at spot between fingers again] Over here. And then he was OK 
[shrugs].  
Psych:  Ohh, ouch! So you had to get a new iPad did you?  
Daniel:  Nah! I just sticked it with sticky tape [gestures as if placing pieces of tape on the iPad 
with his fingers] […] 
Psych:  So, based on that, what do you think a pest is?  
Daniel:  A pest is something that bothers you.  
Psych:  They bother you, don’t they! [Upbeat and encouraging tone] 
 
Not only is Daniel able to generate a “correct” response to this question at the end of this 
conversation (after initially struggling to comprehend the question), but he also 
demonstrates some key skills that are highly relevant to an ASD diagnosis. For example, 
Daniel is able to use gestures effectively to help him convey meaning (this is perhaps 
something he has learned to do to help others to understand him given his language delay), 
he demonstrates the core skill of joint attention (often lacking in children diagnosed with an 
ASD) whereby he shows the psychologist where he fell on his elbow and makes sure she is 
engaged by looking up into her eyes, and he shares in a joke with the psychologist about his 
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younger brother who “annoys” him. Daniel can only demonstrate these skills as a result of 
the psychologist’s deviation from the rigid structure of the WISC-IV, whereby she engages in 
a conversation with Daniel about how his brother is a pest, and what this means for him. It 
is here that we can see that the fixed, statistical norm-based quantitative conception of the 
normal and pathological, as critiqued by Canguilhem (1989) – discussed earlier in this 
chapter – forms the theoretical underpinnings of the WISC-IV. Yet, it is this (rare) moment in 
which the psychologist (unknowingly) embraces Canguilhem’s (1989) alternative qualitative 
conception of the normal and the pathological, allowing the child to demonstrate his 
“health” and “normal functioning” through relaxing the rigid rules around administration of 
the standardised WISC test and allowing him to express himself through stories and 
experience.  
 
“You’re not supposed to, but…”: Making allowances, tweaking words, 
altering tone and honing-in on questions  
In this chapter, I have focused on the strict structure of the WISC-IV and the rigid 
parameters around its administration. I have drawn on examples to demonstrate how this 
has a profound impact on a child with autism and their ability to achieve within the confines 
of this test. A key focus of the reflexive interviews with the psychologist was this rigidity of 
the WISC-IV; and how this impacts the psychologist’s ability to perform her job, whether the 
child’s full potential is captured by this test, and whether the test is useful in determining 
whether the child is on the autism spectrum. A key theme that emerged from these 
discussions was the creative ways that the psychologist manipulated or subtly adjusted the 
tool so that she could achieve the result she needed. There were two key motivators behind 
this approach: (1) to provide opportunities for the child to succeed – “we have to get the 
best out of [them]”; and (2) to draw out ASD symptoms, thus making autism visible, within a 
test that is not an ASD diagnostic tool.  
 
The first subtle adjustment is the way the psychologist makes allowances throughout the 
assessment by tweaking words and phrases, and slightly varying her tone as she reads out 
questions and responds to their answers. In the exchange below, the psychologist explains 
to me the necessity of using positive words and an elevated tone after the child gives a 
response to each question, regardless of whether they are marked right or wrong:  
 
Psych:  So, you’re not supposed to give positive praise – just so you know!  
Me:  Yeh? It’s interesting… 
Psych:   But, I have a tendency to give it because I feel like with these kids, I know them… 
Me:  Yeh! 
Psych:  …and they struggle when they think they are [giving] the wrong answers. So, you’re 
supposed to…I would say, “Good, good, good, good, good” [elevated tone] – even 
when it’s wrong!  
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Me:  Yep, yep, exactly! And that’s how you’ve been trained, you know, through your work at 
[the private practice early intervention clinic] as well?  
Psych:  Yep! Yep! Exactly! I had a very very low-functioning boy at the hospital – he didn’t 
understand half the stuff – so it was literally, every single question: [puts on excited 
voice] “‘Yay, good job,’ next [question], ‘Yay, good job,’ next [question]” – even though 
he was getting them wrong [laughs, good naturedly].  
Me:  Yeh, yeh. That’s really interesting!  
Psych:  Because you have to!  
Me:  So, you’re sort of feeling like, if you don’t give them that reinforcement, you’ll “lose 
them” [lose their attention] completely, is that right?  
Psych:  Yeh, yeh, exactly! Exactly! You’ve got it!  
Me:  …that they need some sort of… 
Psych:  …they need some sort of motivation!  
 
The psychologist talks about the necessity of this adjustment in tone – “because you have 
to” – drawing on her many years of experience working as a therapist with children with an 
ASD – “I feel like with these kids, I know them…”. Without this praise and variation in tone, 
the psychologist talks about losing the child’s attention and the child struggling to complete 
the task. By adding some words of encouragement after the child’s response, the 
psychologist is making a small adjustment to encourage the child to continue to attend to 
the questions and participate in the test.  
 
Another allowance the psychologist makes is the simplification of the instructions read out 
to the child. In the example below, the psychologist reflects on a video clip of 15 year-old 
Brendan losing focus, and then regaining his interest when the psychologist provides an 
example of how to complete the task at the end of a long, read-out explanation. She 
discusses how she must read out the standardised words first, but after this, she simplifies 
the instructions by editing them down to the key terms and relaying these in a clear, 
emphatic tone:  
 
Psych:  You know what, they’re not listening to your verbal instruction because it’s too much 
language for them. And, I mean, that’s the tool! There’s too much language, but if you 
just give them an example, they draw on what they’re supposed to do based on the 
example – like the pattern, they’re looking for a pattern. So the minute I said the 
example, he came up [demonstrates regaining of attention with clear eye-contact] […] 
Me:   Yeh, it’s hard because I can see you sometimes…like, you’re changing your tone, you’re 
trying to say the… 
Psych:  …key words! 
Me:  …the key words and everything, yeh – you can see the kids are just like errrgh 
[demonstrates loss of attention by looking away, turning head] 
Psych:  Because I would have just said [for the WISC task instructions], “Say numbers then 
letters. Numbers in order, letters in alphabetical order” [says this in an emphatic way, 
clear way]. So I’d say that first.  
Me:  So, you are still able to break it down in your own way, before or after you’ve said the 
“standardised”… 
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Psych:  Yeh, I do! Whether you are supposed to or not, that’s another whole debate. But, like I 
said, you’re looking at the reason why you’re using it in the first place… 
 
The psychologist acknowledges that this might not be common practice to summarise the 
instructions into key words and relay this edited version to the child, but she points out that 
this is an essential practice to maintaining the child’s interest and focus to obtain a snapshot 
of cognitive functioning for the clinical trial – “you’re looking at the reason why you’re using 
[the WISC] in the first place.” The psychologist has used her experiential knowledge and 
“feel” for autism to subtly alter the test, yet simultaneously remain within its parameters by 
continuing to read the standardised instructions and maintain the overall structure and 
integrity of the test. She goes on to clarify: 
 
Psych:  The experience and the training…and, I mean, I’m not “experienced” [changes tone to 
indicate self-deprecation] you know, in terms of age, but in terms of seeing these 
[autistic] kids everyday, you know, you do learn how to adapt for them. And, because, 
like I said, this is an IQ test: to get the best out of them, you need to try to cater for 
their own inflexibilities and then you write in the report whether it’s a true reflection 
or not, we don’t know, but we’ve got what we can out of it  […]. The report’s really 
important.  
 
The last part of this quote, however, demonstrates again how the psychologist will always 
defer to the scientific method of clarity and making ones work transparent and replicable. 
She uses the psychological report – a diagnostic summary that is written by the psychologist 
after the test results have been analysed – as a way to justify and validate these small 
deviations from the standardised WISC-IV manual. Thus, the appearance of a subtle 
rebellion against the rigidity of the tool by way of making the WISC a little less alienating 
and confusing for the child is justified, minimised, and explained away by their 
documentation in the diagnostic report. The psychologist qualifies these amendments with 
frequent references to the diagnostic report throughout the reflexive interview:    
 
Psych:  So, with the cognitive assessments, they’re not tailored for kids that have got 
difficulties. So, when you have a kid with these difficulties, you need to adjust. So, 
there’s no set protocol. You have to follow the standardised method, but with kids like 
this, they’re not going to follow-through at all if you [use] that standardised method. 
So, in the [diagnostic] report, we mention that we had to use x, y and z, or adjust for x, 
y, z. But, as long as the instructions are the same, umm, I mean…because you’re trying 
to get the most out of the child as well, right! So you’re looking for a baseline. So, as 
long as it’s clear in the report, so that people know... 
 
Psych:  Yeh! But remember as well, we have to be careful – that’s why you write in the report 
what you do. Because it’s not really then a reflection of say, “low-average” – it might 
be an over-estimate because you inflated [the child’s score], because you helped them 
a little bit… 
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The second key creative technique the psychologist uses while administering the WISC-IV is 
to identify and pinpoint certain questions that draw out ASD symptoms, thus making autism 
visible and explicit within the clinical encounter. It is important to remember that the WISC-
IV is not an autism-specific tool, so the questions are not designed to help the clinician 
diagnose this disorder. In the following two examples, the psychologist discusses two 
different occasions in which symptoms of autism became clear to her in the child’s 
responses to the test questions. The first example is drawn from the reflexive interview with 
the psychologist after playing back a video clip of 15 year-old Brendan providing a definition 
of the word absorb, in which he references superheroes to explain its meaning:     
 
Me:  So, the main [example] I wanted to talk about was “absorb,” which was at the 
beginning… 
Psych:  Yeh! The superpowers! That was how he associated it. (…) That’s part of autism! That’s 
part of the actual diagnosis where [the child] takes something out of context to explain 
the world or whatever it is… 
Me:  And so, that’s a key marker for you of: “this is autism?” 
Psych:  Yes.  
Me:  So, a kid that isn’t on the Spectrum will maybe just draw from their own personal 
experience, versus using a movie or…? 
Psych:  So, even if [a child not classified on the Spectrum] used a movie, for example, they’d 
use it differently, because they might say, “Oh, in the movie the character does blah 
blah blah blah,” or, “Skeletons are real because it was in the movie blah blah blah 
blah.” These kids are actually using the rules or the context to add to their meaning. 
So, like, for Brendan, it was, well, he thinks about the movies and the superpowers, or 
whatever it is, and he applies it – he fits it in – whereas the other kids, they don’t fit it 
in, it comes as an example, these [autistic] kids fit it in. Maybe that’s a good way to put 
it? 
 
By asking Brendan a seemingly simple verbal comprehension question, the psychologist is 
able to extrapolate from his response a key indicator of ASD. While watching the video clip 
in the reflexive interview, the psychologist immediately reacted to Brendan’s response 
when he began talking about superpowers. Her response above draws upon her experiential 
knowledge of how a child with autism talks about movies – “for Brendan…he thinks about 
the movies and the superpowers, or whatever it is, and he applies it – he fits it in.” For a 
clinician that knows what to look for, and draws on their experience administering a tool 
with a certain population, a seemingly straightforward IQ test can in fact reveal symptoms 
of a disorder such as ASD.  
 
The second example is also drawn from a video clip of 15 year-old Brendan providing an 
answer to a question about a social scenario: “why should you say sorry?” I asked the 
psychologist what her impressions were about his response to this question, which was 
“That’s what you’re supposed to do”:  
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Psych:  Yeh, that’s an autism one. So, normally we do – you’re not supposed to, but – 
sometimes when I go look at the…I’ll go to the emotional questions [in the WISC] just 
to see how they respond, because that’s part of the autism and usually you’ll find that 
they don’t know what to say. [Their response] is just very rule-focused.  
Me:  So, yeh, what was it about that made you go, “Oh, that’s autism!” 
Psych:  Because he said, “That’s what you’re supposed to do” and he couldn’t understand the 
reasoning behind it – why! He could only understand the context, what you should do. 
Me:  Yes. And in terms of that response being scored in the WISC, is that… 
Psych:  He wouldn’t get it! 
Me:  So that question is specifically looking at, you know, that theory of mind-type response 
– being able to put yourself in someone else’s shoes?  
Psych:  Umm…I’m pretty sure he might have got one [point] because he [mentioned] the 
context, but I think the [complete] answer is “because it makes them feel better.”  
Me:  So, he’s just giving rule-based kind of responses… 
Psych:  A learned response. 
Me:  …this is what you’re supposed to do, but because he can’t sort of say, “Because, if that 
was me, and someone did that to me, I would feel much better if someone said sorry” 
etcetera, etcetera.  
Psych:  Yeh, he doesn’t get that.  
Me:  Yeh, and so that’s a common theme in all [children with ASD]? That they’re giving you 
a rule-based response and that’s a key kind of [indicator] [clicks fingers to emphasise]  
Psych:  Autism! Yeh! And you can use that in your observations. 
 
The psychologist concedes at the beginning of this quote that “you’re not supposed to, but 
– sometimes…I’ll go to the emotional questions [in the WISC] just to see how they respond.” 
This admission highlights the way in which the psychologist manipulates the questions in the 
WISC-IV to serve her own (or the clinical trial’s) purposes – that is, to determine if the child 
has an ASD. Again, we can see here how the psychologist uses her experiential knowledge to 
draw inferences about the child outside of the parameters and intended purpose of the 
WISC-IV. She interprets Brendan’s response as a “learned response,” emphasising that “he 
couldn’t understand the reasoning behind it – why! He could only understand the context, 
what you should do.”  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the labour involved in reaching an ASD diagnosis through the 
rigid way the trial requires diagnosis to fit within the narrow parameters of what counts as 
“evidence”. The WISC-IV sessions are focused on what counts as normal and pathological, 
and they are constrained – drained of intersubjectivity and creativity. These sessions 
embody Canguilhem’s critique of the quantitative distinction between the normal and the 
pathological that drives science as a positivist, objective enterprise. Unsurprisingly, and as 
Canguilhem points out, this quantitative distinction does not hold up in practice, because it 
cannot account for the lived experience of health. This chapter has drawn on numerous 
examples to demonstrate the possibilities of acknowledging and recognising concrete 
competencies in a more qualitative approach to the assessment of children with ASD.  In the 
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following chapter I will discuss the use of the Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI-R) with 
parents as an ASD diagnostic tool in the clinical trial, and examine how this tool, while still 
standardised, provides more scope for clinical creativity and interpretation.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Performing, translating and feeling autism through 
clinical labour: Invoking images, triggering memories 
and creating evidence 
 
Introduction 
I have demonstrated that the prescribed norms and standardised nature of the diagnostic 
tools used in the clinical trial studied for this thesis have a rigid and limiting impact on the 
diagnostic process. This is evidenced by their deference to quantitative or statistical 
conceptions of what is normal and abnormal, the way that they elide complexity and 
messiness through the process of reducing experiences, stories and examples to numerical 
scores, and the way in which the tool privileges abstract competence at the expense of 
concrete competence (or autistic intelligence). This chapter, however, will focus on how the 
complex and visually rich data that is gathered during the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (ADI-R) allows the diagnostic encounter to be conducted as a more negotiated and 
information-seeking enterprise between the psychologist and parent(s). Key to this 
approach are the techniques used by the psychologist within the ADI-R interview to (1) 
trigger memories through invoking images and specific events in the minds of the parents, 
and (2) use one’s body to act out what I am calling “corporeal labour” in the diagnostic 
encounter. This chapter will also explore how the parents use their own form of corporeal 
labour to translate their knowledge about their child, which is often the only way that they 
can convey this knowledge due to their lack of a clinical vocabulary that would enable them 
to communicate verbally the complexity of some of their child’s behaviours and mannerisms 
(such as repetitive and stereotyped behaviours, “stimming,” complicated movements of the 
body and so on).  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the ADI-R is classed as a standardised interview 
because: it specifies the range of behaviours to be covered and there is a predetermined 
coding system for each behavioural item. However, the ADI-R includes two key techniques 
for improving retrospective recall that offer the potential for a more creative, visual and 
embodied approach to the diagnostic encounter: (1) Using a trigger event to create a 
specific memory that conjures up an image in the mind of the parent – for example, the 
parent is asked about a significant event that occurred between the ages of four and five, 
such as a birthday, moving house, Christmas, or holiday, to help them remember this time in 
the child’s life; and (2) Using a specific occasion questioning style – the interviewer is 
expected to elicit a sequential account of the child’s behaviour – what they actually do – by 
focusing on a specific occasion, and ideally prompting the parent to “recreate a picture in 
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their minds of a sequence of behaviour that they have observed, rather than report a 
general impression” (Le Couteur et al 1989: 368).  
 
These two techniques are crucial for a tool that relies on the parent recalling information 
and examples from up to 12 years ago. Interestingly, the developers of the tool – Le Couteur 
et al (1989) – point out that we do not encode memories in terms of dates, or ages, but 
rather, associate them with significant personal events. Thus, the emphasis of the ADI-R is 
on momentous personal events – images, smells, feelings, sounds – and these form the 
foundation of the ADI-R, and set the tone for this standardised assessment.  
 
Crucially tied in with this discussion is my use of video-reflexive ethnography (VRE) to collect 
data during these diagnostic sessions, and the emphasis this approach has on not only on 
recording what can be seen, but the active and dynamic nature of this data. Through the use 
of video, I have been able to capture and analyse the significance of the visual, emotional 
and corporeal elements of the ADI-R in the clinical encounter, and demonstrate how they 
are often used by both psychologist and parent to convey, and in fact translate, significant 
clinical information that may have been invisible or misinterpreted otherwise. I will examine 
how clinical labour – involving both corporeal and emotional work – is performed by the 
parents and psychologist to embody the ADI-R. I will explore how these forms of emotional 
and corporeal labour are used variously to translate the complexity of autism symptoms and 
clinical language, as well as to explain behaviour, bodily movements and expressions in a 
way that language cannot, and how these forms of knowledge are sometimes considered 
the most valuable form of evidence. I will also explore the ways that Hochschild’s (1983) 
emotional labour is enacted and the significant care work that the psychologist performs 
during the diagnostic encounter.  
 
Clinical labour as the creation of a form of value 
This chapter relies heavily on the concept of labour and is used to describe the work 
performed by parents and the diagnosing psychologist throughout the ADI-R clinical 
encounter. However, embedded in this concept of labour within the clinical trial is the idea 
that this work involves the creation of a form of value:  labour in this context is a social 
relation and involves the production of scientific knowledge/data (Cooper & Waldby 2014).  
 
The clinical trial studied for this thesis is described as a randomised double blind placebo-
controlled trial, interested in testing the efficacy of the SSRI Fluoxetine in the treatment of 
repetitive behaviours in children with autism. This Australian trial is NHMRC-funded and run 
by a not-for-profit Australian children’s research institute. The protocol for the trial explains 
that the evidence for the use of SSRI medication for repetitive behaviours is inconclusive, 
and that the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) in Australia, and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in the United States are yet to approve the use of SSRIs for repetitive 
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behaviours in autism. And yet, over the past decade in Australia, the “off-label” – that is, 
“for medical indications that have not yet been tested” (Cooper & Waldby 2014: 215) – use 
of Fluoxetine and other SSRIs in children with autism has become increasingly common. 
Thus, the key aim of the trial is to test the efficacy and safety of low dose fluoxetine in the 
treatment of repetitive behaviours in children with autism. 
 
Particularly relevant to this study is the fact that few prescription drugs have been tested on 
children, meaning that the majority of drugs taken by children are prescribed off-label. 
Melinda Cooper and Catherine Waldby (2014) explore this off-label use of drugs in the 
context of the US, explaining that: 
 
The consumption of drugs “off-label”…is a widespread and not formally regulated, practice. The 
FDA has little jurisdiction over the actual practice of medicine, leaving the doctor free to make 
decisions with regard to how drugs should be consumed once normal standard-of-care options 
have been exhausted. It appears, in fact, that off-label indications constitute a huge proportion of 
overall prescriptions in the United States, with some estimates suggesting that over 60 per cent of 
legal drugs are prescribed for nonstandard use. (215)  
 
In light of the above, it appears that the use of off-label drugs both in the US, and here in 
Australia, is extremely lucrative for pharmaceutical companies. Cooper and Waldby (2014) 
explain the very calculated process by which pharmaceutical companies conduct clinical 
trials, seeking approval for just one medical indication (for example, an indication that is 
either easy to prove or the most remunerative in terms of its patent life) and then once 
approved, promoting the off-label use of its drug for untested indications. Lauren 
Rosewarne (2013) similarly argues that the truly lucrative market emerges through the off-
label use of a drug. Rosewarne (2013) uses several examples to demonstrate the ways that 
pharmaceutical companies create and expand their markets via “making allusions…to 
nonapproved uses” (136). By linking the off-label uses with the drug’s side effects, the 
pharmaceutical company is legally able to indirectly promote the drug for other uses. Thus, 
an important element to understanding the clinical trial studied for this thesis, and the 
labour that is being carried out within it, is the idea that through this clinical trial a market-
oriented form of value is being created for the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
The OECD points to life sciences research as contributing to advances in healthcare and 
biotechnology at a pace more rapid than ever before. This is significant because this 
research is also driving large sectors of the global knowledge economy (OECD 2000). 
However, few researchers have focused on the forms of embodied labour – such as the 
contribution made by participants in drug trials – that are necessary to sustain such an 
economy. Cooper and Waldby’s (2014) innovative examination of clinical labour provides a 
theoretical foundation for the way that I will talk about the work carried out by the parents 
and psychologist throughout the ADI-R diagnostic encounter. Cooper and Waldby (2014) 
argue that participation in clinical trials should be regarded as “labour” when: 
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The activity is intrinsic to the process of valorization of a particular bioeconomic sector and 
when therapeutic benefits to the participants and their communities are absent or incidental. 
Indeed, much clinical labor consists precisely in the endurance of risk and exposure to 
nonpredictable experimental effects that may be actively harmful, rather than therapeutic. We 
also include the situation where clinical labor is performed in exchange for health care, 
reconfigured as an “in kind” compensation for service, comparable to “workfare,” where the 
payment of welfare benefits is made contingent upon the obligation to work. (8-9)  
 
They go on to explain how this clinical labour relates to the clinical drug trial: 
 
Human research subjects…occupy a liminal but critical position in the postindustrial biomedical 
economy…their labor is fully internal to the value chains of the pharmaceutical and biomedical 
industries. The data generated by human research subjects is incorporated, in an immediate 
sense, into the investigational new drug application that needs to be submitted to regulatory 
authorities before a drug is approved for marketing. (9) 
 
Importantly, Cooper and Waldby (2014) explain that the work performed by the participant 
in the drug trial “does not figure in the economic analyses of labor in the life sciences” (9). 
Of more concern are notions of professional divisions of labour, with particular focus on 
“the cognitive labor of the scientist as the technical element necessary to the establishment 
of intellectual property in living matter” (Cooper & Waldby 2014: 9). While the child is the 
consumer of the active medication or placebo for the drug trial studied for this thesis, the 
parent also plays a crucial role in providing the data. This, of course, is due to the fact that 
the symptoms of interest in this trial must be observed and recorded by the parents – there 
is no biological test or scan that the trial clinicians can complete to determine the efficacy of 
the medication.  This parent-provided data is then “incorporated…into the investigational 
new drug application that needs to be submitted to the regulatory authorities before a drug 
is approved” (Cooper & Waldby 2014: 9). In this trial’s case, the aim is for the drug to be 
approved for use in the treatment of repetitive behaviours in children with autism. The 
parent not only administers the fluoxetine to their child, and observes and records the 
child’s behaviours during the trial period, but also provides essential “baseline” information 
about the child’s functioning prior to taking the medication via the ADI-R assessment. 
Therefore, the labour performed by participants in this clinical trial involves “compliance 
with often-complex medical regimes of dosing, testing, appointments and self-monitoring”, 
with non-compliance rendering these carefully developed clinical protocols, standards and 
procedures useless (Waldby & Cooper2008: 59).  
 
This chapter will focus on two circuits of value production taking place within the trial: the 
first involves the clinical outputs of the trial that need to meet the rigours and standards of 
the Therapeutic Goods Administration approval process; and the second involves the care 
being offered to the patient (both parent(s) and child) at the point of the trial, whereby the 
patient receives “free care” or “treatment” (such as behavioural tips and clinical care 
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suggestions) in exchange for participation in the fluoxetine trial. In exploring these forms of 
value production, I will draw on the embodied work of the parent and the psychologist and 
show how the process of performing, translating and feeling autism constitutes a uniquely 
collaborative form of “clinical labour.”  
 
Achieving autism through corporeal labour: invoking images and 
triggering memories 
The following section draws on the work of Gardner and Williams (2015) and Natasha Myers 
(2015) to explore the way that corporeal labour is used to enhance the ADI-R techniques of 
triggering memories through invoking images and specific events in the minds of the 
parents, and further, how the parents use corporeal labour as a translation device to convey 
their expert knowledge about their child. In this way, parents are able to bypass clinical 
vocabulary and communicate their knowledge in a way that clinicians perceive to be a more 
valuable and accurate form of evidence. Significantly, this finding was accomplished through 
my use of the VRE methodology: identifying parents’ bodily movements as a key component 
of building a case for a diagnosis of autism was brought to the fore for the psychologist by 
watching back edited video clips of her ADI-R interactions with the parents.  
 
Specifically, when using the term corporeal labour, I refer to John Gardner and Clare 
Williams’ (2015) conceptualisation of “clinical work involving the body” which enables the 
“generation of understanding within such consultations” (2). Thus, this labour involves 
clinicians using their body as a “communicative apparatus within a carefully constructed 
material terrain” (Gardner & Williams 2015: 2); yet the knowledge required to conduct 
these diagnostic sessions is also embodied: “clinicians possess a body that has learnt to be 
sensitive to, and moved by, a set of contrasts that many other bodies would fail to register” 
(2). The clinician’s gaze is guided and channelled within this diagnostic space: their 
embodied knowledge and experience of autism is activated within the diagnostic encounter. 
Gardener and Williams’ (2015) study is particularly relevant in the context of my own study, 
as their work focuses on how bodily gestures are used to encourage compliance from their 
patients and to generate clinically relevant data during multidisciplinary clinical team 
diagnoses with children affected by a movement disorder called dystonia.  
 
Moving away from the specific context of the diagnostic space, and to the area of the 
laboratory where protein molecules are studied, Myers’ (2015) innovative work explores the 
way that molecular protein modellers engage their bodies actively in their work. Her study 
examines the ways that these scientists “get entangled – kinesthetically and affectively – in 
their modeling efforts” and the way that they “confront the limits of what they can see and 
what they can know” (1). Her work challenges assumptions about what counts as the kinds 
of labour that constitute scientific research, and how scientists work with and relate to their 
objects of inquiry. Myers (2015) stresses: 
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Scientific objectivity is conventionally understood as neutral, rational, and so disembodied 
practice. Scientists are expected to dissociate their cognitive activities from their bodies’ 
complicating passions and proclivities… the practitioners documented in this book reveal that life 
science research is a full-bodied practice. (2)  
 
Myers highlights the important combination of knowledge about chemical laws and physical 
properties of proteins obtained from books, and a kinesthetic and affective sensibility that 
forms an integral part of their scientific inquiry. This chapter extends this perspective to 
demonstrate the integral role that the body plays in making sense of ASD and the questions 
in the ADI-R assessment tool through acting-out and using gestures to make ASD visible and 
translatable during the diagnostic clinical encounter. The full-bodied labour performed by 
both parent and psychologist during the ADI-R is essential in formulating a diagnosis. It is 
also highly collaborative: the body here emerges as a way to share, reason, negotiate and 
translate knowledge. As Myers (2015) highlights, protein modellers: 
 
engage their entire bodies, including their hands, arms, shoulders, heads, necks, torsos, and even 
legs in model building…they practice a kind of “molecular calisthenics” as they figure out (for 
themselves) and relay (for others) their intimate knowledge of molecular forms and movements. 
While this is a practice that both enables and constrains how they imagine molecular worlds, 
their bodies provide a pliable, readily available medium for reasoning through the specificities of 
protein structure and sharing their insights with others. (18) 
 
Similarly, in the ADI-R interview, both the parent and psychologist engage their entire bodies 
– eyes, mouth, head, neck, shoulders, arms, hands, fingers, legs and feet – in the 
collaborative and negotiated process of acting out and making sense of autism. These 
movements and gestures act as common ground, or a common language, for the parent and 
psychologist. Sometimes there may be clinical language to describe the gestures or 
movements that the parent acts out, and in such cases, the psychologist is able to transform 
and translate the physical into words on paper. However, in some cases, there are no 
standardised clinical words that can describe these “kinesthetic sensibilities” and the 
psychologist must improvise and think creatively to translate this knowledge into a 
“useable” standardised form. As Myers (2015) observes in the quote above, “bodies provide 
a pliable, readily available medium,” thus allowing the parent and clinician to effectively 
share their knowledge and work together and alongside each other to produce a diagnosis.  
 
In the following sections, I will draw on my observed and videoed data of the ADI-R sessions 
involving the parents and psychologist to explore various ways in which corporeal labour is 
enacted. First, I will explore how the psychologist embodies the ADI-R and its clinical 
language to translate standardised questions to the parents, thus demystifying the often 
technical language that surrounds autism and enhancing the parent’s understanding of not 
only the question being asked, but also their overall knowledge of autism. Second, I will 
demonstrate the power that comes with the parent’s use of corporeal labour during the 
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ADI-R, and how this in fact aligns with a key technique that the ADI-R uses in the generation 
of evidence. In this way, embodying or performing autism becomes a sign of the “expert 
parent.” Third, I will explore the way that corporeal labour is employed throughout the ADI-
R to translate, explain and decipher symptoms and behaviours. In many cases, language is 
an insufficient tool to convey or describe autism, and without corporeal labour, there would 
be no shared understanding and no evidence.  
 
Embodying the ADI-R: Using corporeal labour to translate 
standardised questions 
The psychologist frequently embodies the ADI-R text in the way that she acts out certain 
behaviours, or uses her body or voice to “perform” autism, to prompt the parent(s) to 
remember behavioural features of their child and to translate, or transform, the text-based 
manual into a more relatable form. Just like in Gardner and Williams’ (2015) exploration of 
the diagnostic practices of physiotherapists for children with a movement disorder, we can 
see how corporeal and verbal communication are used simultaneously and complement one 
another throughout the diagnostic encounter: 
 
In the process, bodily movements and words acquire specific meaning within the assessment. Indeed, 
verbal utterances are indexical to the [physiotherapist’s] body movements and the material and 
discursive elements that constitute the diagnostic space. (Gardner & Williams 2015: 8)  
 
Successful communication of the ADI-R questions/items is paramount in the “generation of 
sought after clinical information” (Gardner & Williams 2015: 8). The work involved in 
eliciting this clinical information is substantial for the psychologist: the parent(s) are 
prompted to respond to carefully-worded questions, paired with bodily movements and 
gestures, generating key diagnostic information that the psychologist goes on to code and 
quantify.  The entities that constitute this diagnostic space (predetermined, of course, by 
the diagnostic tool) shape and amplify these interactions so that they are easily recognised 
by the psychologist’s diagnostic gaze. In the example below, the psychologist asks the 
parent(s) whether the child has any odd mannerisms, such as flicking their fingers near their 
eyes, flapping, fixating on their fingers, or rubbing their hands together. For every ADI-R I 
observed and filmed, the psychologist asks the following question and embodies each 
description with the accompanying gestures illustrated in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 below: 
 
Psych:  Does he have any, umm, mannerisms that are odd? So, like, umm with his hands: so, 
flicking his fingers near his eyes [demonstrates by flicking thumb and forefinger very 
close to eyes], flapping [demonstrates with both hands flat and to the side of body, 
moving up and down repeatedly], or…any of those hand mannerisms at all 
[demonstrates by moving fingers near eyes and rubbing hands together]? Or anything 
a bit strange that you’ve noticed? 
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Figure 6.1: Psychologist displaying gestures associated with “odd mannerisms”  
 
 
Figure 6.2: ADI-R with Abigail, mother of David – demonstration of “odd mannerisms”  
 
 
In the following exchange between the psychologist and Simon’s (a 17 year old autistic 
teenager who has previously been diagnosed with ADHD) father, Jacob, we can see how the 
psychologist uses both the specific occasion questioning style that is characteristic of the 
ADI-R, as well as her body to indicate a visual demonstration of what she means: 
 
Psych:  What about that time, going back to when [Simon] had little speech, and used to do 
everything himself, do you remember him, like, ever pulling you [demonstrates 
reaching out and pulling father] to the door to get you to open something, or taking 
your hand [holds out hands and pretends to place on door handle] and putting it on 
the door, or standing there screaming to get something because he couldn’t reach? 
Jacob:  No, well see, what it is, is we had one kid, then we had another kid, then another kid, 
and – it’s sort of not not taking notice of the other one, but, you know what I mean, 
trying to care…I just can’t remember always, you know. I haven’t got the best 
memory either.  
Psych:  That’s OK. Yeh, yeh. Just remember what you can.  
Jacob:  Yeh, I sort of can’t remember. 
Psych:  OK [writing in ADI-R booklet].  
 
This interaction is particularly interesting given the age of Simon who is undergoing 
diagnosis: because Simon is 17 years old, Jacob is required to remember back over 12 years 
to produce examples of Simon’s behaviour in question, as required by the ADI-R. As he 
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reiterates, this is incredibly difficult. By using gestures the psychologist tries to create an 
image in the mind of the father of Simon performing that behaviour 12 years ago.  
 
Another example of this display of corporeal labour is evident in the ADI-R conducted with 
Hayley, the mother of Daniel: a nine year-old boy whom the psychologist has actually 
worked with for years in the private practice she works for. Not only does the psychologist 
use gestures to convey meaning in this exchange, she uses these gestures to legitimise 
Hayley’s response to a question about sharing through the psychologist’s own experience 
with the child:  
 
Psych:  Does he ever offer to share with you now, so… 
Hayley:  [emphatically] Yes! Now, Yep! Like, you have to ask, but he will! 
Psych:  Actually, you know what, I’ve seen him at school, and he’ll voluntarily say, “Here, do 
you want…” [gestures with hand as if giving], or the kids will just [gestures as if 
grabbing]… 
Hayley:  Kind of grab…[laughs]  
Psych:  Yeh [laughs] 
Hayley:  And then he’ll say, “Yeh, you can have it.” But before, he’d be like, “No! It’s mine!” 
[gestures with hand as if protecting object] 
Psych:  All right. So when he was four or five? 
Hayley:  No [shakes head], no chance! 
 
Thus, as we can see from the interaction between the psychologist and mother Hayley, 
above, some ADI-R questions, as text read out to the parent, can be confusing and unclear. 
Yet, when paired with “specific corporeal form and movement,” these ADI-R questions 
“acquire specific referents within the assessment” (Gardner & Williams 2015: 8). Through 
the pairing of bodily movements with verbal standardised questions, the psychologist is 
participating in “the production of a meaningful semiotic world: the material terrain is 
interactionally-transformed via an interplay of physical enactment and verbal instruction 
into a diagnostic space, which will subsequently enable the production of diagnostic 
knowledge.” (Gardner & Williams 2015: 8-9).  
 
This use of gestures throughout the ADI-R by the psychologist presents an obvious contrast 
to the complete lack of gestures used in the WISC-IV with the child. While children often use 
gestures throughout the WISC-IV to convey their meaning, or to translate an answer, or to 
help explain a story, the psychologist’s behaviour, in comparison, is regulated, her gaze 
channelled in a “non-negotiable transfer of knowledge” from subject to observer (Varga 
2011: 138). Unless the child’s gestures are seen to represent examples of repetitive, 
unusual, quirky or problematic behaviour – and thus transcribed by the psychologist in the 
“behavioural observations” section of the WISC-IV score sheet – they are rendered invisible 
under the psychologist’s gaze which remains within the parameters of the highly 
standardised tool.  
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The coding process for these interactions and responses, both corporeal and verbal, is just 
as nuanced. Some responses to questions in the ADI-R are quite lengthy and highly 
negotiated by both psychologist and parent(s). This is often clear in the sections of the ADI-R 
in which the psychologist asks about the child’s ability to point things out to their mother or 
father using gestures and gaining attention, as well as questions relating to any unusual or 
repetitive mannerisms the child may exhibit. For example, in the following exchange 
between the psychologist and Alice, the mother of trial participant Leo (a thirteen year old 
boy who has previously been diagnosed with ADHD and Oppositional Defiance Disorder 
(ODD)), we can see how complex and nuanced a gesture as seemingly simple as “pointing” 
can be (see Figure 6.3), and the work that is required by both psychologist and mother to 
ensure that this knowledge is accurately translated and understood by both parties: 
 
Psych:  What about in the past? Did he used to point when he was four or five? Did he say, 
“Mum, look!” [demonstrates by pointing with arm and index finger outstretched]. 
Alice:  Yeh, there’d be tractors – he’d notice all the trucks and tractors.  
Psych:  So, he’s go, “Oh, this tractor is…” [demonstrates by pointing with arm and index 
finger outstretched]. Now, how would he point? Would he go like that [demonstrates 
with outstretched flattened hand], or would he go like this [demonstrates arm 
outstretched with index finger pointing], or would he just [demonstrates hand raised 
straight up in the air]…? 
Alice:  Yeh, sometimes he wouldn’t even point, because I’d be like, “Where? Where?” [turns 
head right and left, looking around, as if puzzled and searching] you know.  
Psych:  Yeh, OK. So, sometimes he did, sometimes he didn’t. 
Alice:  Yeh, if he did, it’d be like [demonstrates with just index finger pointed, but arm 
remaining close to body] 
Psych:  So, minimal maybe?  
Alice:  Yeh, he’d just assume you know.  
Psych:  [nodding] Yeh, these are all the types of things we are looking for.  
Alice:  Oh, OK! 
Psych:  Because a lot of kids on the Spectrum, I mean, they don’t use all the social overtures. 
They either verbalise or they don’t use that contact with your language, with your 
gesturing, so…these are all the things we are looking for. 
Alice:  Oh wow, there you go! 
Psych:  Yeh, it’s very interesting! 
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Figure 6.3: Psychologist’s demonstration of pointing during ADI-R with Alice (mother of Leo)  
 
 
This is issue of “pointing” is similarly negotiated between the psychologist and Laura, the 
mother of trial participant Patrick (an eight year old boy who struggles with social 
interaction and aggression). In the exchange below, it is evident how important these 
gestures are for the psychologist to clarify exactly the kind of pointing behaviour she is 
looking for, and for Laura to translate the subtle ways that her son, Patrick, communicates 
and gestures to direct attention:  
 
Laura:  I’m pretty sure that he has that finger pointing ability [demonstrates pointing with 
index finger], but it’s not something that I can say he does all the time. It would be 
seldom. He, like that [gestures with definitive point], it’s not really… [shakes head]  
Psych:  Because, I mean, I guess the purpose of the finger point is that you have intent. So, I 
mean [demonstrates by pointing upwards and following direction of the point], you 
know exactly what you’re looking at, what you’re directing at. Whereas, a lot of kids, 
you know, do it like [gestures with flat outstretched palm]…it’s more [gestures 
vaguely with palm flat]. 
Laura:  [shakes head] I’d say Patrick would be more vague with that – not as direct 
[demonstrates with definitive pointing action]. He’s more…he uses his gestures more 
[uses hands to indicate bringing something towards her] to come in, to say, “Here I 
am,” rather than what’s outside of him [gestures with hands away from self – as if 
pushing something away]. Does that make sense? Like, he does a lot of this [turns to 
Tom and places hands on his leg, and then moves her hands towards herself]. And if 
he sits next to me, he’s got to put his foot like that [places her foot on top of Tom’s 
foot]. He’s got to be touching me, like, to bring you next to him [brings hands 
towards herself]. But, to say, “There’s the bottle of water” [points finger at 
hypothetical bottle of water]; he’d just go [lowers tone to a mumble] “There’s the 
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bottle of water” [slightly inclines head to indicate direction of hypothetical bottle of 
water], like that [slightly inclines head] [laughs]. 
 
The psychologist must ensure that she communicates the question in the correct wording, 
and then determine if the question has been understood by the parent(s) – she must gauge 
this based on how the parent(s) responds, and measuring this against what she already 
knows about the child (from previous reports from other clinicians, or previous interactions 
with the child). If the question has not been understood, or there is doubt in the 
psychologist’s mind regarding the parent’s answer, then the psychologist must find a way to 
reframe the question, or make its meaning clearer through the use of corporeal form and 
movement. The psychologist will often provide a clinical “summary” or “interpretation” of 
what the parent has said to ensure that there is consistency between what the parent has 
communicated and how the psychologist has understood the response. Thus, as Gardner 
and Williams (2015) argue, the body is used to generate understanding and to translate 
complex clinical ideas. The psychologist uses her body as a “communicative apparatus” 
(Gardner and Williams 2015: 2) that has been honed and trained, through years of 
experience working with children with autism and their families, to not only perform autism, 
but also to recognise it in the bodily performances of others.  
 
The psychologist also stresses another important dimension to this corporeal labour, 
relating to the way that it can provide the parent with a moment of realisation or 
understanding about their child. The psychologist emphasises, throughout the reflexive 
interview, the difficulty some parents have coming to terms with, or understanding, their 
child’s autism symptoms. In the following three quotes from the reflexive interview, the 
psychologist argues that using her body to demonstrate examples of autistic behaviours can 
sometimes help families to “see for themselves,” to “understand,” and to “realise”:  
 
Psych:  Often families over-estimate what their child does, and then, when you break it 
down for them, they realise they don’t, and you know if they do or don’t based on if 
the families, again, can give examples – and Mum, straight away says, “Well, 
actually, now that I think of it, he can’t [point things out to his parents]” [gestures 
definitely by tapping the table with her hand]. So, then we use that [points at paused 
video on computer screen] because that’s giving you an indication. And if…if you’re 
unsure, the scoring is good because you don’t have to score it, or you can put it in 
the middle, because a lot of the scoring is like, “[does] that [go] there?” but it might 
be limited. And normally, because – if they can’t give an example – [the behaviour] is 
either not an issue [that is, it’s not present], or they actually haven’t noticed [the 
behaviour] before, because they’re so used to it. So, that’s when you try and ask for 
specific examples, or give them examples. Yeh, and when I had to use the gestures, 
then they seemed to understand a little bit more. Like I said, what you were talking 
about before in terms of the norms – they don’t know what’s “normal” [makes scare 
quotes with fingers], so they just go based on what they know, and I know Stephen 
was an only child… 
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Psych:  Like I said, you validate…to, you know, validate their thoughts and their beliefs. But 
then you try and counteract that belief by…and this is where the examples [in the 
ADI-R] come in, when you try and say, “Well, is this happening? Is this happening? Is 
this happening? Is that a problem now?” So they can see for themselves, that 
realisation. It’s problem solving with the client. You’re formulating together.  
 
Psych:  I feel like families that don’t understand [ASD diagnosis], so for example, I’ll say, 
“Will he peer at things?” They’ll say, “No”. So then I’ll go, “OK, does he do this?” 
[demonstrates with mobile phone by turning it so the screen faces downwards and 
moving it towards and away from her eyes] “Oh, yes he does!” “Does he do this?” 
[stretches out arm with fingers apart and stares at fingers as she moves arm in a 
horizontal arc], “Yeh, he does!” “Does he do this?” [demonstrates bending down and 
staring underneath table] “Oh yeh, he does!” This is what it is. [The parents] don’t 
understand [scrunches up nose and shakes head]. So, gestures in that context – to 
explain to families – it helps as well. You can use [the gestures] in examples. (…) And 
then you say, “Yeh, I get what you mean because I know exactly what you’re looking 
for” – because there are specific gestures that are specific to autism [emphasises 
point by tapping table]. Like, some kids do, you know, this [stretches out arm and 
spins around] and spin, but autistic kids do it [stretches out arm with fingers slightly 
apart, body crouched over, staring fixedly at fingers as spins body around]. So, I think 
it’s a good way to differentiate 
 
Through these interactions between the psychologist and parent(s), we can see how this 
negotiated process unfolds, and how the psychologist relies on demonstrations and 
performance to clarify her meaning. It is clear that to successfully administer the ADI-R the 
psychologist must draw on her years of experience working with children on the Spectrum 
to produce relevant and meaningful actions and performances capable of translating the 
ADI-R questions into a form that is intelligible to parents.  
 
The power of corporeal labour as evidence: Performing autism as a 
sign of the “expert” parent 
A particularly complex example of this use of corporeal work and the need to transcribe this 
knowledge into textual form to produce a definitive answer and allow the question or item 
to be “scored” is evident in the ADI-R interview with Patrick’s parents, Laura and Tom. This 
ADI-R was particularly interesting because it involved two parents who had separated, and 
thus spent time with Patrick in their respective homes. In the ADI-R diagnostic encounter, 
there was often disagreement between Laura and Tom when answering the psychologist’s 
questions. In the interaction below, we see how the psychologist must mediate between the 
parents and negotiate an answer that she can later score: 
 
Psych:  What about when he’s younger? When he was younger, looking at when he was 
four. Umm, did he ever, ahh, you know, if you had the cars, did he ever, you know, 
play with them properly [moves hands around as if pushing toy cars]  
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Laura:  No, he’d smash them into each other. Or fling it [swings arm, pretending to fling toy 
car into the wall] and see how fast he could smash [the car] into the wall. 
Psych:  OK, when he’s smashing them, was it quite repetitive? In that it’s [acts out banging 
cars together over and over again] smashing, OK, let’s do it again, smashing.  
Laura:  Yep [nodding]. In the kitchen, remember the kick boards in the kitchen [looks at Tom 
for acknowledgement]? He’d just ram them in [swings arm as if throwing cars at 
wall] – all of them!  
Tom:  [looking sceptical and talking over Laura] I don’t know that that’s repetitive 
[muttered in lowered voice]. It’s just normal play! Just normal kids play, that’s all! 
Laura:  [talking over Tom] …and he’ll get them all together [uses arms and hands to act out 
gathering objects together] and line them up nice and neatly, and then…[moves 
hands rapidly to indicate messing objects up].  
Tom:  [talking over Laura] …we all played cars, and we all played the same way… 
Psych:  OK, and we all do that, but kids on the Spectrum, what they do it that, the way they 
play is exactly the same. So, you know, even if it is the, you know, the diagonal on 
the table [pretends to move cars diagonally on a flat surface], it could be the same – 
so, just going like this [moves hands back and forth in the same way as if pushing car 
on diagonal trajectory]. 
Tom:  No, nah. He wasn’t doing that. [shakes head] Never done it like that. He doesn’t 
play…he doesn’t play the game for long, he doesn’t play it… 
Psych:  See, it looks like play…but it’s always the same type of play. 
Tom:  [shrugs] But you only play a car one way. You’ve got to hold it and you’ve got to go 
like this [moves hand backwards and forwards as if moving a toy car]. It’s not going 
to continue going on its own!  
Laura:  Like, we had the mat [draws a big square with finger] that had a track on it. He didn’t 
get the car and drive along the track [moves hand as if driving a toy car in an orderly 
way along the road] and go visit someone… 
Psych:  So that’s what we’re looking at… 
Laura:  …he would just get the cars and smash them [uses hands to demonstrate cars being 
smashed together]  
Psych:  See, that’s repetitive, because, like, you know, it’s the same type of movement with 
the hands: that way [moves hands to the right] and that way [moves hands to the 
left] and that way [moves hands to the right]. 
Laura:  That’s why he never plays well with other people: because it interrupts the way that 
he wants to do something. See, he doesn’t want to go and drive around, you know, 
race, and do all of that. He just wants to smash them up [acts out smashing cars with 
hands].  
 
When this clip was played back to the psychologist in the reflexive interview, she discussed 
the difficulties involved when two parents disagree. When asked how she resolved this in 
terms of transcription of her notes and then coding/scoring the response, she specified that 
she privileged the knowledge of the parent who was able to provide specific and multiple 
examples of the behaviour in question. In the quote below, the psychologist outlines the 
reasons why her intuition tells her to trust the mother as a “more reliable source”:  
 
Me:  So, obviously you have Mum going, “No he doesn’t do that”, and Dad going, “Yeh, he 
does”. What do you do in terms of taking notes [in the ADI-R booklet] and who do 
you listen to? How do you score that?  
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Psych:  So, with umm…look you can see, like, for example, Dad’s in denial because he keeps 
on going back and saying, “All children do that, kids do that”. So, when that happens, 
you know the parent that’s a little bit, maybe, less reliable, than the parent that is 
[more reliable]. But, with autism assessments, you’re always looking at if it happens, 
or if it doesn’t [emphasises by tapping edge of hand on table]. So, Dad’s saying, “No 
no yeh he does, no he doesn’t, yeh he does”, so, it’s not consistent. Whereas Mum is 
more adamant and, you know, “No, he doesn’t”. So, you can see that that’s the more 
reliable source [points at video still of Mum on computer screen]. So then, when 
you’re scoring, you can either, like, work out the middle or the threshold, or you can 
go based on where you’ve got more evidence. And we’re looking at consistency 
across contexts as well. But yeh, Dad’s in denial and he keeps on using…he keeps on 
referring it back to other kids, rather than telling me if it happens or doesn’t happen 
– that’s all I need to know. 
 
It is clear from the quote, above, that the psychologist, throughout this ADI-R, must make 
value judgments about which of the parents is providing the reliable source of information. 
Laura describes her experiences with her son, Patrick, referencing and acting out behaviours 
that he exhibits (or does not exhibit) based on the question asked by the psychologist. Laura 
uses specific, concrete examples based on what she has seen her son do. Tom, Patrick’s 
father, on the other hand, makes generalised statements about how all children play and is 
not able to provide specific experiential examples that the psychologist can record as “data” 
or “evidence” that can then be used to generate a score.  
 
The psychologist, meanwhile, must take notes about the interaction. Answers generated by 
the ADI-R questions, and further shaped and amplified by clarifications and corporeal 
prompts, are “captured and translated into more durable modes of representation such as 
text” (Gardner & Williams 2015: 9). The psychologist must go through a process of deeming 
what counts as evidence to be recorded in the ADI-R booklet, determining how to translate 
complex bodily movements and/or facial expressions, inscribing this in the ADI-R booklet in 
clear shorthand notes (so that she can later return to the data to verify the scores), and 
finally, to attribute a number from 0 to 3, based on the inscribed data, to indicate the 
presence and severity of the symptom.  
 
What is particularly interesting about this example is the way that Laura is able to establish 
herself as the “reliable” source of information in this interaction through her use of 
gestures. The psychologist states that the most important part of an autism diagnosis is 
being clear about “if [the behaviour] happens, or if it doesn’t [emphasises by tapping edge of 
hand on table]” – she even emphasises her point by tapping the table as she says this. As I 
have stressed throughout this thesis, this is important because all that we really know about 
autism (in terms of diagnosis) is what can be seen and observed – that is, behaviours, 
communication, and social interaction. In Figure 6.4, the red box around the inscription: 
“smash into each other (repetitive)” on the ADI-R booklet highlights that it is Laura’s ability 
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to act out Patrick’s “smashing up” of the cars to indicate repetitive play that provides the 
psychologist with reliable evidence that can be “counted” by the ADI-R tool.  
 
Figure 6.4: Psychologist’s inscriptions on the ADI-R for “Imaginative Play with Peers”  
 
 
 
During the reflexive interview, the psychologist also makes an important point about what a 
parent’s corporeal labour means to her, and why she counts it as evidence:  
 
Psych:  And then, with this one, as well, Mum’s use of gestures – it was like she was replaying 
the stuff in her head. So, it was like her way of remembering. That’s how I saw it. 
Me:  Can you talk a bit more about that?  
Psych:  It shows that she’s got more concrete, clear ideas in terms of what [the behaviour] is, 
but maybe it’s hard to put a label to it. I mean, she’s not a clinician, so she doesn’t 
know what it is. Umm, so that, for example [points to paused video on computer 
screen] to Stephen’s family, where their gestures, when I gave the gestures, they 
couldn’t give [the gestures] back, whereas [Daniel’s] Mum was able to give [those 
gestures] back, so she’s a more reliable source. 
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For the psychologist, Daniel’s mum’s gestures demonstrate that she is acting out a clear 
memory of Daniel performing that behaviour – “it was like she was replaying the stuff in her 
head” – and this performance cements her as a reliable source. This labour performed by 
Daniel’s mum is then transcribed onto the ADI-R scoring booklet and incorporated and 
counted as evidence towards Daniel’s diagnosis of ASD and his ultimate participation in the 
drug trial. 
 
Most importantly though, this performance or translation of ASD symptoms enables the 
psychologist to exercise her clinical judgement, her gut feeling, within the diagnostic 
encounter. In the following exchange, which takes place during the video-reflexive 
interview, the psychologist reveals the flexibility available to her in the scoring of the ADI-R, 
and how she uses her clinical instincts to evaluate the evidence (in this case, examples via 
gestures) presented to her by Stephen’s parents, Jenny and Matthew:  
 
Psych:  I think, yeh, I think the good thing about the assessment process is, because you’re 
asking so many questions, families start to think about things themselves, and then 
they start to realise. And, as well, when you go through, again, the autism spectrum, 
you explain the high functioning… and then they seem a little less resistant, as well. 
Yeh, this was an interesting family [referring to an ADI-R clip we had just watched of 
Stephen’s parents, Jenny and Matthew]. They changed their answer fifty times! 
[smiles] I think you’ve got to go by your gut sometimes.  
Me:  OK, OK. And, what does that entail for you – going by your gut? 
Psych:  So, for example, with this family, right – they straight away said, “yes” [in response to 
a question regarding whether Stephen could point out things to the parents using 
gestures and eye contact], but again, when I started to ask for examples, they couldn’t 
[…] So, for example, with this family, you could tell straight away that, like, they didn’t 
really get it. So, because they didn’t really get it, and they had no evidence, you could 
kind of tell that, well, I think he doesn’t – because it would be very obvious [if Stephen 
was able to point things out to his parents using gestures and eye contact]…Yeh, 
sometimes I think you just have that feeling, like, “Oh, I think they’re wrong.” But, like 
I said, at the same time, the ADI-R is very specific, where it’s all about evidence to 
reduce that subjectivity. Sometimes I put a question mark if I’m not sure.  
Me:  And then, how does that work when you’re going back and scoring it if there’s a 
question mark there?  
Psych:  So, when I score it, like I said, normally, because they’re like severity-type levels [holds 
hands horizontally at different heights to indicate different levels], so if it’s there…and 
then [the ADI-R always specifies], “Is the skill there, but is it limited?” [emphasises 
point by tapping open palm with side of hand]. I normally put that one, or I put 
“unclear”…you can put one where it’s like “unsure” or… 
Me:  OK, so there’s a bit of flexibility within the tool? It’s not so definitive – like it has to be 
yes or no?  
Psych:  No, no. So there’s four [holds up four fingers] rating scales – I can’t remember off the 
top of my head, I might be wrong. There’s always a zero, a one, a two [indicates by 
tapping finger on table for each number as if drawing out a scale], a three, and then I 
think four and five are “non-applicable”-type. So you just tick if they’ve got no 
language. So, with zero, it’s like you’re typically functioning […] So that one is always, 
you know, that’s typical, no problems, whatever…number one [holds up index finger] 
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is the one where it is a bit unclear [holds hands up at chest level, facing palms down, 
and alternates them up and down] – so it sounds like he does, but then it sounds like 
he doesn’t – so it’s enough to code there [draws circle with finger on table], whereas 
two and three are quite sure…So it’s good in that aspect. 
Me:  So, it gives you a bit of flexibility?  
Psych:  Yeh, I think so. 
 
Given that Jenny and Andrew were unable to provide clear examples of Stephen exhibiting 
(or not exhibiting) pointing behaviour, the psychologist uses her clinical instincts – based on 
this diagnostic interaction with Matthew and Jenny, and a short interaction with Stephen 
during the WISC-IV, as well as her many years of experience working with children on the 
Spectrum and their parents – to form a judgement about whether the parents have 
provided an example that counts as evidence in the ADI-R. From the psychologist’s 
perspective, the ability to produce the examples, and act these out as if replaying a 
memory, is the key to producing significant, usable evidence: “the ADI-R is very specific, 
where it’s all about evidence to reduce that subjectivity.” The psychologist also details the 
scoring mechanisms the ADI-R tool has in place to account for uncertainty, and the flexibility 
afforded to her if there is any doubt she may have with regards to scoring.  
 
When language fails us: Using corporeal labour to translate 
knowledge   
A key element in enabling this flexibility in the ADI-R is the way that the psychologist allows 
and relies upon the body as a vehicle to collaborate, share, negotiate and translate 
knowledge. Myers’ (2015) work is pertinent here, in particular her observation that the 
protein modellers “do not ‘see’ molecules or produce ‘images’ of biological phenomena 
rather, they make models to render the molecular world visible, tangible, and workable” 
(18). Likewise, for the psychologist and parent, they do not “see” or “know” an ASD 
diagnosis, but rather construct it together via their gestures and actions to render the 
diagnosis visible, tangible and workable. The diagnosis is a “rendering” because it is a 
representation of ASD, created through the labour performed by the parent and the 
psychologist during the clinical encounter. This labour is performed through the lens of the 
ADI-R. Just as a scientist looks through a microscope at a cell and manipulates what they see 
through the application of dyes or adjusting the light source, the ADI-R similarly manipulates 
and directs the gaze of the psychologist to see autism under certain standardised 
conditions.  
 
The example transcribed below, which takes place during the ADI-R with Kate, Ian’s mother, 
highlights this rendering process through the overall structure of the ADI-R, and the way 
that the psychologist and parent work together to frame a response to the question “What 
kinds of things make Ian happy?” Here we can see Kate’s intuitive, or tacit, knowledge about 
her son Ian’s expression of emotions, and how the psychologist helps to draw out a 
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concrete and clinically relevant example of Ian’s display of emotion to count as evidence in 
the context of the ADI-R. Kate and the psychologist, by working together, are able to render 
Ian’s expression of happiness visible and tangible by conjuring up a memory and acting this 
out. As a result, an anecdote is produced that can be recorded as evidence on the ADI-R 
score sheet:  
 
Psych:  What kinds of things make Ian happy? 
Kate:  If I buy him a new art book. He likes that. If I buy him art supplies and things like that, that 
makes him happy. But he doesn’t really show it, he’ll just go, “thanks mum” [in a monotone]. 
But I know, I know he’s happy.  
Psych:  So how does he show these feelings? So, you said he says, “thanks mum”. 
Kate:  Yeh, that’s about it, it’s like he’s embarrassed to show that he’s happy. Sometimes I find… I 
know he was really happy about it, but there was no, like…most people would be like, 
“Yessss! Thanks Mum!” [excited tone] [fists clenched impersonating excitement] But there’s 
none of that with him, it’s still always very flat [gestures with palms flat]. 
Psych:  OK, I noticed that yesterday….Does he ever seem to want to share in his enjoyment of 
something?  
Kate:  Oh yeh! …My mum came over this morning…and it was like, “[Grandma] come and have a 
look at my lizard, come and have a look at my lizard!” So then my mum’s there on the floor 
[imitates grandma’s posture lying on the floor eagerly looking at the lizard] – my 73 year old 
mum! – on the floor looking at this lizard [smiling]. So yeh, he was very excited [emphasises 
with hands splayed out] and that was his way of being excited.  
 
The excerpt from Kate’s ADI-R, above, demonstrates another dimension of this concept of 
corporeal labour: one which privileges parents’ knowledge and intuition because they are 
“experts about their own children”. Parents find themselves in a unique position during the 
ADI-R where they must frequently draw on their intuition and gut feeling about their child, 
but also translate this gut feeling into something meaningful and reasoned that can be used 
as evidence by the psychologist. These meaningful examples are built on an accumulation of 
the unique and privileged knowledge that only a parent can have about their child:  their 
sensitivities to their child’s quirky behaviour; an understanding of when, where, why and 
how these behaviours manifest; and their ability to make judgements and evaluate what 
constitutes normal behaviour based on their observations of other children. Relevant here is 
Myers’ (2015) observation of the way that protein modellers use their bodies in their work, 
describing them as being “contoured by a kinaesthetic and affective sensibility” (4). Myers 
argues that this kinaesthetic and affective sensibility is about feeling and embodying the 
work, and cannot be learned by consulting books. Likewise for autism diagnosis, the parents 
are able to embody and perform their children’s behaviours because they live with them 
and experience them on a daily basis. Similarly, clinicians who see autistic children day-to-
day in their practice hone a kind of “intuition”, a “sense of things” or a “gut feeling” through 
the quantity of cases they see. So much of what we know about autism is restricted to what 
we can see – behaviours, language, social interaction. Thus, the importance of using the 
body to translate and explain – for both parents and clinicians – becomes a vital source of 
communication during the clinical encounter.  
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A section of the ADI-R involving questions about repetitive behaviours and stereotyped 
movements of the body holds key relevance to the clinical trial studied for this thesis given 
the fluoxetine effects are measured based on the presence or absence of these behaviours. 
Examples of repetitive behaviours and stereotyped movements can include hand-flapping, 
rocking, eye twitching, lining up toys and so on. However, this section of the ADI-R is also 
important because my video data shows that this is a key instance where parents rely 
heavily on corporeal labour to communicate their knowledge. Through their gestures and 
actions, the parent(s) and psychologist grapple with complex gestures, movements and 
expressions to render the diagnosis visible, tangible and workable. The four groups of video 
stills (see Figures 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8) from four different ADI-Rs I discuss, below, 
demonstrate the immense variety as well as complexity of the gestures involved in 
conveying these behaviours, the full effect of which is hard to convey without seeing the 
video clips themselves. The images below show that the way that the parents use their 
hands, faces and bodies to perform their child’s unique version of autism, differs 
profoundly; and yet they all defer to this corporeal labour as their “communicative 
apparatus” (Gardner & Williams 2015: 2).  
 
For Gil’s mother, Sarah, these behaviours take the form of hand movements in front of the 
eyes, twisting and playing with fingers, placing objects in certain orders and lining objects 
up, smelling fingers, and hands over ears (see Figure 6.5). For Stephen’s mother, Jenny, such 
repetitive behaviours are evident in the highly symmetrical worlds her son has constructed 
with Lego, the ordered way in which he plays with his Star Wars characters, and the way he 
recreates a mental picture that he has in his head through his physical play (See Figure 6.6).  
 
  206 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Video stills of Sarah demonstrating her son Gil’s repetitive behaviours  
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Figure 6.6: Video stills of Jenny demonstrating her son Stephen’s repetitive behaviours during 
the ADI-R 
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Figure 6.7: Video stills of Hayley demonstrating her son Daniel’s repetitive behaviours during the 
ADI-R 
 
 
The following extract from Daniel’s ADI-R with his mother, Hayley, paired with the video stills 
(see Figure 6.7), demonstrates the complexity of the verbal and corporeal “evidence” presented 
by Hayley. The nuances of Daniel’s lining-up behaviours would be lost without the 
accompanying visual clarifications and demonstrations: not only do Hayley’s actions generate 
understanding (Gardner & Williams 2015), she is also rendering these complex symptoms 
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visible and tangible (Myers 2015), allowing the psychologist to gather evidence, build a 
representation of autism, and justify the score she ascribes to that section of the ADI-R:  
 
Psych:  Did he ever line up things the same way over and over? 
Hayley:  [nods emphatically] Always!  
Psych:  So, what are some examples? I know you said the figurines and cars and stuff… 
Hayley:  There’d be like, the hot wheels – he’d line them all up [gestures with fingers indicating a 
line]. And then I bought the figurine set of Ickle Pickle and he’d kind of line the up 
[gestures as if placing figurines in a row]. Ummm, even now with the Skylanders, cos he’ll 
put them kind of in order. And with the Lego – he’s got a couple of little displays and he’ll 
line them up and he’d always make sure they’re in a line and straight [squints eyes and 
gestures as if adjusting object to make straight].  [Smiles] And books! Books! [points at 
psychologist to emphasise point] Big thing! Like, they all had to be… [gestures with both 
palms flat facing each other] and if they fell down he’d get the shits and put them back 
up because he wanted them all straight…in order [gestures with palms straight, 
indicating precision]. 
 
Similarly, during David’s ADI-R with his mother Abigail, we can see how important the use of 
hand gestures are in Abigail’s account of David’s specific way of holding hands with her. Pairing 
the transcription of this exchange with the video stills (see Figure 6.8) highlights the very 
precise sequence of movements that David uses to hold hands with Abigail in a particular way:  
 
Psych:  Did he ever, umm, show you what he wanted by taking your hand, or your wrist, and using 
it as a tool… 
Abigail:  [nodding] But he…[uses hand to demonstrate – interlaces fingers] when he grabbed my 
hand it was in a certain way, like, you know, he would never grab me there [demonstrates 
by clasping at her wrist] because we can’t, even to this day, grab him by the wrist. He’d like 
grab…[holds out hands flat and begins to carefully interlace fingers] he’d set his hand 
perfectly into mine [shows hands clasped together with fingers interlaced] and it would 
have to be comfortable, and then drag me along – like, it would have to be…he does it a 
certain way.  
Psych:  OK [writing the entire time, but also looking up to watch Abigail’s gestures]  
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Figure 6.8: Video stills of Abigail demonstrating her son David’s specific way of holding hands 
during the ADI-R 
 
  
This translation process through corporeal work is regularly carried out when language and 
words fail to articulate and capture the complexity of these “autism” behaviours. In fact, I 
would suggest that this corporeal work is essential to the ADI-R’s effectiveness as a diagnostic 
tool, and any diagnostic tool hoping to assess a parent’s account of their child’s possible autism. 
Both the psychologist and parents use this visual technique to explain, make sense of, translate 
and codify knowledge.  
 
Additionally, the other vital factor involved in this corporeal demonstration of the repetitive 
symptoms of ASD is that, in many cases, these behaviours may be unique, or essentially 
different, to each child diagnosed with ASD. While the psychologist may be able to group 
various unique behaviours into a category such as “hand flapping” or “stereotyped movements 
of the body,” the parents may not be able to recognise or identify such categorisations. Thus, 
the parents’ ability to act out these qualitatively different mannerisms, quirks and behaviours, 
and for the psychologist to then categorise and codify this knowledge, demonstrates the 
experiential, naturalised and qualitative way in which the two parties generate and formulate 
the diagnosis together. This would seem to confirm Canguilhem’s (1989) argument, discussed in 
Chapter 5, which posits that disease and disorder cannot be reduced to a quantitative deviation 
from a statistical norm, but instead must be understood as a qualitative difference based on the 
patient’s value-orientation and experience. 
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The unique, qualitative dimension of each child’s diagnosis with ASD manifests itself in each of 
the ADI-Rs observed and/or filmed for this thesis. By using video-reflexive ethnography not only 
to collect data, but also to actually experience the autism diagnostic encounter, alongside the 
psychologist I was afforded a rare opportunity to witness and articulate the highly qualitative, 
dynamic, collaborative and corporeal nature of diagnosing autism. Corporeal collaboration 
involved the psychologist and parent working alongside one another to find a common 
understanding through synonymous (body)language. The following three examples highlight 
this collaborative endeavour between parent(s) and psychologist.  
 
In the ADI-R excerpt, below, Laura offers an account of the quirky behaviour of her son Patrick 
(an eight year old boy who struggles with social interaction and aggression) (see Figure 6.9). 
Here, Laura struggles to articulate the behaviour she has observed and uses her hands and 
whole body to perform and try to make sense of it. After going through this process of 
demonstrating Patrick’s behaviour, the psychologist is able to recognise, understand and 
categorise this behaviour into a broader group of “sensory” ASD symptoms. She goes on to 
validate and reflect the behaviours Laura mentions by linking them with other “sensory” 
behaviours she has seen displayed by children diagnosed with ASD:  
 
Laura:  It’s like he’s readjusting [by peering at his hand]. [To dad] Have you noticed it yet?  
Tom:  [shakes head]  
Laura:  Always! Always, always! [demonstrates stretching out arm and forming a circle between 
index finger and thumb, and then peering at the circle out of the corners of eyes]. And 
then look away. Sometimes he’ll do it when he’s talking. He’s talking to you and then he 
goes like that [demonstrates peering/hand gesture again] out of the corner of his eye.  
Psych:  And it’s only those two?  
Laura:  Yeh, it’s hard to explain [demonstrates peering/hand gesture again – as if trying to make 
sure she has got it right]. And I tried to film him one day. It’s really bizarre what he does, 
and I think, “What the..?! What are you doing?” [furrows brow in puzzlement]. I asked 
him about it once and he was so uncomfortable, so I thought, “I’m leaving that alone!”  
Psych:  It’s a sensory thing that he does. I’ve had a lot of kids that do it. It’s the peering and the 
way that they position their hand. Some kids it’s like this [peers at flat hand on lap], 
some kids it’s like that [hand up to face peering through cracks in fingers] 
Laura:  Yeh, it’s like he’s looking at his thumb, but he’ll put his fingers together. 
Psych:  Yeh! 
 
Similarly, the interaction conveyed in the Figure 6.10, below, between the psychologist and 
Leo’s mother, Alice, highlights the way that corporeal labour is used by the parent and 
mimicked by the psychologist so that she can be sure she has understood the parent correctly. 
Here, Alice is demonstrating a variety of behaviours that Leo exhibits and the psychologist is 
mirroring these hand gestures to ensure she has interpreted correctly, and then follows up by  
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Figure 6.9: Video stills of Laura demonstrating her son Patrick’s quirky behaviour during the ADI-
R  
 
 
Figure 6.10: Video stills of Alice demonstrating Leo’s quirky behaviour and the psychologist 
mirroring the gestures during the ADI-R  
 
 
clarifying whether Leo performs other similar gestures (see bottom two images in Figure 6.10). 
Together, Alice and the psychologist work alongside each other to formulate, translate, and 
 213 
settle on these ASD symptoms. This collaboration via their gestures and actions “renders” 
(Myers 2015) the ASD diagnosis visible, tangible and available to be used as evidence.  
 
For Sophie and Stewart, parents of Rupert – an 11 year old who was diagnosed with autism at 
the age of three and likes to make up rap songs – participating in the ADI-R involved the added 
challenge of completing the interview in English, their second language.  Sophie and Stewart’s 
use of corporeal labour throughout the ADI-R is key to the way they were able to clearly convey 
their knowledge about Rupert to the psychologist. Through the clarity of their performances 
they are able to combine language and corporeal labour to successfully translate their 
knowledge into “evidence” that can be used by the psychologist in the ADI-R format. I will use 
three forms of data to illustrate how this was achieved when the psychologist asked Sophie and 
Stewart about whether Rupert had any unusual sensory interests: transcription of the 
interaction; video stills of Sophie and Stewart’s body movements; and an image of the 
diagnostic tool with the psychologist’s notes inscribed. Working alongside each other, both the 
parents and psychologist are able to collaborate and formulate the diagnosis together.  
 
In the following transcription, the psychologist asks Sophie and Stewart whether Rupert “seems 
particularly interested in the sight, feel, sound, taste, smell of things or people.” Sophie and 
Stewart answer the question using a combination of language and hand/whole body 
movements and gestures: 
 
Sophie:  I took him back to home and I saw how he…[demonstrates by raising her hands to her 
eyes] 
Stewart:  [gesturing towards the blinds in the clinic room] He saw, like, lines… [tilts head to the side 
with arm outstretched, moving head and arm simultaneously as if following an object 
moving along a straight trajectory] and goes like that [whips his head to the side] 
Psych:  Ahhh, I know what you mean! 
Sophie:  [pointing at the blinds] This window, now, these lines [gestures by pointing and drawing 
a line with her finger in the air] when he comes, straight away he will: [tilts her head to 
the side and then begins rolling head around in circles repetitively whilst looking at the 
blinds from the corners of her eyes] look at it this way.  
Stewart:  He just look and look [demonstrates by tilting head to the side and looking out of the 
corners of his eyes] 
Psych:  Yeh [nodding in confirmation], he’s stimming!  
 
Without the transcription of the gestures and bodily movements used by Sophie and Stewart, 
the reader would have very little insight into what Rupert’s “unusual sensory interest” entailed; 
and likewise if the psychologist was only privy to the words used to describe Rupert’s 
behaviour, she would have little to no understanding either. The video stills reproduced below 
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(see Figure 6.11), whilst unable to fully capture the in-vivo richness of the video itself, add 
another layer of insight into the translation of this corporeal knowledge.  
 
Figure 6.11 shows Sophie’s use of hand gestures to convey Rupert’s focus and attention 
directed towards the blinds, and the two images at the bottom/middle of Figure 6.11 show the 
way that Sophie acts out Rupert’s head rolling (due to confidentiality, I am required to blur 
participant’s faces so unfortunately the images here are unable to convey the detail in the facial 
expressions and head movements). Stewart’s body and arm movements at the top of Figure 
6.11 illustrate his interpretation of Rupert’s mannerisms when looking at the light through the 
blinds.   
 
If we return to the transcription of this interaction, we can see that the psychologist displays 
clear signs that she understands Sophie and Stewart’s words and actions. She affirms and 
acknowledges Stewart’s performance: “Ahhh, I know what you mean!” and validates both 
parent’s accounts at the end of their enactment by translating their knowledge into a  
 
Figure 6.11: Video stills of Sophie and Stewart using corporeal labour to explain Rupert’s 
“unusual sensory interest” in light and blinds during the ADI-R  
 
 
medical/psychological term: “Yeh [nodding in confirmation], he’s stimming!” By using the term 
“stimming” the psychologist is referring to a clinical term to describe self-stimulatory 
behaviour, which involves the repetition of physical movements, sounds, or the repetitive 
movement of objects. In doing so, she categorises Rupert’s behaviours as part of the broader 
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ASD symptomology. Further, she goes on to record this interaction in the ADI-R booklet (see 
Figure 6.12), albeit in simplified terms, thus counting this piece of knowledge as “evidence” and 
a verification of autism. 
 
Figure 6.12: Psychologist’s inscriptions in the ADI-R booklet for “Unusual Sensory Interests”  
 
 
In the video-reflexive interview with the psychologist, I played back various clips from Sophie 
and Stewart’s ADI-R interview, and questioned the psychologist about the difficulties associated 
with conducting the ADI-R with culturally and linguistically diverse families.  In the following 
excerpt from the video-reflexive interview, the psychologist discusses the strategies that she 
uses to address this:  
 
Me:  How do you deal with, you know, working with families where there is a little bit of a 
language barrier, or there is a bit of, you know, a lack of understanding – how does that 
work for you [with] diagnosing and coming to that… 
Psych:  Usually with families with a language barrier, because they don’t understand, umm, 
often you let them talk first and then you’d ask the same type of question but in a 
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different way. Like, for example, it’s very clear – there are repetitive behaviours and 
stimming [points at computer screen where video has been paused] – [the parents] don’t 
understand that, they actually don’t understand what the concept of autism is. So, just 
collect the data and then go through [it] with them. So, sometimes I have families like 
that and I’ll say, “Well, actually…we call that sensory stuff, so it just means, you know, 
impulsivity, and he can’t control it, and he enjoys it”. And I always give an example, I’ll 
say, “You know how you click a pen [demonstrates curving fingers around pen and 
moving thumb up and down rapidly as if clicking the top of a pen] – it’s like that! And he 
needs to do that”. Umm, so with a family like that, I would normally, yeh, break it down. I 
know the questions are standardised, but, families like that, they don’t understand those 
standardised questions, and they don’t even understand - this family specifically – they 
don’t understand what autism is… 
 
Through this response we obtain more insight into Sophie and Stewart’s situation, and their 
limited understanding of and knowledge about ASD. The psychologist emphasises the 
limitations of language, especially in the form of standardised questions, in this context and the 
importance of collecting the data and going through it with them. As the transcribed interaction 
during the ADI-R, video stills and snapshot of the scored ADI-R booklet show, the data 
collection process for Sophie and Stewart involves significant collaboration and translation via 
corporeal labour. The psychologist, in turn, acknowledges and affirms the behaviours during the 
ADI-R, as well as during the reflexive interview, where she reinforces her translation of the 
parents’ performance of Rupert’s behaviours as a display of “repetitive behaviours” or 
“stimming.” She goes on to stress that a part of this collaborative process of “rendering” (Myers 
2015) an ASD diagnosis involves reflecting and validating the behaviours described by providing 
an example and acting this out (in the excerpt above the psychologist demonstrates this by 
clicking the pen repetitively). Thus, both parents and psychologist have used the same language 
– performance or corporeal labour – to reach a common understanding in the diagnostic 
encounter.   
 
Using video as a form of evidence in the ADI-R 
The focus of the chapter so far has been on the way that the parents and psychologist use 
corporeal labour in the negotiated space of the ADI-R diagnostic encounter, and how I have 
analysed this through my video-reflexive ethnographic work. However, some of the parents 
that participated in this clinical trial have also engaged in their own video ethnography in their 
home lives. Recognising that the psychologist will have limited interaction with their child, 
some parents independently decided to film their children at home when they were displaying 
some of their puzzling, quirky or difficult-to-explain behaviour.  
 
 217 
For example, Sarah, the mother of Gil (a nine year old boy who is quiet and engages in rocking 
behaviour), brings in a video of Gil rocking (that is, while seated he rocks back and forth) to 
show the psychologist and help determine if this behaviour is viewed as “repetitive”. Similarly, 
Jenny and Matthew, the parents of Stephen (who is seven years-old and has a diagnosis of 
Agenesis Corpus Collosum (ACC)), play three separate videos to the psychologist: two 
demonstrating the intensity of Stephen’s tantrums, and the other focusing on his reading ability 
and a conversation he has with his parents (see Table 6.1 and Figure 6.13). This takes up ten 
minutes of the nearly three-hour diagnostic session, and prompts some comments, 
observations and questions from the psychologist that help inform her overall diagnostic 
opinion of Stephen.  
 
Table 6.1: Transcription of psychologist’s comments during video playback during Stephen’s ADI-
R  
Reference in video Psychologist comment/question/observation 
Stephen having a meltdown “You’re not even talking to him and he gets quite worked up!” 
Stephen having a meltdown “Did he have a meltdown because he was frustrated?”  
Stephen reading “Can he attend to his work at school?” 
Stephen talking about a TV 
show  
“I think he’s reciprocating though in that situation. I know it’s his 
own interest, but at least he’s able to build on it.” 
Stephen reading (focus on 
bodily movements of child) 
Psych confirms that the bodily movements are not stereotyped or 
repetitive according to ADI-R criteria because “they are 
contained”.  
 
When asked about this video in the reflexive interview, the psychologist explained the 
importance of being able to see a video if she is unable to see the child in the diagnostic 
encounter: 
 
Psych:  So, I remember I requested [the video]. Yeh, I requested it because I wasn’t going to see 
him, because he had already [done] a WISC assessment. So I wanted to make sure that 
what they were saying was reliable.  
 
The video, in this case, provides the psychologist with an opportunity to observe Stephen in his 
home environment engaging in the behaviours that the parents have referenced throughout 
the ADI-R. Given that the ADI-R is contained within the clinical trial (with strict protocols around 
which diagnostic tools can be used), the psychologist does not have the opportunity to view 
Stephen in his everyday environment. The video of Stephen is natural and contextual (Stephen 
is not aware he is being filmed in the lead up to, and during, a  
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Figure 6.13: Psychologist, Jenny and Matthew watching videos of Stephen’s behaviour 
 
 
tantrum). The psychologist goes on to clarify the importance of including a naturalised, 
contextual observation of the child in the diagnostic process: 
 
Psych:  They probably should make video as part of the assessment process. And this is why we 
use school observations – because you’re getting more realistic pictures than what 
parents report. Like I said, parents could overestimate or underestimate, but when you 
see it... 
 
Psych:  Yeh, I think sometimes, I like seeing the child because sometimes I doubt…I don’t doubt 
the parents, but like I said, you need more than one source of information. Umm, 
especially Michael’s Mum [Teneale]…she would be one parent – and I had another 
parent the other day – where I didn’t really feel that they understood the ADI-R enough. 
So, I was really relying on seeing the child. So, when I saw the child – for example, on 
Monday, I was like, “Oh, he doesn’t have autism”, and it was just validated… 
 
The video example of Stephen not only highlights some complex behaviours that the parents 
needed help deciphering, but also demonstrates some strengths Stephen possesses, namely his 
reading ability and conversational skills. In relation to the video of Stephen’s conversation with 
his parents, the psychologist notes: “I think he’s reciprocating though in that situation. I know 
it’s his own interest, but at least he’s able to build on it.” The psychologist acknowledges the 
importance of the role video could play in the diagnostic encounter, highlighting that 
naturalised observations are crucial in a normal clinical diagnosis (as opposed to the diagnosis 
that takes place in a clinical trial). Given the time and funding constraints of the clinical trial, 
video could be a valuable addition to ensure some naturalised data is taken into account in the 
diagnostic encounter.  
 219 
 
In the video-reflexive interview, the psychologist reflects on her focus on writing in the scoring 
booklets during the diagnostic encounter, and feeling like she is missing out on important 
observational opportunities. She seems disappointed that she was not able to pay more 
attention to her “clients” and notes the pressure she is under to record the data: “you miss that 
opportunity” and “it’s always about the collation of data.” She suggests, in the excerpt below, 
that perhaps videotaping the diagnostic session (as I have done as part of my research) would 
be helpful, enabling the clinician to watch and observe more throughout the session itself, 
instead of focusing on recording the data:  
 
Psych:  [after watching first video] Well! I’m not very tuned-in with some of my clients! I’m just like 
[mimes head down and writing – she smiles and laughs while she does this].  
Me:  Well, it’s interesting because…and that’s something as well that struck me, there’s 
obviously a lot of pressure on you…to write all of this and to get it all down… 
Psych:  …to interpret it… 
Me:  Yeh! In the ADI-R I find it’s not as much of an issue, but in the WISC it’s the same thing – 
you’re writing and there’s often times where the kids will be doing stuff and… 
Psych:  You miss that opportunity!  
Me:  Yeh, yeh, yeh! And that’s interesting you’ve pointed that out yourself. I don’t know if you 
were as aware of that having not seen the video? 
Psych:  Yeh, you do! It’s hard! I try and…with ADOS videos, because you need to watch more, I 
normally video tape [the diagnostic session], but, we’re supposed to write and just do it 
then. I find it’s hard…I do find it hard with some of these families. Like, for example, with 
Daniel, I knew him – it was easy for me. I was like, “beh beh beh beh beh [gestures as if 
robotically writing], yeh I see that”. With the families where I’m not sure, yeh, I try and get 
more specific examples. But it is hard to write as well. But, in saying that, at the end of the 
day, it’s always about collation of data. 
 
The psychologist’s observation demonstrates an implicit value placed upon the qualitative, 
observational and emotionally nuanced aspects of the diagnosis. The psychologist critiques 
both the diagnostic tool and her subsequent implementation of it in practice, describing the 
diagnosis as a missed opportunity, and her practice as not very tuned-in. Given the pressure to 
write, observe, analyse, score and demonstrate sensitivity to the parent, videoing the session 
may allow the psychologist to focus on observing and “tuning-in” during the diagnostic 
encounter.  
 
“Caring about” and “caring for” (Lappé 2014): the clinical trial as a route 
to access resources 
Early on in my VRE data-gathering and in general observations of, and interactions with the 
main trial psychologist relates, it became clear how much extra care work, or “off protocol 
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activities,” were carried out between the psychologist and parent(s). This extra care work is a 
product of the inevitable tension that exists between doing good research and simultaneously 
delivering patient care within the clinical trial. Chen, Miller and Rosenstein (2003) argue that 
research and care are in fact very different kinds of activities given that hypothesis-driven 
research is ostensibly independent of a patient’s best interests, whereas care is about treating 
the individual needs of a patient. Throughout the diagnostic encounter, the psychologist offers 
each family numerous therapy suggestions, strategies to combat problematic behaviour, and 
general advice on autism. In addition, there is constant care and advice provided to the child 
and family with regards to the medication. The family is encouraged to seek extra support and 
regularly consult with the trial psychologist and paediatrician should they have any concerns 
about the medication and its effects, even if their concerns relate to their belief that the child is 
taking the placebo and not coping, and may therefore need to be removed from the trial. An 
important component of this care work relates to the low socio-economic background of many 
of the participants in the trial. Consequently, the trial represents not only a means to access 
medication but also high level of care and resources that may otherwise be unavailable to 
them.   
 
In order to better understand this notion of care work in the clinical trial I draw on Hochschild’s 
(1983) concept of emotional labour. This involves the cultivation of a deliberate emotional 
response by (in the case of this thesis) the psychologist in order to interact with patients, as 
well as repressing unwanted emotions to deliver care. Hochschild (1983) explains that it is the 
separation of acting or displaying emotion and genuinely feeling emotion – that is, emotive 
dissonance – that leads to emotional labour. This emotional labour is performed through 
(Hochschild 1983): (1) Surface acting – shaping how we outwardly appear through body 
language, facial expressions, posture and sympathetic noises (for example, sighing). In terms of 
the psychologist and patient, surface acting manifests as expressing empathetic behaviour 
towards the patient in the absence of consistent emotional and cognitive reactions: the 
psychologist tries to seem sad, concerned or happy during the diagnostic session. The facial 
expression/body language/posture and so on are “put on” (23); (2) Deep acting – involves 
creating “the inner shape of feeling” (22): the psychologist attempts to generate empathy-
consistent emotional and cognitive reactions, that is, attempting to actually feel the emotion 
that they are expected to display. This “conscious mental work” (23) separates the 
manufactured feeling from their central self; or (3) A combination of both. 
 
The relationship between clinician and patient has long been acknowledged as a vital 
component of treatment and effective care (see for example, Cassel 1997; Epstein & Hundert 
2002; Larson 2003). In this section, I explore the ways that the psychologist performs this 
emotional labour to cultivate an affective atmosphere within the diagnostic encounter, and 
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how this in turn produces an affective response in herself, the parents, and the children. I will 
also explore the strategic motivations behind such an approach which can encourage 
compliance of participants within the clinical trial.  
 
Jespersen, Bonnelycke and Eriksen’s (2013) ethnographic examination of a randomised 
controlled trial investigating the effects of exercise amongst moderately overweight Danish 
men raises a key point about the care practices that take place during a clinical trial. They argue 
that care practices – that is, expert advice, personal and emotional considerations, and 
encouraging conversations – play a vital role in encouraging and maintaining participation and 
helping to improve the research process. Jespersen and colleagues (2013), Timmermans (2010) 
and Mol and colleagues (2010) all emphasise that it is this practical and emotional work that 
enables the production of the scientific data, and, in fact, that this emotional labour could be 
considered inherent to clinical trial work. But perhaps most importantly, “these heterogeneous, 
messy and dirty practices are washed away in the abstractions and purifications that are 
necessary to produce scientific results.” (Jespersen et al 2013: 658).  
 
For Jespersen and colleagues (2013), this care work is often strategic. For instance, they draw 
on examples from their ethnographic observations of men participating in exercise tasks in 
which they are encouraged with motivational cheering from the scientific staff. This care, via 
praise and applause, is seen to not only motivate participants to continue exercising, but also to 
“secure their compliance” (Jespersen et al 664). Likewise in the WISC-IV sessions with the 
children, the psychologist often encourages and reinforces through verbal praise, and in one 
session, even rewards a child’s compliant behaviour with an electronic toy provided earlier by 
the parent.  
 
Lappé (2014) argues that, “research and care become intimately intertwined and mutually 
constructed during the research process” (304). This caring for the child and parents takes the 
form of “another set of eyes” (Lappé 2014: 311) directed towards the child. Specifically, in this 
fluoxetine trial, this takes shape through the extra work performed by the psychologist. The 
following excerpts from the diagnostic interview with Laura and Tom, Patrick’s parents, 
illustrate a common occurrence throughout each diagnostic session that I observed: 
 
Psych:  I’m just going to suggest, to help him – because he’s starting a new school, and you want 
him to start off well – I mean…with kids on the Spectrum, it’s all about tweaking stuff. So, 
for him, you know, you say something, then you give it to him, and so he understands the 
system. But, what about having it visualised as well. So, you know, going back to basics, 
you know how they have the “tick chart” or a jar where he gets tokens and he puts them 
in? But for Patrick, because he can’t regulate himself, coming up with goals for him…so 
for example, if you say, “If this person swears/says a bad word at you, you did ….” And 
 222 
then you have a solution for him, and if he does that, then he gets a tick, then it goes in 
the jar, and then however many things he gets in the jar, he gets a reward. Just so that 
way, he’s starting to use the stuff he’s been taught. Because he’s got a lot of tools from 
what it sounds like.  
Laura:  He just doesn’t know when and how to use them. 
Psych: Exactly!  
 
Psych: That’s something…I mean, he doesn’t have an anxiety specifically, but because he’s a 
very anxious child and very inflexible, there’s a program that a lot of psychologists use, 
it’s called “Cool Kids” – it’s for kids on the Spectrum (they’ve made one specifically). So, if 
you want to have a look into it, it’s at Macquarie Uni, and they run it really cheaply. I 
mean, they’ll screen first to see if he is suitable for the program, but I think it might be 
something to look into.  
 
Psych:  So he needs to have like, a manual. 
Laura: Yeah, I like that! We’re going to do that. I’m going to get him to help me write it – all the 
pictures and stuff. 
Psych: You know what you do: take photos of him, put it in a PowerPoint, and then print them 
out. Kids love it! 
Laura: Yeah, I think it’s a great concept! And I’m going to get him to keep it with him all the 
time. 
Psych: Yeah, yeah. Get him to keep it in his bag, call it “What to do when Patrick gets angry”. 
 
In the video-reflexive interviews with the psychologist, I asked what motivated her to provide 
this extra care for families: 
 
Psych:  I think families need to know that it’s not such a bad thing…like [getting a diagnosis of 
ASD] is not the be all and end all. There’s always ways to help these children and I think 
the problem is that there are services out there that, I guess, oversell when they 
shouldn’t be, and some of these families just need some basic strategies. And, not only 
that, they are coming into this trial, they are so desperate [for help] – they’re at the point 
where they need to try medical intervention [medication], and behavioural medications 
[like Fluoxetine] still do work. Yeh, it helps [the family] and I think having the experience, 
like doing both [diagnosis and treatment] – because some clinicians only do the 
diagnostic stuff – when you do the assessment and the intervention, I think you can 
connect it a little bit more. So, with the families, when you’ve got that example [of a 
strategy the family can use to target a difficult behaviour] there you realise it helps them 
understand what they can do. Yeh, I do that a lot [in the trial diagnostic sessions] [laughs] 
– I go off topic!  
 
Throughout each interview, the psychologist consistently offers helpful tips and guidance to 
families based on her years’ of experience working as a therapist for children with autism. She 
often veers away from the standardised format of the very long (three hour) diagnostic 
interview to make sure she is able to include information on treatment strategies that the 
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family has, in most cases, never heard of. For example, in the case of Stephen who has 
problems with social interactions with his peers during play dates, the psychologist 
recommends that his parents, Jenny and Matthew, try implementing a schedule or plan before 
the friend comes over for the play date: 
 
Psych:  Just a little bit off topic, while we’re on the subject of friends: when he has friends over, 
it’s a good idea to set the routine up before they come over, so you have a plan. So then 
you write down a schedule of what he should do. Maybe, “10 o’clock play blocks or 
Lego…” just so that he knows how to set up the play and maintain that for a decent 
period of time, because he struggles with that [side of] friendship. 
Jenny:  That sounds really good.  
Matthew: It’s weird because he’ll sit and play with Lego, but his friend wants to play with the 
computer game, so he’ll play that for 5 to 10 minutes, but then he’s like, “Oh, I want to 
go back and play with the Lego.”  
 
Similarly, in the diagnostic interview with David’s mother, Abigail, this care work comes in the 
form of the psychologist expressing concern over the way that David’s school is dealing with 
him in the classroom. During the interview, Abigail provides many examples of problems that 
David has experienced, and relays her frustrations, anxieties and sense of powerlessness. In 
response, the psychologist offers advice as well as action on her part: 
 
Psych:  With the [diagnostic] report, I’ll do it as fast as I can, but I can write down, “he does need 
more support”, and “we saw from our interview that once you establish some routine 
with him, he’s able to respond and learn”. And I think they need that as well, so if we’ve 
signed off on it, they can see that it’s not just you, that you’ve got clinical support that’s 
saying: “this is what this child needs”. So hopefully that might help a little bit as well.  
 
In the video-reflexive interview, the psychologist talks about this care work as being part of her 
“ethical practice” and stresses that ultimately this trial involves the mental health of the 
patient. She talks about the sensitive and patient-centred work that is important to her practice 
as a psychologist: 
 
Psych:  That’s part of our ethical…I mean, it’s common sense! It should be part of your ethical 
practice, like it should be part of your ethics, or whatever you want to call it! Yeh, it 
should be part of your practice because psychology is very sensitive – it’s about the 
patient. So, I think it’s a little bit different to medicine, because [with] medicine we’re 
focusing on that biological component, and I mean, you do your follow-up and that’s it! 
Whereas this [trial], it’s mental health, the mental health of the patient…It’s more like: 
there’s a problem, and there are strategies to manage these problems – “this is what I 
need to do”. It’s the same as medicine – you need stitches to stitch up a wound [mimes 
stitching with needle and thread]. In psychology, you need to give families strategies to 
help them manage their [children’s] behaviours, their problems, or whatever it is.  
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This caring for the child and family also manifests in the free provision of psychological and 
medical diagnostic and treatment services. Many of the families participating in this trial are 
from a low socioeconomic background, and have limited access to care and services, 
particularly given the intensive treatment schedule demanded by autism therapies such as 
applied behavioural analysis (ABA). Trial staff consistently fielded emails and phone calls from 
the parents of participants that required help and support that went outside of the trial 
protocol parameters. These extra consultations may involve asking the psychologist for their 
advice on therapies, to discuss other medications that may be helpful for the child, or even 
simply to “vent” to the psychologist about a particularly bad day that the child had at school. 
Lappé (2014) demonstrates that this caring for attitude of autism research is perhaps more 
common than we might think: 
 
The relationship built into the conduct of the research do more than just satisfy the methodological 
needs of the study. In a changing ethical and societal environment, they actively create science as a 
particular route for assessing resources that may not otherwise be available to families. (312) 
 
In the video-reflexive interview, the psychologist makes an important point about the 
importance of being a clinician that is involved in working with children with ASD in both a 
diagnostic and treatment capacity, and using this experience and knowledge within her role as 
diagnosing clinician in the clinical trial. The psychologist makes an important distinction 
between “clinicians” (those that practice outside of the clinical trial) and “researchers” (those 
that work within the research space of the clinical trial): 
 
Psych:  The trial’s an opportunity for [the family]. I mean, it’s not supposed to be, but it’s a way 
to help them. And, I mean, trials are hard because the risk is you’ll be on placebo – and 
that’s that ethical dilemma. But, the good thing about the trial is, because we’re 
clinicians on the trial, I think it makes it a bit easier – it’s not easy – but I think we have 
more of an understanding of when [the children] have to be pulled out. Whereas – and 
this is where I find for researchers it’s a bit difficult… - if you’re not a clinician, I don’t 
think you get it. Because, it’s not the numbers, it’s: “this isn’t working for this child, we 
need to do something else, it’s not practical, we’ve got enough data”. Whereas a 
statistician: “No, because you haven’t reached the full twenty-two weeks [set out in the 
guidelines of the Fluoxetine trial], we’re not going to have the statistical power that 
needs to be reached, blah, blah, blah. They can only be withdrawn if X, Y, Z”. It’s not as 
concrete as that, it’s not black and white! The clinical stuff is grey! [laughs]  
 
Thus, for the psychologist, the trial protocol and the clinical trial itself are malleable entities 
that are able to incorporate affect, caring, and individualised approaches into their apparent 
“rigid” and “scientific” structure. For the psychologist, duty of care and what is best for the 
child can override the strict parameters of the clinical trial.  
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As Jespersen et al (2013) point out, “Interfering elements, such as emotions, actors and 
practicalities, are not just obstacles that are later removed, but also allies and resources that 
are drawn upon while engaging in the [trial]” (666). Thus, the emotional labour that the 
psychologist employs throughout the trial in both the WISC-IV and ADI-R sessions is crucial to 
the data gathering and overall success of this clinical trial.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the key ways that the psychologist, parents, and children are 
involved in the construction and formulation of an ASD diagnosis. In the clinical trial studied for 
this thesis, it is clear that diagnosis is reached through a complex process of negotiating, 
shaping, ordering, matching, observing and coding. Techniques used by clinicians to achieve 
diagnosis include tinkering with standardised tools, corporeal labour, and balancing the tension 
between quantitative and qualitative approaches to diagnosis. Canguilhem’s (1989) work is 
used throughout this thesis to demonstrate a tension that exists in this clinical trial between 
science in theory and science in practice. As I have argued, the ever-looming presence of the 
scientific ideal of the gold-standard randomised controlled trial – with its foundations in 
quantitative theory and statistical methods – is always seen as the ultimate goal for this clinical 
trial. The outputs of the study – the protocols, the publications and reports, and the statistical 
data generated – will always need to somehow fit this quantitative paradigm, whereby disorder 
is understood as a quantitative deviation from a statistical norm. However, it is behind the 
scenes that the real labour of the clinical trial occurs. This labour generates data through 
participants’ value-orientation, their experiences, stories, corporeal labour, translation of 
knowledge about their child, and their negotiation within the clinical encounter with the 
psychologist, and the diagnostic tool itself. This work is above all unique and qualitative. It is 
the job of psychologists involved in the diagnostic encounter to filter, translate, categorise, 
codify and quantify this complex, inter-subjective, experiential knowledge to fit with the clinical 
trial agenda which views disorder as a quantitative deviation from a statistical norm.  
 
Significantly, the ADI-R diagnostic tool is described as an assessment tool, and for many, this 
denotes traditional medical or clinical hierarchical relationships of the doctor and the patient, 
or the scientist and the clinical trial participant. However, if we examine the meaning of this 
term further, the root of the word assessment is from the Latin word assidere, which means, 
“to sit beside” (Stefanakis 2002). The data from my observations and filming of the ADI-R 
overwhelmingly supports this notion that the ASD diagnostic process is reliant on collaboration 
between the psychologist and parent, achieved through shared and negotiated corporeal 
labour.  
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CONCLUSION 
Rethinking autism diagnosis through an “alongsider” 
approach 
 
The value-laden and qualitative practice of autism diagnosis 
This thesis has focused on the quandary facing clinicians and researchers involved in diagnosing 
and defining autism spectrum disorders in the clinic, the clinical trial and in research more 
generally. Clinicians must follow strict protocols, guidelines and standardised tools that dictate 
the questions to ask, how they should be asked, the order in which they should be asked, how 
they should react to the answers, what information they need to record, and the form in which 
these answers should be recorded. Or so medicine would have us believe.   
 
It is clear from the video data gathered for this thesis, and the subsequent analysis of this data 
alongside the clinical trial psychologist, that autism diagnostic practices are far from neat, 
objective, certain or ordered. Yet, assessment tools used in the autism diagnostic session 
continue to reduce differences between individuals labelled with autism and those classed as 
neurotypical (“normal”) to a quantitative deviation from a fixed norm (that is, a number, code 
or score).  Throughout this thesis I provide insight into what diagnosing autism as part of a 
clinical trial looks like in practice: the reframing of autism as a disorder firmly located in the 
brain; the complexities of the clinician-parent-pharma alliance; the constant clinical struggle of 
following the assessment tool or deviating from it to obtain useful data; the corporeal labour 
carried out by both parent and clinician to convey and translate complex behaviours; and the 
emotional labour and care work carried out by the trial clinician. Using VRE has allowed me to 
engage with this qualitative, nuanced, messy and complex view of autism and the diagnostic 
practice that goes with it. Rather than offer solutions or ways to counteract this mess, I seek to 
show, following Canguilhem (1989), that it is this qualitative diagnostic work that provides a 
more candid and authentic account of the lived experience of autism and what real diagnostic 
practices entail.  
 
However, this thesis does not wish to discount or dismiss the contribution of these 
standardised approaches in diagnosis, and indeed recognises that these tools have a role to 
play. The clinical trial diagnostic encounter frequently engages with these two, at times, 
conflicting discourses of (1) the positivist view of health – focusing on objectifying and 
standardising autism diagnosis; and (2) Canguilhem’s (1989) qualitative conception of health – 
focusing on how a patient feels and what they individually experience as health and illness. As I 
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have discussed in both Chapters One and Two, clinicians acknowledge that this qualitative 
approach to autism diagnosis in both the clinic and clinical trial is an inevitable part of their 
practice given the heterogeneous nature of autism: it is about doing the “doable job” (Lenne 
and Waldby 2011).  
 
However, evidence, standards, guidelines, tools and “medical treatments” (namely medications 
such as fluoxetine) are ever-present in the clinical encounter, looming in the background as an 
undeniable presence and in some way contributing to the formalisation of clinical behaviours 
and research practices. Importantly, this formalised structure has its foundations in the 
classificatory drive that emerged in the early twentieth century in Australia and the rest of the 
world, and has persisted across many significant diagnostic revolutions (such as the 
introduction of the DSM and subsequent revisions). The much maligned eugenics movement 
also played a key part in cementing the role of this overarching classificatory and statistically, 
“science”-focused hierarchy. Today, we can still see the connections between what were and 
are considered “problem populations” (then, the feebleminded, and today, those individuals 
diagnosed with autism) and the need for “social control” (then, institutionalisation, and today, 
medicating using SSRI drugs such as fluoxetine to manage repetitive (“difficult”) behaviours). 
This is not to say that these diagnostic tools and guidelines play a necessarily domineering role 
in the clinical encounter today, but I do seek to show that they are a factor in diagnostically 
shaping and driving the moving target of autism. This is characterised by different impairments 
and strengths of autism reported across particular contexts and participants. My discussion of 
the classification of deviance in the early twentieth century in Australia highlights that this 
category, throughout history, experienced many ebbs and flows, and the individuals labelled as 
“deviant,” “feebleminded,” “mad,” “mentally defective” and so on experienced changing 
fortunes as these categories shifted and were redefined. Significantly, while diagnostic 
decisions were perhaps simplified in the early twentieth century in terms of whether an 
individual was institutionalised or not, as I discuss in Chapter One, the stability of these 
categories was still highly scrutinised. For example, it was the “higher-functioning” 
classifications that were the most difficult to assess, which presented problems from the point 
of view of eugenics, because the “feeble-minded” could slip between the diagnostic cracks and 
thus avoid the scrutiny and gaze of the state. Classificatory practices have made the 
surveillance of children a priority, and we can directly trace the current fervour to use 
assessments, checklists and intelligence tests – not just in relation to children’s health, but also 
in education and social interactions – back to this period when the application of IQ tests within 
schools was perceived as allowing the success of eugenic reforms.  
 
This thesis argues that current medical protocols and guidelines hold up this positivist, objective 
view of diagnosis via standardised tools as the gold standard of practice. Yet, when we observe 
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clinicians doing this diagnostic work and talk to them about the diagnostic encounter, we see 
that there is constant negotiation between the quantitative approach – and the very obvious 
critique and scepticism that clinicians seem to have about the arbitrariness and flaws built into 
these standardised documents – and the more nuanced, creative and “gut feel” of the 
qualitative approach. While this thesis often sets up a dichotomy between the qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, the VRE data also provides some initial insights into the subtleties and 
strangeness of these diagnostic tools that warrants further investigation. However, the focus of 
this conclusion is on the utility and value of qualitative data in the diagnostic session. Later in 
this chapter, I will argue that when this diagnostic information is used appropriately, it can 
provide a more holistic and nuanced assessment of the child and their abilities.  
 
The mechanisms involved in diagnosing autism in practice 
This notion of what “should be done” according to the rules and protocols of the clinical trial, 
compared with the practical reality of the diagnostic session, is one of the key themes the 
clinical trial psychologist returns to in the reflexive interviews conducted for this thesis. In each 
diagnostic session the psychologist is required to follow the standardised diagnostic tool. 
However, she is also required to gather detailed information about the child’s repetitive 
behaviours and restricted interests in order to test the medication’s efficacy. To do so, she 
must, at times, creatively move outside of the confines of the tool to gather this data. This is 
particularly evident in the way that the psychologist draws information from the parents in the 
ADI-R by using her body to act out behaviours, and encouraging the parents to do so too, 
allowing them to communicate by way of this common corporeal language. This clinical 
creativity is quite different to the rigidness of the WIC-IV session with the children, where what 
the clinician and children say is more tightly controlled, and what counts as evidence is 
narrower and more prescribed. 
 
It is the constant clinical interplay, negotiation, and compromise between standardised tools, 
the reality of diagnostic practice, and the relentlessly changing conceptions and definitions of 
what autism is that drove my reflexive interview sessions with the clinical trial psychologist. 
Trying to grapple with these seemingly disparate concepts, which each playing a role in 
directing the autism diagnostic encounter, was a major theme in our discussions. In observing 
her diagnostic practices during the clinical trial and in our reflexive interviews, the psychologist 
actively tries to balance and negotiate a diagnostic process that allows all three of these 
elements to work together.  
 
In Figure 7.1, below, I seek to represent this diagnostic approach through three separate 
machinery cogs, constantly in motion, working together to drive the autism diagnostic process. 
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If one cog stops working, the process breaks down. The blue cog represents the qualitative, 
nuanced and creative diagnostic work that I have documented in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
This work acknowledges and embraces the complex and messy aspects of autism diagnosis in 
the clinical trial. This approach privileges: the emotion and care work involved in autism 
diagnosis; the need to rethink diagnosis to focus on the strengths and abilities of the child; the 
ability to convey complex clinical ideas using our bodies; the complex alliances and 
relationships that evolve in the clinical encounter; and the various ways clinical creativity can be 
used to produce “evidence”.  
 
However, this qualitative diagnostic work does not function in isolation, but interacts with and 
is driven by the quantitative-based standardised tools (green cog, Figure 7.114) that seem to 
hem-in the diagnostic process. These documents not only drive the decisions behind what data 
is collected in the clinical trial, but also (unofficially) shape the way that clinicians engage in 
these creative diagnostic practices given that they are still required to produce evidence that 
fits within the accepted clinical trial paradigm. The standardised tools provide a structure and 
framework to the diagnostic session: clinical tasks and questions that have been researched, 
tested and validated within the epidemiological paradigm.  
 
Furthermore, these messy and qualitative diagnostic practices that act upon the protocols and 
tools, and vice versa, also feed into, and act as influencers on, what Singh (2015) terms 
“multiple autisms” or alternatively, what Hacking (2006) describes as the “moving target” of 
autism. This final multi-coloured cog (see Figure 7.1) represents the open-ended and uncertain 
nature of this diagnostic category: what this category has been, and what it will become, 
remains an open black box. The uncertainty surrounding the category of autism is constantly 
present during the diagnostic and reflexive sessions filmed for this thesis. Parents were often 
confused about the changing labels associated with autism, why their child had not been 
diagnosed sooner, how and why the medication being tested for the clinical trial would help a 
child with autism, and what the shift from the DSM-IV-TR to the DSM-5 would mean for their 
child’s diagnosis. This in turn meant that the clinician was also grappling with and trying to 
provide answers to these complex questions during the ADI-R with the parent(s). For example, 
within the same diagnostic session the psychologist would often use definitive neurological 
explanations of autism when asked about the medication, framing autism as an “anxious brain” 
disorder; yet later in the session, she would talk about the heterogeneous nature of autism and 
how the criteria are constantly changing.  
                                                           
14 This diagram is intended to be interpreted as a visual conceptualisation of the diverse findings of chapters four 
through six. I do not wish the diagram to be read as an attempt to impose order on the diagnostic mess that I focus 
on and reveal throughout this thesis, it simply represents a way of demonstrating the dynamic and constantly 
moving diagnostic work that goes on in practice according to my VRE data.  
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Figure 7.1: The dynamic process of diagnostic work in practice during the clinical trial and its 
impact on standardised diagnostic documents and criteria  
 
 
In Chapter Four, I consider the differences between autism that is diagnosed in the clinic and 
the autism that is diagnosed within the clinical trial. Participation in this clinical trial is linked to 
what Mol (2002) describes as multiple ontologies, “Different enactments of a disease entail 
different ontologies. They each do the body differently” (176). We can see that through the 
treatment of autism with medications (such as SSRIs, stimulants and antipsychotics) the 
classification of autism is reframed. Inevitably, this trial promotes a particular enactment of 
autism (that is, as treatable with the SSRI Fluoxetine), which produces a corresponding ontology 
(that is, autism is shaped as a disorder of the brain and seen through the lens of anxiety, as 
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indicated by the child’s manifestation of repetitive behaviours). This process of fostering and 
promoting the image of the “anxious autistic brain” (multi-coloured cog) is exemplified in Figure 
7.1, above. A key section of the ADI-R involves questions about repetitive behaviours and 
stereotyped movements of the body, and therefore this becomes a significant component of 
this diagnostic session within this clinical trial. Obtaining this data involves gathering complex 
clinical evidence from the parent through corporeal labour (blue cog, Figure 7.1) and then 
shaping and translating this data to fit within the ADI-R (green cog, Figure 7.1). In the context of 
this clinical trial, the focus of the ADI-R is not only to determine whether the child meets the 
cut-off scores for autism diagnosis, but also, whether and to what extent these repetitive 
behaviours and stereotyped movements are exhibited by the child. This is crucial given that a 
decrease in these behaviours is the only measure of the medication’s effectiveness. 
 
The VRE approach allowed me to focus on the active and dynamic forms of knowledge 
production that went on within the clinical trial. New ontologies are linked to the ways in which 
autism itself is enacted. In the context of the clinical trial, autism is enacted as: a “treatable 
anxious brain” where autism is reframed and reconceptualised (almost too deliberately) with 
the drug fluoxetine, repetitive and stereotyped behaviours, and anxiety (Chapter Four); a 
disorder to be standardised, with the prime aim of delineating what counts as normal and 
pathological, at the cost of discounting the lived experience of health (Chapter Five); and 
“corporeal labour” that can be translated into “clinical evidence” (Chapter Six). 
 
The intention here is not to suggest that there is a “correct” or “incorrect” way to diagnose 
autism. Instead, I would like to highlight to the reader the complex ways that different 
knowledges and competing priorities must be negotiated and ultimately work alongside each 
other to reach a diagnostic decision. This is truly a remarkable achievement and demonstrates 
the immense amount of clinical labour, on the part of both clinicians and the trial participants, 
that goes into producing this data.  
 
There are three key ideas that I would like to leave with the reader, which seek to build on my 
exploration of the autism diagnostic encounter in the clinical trial. First, future research in this 
field needs to consider the vital role that VRE plays in capturing rich, candid and dynamic data 
that is produced and analysed alongside and in consultation with the patients, families and 
clinicians involved in the research. Second, I consider the importance of shifting autism 
diagnostic emphasis to an approach that includes the child’s voice in a more meaningful and 
non-standardised way. By drawing on my review of the historical literature in Chapter One and 
the contemporary landscape of autism diagnosis and definition as it stands today, I argue that 
this approach is key to providing a more holistic and meaningful diagnostic experience. The 
third area for development in this research involves viewing medical and psychological 
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assessment and diagnosis as an opportunity to embrace an “alongsider” (Carroll 2009) 
approach. This alongsider approach focuses on clinician, researcher and patient working 
collaboratively and sharing their expertise to strengthen or improve the clinical encounter. The 
data collected for this thesis demonstrates the potential to incorporate a qualitative, candid 
and collaborative approach during the diagnosis of autism. This is evidenced by the trial 
clinician switching between “assessor” and “alongsider” approaches during the diagnostic 
sessions and contrasting the different information gathered from the children and parents 
under these distinct styles. 
 
The clinical trial in action: a dynamic and negotiable space explored 
through VRE 
During my time as an ethnographer observing, filming and participating in the clinical trial, it 
was clear that this clinical domain was in fact an alive and negotiable space. Importantly, VRE 
brings forth and makes visible ideas that may otherwise have remained hidden and tacit 
components of practice if another methodology were used. This thesis demonstrates that the 
clinical trial and its processes are both influenced by, and influencers on, real clinical practices. 
This leads to reshaping clinical gazes, diagnostic behaviours, ways that data is collected, and 
how findings are produced. However, it is only through the methodology of VRE and its 
emphasis on rapport-building through ethnographic practice, visual recording of data, and 
engaging clinicians in reflexive viewings of their videoed practice, that these complex and 
nuanced clinical practices are revealed. In this way, VRE holds value for future explorations of 
clinical practices relating to diagnosis, treatment and research of autism.  
 
As Chapters One and Two demonstrate, a large body of literature already exists documenting 
clinicians’ attitudes (usually through interviews or surveys) towards EBM and standardised tools 
and their use in practice. These studies report what clinicians choose to share, and what is most 
meaningful to them in this clinical setting. VRE offers a richer account of this issue: it allows the 
researcher to embed themselves in the clinical situation as an outsider and familiarise 
themselves with this new environment, simultaneously building rapport with the clinicians 
around them; it provides a visual record that can later be played-back and watched repeatedly 
for analysis; it reveals tacit, ritualistic, and unspoken practices that may seem mundane or 
insignificant to those that perform them every day, but may in fact be the key to gaining insight 
into complex clinical problems; it offers an opportunity to make sense of and analyse the visual 
data alongside the participants involved in the research in a collaborative reflexive process; and 
it provides the impetus for practice change to occur because the participants are given the 
opportunity “to articulate changes to better suit their contexts and purposes” (Iedema 2014: 
196).   
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Given this VRE research was embedded within a clinical trial, and clinical trials are governed by 
strict protocols and rules regulating their practices, achieving practice change was beyond the 
scope of this study. However, this is an important element in the VRE methodology (Iedema et 
al 2013) and warrants discussion as to how it could play a role in future sociological 
investigations of autism clinical practices. In Chapter Three, I discuss how VRE is used in hospital 
settings to enact practice change: for example, to strengthen health professionals’ infection 
control and limit hospital-acquired infection and improve quality of care for end of life patients 
(see Collier & Wyer 2016). By including the practitioner and patient in the research process, and 
in subsequent self-reflection and collaboration, VRE enables clinicians to identify changes in 
their practice that can be tailored to their circumstances and needs. VRE is above all a 
collaborative approach: where the researcher, clinician and patient come together to negotiate 
what issues are important, what data to collect, how to collect this data, and how to use the 
data (Iedema 2014). The people involved in the research care about its process because “they 
have been given a stake in it and its outcomes” (Iedema 2014: 197). In the following section I 
will explore this notion of enacting change through VRE within the context of autism diagnosis.   
 
Including the child’s voice in a more meaningful and non-standardised 
way    
This thesis, and other emerging sociological research interested in autism diagnosis and 
treatment (see Fitzgerald 2014; Hollin 2013) has identified a clinical creativity that exists 
alongside the standardised approaches upheld by medicine as the “gold standard” in clinical 
practices. This research shows that clinicians are already well aware of the messiness of the 
autism diagnostic process and are developing their own informal techniques to work around 
and on the margins of the clinical diagnostic “gold standard” tools. What needs to be addressed 
here is the organisational and institutional drive of the fields of medicine and psychology to 
oversee and regulate autism diagnosis through standardised tools.  
 
As I have outlined in Chapter One of this thesis, the fields of psychology and medicine are 
inextricably intertwined with standardisation and EBM. Since the early twentieth century in 
Australia, standardised tools have been used to classify children with developmental delay. 
Over the past 120 years, this process has become far more formalised, with many more 
diagnostic labels available to diagnose children that were, back then, simply identified as 
“mentally deficient.” This pursuance of standardised practices has persisted, over time, despite 
the enduring mystery and messiness surrounding the etiology and causes of autism. In view of 
this power, and the awareness amongst clinicians of what clinical practice actually entails, it 
appears that what is needed to effect change in autism diagnostic practices is organisational 
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and institutional change.  It would be open to future researchers and policymakers to 
encourage a formalised and more widespread adoption of qualitative, candid and socially 
nuanced approaches within the existing standardised autism diagnostic framework.  
 
As I have already argued in this chapter, this approach does not seek to dismiss or discount 
standardised approaches. Figure 7.1 clearly illustrates the important role that these tools and 
guidelines play in allowing the process of autism diagnosis to unfold. Instead, I suggest that 
based on the VRE data gathered in this thesis, this practice change could take the shape of: 
incorporating elements of a strength-based assessment for children undergoing an autism 
diagnosis (as discussed in Chapter Five in relation to “concrete competencies”); including the 
child’s voice in a more meaningful and non-standardised way, especially within the context of 
clinical trial research (as discussed in Chapter Five); and acknowledging the importance of 
corporeal and emotional labour in forming an autism diagnosis (as explored in Chapter Six).  
 
Demonstrating the usefulness and value of these qualitative approaches could ideally be 
achieved using the VRE methodology in further research, clinical trial and clinic settings. For 
example, in Chapter Five I discuss the way that the psychologist uses the WISC-IV in a highly 
structured and restrictive way that omits the child’s strengths and emphasises the child’s 
cognitive “deficits.” I reflect on the way that this tool narrows the clinician’s gaze to focus on 
and look for these deficits, rather than seeing the interaction with the child as an opportunity 
to gather information on other more complex and nuanced behaviours and abilities. I use 
numerous examples from the filmed WISC-IV sessions to document these overlooked 
competencies, and draw on some key statements made by the psychologist in the reflexive 
interview where these video clips were played back. The psychologist acknowledges in these 
interchanges that valuable information about the child is lost and concedes that this is a 
“shame,” and yet she must reconcile this with the clinical trial directive of following the strict 
protocol. Crucially, it was only through the VRE process of embedding myself within the clinical 
trial and observing many WISC-IV sessions, watching these videos repeatedly to begin the 
analysis process and selecting clips to play back in the reflexive interview, and then discussing 
and analysing these video clips alongside the psychologist that this finding was revealed. 
 
The challenge for future researchers, and indeed the institution of medicine, is to extend the 
diagnostic gaze, and reimagine the diagnostic process to formally acknowledge the value of 
both qualitative and quantitative conceptions of autism. As Michael McDowell (2017) points 
out in his recent article in The Conversation:   
 
Rather than striving to secure diagnostic precision in the complexity and imprecision of the real 
world, a more salient question is how best to help children when diagnostic uncertainty is 
unavoidable… consider two children almost identical in need. One just gets over the diagnostic 
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threshold, the other not. This may be acceptable for academic studies, but it’s not acceptable in 
community practice. An arbitrary diagnostic boundary does not address complexities of need. 
 
The focus of future researchers within this field of autism research needs to take into account 
the individual, unique and complex needs of each child.  
 
Assessment and diagnosis as an opportunity to embrace an “alongsider” 
approach 
I would like to conclude by considering the symmetry between the VRE approach to research 
and the more candid and qualitative autism diagnostic approach that I suggest should be 
formally incorporated into existing diagnostic frameworks. In Chapter Five, I demonstrate that 
the diagnostic practices of the trial clinician (as framed by the WISC-IV) objectify the social and 
cognitive functioning of children, and this in turn produces a picture that is at best a filtered 
down and oversimplified representation of the child’s capacity, and at worst completely at odds 
with the child’s actual abilities.  
 
I argue that we need to embrace the same reasoning that is used to support the use of VRE in 
social research within the clinic to encourage the “alongsider” approach to autism assessment, 
diagnosis and research. VRE research can be successful in implementing practice change due to 
the reflexive, collaborative, “alongsider” approach that it embraces (Carroll 2009). Participants 
are active in the research project: they have a stake in its process and outcomes (Iedema 2014). 
As Kindon (2003) articulates, VRE moves away from traditional methods of inquiry in which the 
researcher is required to look “at” participants, and instead focuses on observing and analysing 
“alongside” those involved in the research. This is not only evident in the way that the data is 
analysed in collaboration with participants, but also in the way that the researcher’s gaze is 
exposed or made explicit through playing back the video-ethnographic footage (Carroll 2009). 
Importantly, the researcher is held accountable for what they have filmed and how they have 
interpreted it. In the VRE work I carried out for this thesis, this collaboration and accountability 
is evident in the way that my gaze (that is, the video material that I have recorded), the way 
that I have framed the psychologist’s work through my selection of video clips played back in 
the reflexive interview, and my perception and analysis of these clips, can all be questioned, 
challenged and negotiated throughout the reflexive interview.  
 
In the autism diagnostic process described in this thesis, the clinician scores the child based on 
“objective criteria” (through the ADI-R parent interview and the WISC-IV with the child), 
essentially forcing children to fit into these criteria with limited consultation or collaboration 
with the parent and/or child. While I show that the clinician still engages in some diagnostic 
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creativity and embraces some qualitative approaches to work around the margins of the 
standardised diagnostic approach, they are still bound by the limits of the diagnostic tool, the 
protocol, or the guidelines.  
 
Significantly, the ADI-R diagnostic tool is described as an assessment tool, and for many, this 
denotes traditional medical or clinical hierarchical relationships of the doctor and the patient, 
or the scientist and the clinical trial participant. This mentality of traditional medical diagnosis 
and assessment encourages the clinician to look “at” the patient. However, if we examine the 
meaning of this term further, the root of the word assessment is from the Latin word assidere, 
which means, “to sit beside” (Stefanakis 2002). The data from my observations and filming of 
the ADI-R and WISC-IV overwhelmingly supports this notion that the autism diagnostic process 
is reliant on collaboration between the clinician, parent, and child and this is achieved through 
shared and negotiated knowledge transfer.  
 
This “alongsider” mentality during autism diagnosis should be an overt and well-publicised 
component of the diagnostic process. While the ADI-R embraces aspects of this “alongsider” 
mentality through its reliance on the parent’s knowledge, narrative, and memory, the tools 
used in the assessment of children present a different picture. The WISC-IV upholds the 
traditional clinical hierarchy and separation of clinician-patient, and the rigidity of working 
within the confines of the criteria. Tellingly, the WISC-IV is also often used in clinical trials 
involving children with a developmental disorder to get an indication of their cognitive 
functioning. In Chapter Five, I discuss some glimpses of an “alongsider” approach between 
clinician and child that emerged during the WISC-IV assessment process. These were rare, but 
they were powerful, and they demonstrate the potential of this approach in changing the 
landscape of diagnosis and assessment of children to better reflect their abilities and capacity.  
 
Autism diagnosis and research is messy, imprecise and thus constantly changing. Embracing this 
heterogeneity and accepting that we will never have a distinctive and clearly defined entity that 
we call “autism” is the challenge going forward for medicine. I argue that the alongsider 
approach to diagnosis and assessment of autism is one way of ensuring collaboration and 
encouraging parents, children and clinicians to have a stake in the diagnostic and research 
process and its outcomes. To truly achieve and effect practice change, this element of 
alongsider engagement is crucial.  
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